^, 


^  ^ 

<**>. 


IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


1.0 


1.1 


1^121    125 

ttt  Wk   12.2 

S  144   ■" 
Z  l£o    12.0 

u 


6" 


Sciences 
Corporation 


23  WIST  MAM  STRHT 

WnSTIR,N.Y.  14SM 

(71«)t72-4»03 


CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHIVI/ICMH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Cenadian  inttitut*  for  Historical  Microraproductions  /  institut  Canadian  da  microraproductiont  historiquaa 


■»;? 


'.'.V/'^ 


^Mi' 


Tachnical  and  Bibliographle  NotM/Nota*  taohniquaa  at  bibliographiquaa 


Tha  Inatituta  haa  attamptad  to  obtain  tha  baat 
original  copy  availabia  for  filming.  Faatiiraa  of  thia 
copy  which  may  ba  bibliographieally  unlqua, 
which  may  altar  any  of  tha  imagaa  in  tha 
raproduction,  or  which  may  aignificantly  changa 
tha  usual  mathod  of  filming,  ara  chaclcad  balow. 


□   Colourad  covars/ 
Couvartura  da  coulaur 


I     I   Covara  damagad/ 


Couvot  tura  andommagAa 


□   Covars  rastorad  and/or  laminatad/ 
Couvartura  raataurAa  at/ou  palliculia 

□   Covar  titia  miaaing/ 
La  titra  da  couvartura  manqua 

I      I   Colourad  mapa/ 


D 


D 
D 


D 


Cartas  gtegraphiquas  an  coulaur 

Colourad  ink  (i.a.  othar  than  blua  or  blacic)/ 
Encra  da  coulaur  (i.a.  autra  qua  blaua  ou  noira) 


I — I   Colourad  platas  and/or  illuatrationa/ 


D 


Planchas  at/ou  illuatrationa  an  coulaur 


Bound  with  othar  matarial/ 
RaliA  avac  d'autras  documanta 


Tight  binding  may  causa  ahadows  or  diatortion 
along  intarior  margin/ 

La  re  liura  sarrAa  paut  cauaar  da  I'ombra  ou  da  la 
diatortion  la  long  da  la  marga  inttriaura 

Blank  laavaa  addad  during  raatoration  may 
appaar  within  tha  taxt.  Whanavar  poaaibia,  thaaa 
hava  baan  omittad  from  filming/ 
II  aa  paut  qua  cartainaa  pagaa  blanchaa  ajoutAaa 
lora  d'una  raatauration  apparaiaaant  dana  la  taxta. 
maia,  iorsqua  cala  Atait  poaaibia,  cas  pagaa  n'ont 
paa  At*  fiimAaa. 

Additional  eommanta:/ 
Commantairaa  supplAmantairaa: 


L'inatltut  a  microfilm*  la  maiNaur  axamplaira 
qu'il  lul  a  M  poaaibia  da  aa  procurar.  Laa  dAtaila 
da  cat  axamplaira  qui  sont  paut-Atra  uniquaa  du 
point  da  vua  bibliographiqua.  qui  pauvant  modiflar 
una  imaga  raproduita,  ou  qui  pauvant  anigar  una 
modification  dana  la  mAthoda  normala  da  fiimaga 
aont  IndiquAa  ci-dassous. 


toi 


D 
D 
D 
0 
□ 
Q 
D 
D 
D 
D 


Colourad  pagaa/ 
Pagaa  da  coulaur 

Pagaa  damagad/ 
Pagaa  andommagAas 

Pagas  raatorad  and/or  laminatad/ 
Pagas  raataurAaa  at/ou  palliculAaa 

Pagas  discolourad,  stainad  or  foxad/ 
Pagas  dAcolorAas,  tachatAaa  ou  piquAas 

Pagas  datachad/ 
Pa^as  dAtachAas 

Showthrough/ 
Transparanca 

Quality  of  print  varias/ 
QualitA  InAjgala  da  I'impraaaion 

Includas  supplamantary  matarial/ 
Comprand  du  matArial  supplAmantaira 

Only  adition  availabia/ 
Saula  Adition  diaponibia 

Pagas  wholly  or  partially  obacurad  by  arrata 
alips,  tissuaa,  ate  hava  baan  rafilmad  to 
anaura  tha  bast  possiMa  imaga/ 
Laa  pagas  totalamant  ou  partiallamant 
obacurciar  par  un  fauillat  d'arrata,  una  palura, 
ate,  ont  AtA  filmAaa  A  nouvaau  da  fafon  A 
obtanir  la  maillaura  imaga  possiMa. 


Th( 
po( 
of 
filn 


Ori 
bai 
th< 
aio 
otr 
fin 
aio 
or 


Th 
ahi 
TIf 
wl 

Ml 
dif 
an 
ba 
rig 


Thia  itam  is  f  ilmad  at  tha  raduction  ratio  chackad  balow/ 

Ca  document  ast  filmA  au  taux  da  rAductton  indiquA  ci'daaaoua. 


10X 

14X 

1RX 

22X 

aix 

aox 

v 

3 

12X 


lex 


aox 


MX 


28X 


32X 


TIm  copy  fllm«d  h«r«  has  lM«n  r«produe«d  thanks 
to  tha  o«n*rositv  of: 

National  Library  of  Canada 


L'axampiaira  filmA  f ut  raproduit  grAca  k  ia 
ginArositi  da: 

BibiiothAqua  nationaia  du  Canada 


Tha  imagas  appaaring  hara  ara  tha  bast  quaiity 
possibia  oonsidaring  tha  condition  and  iagibiiity 
of  tha  original  copy  and  in  icaaping  wKh  tha 
filming  contract  spacifleations. 


Original  copiaa  in  printad  papar  covers  ara  filmad 
beginning  with  tha  front  covar  and  anding  on 
tha  last  paga  with  a  printad  or  illustratad  impras- 
slon,  or  tha  back  covar  whan  appropriata.  All 
othar  original  copias  ara  filmad  iMginning  on  tha 
first  paga  with  a  printad  or  iliuatratad  (mpras- 
sion.  and  anding  on  tha  last  paga  with  a  printad 
or  iliuatratad  imprassiqn. 


Laa  imagaa  auhrantas  ont  4t4  raproduitas  avac  la 
plus  grand  soin,  compta  tanu  da  la  condition  at 
da  la  nattatA  da  l'axampiaira  film*,  at  90 
conformity  avac  las  conditions  du  contrat  da 
filmaga. 

Laa  axamplairas  originaux  dont  la  couvartura  en 
papiar  aat  imprimAa  sont  filmis  an  comman9ant 
par  la  pramiar  plat  at  an  tarminant  soit  par  la 
darnlAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  amprainta 
d'impraasion  ou  d'illustration.  soit  par  la  sacond 
plat,  salon  la  cas.  Tous  las  autras  axamplairas 
originaux  sont  filmte  an  commandant  par  la 
pramlAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  amprainta 
d'impraasion  ou  d'illustration  at  an  tarminant  per 
la  damlAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  talla 
amprainta. 


Tha  iaat  racordad  frama  on  aach  microficha 
ahall  contain  tha  symbol  ^-^^  (moaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  tha  aymbol  V  (moaning  "END"). 
¥vhichavar  appliaa. 


Un  das  symbolaa  auhrants  apparattra  sur  la 
darniAra  imaga  da  chaqua  microficha.  salon  la 
caa:  la  symbols  -^  signifia  "A  SUIVRE".  la 
aymbola  ▼  signifia  "FIN". 


Mapa.  platas,  charta,  ate.  may  ba  filmad  at 
diffarant  reduction  rattoa.  Thoaa  too  larya  to  ba 
antiraiy  included  in  one  exposure  ere  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hend  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  framea  aa 
required.  The  following  diegrems  illustrate  the 
method: 


Lee  certes.  plenches.  tableeux,  etc..  peuvent  itre 
fllmto  A  dee  taux  do  rMuction  diff Arents. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  Atra 
raproduit  en  un  aeul  clichA.  11  est  filmA  A  partir 
da  I'angle  aupArieur  gauche,  de  geuche  A  droite, 
et  de  heut  en  baa.  en  prenant  la  nombro 
d'images  nAcessaire.  Las  diagrammas  suivants 
illuatrant  la  mAthode. 


1 

2 

3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

8 

'i^    v> 


".*';*f--' 


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^ 


r:-  1"^* 


I.  >* 


raSFl5N€E 


5f> 


OK 


MaaaiHKtt  G^^fi^aAL  B^saE^ 


~7  "  „ 


/.' 


/ 


■# 


r  »1    ' 


■!( 


^VJ 


,&1»#- 


s     >  »«.«■     ». 


V?*. 


'^■'JV, 


<•■  f 


,^' 


i"  y 


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.^:.i^ 


L, 


■■^■ 


,n 


'■    / 


■j-fi' 


y 


>-"•> 


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« 


,,   P^r^ f  //  '/(/<'■  b!:. 


/ 


OEFENCE 


^-^■: 


or 


BBIGADIEB  G£y£kAL  W.  HULt. 


SdinNd  bcAm  the  Gcnaad  CoutliKtM,  of  nUd  M^jor  Ctaand 


WITH  AX 


AODEESS  TO  THS  CITIZENS  OF  THE  imiTEO  SPATES. 


tV&ITTBH  BT  HIMSELF. 

Ccvied  ftin  teariglod  Binuanlpt,  ind  poUiihed  Iqr  hU  Mdi^ 


To  «Mdi  an  pnAttd, 

THE  CHARGES  AGAINST  BRIGADIER  GENERAL  HULL,  AS 
SPECIFIED  BT  THE  GOVERNMENT. 


^.  ^ 


BOSTON  : 

PUBLISHED  BY  WELLS  AND  LILLT. 
Comt-Stnet. 


••••«■•••••• 


1814. 


«< 


DISTRICT  OF  MASSACHUSETTS.  TO  WIT  i 

Dittrkt  Cltrk't  Q#br. 

BE  it  lemanlxBod,  that  on  Uie  nintbdBy  of  Jane,  nnodamiol  dijbMNi  knot 
dredttid  fiwrteoi,  and  in  the  thiity-dgiitli  year  of  tbeirnkpendeMeaf  the  Vni> 
ted  StatctoT  America,  William  WeUi  and  lUbm  Lilly  of  the  nid  Diitiiet, 
have  depodted  in  thiiollloethe  title  of  a  book,  the  right  whereof  they  efadm  m 
Fnprieton,  in  the  woida lbUowin(,  to  wit: 

Oefeneeof  Brigadier  Oenend  William  Roll.  Delivered  befbre  the  gaeml 
Cgurt-Martial,  of  wUeh  Uti.  Oen.  Deaibom  ww  Pmident,  at  Albany,  March, 
one  thounnd  right  bandied  and  foortaen.  Withan  Addrewtothe  Citiicntof  the 
United  State*.  Written  by  himielf.  Ct^iedfimm  the  original  manoicript,  and 
publiihed  by  hit  authority.  To  whieh  are  preflxed,  the  Cbvget  agaiMt  Ocne» 
ni  Hull,  a*  ipeeifled  by  the  Oorcmmem. 

'  IneanfarmitytotlKActorthe'CoagreU;ofthetTnitedStatef,Intitle^"AnAct 
Or  the  Eneoungement  of  Learning,  by  Hearing  the  eopiei  of  lAipe,  Chara  and 
Bodki,  to  the  Authort  and  Proprietor*  of  ludiCopie*,  during  the  timet  therein 
mentioned;"  and  alio  to  an  Aat  intitled,  "  An  Aet  tupplemaitary  toan  Aet, 
intitled,  an  Aet  for  the  Encouiagement  of  Leaning,  by  Kcuring  the  Co^et  of 
Map*,  Charu  and  Booki,  to  the  Authou  and  Proprieton  of  radi  Copiet  during 
the  timet  therein  mentioned;  and  extending  the  BcneAti  thereoftothe  Arttof 
Detigning,  Engiavingand  £tdiing  Hiitorical,  and  other  Prinu." 

WILLIAM  S.  SHAW.  { ^jf^^SS^K** 


T4 


■■<. 


',-tfmm'>nmi.ie^^. 


'■pcnJCTjiw  r-  '^vH'mmuiMKmm*-  • 


ADDRESS 


4 


TO  THE 


CITIZENS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


^*>!'a 


'  :  'M 


rclIow>Citiiaif, 

Iir  submitting  my  defence  to  your  consideration, 
and  m  making  my  appeal  to  your  judgment,  I 
have  only  to  ask  you  to  examine  with  candour, 
and  decide  with  impartiality.  I  am  sensible  the 
fate  ctf  <Nie  man  is  of  little  consequence,  compared 
to  the  fate  of  a  nation..  '  ' 

If  the  sacrifice  of  me,  however  innocent,  could 
make  atonement  for  the  sins  of  others,  redeem 
our  misfortunes,  and  restos'e-the  national  charac- 
ter, it  might  be  justified  '>j  precedents  in  other 
countries,  and  perhaps,  as^  patriot,  I  ought  to  be 
satisfied.  It  is  unfortunate  for  the  administraticm, 
and  for  the  other  generals  who  have  conducted 
oiir  armies,  that  it  cannot  have  the  effect.  In  coun- 
tries, where  the  people  are  hardly  permitted  Xf^ 


ifi'iiiilBiiilii  i'li'r" 


)i^-i^^0^*i^i0^S£!^^'^'^-  .'ikJ^'*:'?*-- :'" 


-W^m^'^i:'^:>isii^: 


iv 


•'^ 


ADDRESS  OF 


think,  and  their  only  prerogative  is  obedielice,  in« 
nocence  n  no  shield ;  and  becauie  there  can  be  no 
inquiry,  the  most  elevated  merit  is  often  brought 
to  the  scaffold  for  the  most  meritorious  conduct 
But  in  a  country  where  justice  is  the  basis  of  its 
government,  where  the  people  are  enlightened  by 
science,  and  understand  both  their  rights  and  du* 
ties,  such  outrages  on  justice  cannot  with  impu- 
nity be  committed. 


Under  a  government  thus  constituted,  when 
public  misfortunes  occur,  those  to  whom  the  ad- 
ministration is  intrusted  are  in  the  first  instance 
responsible.  They  well  know  the  public  ven« 
geance  will  fall  on  them,  unless  they  avert  it,  and 
too  often  have  no  other  means  of  justification,  but 
in  the  condemnation  of  otherjs.  The  power  they 
possess,  and  the  patronage  they  can  give,  afford 
great  facilities  in  effectmg  the  object.  It  is  how- 
ever  our  happy  lot,  that,  when  this  power  and  pa- 
tronage are  unjustly  exercised,  a  remedy  exists ; 
and  that  remedy  is  an  appeal  to  your  justice.  Ta 
that  justice  I  now  appeal,  in  the  confident  expec* 
tation,  that  you  will  be  satisfied  of  the  purity  and 
rectitude  of  my  conduct,  that  you  will  reverse 
the  unjust  sentence  which  has  been  pronounced, 
against  me,  and  restore  me  to  that  honourable 
standing  in  society,  which  had  been  acquired  by 
the  services  of  nearly  half  a  century. 


X  i.*--»' "-*»«. 


.^. 


-/^r*^-  •'^,  t  V.  *  *^'^.  ^fr-!^  .i .:  r  • 


i»'?'-iSXilP*H'*'n<j»«.oa-*r»--.; 


.*• 


GENERAL  HULL.  r 

I  regret  that  it  is  not  in  my  power,  in  this 
communication,  to  present  to  you  all  the  testimo- 
ny and  ^  documents,  on  which  my  defence  is 
grounded,  and  which  had  any  relation  to  the  trial. 
The  proceedings  of  the  Court  Martial  are  depo- 
sited in  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  the  De- 
partment of  War,  and  by  law  I  am  entitled  to  a 
copy  of  them.  As  soon  as  they  are.  obtained, 
they  will  be  published  in  a  separate  number. 


'k- 


I  believe  we  are  all  conscious  of  the  crimeihof 
wlich  we  are  guilty.  When  I  might  have  shel- 
tered myself  in  the  enemy's  territory,  as  a  priso- 
ner of  war,  I  ask  you  to  account  for  my  return 
to  my  own  country  on  any  other  principle,  than 
8  consciousness  of  my  innocence,  and  that  I  had 
faithfully  done  my  duty  1  What  other  principle 
could  have  induced  me  to  have  requested  an  in- 
vestigation of  my  conduct  ?  When  a  Coiirt  Mar- 
tial was  ordered  to  assemble  at  Philadelphia  for 
my  trial,  why  did  I  promptly  repair  there,  with- 
out any  restraint,  and  without  even  having  been 
divested  of  my  sword  ?  After  the  trial  was  post- 
poned by  the  government,  without  any  request  <mi 
my  part ;  and  having  before  that  time  received 
notice. of  my  exchange  from  the  government,  why 
did  I  remain  more  than  a  year  in  the.  country, 
without  my  restraint  or  confinenfent  ? 


I 

'  "1 


'•>»«*H'i 


^'••— ^^w^itr 


is 


m^ 


I 


I  • 


.^.wt 


»■ '. 


fl  ADDRESS  OF 

When  the  new  court  wu  ordered  for  my  trial 
at  Albany,  and  I  wai  fiumiahed  with  the  volume 
of  capital  chargea,  exhibited  againit  me  by  the 
gOTemmenty  why  did  I  voluntarily  appear  before 
the  Court,  and  submit  to  my  trial,  when  it  wai  in 
my  power  bo  easily  to  have  avoided  it  ?  Why, 
after  the  trial,  did  I  return  alone  and  unattended 
to  my  residence  in  MassachuRetts,  and  there  wait 
the  sentence  of  the  Court  Martial  ? — I  do  presumcT 
your  answer  must  be^  Ihat  this  conduct  only  could 
hare  resulted  from  a  consciousness  of  innocence, 
and  a  full  conviction  that  I  had  done  my  duty. 

I  now  ask  you  to  consider  the  conduct  of  the  go- 
vernment, in  relattion  to  me.  Did  ihtiy  believe  the 
black  catalogue  of  charges  they  exhibited  against 
me  was  true  ?  If  they  diet,  could  the  iTdministration 
have  been  justified  in  leaving  me  at  perfect  liber- 
ty, for  more  than  a  year  after  I  had  been  furnish- 
ed with  a  c(^y  of  these  charges  ?  Did  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Court  Martial,  who  pr(Hiotmced  the 
sentence,  in  their  consciences  believe  I  was 
guilty, 'and  deserved  punishment?  If  they  did, 
how  cab^eir  conduct  in  directing  me,  the  day 
after  the  sentence  was  concluded,  to  return  to 
my  home  in  Massachusetts,  without  any  kind  of 
restraint,  :j^  without  requiring  any  kind  of  seci^ 
rity  for  my  1||i^ance  to  receive  the  execution 
of  the  senteio^Tfais  direction  was  given  the 


.V 


.<V- 


¥. 


■A 


'"**f   r- 


»«ii?^--:;. 


■■"--^mm.li^  ■  •  vmmimmsvrm*^^-. '■»'«■■■■ 


GENERAL  HULL. 


fii 


day  ftfter  the  lentence  was  pasted.  Can  it  be 
preaumed  there  waa  a  concert  between  the  Preii- 
dent  and  the  Court,  and  he  had  directed  the  Court 
to  adopt  this  meuit^re  previous  to  tLe  sentence  ? 
Is  it  possible  it  woi  understood  between  the  Pre- 
sident and  the  Court,  previous  to  the  conclusion 
of  the  trial,  what  the  sentence  should  be,  and  that 
it  should  be  remitted  by  him  ?  And  if  both  the 
President  and  the  Court  had  believed  in  their 
consciences,  I  had  been  guiltj  of  the  crimes  with 
which  I  was  charged,  could  it  be  reconciled  to 
their  duty  to  leave  me  in  a  situation,  where  I  could 
to  easily  avoid  the  punishment  which  was  to  have 
been  inflicted  ? 


I  have  stated  these  facts,  and  made  these  ob- 
servations, to  convince  you,  that  my  whole  con- 
duct has  manifested,  I  myself  was  conscious 
of  no  crime,  and  it  was  not  the  intention  either 
of  the  President,  or  the  Court  Martial,  that  I 
should  receive  the  punishment  which  had  be^ 
ordered. 

'tki 

I  now  ask  you,  my  fellow-citizens,  Uklt^ioTe^ 
for  yourselves  what  have  been  the  mo^f$e%  of  the 
administration  in  this  business?  Wl|hi respect  to 
two  thirds  of  the  members  of  the.$4ttrtJifafilM;^ 
they  have  ordered  a  sentence,  wh^BhMpbir  con- 
pciences  they  beliered  ought  not^j^HKecuted. 


'IH 


m*'* 
^  .•.. 


.'?^V, 


Tiu 


ADDRESS  OF 


The  Court  Martial,  in  justification  QC«their  con- 
duct, in  recommending  me  to  the  mercy  of  the 
President,  can  appeal  to  no  precedenti  not  even 
the  proceedings  in  the  trial  of  admiral  Byng.  Af- 
ter the  Court  had  found  him  guilty  of  a  particular 
charge,  there  was  nothing  left  to  thefr  discretion* 
The  articles  of  wai  provided,  that  the  punishment 
should  be  death.  In  my  case  the  articles  of  war 
provided  death,  or  such  other  punishment  as  the 
Court  Martial  should  think  proper  to  order.  Why 
then  did  not  the  Court  order  such  .a  punishment 
as'they  believed  ought  to  have  been  inflicted ? 

From  these  facts  and  observations,  I  do  think 
the  motives  of  the  administration  must  be  appa- 
rent. And  indeed,  I  presume  it  will  not  be 
in  your  power  to  reconcile  the  conduct  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States,%nd  the  conduct 
of  the  Court  Martial,  without  believing  there  was 
a  concert  and  understanding  how  this  busmess 
was  to  be  conducted. 


With  respect  to  the  lenity  of  the  Court,  I  in- 
formed them  I  did  not  ask  it ;  and  I  requested 
no  other  mercy  from  them,  than  the  mercy  of  a 
decision  ;  that  they  would  decide  on  my  case,  and 
keep  me  no  longer  in  suspense. 

In  regard  to  the  pardon  of  the  President,  I  had 
no  opportunity  of  requesting  it,  because  it  was 


GENERAL  HULL.  k 

granted,  before  I  had  any  knowledge  of  the  sen- 
tence. Ingratitude,  I  hope,  is  no  part  of  my  cha* 
racter.  But  I  do  submit  to  your  consideration, 
whether  I  ought  to  feel  grateful  to  him,  when  the 
National  Intelligencer,  a  paper  publiehed  at  hk 
door,  and  under  his  auspices,  in  giving  an  account 
of  the  trial  and  announcing  the  senteiice,  states, 
that  the  punishtnent  is  more  protracted  and  terri- 
ble, in  consequence  of  a  remission  of  the  sentence. 
If  his  object  was  to  aggravate  and  increase  the 
punishment,  it  cannot  be  called  an  ftct  of  mercy. 


There  are  two  vei^y  impotiant  facts,  relating 
to  my  situation,  as  commander  of  the  north-west- 
ern army,  not  noticed  in  my  defence.  One,  tjbe 
armistice  agreed  to  by  general  Dearborn,  from 
which  my  army  was  expressly  excluded.  The 
other,  the  President's  message  to  Congress,  the 
first  session  aftof  the  capitulation.  With  regard 
to  the  first,  the  following  are  the  facts.  This  was 
an  arrangement  of  Sir  George  Prevost,  for  the  sde 
purpose  of  employing  ail  his  forces  against  the 
army  I  commanded.  Having  received  information 
that  the  orders  in  council  had  been  repealed,  on 
the  second  day  of  August,  eighteen  hundred  and 
twelve,  he  despatched  colonel  Baynes,  his  adju- 
tant general,  to  the  head-quarters  of  general  Dear- 
born, at  Greenbush,  near  Albany,  wi^  an  autho- 
rity to  conclude  an  armiatice~-on  the  ninth  of 


af  ADDRESS  OF 

August  it  was  concluded  between  him  and  general 
Dearborn,  and  my  arntj  was  excluded. 


Immediately  after  the  departure  of  colonel 
Baynes  on  his  mission,  major  general  Sheafe  of 
the  British  army  was  ordered  to  lake  Erie,  with  a 
large  part  of  the  British  force  from  Montreal,  to 
be  placed  under  the  command  of  general  Brock. 
From  the  nature  of  the  transaction,  it  is  certain, 
that  general  Brock  was  made  acquainted  with 
these  circumstances,  and  informed  that  he  might, 
with  the  most  perfect  safety  to  his  posts  at 
Kingston,  York,  forts  George  and  Erie,  march 
his  whole  force  against  my  army,  which  had  in- 
vited the  province  of  which  he  was  governour 
and  commander  in  chief.  Calculating  the  dis- 
tances, and  the  celerity  with  wjbiich  the  British 
c(Mnmanders  convey  important  information,  there 
was  full  time  for  the  purpose.  Qf  this  important 
arrangement,  in  which  the  army  I  commanded  had 
so  much  interest,  I  never  received  any  informa- 
tion^from  geqeral  Dearborn.  That  general  Brock 
took  his  whole  force  to  Maiden,  from  fort  George 
and  its  vicinity,  excepting  a  few  men  to  take  care 
of  the  cannon  and  stores,  is  certain ;  and  that  ge-  > 
neral  Sheafe  arrived  from  Montreal  with  the  rein- 
forcements, immediately  after  general  Brock's 
departure  from  Fort  George,  is  likewise  a  fact 
well  knpwn.     That  at  this  time,  on  the  ninth  of 


GENERAL  HULL. 


iA 


August,  a  cessation  of  hostilities  had  been  con- 
cluded, which  extended  from  fort  Erie,  on  the 
east  part  of  lake  Erie,  to  Quebec.     In  my  next 
number,  I  shall  produce  documents  to  prove  the 
facts  I  have  here  stated.     They  are,  howeveri . 
all  so  public,*  ai|d  so  well  known,  that  I  am  fully 
authorized  in  stating  them  without  the  documents. 
That  on  the  day  of  the  capitulation',  the  sixteenth 
of  August,  general  Brock  well  knew  that  a  cessa- 
tion of  hostilities  below  had  taken  place,  is  certain, 
because  on  that  day  he  gave  me  information  of  it, 
and  that  the  orders  in  council  had  been  repealed, 
and  observed,  he  hoped  it  would  be  the  founda- 
tion of  a  peace.     It  is  likewise  well  known,  this 
measure  was  disapproved  by  the  President,  and 
principally  on  account  of  the  effect  it  would  have 
on  my  army.     When  general  Dearborn  was  or- 
dered by  the  President  to  make  diversions  on 
tlie  enemy's  posts  below  me,  and  ought  to  have 
been  co-operating  with  me  with  all  his  forces,  he 
was  sitting  at  his  ease  at  Greenbush,  and  making 
arrangements,  which  were  one  great  cause  of  the 
destruction  of  my  army».    And  yet  this  same 
general  Dearborn  was  appointed  the  president  of 
the  Court  IVfartial  which  has  condemned  me  for  the 
misfortune,  which  his  own  misconduct  had  been 
a  great  cause  in  producing.     lo  sacriGcing  me, 
he  has  undoubtedly  made  some  atonement  for  his 
own  faults,  in  the  opinion  of  the  administration, 


>.-. 


?^^ 


7// 


:'-,)l 


»«^%«♦^,,J,^*^» 


,"~'Ar'^-«c-;;^^^ 


sii 


«* 


ADDRESS  OF 


and  may  be  permitted  to  remain  in  the  possessioii 
of  his  nominal  rank,  and  in  the  enjoyment  of  his 
emoluments,  in  the  degraded  t  iid  disgraceful  situ- 
ation, to  which  he  has  submitted  for  more  than  a 
year.  .  Thus  has  general  Dearborn,  by  adopting 
a  meae!!re,  which  brought  the  pripcipal  part  of 
the  enemy's  force  against  my  army,  exhibited  his 
profound  skill  in  military  operations,  and  his 
talents  and  qualifications  as  commander  in  chief 
of  the  American  army. 


I  shall  now  proceed  to  consider  that  part  of  the 
President's  message,  of  the  fourth  of  November, 
eighteen  hundred  and  twelve,  which  developes 
the  objects  of  my  unfortunate  campaign.  It  is  in 
the  following  words. 

/*< Previous  to  its  declaration,  [the  declaration 
"  of  war]  it  was  deemed  proper^  as  a  measure  of 
"precaution  and  forecast,  that  a  considerable 
"  force  should  be  placed  in  the  Michigan  terri- 
"  tory,  with  a  general  view  to  its  security,  and  in 
"  the  event  of  war,  to  such  operations  in  the  up* 
"  permost  Canada,  as  would  intercept  the  hostile 
"  influence  of  Great  Britain  over  the  savages, 
"  obtain  the  command  of  the  lake  on  which  that 
**part  of  Canada  borders,  and  maintain  cp-ope- 
"  rating  relations  with  such  forces  as  might  be 
"  most  conveniently  employed  against  other  parts. 


\ 


°^<!??---.^ --—»*' 


/"jf^' 


:.-»V  *—-«., 


--<<»,«*      ■■•*,*••. 


GENERAL  HULL. 


xm 


"Our  expectation  of  gaining  the  command  of 
**the  lakes,  by  the  invasion  of  Canada  from  De- 
"  troiti  haviDg  been  disappointed,  measures  were 
*<  instantly  taken  to  provide  on  them  a  naval 
** force  superiour  to  that  of  the  enemy.'* 


The  objects  of  the  force  intrusted  to  my  com- 
mand, are  here  particularly  stated.  They  are 
stated  by  the  first  magistrate  to  the  legislature 
of  the  nation.  This  is  a  document  of  the  highest 
authority,  and  must  be  considered  as  conclusive 
evidence,  that  these  were  the  objects,  for  whicli 
the  expedition  was  ordered,  and  which  the  Pre- 
sident expected  would  have  been  accomplished. 
If  it  was  the  expectation  of  the  President,  that 
with  the  few  militia  under  my  command,  I  should 
have  obtained  possession  of  the  lake,  it  is  unac- 
countable, that  it  never  was  communicated  to  me. 
AU  my  instructions  from  the  Department  of  War 
were  laid  before  the  Court  Martial;  and  there  wa» 
not  the  least  intimation  of  the  kind.  Indeed  I 
never  had  the  most  distant  idea,  that  this  expec- 
tation was  entertained,  until  it  was  disclosed 
in  this  message.  Both  in  my  repeated  writfcn 
communications,  and  in  frequent  conversations 
with  the  President  and  Secretary  of  the  Depart* 
ment  of  War,  I  had  urged  the  necessity  of  a  navy 
on  lake  Erie,  superiour  to  the  British,  in  the  event 
of  war  with  Great  Britain.    I  well  knew  at  that 


M 


hr'y. 


xW 


ADDRESS  OF 


time,  they  had  a  strong  naval  force  on  the  lake, 
perfectly  manned  and  prepared  in  every  respect 
for  offensive  or  defensive  war.  The  United 
States  had  not  a  single  vessel  or  guq  boat  on  those 
waters.  All  they  had  was  an  old  unarmed  trans- 
port vessel,  repairing  on  the  stocks,  and  which  was 
not  launched  until  near  a  month  after  the  declarer 
tion  of  war. 


I 


i^ 


There  were  but  two  modes  of  taking  possession 
of  the  lake ;  one,  by  taking  or  destroying  the  en- 
emy's naval  force ;  the  other,  by  taking  posses- 
sion of  all  their  posts  and  harbours,  both  on  the 
main  land  and  islands,  an  extent  of  coast  more 
than  three  hundred  miles.  I  am  confident  no  one 
will  believe  it  was  possible  for  me,  either  to  have 
taken  or  destroyed  the  British  fleet  then  on  the 
lake,  with  the  means  I  possessed.  The  force, 
under  my  command,  was  totally  inadequate  to 
have  effected  it  in  the  other  way,  especially  after 
the  fall  of  Michilimackinac,  and  all  the  northern 
nations  of  savages  were  in  hostility  against  me. 
Although  I  still  entertain  the  same  opinion  I  gave 
to  the  government,  before  the  declaration  of  war, 
that  a  navy  on  lake  Erie  was  essentially  necessary ; 
yet,  I  now  believe,  had  an  adequate  force  been 
sent  to  the  Michigan  territory,  and  sufficient 
forces  had  been  ordered  to  have  taken  possession 
of  forts  George  and  Erie  at  the  same  time,  and 


Jf*v 


/!!;, 


GENERAL  HULL, 


xt 


these  armies  had  co-operated,  the  whole  of  that 
part  of  the  province  of  Upper  Canada,  which 
borders  on  lake  Erie,  might  have  beeQ  in  our  pos- 
session in  the  campaign  of  eighteen  hundred  and 
twelve,  with  all  the  enemy's  harbours  on  the  bor- . 
ders  of  the  lake,  by  which  means  the  naval  force 
would  have  been  destroyed,  or  must  have  sur- 
rendered at  the  approach  of  winter. 

This  idea  I  suggested  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
In  my  mem<»r  of  the  sixth  of  March,  eighteen 
hundred  and  twelve,  provided  the  object  was  the 
reduction  of  the  Canadas,  and  it  was  the  intentioit 
of  the  govermnent,  contrary  to  every  opinion  I 
had  given,  not  to  build  a  navy  on  lake  Erie.  I 
suggested  it  as  the  only  possible  mode,  and  at  the 
spme  time  pointed  out  ail  the  difficulties  which 
would  attend  it.  On  the  sixth  of  March,  at  the 
time  when  thi»  memou*  was  presented,  I  had  no 
command  in  the  army,  and  had  uniformly  declin- 
ed to  accept  a  military  appointment,  although  I 
had  been  strongly  solicited^  Being  then  the  go- 
vernour  of  the  r>I?«'higan  territory,  it  wus  my  duty 
to  induce  the  government  to  provide  means  foK 
its  safety. 

About  the  eleventh  of  April,  after  I  had  beea 

appointed  to  the  command  of  the  north-western 

army,  unsolicited^   and  even  undesired  on  my 

1* 


tiJ 


•■*IS«!*WWi<* 


.:^.^^-:i^,S5..fe^;^^:J^^;»^-.. 


xvi 


ADDRESS  OF 


part  i  I  then  presented  to  the  Presidentt  througk 
the  medium  of  the  Department  of  W  if,  another 
communication,  in  which  I  represented  in  the 
strongest  and  most  explicit  terms,  the  necessitjr 
of  our.  having  a  naval  force  superiour  to  the  ene- 
my on  the  lakes ;  and  that  without  it,  and  unless 
the  army  I  was  to  command  was  strengthened 
by  additions  to  its  numb«rs,  and  unless  it  were 
followed  by  detachments  to  keep  open  the  com- 
municaticn,  and  insnre  its  supplies  from  Ohio ; 
and  unless  it  was  supported  by  co-operations  on 
other  quarters,  my  army  could  not  be  able  to 
maintain  itself  at  Detroit,  much  less  carry  on  offen- 
sive operations  in  the  enemy's  country.. 


% 


After  these  CfMnmunications,  and  under  the  cir« 
cumstances  in  which  I  was  placed,  I  ask  you,  my 
fellow-citisens,  whether  I  had  any  reasqn  to  be- 
lieve it  to  be  the  expectation  of  the  government, 
that  I  should  have  obtained  the  command  of  the 
lak€S  ?  But  in  this  I  was  mistaken.  It  really  ap« 
pears,  that  it  was,  because  the  President  says,  in 
the  Message  I  have  quoted,  "  Our  expectation  of 
"  gaining  the  command  of  the  lakes  by  the  inva- 
**  sion  of  Canada  from  Detroit  having  been  disap- 
**  pointed,'  measures  were  instantly  taken  to  pro^ 
**  vide  on  them  a  uxvfA  force,  superiour  to  that  of 
♦♦  the  enemy.' 


ft 


'  ^--A.,., 


iJWi- 


'ITSS-J^t;"" 


GENERAL  HULL. 


svii 


The  other  object  was,  **  to  maintain  c6-operat- 
**  ing  relations  with  such  forces,  as  might  be  most 
*'  conveniently  employed  against  other  parts." 

I  opened  a  road  of  two  hnndred  miles  through 
a  savage  wilderness,  invaded  the  enemy's  coun- 
try, remained  a  month  in  the  possession  of  it, 
waiting  for  co-operating  relations,  until  I  was  in^ 
formed  I  should  receive  none  i  and  until  general 
Dearborn,  instead  of  co-operations,  agreed  to  a 
cessation  of  hostilities,  which  afforded  the  enemy 
an  opportunity  of  concentrating  his  whole  force 
against  my  little  army. 

By  the  documents  of  the  government,  it  thus 
appears,  that  these  were  the  objects  of  my  expedi- 
tion ;  and  because  I  disappointed  the  expectations 
of  the  administration  in  not  obtaining  the  com- 
mand of  the  lakes,  with  the  few  Ohio  militia  I  com- 
manded, and  did  not  maintain  co-operating  rela- 
tions with  other  forces,  when  there  ^  ere  none  to 
co-operate  with  me,  I  have  becr^  condemned. 

I  do  expect,  my  fellow-citizens,  when  you  be- 
come acquainted  with  the  true  history  of  my  case, 
you  will  reverse  the  unjust  sentence  which  has 
been  pronounced  agsunst  met  I  am  now  perfect- 
ly supported  by  a  consciousness  of  having  done 
my  duty  in  the  most  faithful  manner,  and  my  only 


'•'u"'.  I''!* 


xviU        ADDRESS  OF  GEN.  HULL. 

detire  is,  to  convince  you  and  posterity  of  the 
purity  of  my  motives,  and  the  correctness  of  my 
conduct.  Under  this  support  I  am  tranquil  and 
happy.  Had  I  pursued  any  other  course,  I  should 
Want  the  consciousness  which  I  now  feel,  and  in 
Mncerlty  I  can  adopt  the  language  of  Pope, 

'  *  One  Kir  apgnfiag  ham  wMe  yam  oatwdijl  i 
"OfttupidtUKnandofloudhttssM;  ^ 

"And  more  true  Joy  MareellMadMfteU, 
**  Thn  Cmmt  witb  a  MMte  at  hii  hedt." 

William  Hullk 
Newton,  (Mass.)  June  Ist,  1814. 


-  ■ '—r »)'•'<»*'       ■«- ^    -,   I    -■■ -.-.•..»,-■,..,..■,.- 


CHARGES. 


//' 


AtavamalCoartlbrtiaKonlaed  I17  the  Prnkknt  of  the  United  8tatM}« 
Tcned  at  Albmy,  in  the  State  of  Mew«Yaric,  on  the  thiid  day  of  Jannarjr  one 
thouiand  eight  hundred  and  fimrteen,  and  continued  bj  a^onnnnentt  to  the 
twenty-flAh  day  of  March  fidlowing,  brigadier  geneml  William  Hull,  of  the 
army  of  the  United  State*,  wai  tried  on  die  firikminc  chaigca  and  ipecUca* 
tioni,  viz: 

CHARGE  I. 

rpRSABON  against  the  United  States,  between  the 
ninth  of  April  and  the  seventeenth  of  August,  eight- 
een hundred  and  twelve. 

First,  specification.  In  this :  That  on  the  first 
day  of  Juljr,  in  the  year  eighteen  hundred  and  twelve, 
before  that  time  and  ever  since,  an  open  and  public 
war  was,  and  is  yet  carried  on  and  prosecuted  by  and 
between  the  United  States  of  America  and  their  ter^ 
ritories,  and  the  united  kingdom  of  Great-Britain  and 
Ireland,  and  the  dependencies  thereof:  and  that  Wil- 
liam Hull,  a  brigadier  general  in  the  army  of  the  said 
United  States,  a  citizen  of  the  said  United  States, 
owing  allegiance  to  the  said  United  States,  and  late 
commander  of  the  north-western  army  of  the  said 
United  States,  well  knowing  the  premise,  and  trai- 
torously and  unlawfully  designing  and  coi-^triving  to 
send  and  convey  intelligence  to  the  said  enemies  of 
the  said  United  States,  touching  a  declaration  of  war 
by  the  said  United  States,  against  Uie  said  united 
kingdom  of  Great-Britain  and  Ireland,  and  the  de- 
pendencies there(^{  and,  also,  touching  the  expedition 
on  which  the  said  north-western  army  under  his  coio- 


n 


CHARGES  AGAINST 


mand  at  aToreiaid  vai  employed;  and,  also,  touching 
the  numben,  itate  and  condition  of  the  taid  north-west- 
ern array ;  in  prosecution  of  the  said  traitorous  and  un- 
lawftil  design,  on  the  said  first  day  of .  .ly,  in  the  year 
aforesaid,  at  the  rapids  of  the  river  Miami  of  the  lalce, 
in  the  territory  of  iMichigan,  the  said  William  Hull 
(then  and  Uiere  bein^*  a  brigadier  general  in  the  army 
of  the  United  States^^  and  l^ing  then  and  there  com- 
mander of  the  said  rorth-Mrestem  army  as  aforesaid,) 
did  traitorously  hire  or  cause  to  be  hired  an  unarmed 
vessel,  with  the  pretended  purpose  of  transporting 
therein  certain  sick  soldiers,  and  the  principal  part  of 
the  hospital  stores  belonging  to  the  said  north-western 
army,  f^m  the  said  rapids  of  the  river  Miami  of  the 
lake  to  Detroit,  in  the  said  territory  of  Michigan,  but 
in  truth,  traitorously  contriving  and  intending  that 
the  said  unarmed  vessel,  together  with  all  persons, 
papers,  and  things  put  on  boa>'1  thereof,  should  be 
captured  by  the  enemies  of  the  said  United  States,  on 
the  passage  of  the  said  unarmed  vossel  fVom  the  said 
rapids  of  the  river  of  the  Miami  of  the  lake  to  Detroit 
Bforesaid,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan  aforesaid :  and 
that  the  taid  William  Hull,  in  further  prosecution  of 
his  said  traitorous  and  unlawful  design  and  contri- 
vance, (being  then  and  there  a  brigadier  general  in 
the  army  of  the  United  States  as  aforesaid,  and  being 
then  and  there  commander  of  the  said  norih-westem 
army  as  aforesaid,)  did  then  and  there  traitorously  put, 
or  traitorously  cause  to  be  put  on  board  of  the  said 
unarmed  vessel,  a  trunk  containing  (among  other 
things)  the  official  correspondence  of  the  Secretary  of 
the  Department  of  War  and  the  said  brigadier  general 
William  Hull,  as  well  touching  the  expedition  on 
which  the  said  north-westefn  army  under  his  com- 
mand as  aforesaid,  was  then  employed,  as  touching  a 
declaration  of  war  by  the  said  United  States  against 
the  said  united  kingdoin  of  Great-Britain  and  Ireland, 
and  the  dependencies  thereof,  and  also,  certain  offi- 
^9\  moiter-rolls,  reports,  and  returns,  of  the  numben, 


I 


■^^'■w  I  I  "  I.. 


■•»■ 


GENERAL  HULL. 


txl 


•((lie  and  eondition  of  the  itid  north-wettem  amy, 
under  his  command  at  aforeiaid :  and  thatafterwanli, 
to  wit :  on  the  second  day  of  July,  in  the  year  afore- 
iaid, the  mUI  v^eMel,  lo  ai  aforeiaid  traitoronily  hired 
or  traitorously  caused  to  be  hired,'  by  the  laid  briga- 
dl«^r  general  William  Hull,  on  iti  paiiage  from  the 
wiia  rapids  of  the  river  Miami  of  the  lakje  to  Detroit 
aforesaid,  was  captured  by  the  said  enemies  of  the 
United  States,  liaving  on  board  thereof,  at  the  time 
of  the  said  capture,  the  said  trunlc  containing  the  said 
official  correspondence,  ai  well  touching  the  said  ex- 
pedition, as  the  said  declaration  of  tvar,  and-  the  said 
official  muster-rolls,  reports  and  returns,  of  the  num- 
bers, state,  and  condition  of  the  said  north-western 
army  (together  with  certain  sick  soldiers,  and  the 
principal  part  of  the  hospital  stqres  belonging  to  the 
said  northhwestem  army,)  and  by  means  of  the  said 
capture,  and  in  fulfilment  of  the  said  traitorous  and 
unlawful  design,  contrivance,  and  intendment  of  the 
•aid  brigadier  general  William  Hul^  the  said  official 
correspondence,  as  well  touching  the  said  expeditionyt 
as  the  said  declaration  of  war,  and  the  said  official 
muster-rolls,  reports  and  returns,  of  the  numbers,  state 
and  condition  of  the  said  north-western  army,  (to- 
gether with  certain  sick  soldiers,  and  the  principal 
part  of  the  hospital  stores  of  the  said  north-western 
army,)  came  to  the  possession,  knowledge  and  use  of 
the  enemies  of  the  said  United  States ;  giving  infor- 
mation and  intelligence  to  the  enemies  of  the  said 
United  States,  as  well  toqching  the  said  expedition, 
as  touching  the  said  declaration  of  war,  and,  also, 
touching  the  numbers,  state  and  condition  of  the  said 
north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States,  then 
and  there  under  the  command  of  the  said  brigadier 
genera]  William  Hull  as  aforesaid;  whereby  the 
said  William  Hull,  on  the  first  day  of  July,  in  the 
year  aforesaid,  at  the  rapids  of  the  river  Miami  of  the 
lake  aforesaid,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan  aforesaid, 
(being  then  and  there  a  brigadier  general  ift  the  army 


,„.,»......  •■'-•'«! 


»dl 


CHARGES  AGAINST 


«f  the  United  States  and  being  then  and  there  com* 
mander  of  the  said  north-Trestem  army  as  *afore8aid) 
and  being  then  and  there  a  citizen  of  the  said  United 
States,  owing  allegiance  to  the  said  United  States,) 
did  thfen  and  there  traitorously  and  unlawfully  hold 
correspondence  with,  and  give  intelligence  to  the 
enemy,  and  did  then  and  there  •traitorously,  by  the 
means  aforesaid,  adhere  to  the  enemies  of  the  said 
United  States,  giving  them  aid  and  comfort. 

Second  specification.  And  also,  in  tins :  That 
afterwards  and  during  the  said  war,  so  as  aforesaid 
carried  on  and  prosecuted  by  and  between  the  said 
United  States  of  America  and  their  territories,  and 
the  said  united  kingdom  of  Great-Britain  and  Ireland, 
and  the  dependencies  thereof,  the  said  north-we?tem 
army  of  the  said  Uqited  States,  under  the  command 
of  the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull  as  afore- 
said, having  entered  the  said  British  province  of  Up- 
per Canada,  and  haviu  <;  established  a  military  post 
at  cr  near  Sandw^ph,  in  the  said  British  province  of 
Upper  Canada;  which  it  was  the  duty  of  the  said 
brigadier  general  William  Hull  to  maintain  and  de- 
fend, in  order  that  tt  said  war  might  and  should  be 
advantageously  carried  on  and  prosecuted  on  behalf 
of  the  said  United  States,  and  more  especially  that  a 
certain  British  foft  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called 
Amherstburgb,  in  the  said  British  province  of  Upper 
Canada,  occupied  by  the  enemies  of  the  said  United 
States,  might  and  should  be  advantageously  attacked 
and  taken  by  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said 
United  States,  under  the  command  of  the  said  briga- 
dier general  William  Hull  as  aforesaid,  yet  the  said 
William  Hull,  (a  brigadier  general  in  the  army  of 
the  United  States,  a  citizen  of  the  said  United  States, 
owing  allegiance  to  the  said  United  States,  and  com- 
mander of  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said 
United  States  as  aforesaid,)  well  knowing  the  premi- 
ses, on  the  eighth  day  jo(  August,  in  the  year  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve,  at  Sandwich 


GENERAL  HULL. 


xxiii 


sforesaid,  in  the  British  province  of  Upper  Canada 
aforesaid,  did  then  and  there  traitorously  and  unlaw- 
fully conspire  and-  combine  with  certain  enemies  of 
the  said  United  States,  (whose  names  are  unknown) 
to  quit  and  abandon  to  the  enemies  oi  the  said  United 
States,  the  said  military  po^t  established  by  the  said 
north-western  army  <^  the  said  United  StatcHs,  at  or 
near  Sandwich  aforesaid,  in  the  British  province  of 
Upper  Canada  aforesaid,  and  to   prevent  the  said 
British  fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amherst- 
bui^h,  from  being  attacked  and  reduced,  or  an  attempt 
being  made  to  reduce  the  same,  by  the  said  norlli- 
westem  army  of  the  said  United  States,  under  the 
command  of  the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull 
as  aforesaid ;  and  that  the  said  William  Hull,  (then 
and  there  being  a  brigadier  general  in  thearmy  of  the 
said  United  States,  then  and  thete  being  commailder 
of  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said  United 
State?)  and  then  and  there  being  a  citizen  of  the  said 
United  States,  owing  allegiance  to  the  said  United 
States)  in  prosecution  of  the  said  traitorous  conspiracy 
and  combination,  did  then  and  there  traitorously  qiui 
and  abandon,  and  did  then  and  there  traitorously  c^u^^; 
to  be  quitted  and  abandoned,  the  said  military  po€|:,^._^^ 
established  by  the  said  north-western  army  <^  Um^I^'^'v§^^, 
said  United  states  as  aforesaid,  at  or  near  Sandwich    '  ^r^^H^^ 
as  aforesaid^' in  the  British  province  of  Upper  Canttda         v  :  •> 
aforesaid,  and  did  then  and  there  traitorously  neglect 
and  omit  to  make  the  proper  preparations  for  attack- 
ing and  reducing,  or  attempting  to  reduce  the  said 
British  fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amherst- 
burgh,  but  on  the  contrary,  did  then  and  there  traitor- 
ously prevent  the  same  from  being  attacked  and  re- 
duced, and  an  attempt  beingmade  to  reduce  the  same 
by  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said  United 
States,  then  and  Cxere  under  his  command  as  afore- 
said :  and,  in  further  prosecution  of  the  said  traitorous 
conspiracy  and  combination,  did  then  and  there  trai- 
torously march,  withdraw  and  remove,  and  traitorously 
c  '  • 


i 


iff. 


XXIV 


CHARGES  A0AIN9T 


order  to  be  marched,  withdrawn  and  removed,  the 
main  body  of  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said 
United  States,  from  the  said  military  post  established 
by  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said  United 
States,  at  or  near  Sandwich  aforesaid,  to  a  place  out 
of  the  said  British  province  of  Upper  Canada,  to  wit; 
to  Detroit  aforesaid,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan 
aforesaid ;   whereby  tne  said  William  Hull,  on  the 
said  eighth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  one  thousand 
eight  hundred  and  twelve  aforesaid,  at   Sandwich 
aforesaid,  in  the  said  British  province  of  Upper  Ca- 
nada, (being  then  and  there  a  brigadier  general  in 
the  army  of  the  said  United  States,  and  being  then 
and  there  commander  of  the  said  north-western  army 
of  the  said  United  States,  and  being  then  and  there  a 
citizen  of  the  said  United  States,  owing  alle^ance 
to  the  said  United  States,)  did  then  and  there  trai- 
torously conspire,  combine,  and  hold  correspondence 
with  the  enemies  of  the  said  United  States,  and  did 
then  and  there  traitorously  and  shamefully  quit  and 
abandon,  and  traitorously  and  shamefully  cause  to  be 
quitted  and  abandoned  the  said  military  post,  so  as 
aforesaid  established  by  the  said  north-western  army 
of  the  said  United  States,  at  or  near  Sandwich  afore- 
said, in  the  British  province  of  Upper  Canada  afore- 
said, and  did  then  and  there  traitorously  neglect  and 
omit  to  make  the  proper  preparations  f^  attacking 
and  reducing,  or  attempting  to  reduce  the  said  fort 
called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amherstburgh,  in 
the  said  British  province  of  Upper  Canada,  but  did 
then  and  there  traitorously  prevent  the  said  British 
fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amherstbui^h, 
in  the  said  British  province  of  Upper  Canada,  from 
being  attacked  and  reduced,  or  an  attempt  being  made 
to  reduce  the  same  by  the  said  north-western  army 
of  the  United  States,  under  his  command  as  aforesaid, 
and  by  the  means  aforesaid,  did  then  and  there  trai- 
torously adhere  to  the  enemies  of  the  said  United 
States,  giving  them  aid  and  conif(Nrt. 


r. 


r^^^.^^-^1 


^li 


GENERAL  HULL. 


XXV 


Third  specification.  And  also,  in  this  -.—That 
Bfterwards  and  during  the  said  war,  «o  as  aforesaid 
carried  on  and  prosecuted,  by  and  between  the  said 
United  States  of  America  and  their  territories,  and 
the  said  united  kingdom  of  Great-Britain  and  Ireland, 
and  the  dependencies  thereof,  to  wit :  on  the  sixteenth 
day  of  August,  in  the  year  one  thousand  e||;bt  hun- 
dred and  twelve  aforesaid,  at  Detroit,  in  the  Michi- 
gan territory  aforesaid,  the  said  William  Hull  was 
then  and  there  a  citizen  of  said  United  States,  owing 
allegiance  to  the  said  United  States,  and  was  then 
and  there  a  brigadier  general  in  the  army  of  the  said 
United  States,  and  was  then  and  there  commander  of 
the  north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States,  and 
was  then  and  there  commander  of  a  certain  fort, 
called  Fort  Detroit,  and  belonging  to  the  said  United 
States,  erected  at  or  near  the  toWn  of  Detroit,  upon  a 
bank  of  the  river  Detroit,  in  the  said  territory  of  Mi- 
chigan; the  works  whereof,  and  the  guns  and  gun- 
carriages  belonging  thereto,  then  were,  and  long  be- 
fore had  been  decayed,  dilapidated,  and  out  of  repair. 
And  that  the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull, 
then  and  there  did  traitorously  conspire  and  combine 
with  certain  enemies  of  the  said  United  States, 
(whose  names  are  unknown,)  then  and  there  traitor- 
ously and  shamefully  to  surrender  and  abandon  to  the 
enemies  of  the  said  United  States,  the  said  fort,  called 
Fort  Detroit,  lielonging  to  the  said  United  States  as 
aforesaid,  and  then  and  there  under  the  command  of 
the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull  as  aforesaid, 
with  all  the  troops,  regulars  as  well  as  militia,  then 
and  there  under  the  command  of  the  said  brigadier 
general  Hull  as  aforesaid,  and .  all  the  public  stores 
and  arms,  and  all  public  documents,  including  every 
thing  else  of  a  public  nature,  appertaining  to  the  said 
fort,  called  Fort  Detroit,  and  to  the  said  north-west- 
ern army  of  the  said  United  States,  under  the  com- 
mand of  the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull  as 
aforesaid.    And  that  in  prosecution  of  the  said  trai- 


i 


■11111  JMmr.t'  "i 


\n 


./<^ 


•A 


XXVI 


CHARGES  AGAINST 


torous  conspiracy  and  combination,  the  said  brigadier 
general  William  Hull  did  then  and  there  wilfully  and 
traitorously  neglect  and  omit  to  repair  and  strengthen 
the  works  of  the  said  fort,  called  Fort  Detroit,  then 
and  there  under  his  command  as  aforesaid,  and  to  piit 
the  same  (together  with  the  said  guns  and  gun-car- 
riages belonging  thereto)  Into  a  proper   state  and 
condition  for  resistance  and  defence  against  the  ap- 
proaches, attacks,  and  assaults  of  the  enemies  of  the 
said  United  States.    'And  did  then  and  there  wilfully 
and  traitorously  neglect  and  omit  to  fortify  the  places 
and  passes  at  and  near  to  the  said  fort,  called  Fort 
Detroit,  by  and  through  which  the  troops  of  the  ene- 
mies of  the  said  United  States  might  then  and  there 
reasonably  be  expected  to  approach,  and  did  approach 
the  s'-id  fort,  called  Fort  Detroit,  for  the  purpose  of 
attackiirf  «aA  subduing  the  same.    And  did  then  and 
there  traitorously  neglect  and  omit  to  oppose,  resist, 
re];)el  and  defeat,  and  to  attempt  to  repel  And  defeat 
the  troops  of  the  enemies  of  the  said  Unked  States, 
in  their  hostile  preparations,  and  approach  to  and 
towards  the  said  fort,  called  Fort  Detroit,  for  the 
purpose  of  attacking  and  subduing  the  same.     And 
that  in  further  prosecution  and  completion  of  the  said 
traitorous  conspiracy  and  combination,  the  said  briga- 
dier general  William  Hull  did  then  and  there  traitor- 
ously and  shamefully  abandon  and  surreAder  the  said 
fort,  called  Fort  Detroit,  then  and  therd  under  his 
command  as  aforiesaid,  (which  it  was  his  duty  then 
and  there  to  maintain  and  defend,)  together  with  all 
the  trOope,  regulars  as  well  as  militia,  then  aAd  there 
in  the  said  fort,  called  Fort  Detroit,  then  and  there 
belonging  to  the  said  United'  States  as  aforesaid,  and 
then  and  there  under  his  command  as  aforesaid,  and 
all  the  public  stores  and  arms,  and  public  doctimi^nts, 
including  every  thing  else  of  a  public  nature,  in  and 
appertdning  to  the  said  fort,  called  Fort  Dc;ti>oit,  and 
to  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said  United 
States,  then  and  there  under  his  conunand  as  afore- 


OENfiRAL  niTLL. 


xxvli 


•aid,  unto  the  enemies  of  the  said  Unit^  States,  to 
'wit;-rto  the  British  forces  then  and  there  under  the 
command  of  mfyor  general  Brock;  whereby  the  said 
William  Hull,  on  the  said  sixteenth  day  of  August, 
in  the  year  one  thousand  eight '  hundred  and  twelve 
aforeraid,  at  Detroit  aforesaid,  in  the  territoiy  of  Mi« 
chigan  aforesaid,  (being  then  and  there  a  citizen  of 
the  said  United  States,  owing  allegiance  to  the  said 
United  States,  and  being  then  and  there  a  brigadier 
general  in  the  army  of  the  said  United  States,  and 
being  then  and  there  commander  of  the  said  north- 
western army  of  the  said  United  States,  and  being 
then  and  there  commander  of  the  said  fort,  called  Fort 
Detroit,  belonging  to  the  said  United  States  as  afore- 
said,) did  then  and  there  traitorously  and  shamefully 
abandon  and  surrender  the  said  fort,  called  Fort  De- 
troit, to  the  enemies  of  the  said  United  States,  to  wit: 
—to  the  said  British  troops  under  the  command  of 
nuyor  general  Brock  as  aforesaid;  and  did  then  and 
there  by  the  means  aforesaid,  traitorously  adhere  to 
the  enemies  of  the  said  United  States,  giving  them 
aid  and  comfort. 

CHARGE  II. 

Cowardice  at  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Detroit, 
between  the  first  day  of  July  and  the  seventeenth  day 
of  August,  in  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred 
and  twelve. 

First  sbecification.  In  this :— -That  during  the 
said  war  so  as  aforesaid  carried  on  and  prosecuted  by 
and  between  the  said  United  States  of  America  and 
their  territories,  and  the  said  united  kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland^  and  the  dependencies  thereof, 
the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull,  c<Hnmanding 
the  north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States  as 
aforesaid,  having  entered  the  said  British  province  of 
Upper  Canada,  in  prosecution  of  the  said  war  on  be- 
half of  the  said  United  States,  and  being  there  in  pos- 


■H. 


xxviii 


CHARGES  AGAINST 


•«88ioii  of  'the  town  of  Sandwich  and  the  ftcyi^^Mt 
country,  in  the  name  and  cm  behalf  of  the  said  United 
States,  and  having  declared  and  avowed  the  ol^ect 
and  intention  of  attacking  and  subduing  the  British 
fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amberstbuigh,  in 
the  said  British  province  of  Upper  Canada,  and,  ge- 
nerally, of  maintaining  and  enlarging  his  position  and 
possession  in  the  said  British  province  of  Upper 
Canada,  on  the  eighth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve,  at  Sandwich, 
aforesaid,  in  the  British  province  of  Upper  Canada 
aforesaid,  did  then  and  there  misbehave  himself  before 
the  enemy,  and  shamefully  manifest  an  undue  fear 
and  apprehension  of  danger  by  a  course  of  conduct 
and  conversation  evincing  personal  alarm,  agitation 
of  mind,  and  privation  of  judgment,  by  abandoning 
the  sai'l  object  and  design  of  attacking  the  said  Bri- 
tish fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amherst- 
burgh,  by  quitting  the  position  and  possession  taken  at 
the  town  of  Sandwich  and  in  the  ai\jacent  country,  in 
the  British  province  of  Upper  Canada  as  aforesaid,  and 
by  retreating  abruptly  from  and  out  of  the  said  British 
province  of  Upper  Canada  to  Detroit,  in  the  territory 
of  Michigan  aforesaid,  without  any  cause  for  so  doing, 
arising  from  the  superiour  numbers,  state  and  condition 
of  the  Britfeh  forces  which  were  then  and  there  dp- 
posed  to  the  said  army  of  the  said  United  States, 
under  the  command  of  tiie  said  brigadier  general  Wil- 
liam Hull,  and  without  any  other  just  and  sufficient 
cause  whatsoever;  whereby  the  officers  and  soldien 
of  said  north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States, 
then  and  there  under  the  command  of  the  said  briga- 
dier general  William  Hull,  were  induced  to  lose  and 
did  lose  all  confidence  in  the  personal  courage  and 
the  military  capacity  of  their  said  commander;  the 
inhabitants  of  the  said  British  province  of  Upper 
Canada  were  taught  to  distrust  the  power  and  profe8> 
sions  of  the  invading  general ;  a  shade  was  cast  upon 
the  reputation  of  the  American  arm«;  and  the  service 


t/^.<.*J! 


lt0IiNEttAL  HULL. 


xxix 


of  the  said  United  States,  in  tlie  proseeutlon  of  tlie 
said  war,  Butfered  great  detriment  and  disadvantage. 
Second  specificatioit.  And,  also,  in  tliis :— That 
during  the  said  war  so  as  aforesaid  carried  on  and 
prosecuted  by  and  between  the  said  United  States  of 
America  and  their  territories,  and  the  said  united  king- 
dom of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  the  dependen' 
<;ies  thereof,  to  wit :  on  the  fifteenth  day  of  August, 
m  the  year  one  ^thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve 
aforesaid,  the  enemy  having  raised  certain  batteries 
on  the  banks  of  the  said  river  Detroit,  in  the  said 
British  province  of  Upper  Canada,  opposite  the  said 
fort  Detroit,  and  certain  American  posts  and  batteries 
estaUisKed  and  erected  near  the  said  fort  Detroit,  in 
the  said  territory  of  Michigan,  and  a  cannonade  being 
commenced  from  the  said  batteries  of  the  enemy 
against  and  upon  the  said  fort  of  Detroit  and  the  said 
American  posts  and  batteries  established  and  erected 
near  thereto,  in  the  said  territory  of  Michigan,  the 
said  brigadier  general  William  Hull,  on  the  said  fif- 
teenth day  of  August,  in  the  jetmone  thousand  eighty 
hundred  and  twelve  afbresaid,  at  Detroit  aforesaid,  im 
the  territory  of  Michigan  aforesaid,  (being  then  and 
there  commander  of  the  said  fort  Detroit,  and  of  the 
vaid  American  posts  and  batteries  established  and 
erected  near  thereto,  in  the  said  territory  of  Michigan, 
and  being  then  and  there  commander  of  the  said 
north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States,)  did 
then  and  there  during  the  continuance  of  the  cannon- 
«de  aforesaid,  shamefully  misbehave  himself  before 
the  enemy,  and  manifest  great  fear  and  apprehension 
oS  personal  danger  by  a  course  oS  conduct  and  con- 
versation evincing  personal  alarm,  agitation  of  mind, 
and  privation  of  judgment,  and  particularly  by  various 
timid  and  cowardly  actions  and  expressions  then  and 
there  used  and  uttered  in  the  oresence  of  the  officers 
and  soldiers^ then  and  there  belonging  to  the  said 
north-western  army  ctf  the  said  United  States,  and  then 
and  there  under  ms  command  as  aforesaid,  as  well  in 


¥ 


Si 


zzt 


CHARGES  AOAINSli' 


I 


the  public  street  of  the  town  of  Detroit,  as  in  place* 
aiyacent  to  the  said  fort  of  Detroit,  and  the  said 
American  posts  and  batteries  establbhed  and  erect- 
ed  near  thereto,  in  the  said  territory  of  Michigan; 
whereby  a  fatal  encouragement  was  afforded  for  the 
hostile  enterprises  of  the  enemy,  a  {temicious  example 
(calculated  to  intimidate  and  to  disorganize)  was  given 
to  the  American  troops,  and  the  service  of  the  United 
States  in  the  prosecution  of  the  said  .war,  was  exposed 
to  hazard,  shame,  and  disappointment. 

Third  specification.  And,  also,  in  this : — That 
during  the  said  war,  carried  on,  and  prosecuted  by  and 
between  the  said  United  States  of  America  and  their 
territories,  and  the  said  united  kingdom  of  Great  Bri- 
tain and  Ireland,  and  the  dependencies  thereof,  to  wit : 
on  the  sixteenth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  one  thoo- 
sand  eight  hundred  and  twelve  aforesaid,  the  British 
forces  under  the  command  of  major  general  Brock  hav- 
ing crossed  the  said  river  Detroit,  having  landed  at  a 
place  vailed  Spring  Wells,  otherwise  called  Spring 
Hill,  in  the  said  territory  of  Michigan;  and  having 
thence  marched  towards  the  said  fort  of  Detroit,  with 
the  design  to  attack  the  same,  the  said  brigadier  ge- 
neral Hull,  on  the  said  sixteenth  day  of  August,  one 
thousand  eight  hiandred  and  twelve  aforesaid,  at  De- 
troit aforesaid,  in  the  said  territory  of  Michigan,  (be- 
ing then  and  there  commander  of  the  said  fort  of 
JDetroit,  and  being  then  and  there  opmmander  of  the 
said  north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States) 
did  then  and  there,  during  all  the  time  of  the  enemy's 
crossing  the  said  river  Detroit  as  aforesaid,  landing 
at  the  said  Spring  Wells,  otherwise  called  Spring 
Hill  as  aforesaid,  and  marching  towards  the  said  fort 
Detroit  as  aforesaid,  with  the  design  to  attack  the 
same  as  aforesaid,  shamefully  misbehave  himself  be- 
fore the  enemy,  and  manifest  great  fear  and  appre- 
hension of  personal  danger,  by  various  timid  and 
cowardly  actions  and  expressions  then  and  there  used 
and  utter^ed  in  the  presence  of  the  officers  and  soir 


n 


GENERAL  HULL. 


xxsi 


dien  beloB^g  to  the  4R  nortb-'westem  army  of  the 
»aid  United  States,  then  and  ther    ^mder  hia  com- 
mand as  aforesaid;  by  avoiding  ak.  jjersonal  d  .ager 
from  malcing  an  attempt  to  prevent  the  enemy^s  cross- 
ing the  said  rivet  to  DMroit  and  landing  at  the  said 
Spring  Wells,  otherwise  called  Spring  Hill;  avoiding 
all  personal  danger  from  reconnoitering  and  encoun- 
tering the  enemy  in  battle  on  the  said  march  of  the 
enemy  towards  the  said  fort  of  Detroit;  by  hastily 
sending  flags  of  truce  to  the  enemy  with  overtures  for 
a  capitulation ;  by  anxiously  withdrawing  his  person 
from  the  American  troops  in  the  open  field  to  a  place 
of  comparative  safety,  within  the  walls  of  the  said 
fort  Detroit;  by  an  irresolute  fluctuation  of  orders, 
sometimes  inconsistent  with  each  other,  and  some- 
times incoherent  in  themselves;  by  forbidding  the 
American  artillery  to  fire  on  the  army  on  the  said 
march  of  the  enemy  towards  the  sai        !.  Detroit ;  by 
calling  the  American  troops  from  the  held,  and  crowd- 
ing them  in  the  said  fort  Detroit,  while  the  enemy 
was  on  the  said  march  towardo  tho  said  fort  Detroit; 
by  a  precipitate  declaration  to  the  eremy,  that  he 
surrenderwi  the  said  fort  Detroit,  and.^^.said  north- 
western army  of  the  said  United  StatesTttefore  terms 
of  capitulation  were  signed  or  considered,  or  even 
suggested;  and  generally  by  a  course  of  conduct  and 
conversation  evincing  personal  fear,  agitation  of  mind, 
and  privation  of  judgment;  whereby  the  said  fort  of 
Detroit,  and  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  United 
States,  then  and  there  under  the  command  of  the  said 
brigadier  general  William  Hull,  were  then  and  there 
rendered  an  easy  and  certain  conquest  to  the  approach- 
ing enemy;  the  ofiicers  and  soldiers  of  a  gallant  army 
(compelled  by  the  obligations  of  military  law  to  ohef 
the  orders  of  their  commander)  were  exposed  to  un- 
merited mortification  and  reproach ;  and  the  service 
of  the  said  United  States,  in  the  prosecution  of  the 
8a^<!|  war,  sufTeivd  great  detriment  and  discredit. 


■■■'•  m 


*■> 


zzsU 


CHARGES  AGAINST 


FovRTH  BPEoiFioATioN.^nci,  alio,  in  this : — Tliat 
during  tlie  said  war  so  as  aforesaid  canried  on  and  pro* 
secuted  by  and  between  the  said  United  States  of 
America  and  their  territories,  and  the  said  united 
kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  the  depen- 
dencies thereof,  to  wit :  on  the  sixteenth  day  of  Au> 
gust,,  in  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
twelve  aforesaid,  at  Detroit  aforesaid,  in  the  territory 
of  Michigan  aforesaid,  the  said  fort  Detroit  being  tlien 
■and  there  well  garrisoned  and  supplied  with  cannon, 
ammunition,  and  provisions;  the  said  north-western 
a^iny  of  the  said  United  States  being  then  and  there 
well  supplied  with  arms,  ammunition,  and  provisions ; 
and  the  officers  and  soldiers  thereof  being  then  and 
there  in  liigh  spirits,  and  eager  to  meet  and  encounter 
the  enemy  in  battle ;  and  a  fine  train  of  artillery  being 
then  and  there  subject  to  the  orders  and  disposal  of 
the  said  brigadier  general  Hull,  for  the  purposes  of 
defence  or  attack,  yet  the  said  brigadier  general  Wil- 
liam Hull  (then  and  there  being  commander  of  the 
said  fort  Detroit,  and  of  the  said  north-western  army  of 
the  said  United  States)  acting  upon  the  impulse  of  per- 
sonal <ear  tifA  apprehension,  and  contemplating,  as 
the  means  or  personal  safety,  a  shameful  abandonment 
and  surrender  of  tfie  said  fort  Detroit,  and  of  the  said 
north-western  armj  of  the  said  United  States  under 
hb  comni;  i/il  as  aforesaid,  to  the  approaching  enemy, 
did  then  and  thsre  shamefully  misbehave  himself  be- 
fore the  enemy,  and  did  then  and  there  enter  into  a 
disgraceful  capitulation  with  the  enemy,  containing  no 
consolatory  stipulation  that  the  said  garrison  and  army 
should  march  out  of  the  said  fort  of  Detroit  with  the 
honours  of  war;  no  just  and  humane  stipulation  for  the 
.  security  and  protection  of  such  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
said  British  province  of  Upper  Canada  as  had  accept- 
ed* the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull's  invita- 
tion to  join  the  American  standard;  nor  any  reason- 
able stipulation  for  an  opportunity  of  reporting  to  the 
Secretary  for  the  Departmeht  of  War  the  circum- 


•m^ 


GENERAL  HIT 


cxiiU 


•taneet  of  so  unexpected  and  lo  Important  an  event 
and  did  then  and  there  shamefully  abandon,  surrender, 
and  give  up  the  said  fort  of  Detroit,  together  vrith  all 
the  troops,  regulars  as  ^vell  as  militia,  then  and  there 
under  his  command  as  aforesaid,  and  aH  the  public 
stores  and  arms,  and  all  the  public  documents,  includ- 
ing every  thing  else  of  a  public  nature  belonging  to  the 
said  fort  ^  Detroit,  and  to  the  said  north-western 
army  of  the  said  United  States,  then  and  there  under 
hU  command  as  aforesaid,  to  the  said  approaching 
enemy,  to  wit : — to  the  British  forces  under  the  com- 
mand of  miyor  general  Brocks  without  any  cause  for 
so  doing,  arising  from  the  superfour  numbers,  state  and 
condition  of  the  said  British  forces ;  or  from  the  ac- 
tual want,  or  Just  expectation  of  sudden  vvant,  of  arms, 
ammunition,  and  provisions  for  the  said  fort  Detroit, 
and  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said  United 
States,  and  without  any  other  adequate  cause  what- 
soever; whereby  the  territorial  sovereignty,  rights, 
and  property  of  the  faid  United  States  were  shame- 
fully ceded  to  the  enemy;  a  brave  and  patriotic  army 
was  wantonly  sacrificed  by  the  personal  fears  of  the 
commander;  and  the  service  of  the  said  United  States, 
in  the  prosecution  of  the  said  war,  sufTered  a  great 
and  afflicting  loss. 

CHARGE  III. 

Neglect  of  duty  and  unofficerlike  conduct,  while 
commanding  a  separate  army,  between  the  ninth  of 
April  and  the  seventeenth  of  August,  in  the  year  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve. 

First  specification.  In  this :— -That  before 
and  during  the  said  war,  carried  on  and  prosecuted 
as  aforesaid,  by  and  between  the  said  United  States 
of  America  and  their  territories,  and  the  said  united 
kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  the  de- 
pendencies thereof,  the  said  brigadier  general  William 
Hull,  bei^ig  duly  appointed  to  command  the  north- 


hi 


'm 


TV^V^^^.^- 


sxxiv 


CHARGES  AGAINST 


western  army  of  the  said  United  States,  did.  actually 
take  an4  assume  the  command  of  the  said  army,  on 
or  about  the  twenty-fifth  day  of  May,  in  the  year 
one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve,  at  or  near 
Dayton,  im  the  state  of  Ohio,  and  did  thence  con- 
stantly continue  i|i  the  actual  command  of  said  army, 
as  well  on  the  march  from  Dayton  aforesaid,  to  De- 
troit, in  the  territory  of  Michigan,  nnd  at  Detroit 
aforesaid,  as  in  the  British  province  of  ITpper  Cana- 
da, until  his  capitulation  with  the  enemy,  and  the 
consequent  surrender  of  fort  Detroit,  in  t|ke  said  Mi- 
chigan territory,  witli  all  the  troops,  regulars,  and 
militia  under  his  command,  to  the  British  forces  un- 
der the  command  of  major  general  Brock,  to  wit  :— 
at  Detroit  aforesaid,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan 
afwesaid,  oq  the  sixteenth  day  of  August,  in  the  year 
one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve  aforesaid. 
And  that  the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull* 
unmindful  of  the  important  tnist  reposed  in  him,  dur- 
ing all  the  time  aforesaid,  and  as  well  on  the  march 
of  the  said  army  from  Dayton  aforesaid,  to  Detrt^t 
aforesaid,  and  at  Detroit  aforesaid,  as  in  the  British 
province  of  Upper  Canada  aforesaid,  was  guilty  of 
neglect  of  duty  and  of  unofficerlike  conduct,  by  ne- 
glecting and  omitting,  with  sufficient  care  and  fre- 
quency, to  inspect,  train,  exercise,  review,  and  order, 
and  to  cause  to  be  inspected,  trained,  exercised,  re- 
viewed, and  ordered,  the  said  army  under  his  com- 
mand as  aforesaid;  and,  also,  by  neglecting  and 
omitting,  in  due  form  and  time,  to  prepare  an  order 
of  battle,  and  to  make  the  same  known  to  the  said 
army  on  the  march  from  Dayton  aforesaid,  to  Detroit 
aforesaid,  in  the  Michigan  territory  aforesaid,  whereby 
the  discipline  of  the  troops  under  the  command  of 
the  said  brigadier  general  William  Full  as  aforesaid, 
was  in  danger  of  being  relaxed ;  their  comfort  was 
liable  to  be  impaired ;  their  confidence  in  the  military 
skill  ami  dispositions  of  their  commander  was  dimi- 
nished ;  and  the  said  army  was  exposed  to  the  hazard 


■>*■ 


enEiifot  flt0ls» 


cxxt 


itoeMTS  fMNMivioif .     Juidi  tiloi  In  ihto  »•««• 
TIM  Miir Hi mM «w  iQaifiiiwlMidl MfrM  w 

ngil^gMr^Nit  Main^^a^  K^ria>  pni4«lie 
qMBd^  Itt  wlM  •!!  nr  about  <l^  ftwt 

aM|#i|#S£ia^ 

tar  0^ii««t  i<kMiM4>  ^  l!li«  tarilfeB^  V  l«filiiff« 
oToiidiMb  ttini^  ib^l^  liiip^pic  lyi^lteimit .aaase  to 

fk»  fllAiitrriM  eiNi*  ^nA  tli#  t#tf|«diiin,  aii4  the 
mM  ittilMWiiM  iir  Oveat  JRiiaiii  aadvlialaad, 
aiirtpAnNABiiMtlltoa^^^i^^ 
<£%:«iii||r  M««Mttl0  tflwlneli^ligr  ttim  aal  tlmw 
^lirfmpo^iMteto^^U  afriiKVBMil  ▼#»!,««« 

pifCiliig  or  afim^  to  ba  put  eo  board  ^tliefeoi;  to  ba 
tmiMporCcid  b^^it^^paMago  ftom  the  said  la^  oT 
the  tl«er  Imoii  of  the  lake^  to  Detvolt  afeietald» 
rthe  laid  biigBiQer  genefal  WttHaaA  QaU  having  wif^ 
fieieBt  eaoie  to  kiMtrir  br  to  believe  the  immiiieiit 
danger  of  eaptnrO  by  the  enemy  to  which  the  said 
ananned  veiiel  an  tha  poiMg^  *'^'*«Btoid|  would  be 
exposed)  eartahi  sifik  audiOni^  and  a  gim  part  of 
the  hospital  stores  Ibelonglng  to  tha  said  arny,  to- 
gUher  irilh  a  imnk,  con^atoing  (attenK  other  tldngn) 
the  jMi«ni  hereinliftar  mehtiiHie^  vluch  it  was  the 
dntf  iir  Oie  said  brigadier  general  WiU^am  Matt  most 
cami^^to  Iceep  and  preserve  from  the  knowled^^ 
and  Vieir  of  dia  eheiny,  that  is  to  say:  the  oflieial 
conespon^feoace  ofthe  Secretary  of  the  Department  of 
War  and  the  iiid  brlgpidier  general  Wqyttam  dull,  aa 
tr^ll  toiicfaittg  ^  espeifBtioftOli  i^eh  tiie  said  north- 


■1^1 

•-    Si 

xixvi 


ClfAMES  AdAINST 


Weateni  Ai%  ttiia«r  lil»  eoiiiiniiiid^  «s  ftlbieMi^,  ir» 

then  employied,  as  touotdii^  •  didJamtion-cl  war  t^ 

tlie  said  iThiteS  SCafesof  Ameilea'fl||aliitt  the  iaw 

imlted  iBittdoiii  pt  Oceat  Bittaln  and  Iralaod)  •fnA 

the  depenaencie*  therectff^  and,  also,  owftaiii  otk«r 

official  muster  ro^  reports;  «(idrettiRiS<tf  tib«.  mail-. 

hers,  state;  and  ei<kiditi6ir«f'ili»  said  aingr  ttnfei  !# 

c^nioiaii^  as  aforesaid.'    AM  ib^  «aid  unarnl^  y«s- 

sel  on  the  pattiige  'aforesaid^'  firemJUiiBHudd  ni|i^s  f( 

the  riv^r  Miai|fi  of  the  lake  towttda  Dimwit  a^orii^ 

said^  fift^r#|rdi  fo  wit :  on  or^idboiit^^frieaoiid  daf 

dt  Jttljr  in  tWyear  mie  thonsand  e^|liil«ndVBd^d 

twelYli  aA>JreJN^,  was  eaptmed-bgr  the^'^'^n^  hKHmt 

ohbpaird'^re^  at  tli»  tlnMof  sadft  e«pl»^ Ttlie 

sidd  idek  solmers,  the  said  hdipttid^itoires^  and  tha 

said  tmnk,  eontainii^;  the  aaid  oi^d  e^aeafi^ 

dfence,  and,  adso,  tlie  said  imuAerrolla»;|Bpoit8,. {and 

retikniB  cf  the  minibers,  staite,  aiii^  dMH^tiDii  of  the 

said  army  I  whereby  the  said  sioli  s^jM^eraweye  made 

prisonert  of  war;  £he  said  Impi^^^stori^ were  loiHt 

td  the  United  States ;  and  Uie  said  offieial  «9niapQi|» 

dence,  and  the  iaid  muster  ioU%reports,>aikd<'retunii! 

of  the  numlMtfs,  statej  and  eondkion  of  the  sfid  ani^ 

Cftme'  to  the  p08^eask>lir  lukowled^^  and  use  :of  ti;^ 

enemies  df  ttie  United  States,  to  the  greM  mmy,  of 

the  said  United^Stat^s; 

THtKD  sPKCiFiCAtioK.  And,  also,  in  tbis  >— Thai 
during  the  said  war  io  as  aforenid  cani^oa  and 
prosecuted  by  and  betwe«a  the  said  United  States  ji(tf 
America  and  their  tendtori«s,  and  tlif  said  ludted 
kingdpm  gf  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  the^P- 
pendencies  thereof,  th0  sidd  Mpdi^r  gfNpmal  ^H- 
fiamHnll,  having  arrii^<NlwiUitlie«iid  nmrtli'Weatem 
army  of  the  said  United  States  under  his  command. 
as  aforesaid,  at  Detroit,  in  the  tenitory  (^  lfieh^san» 
on  tlie  seventh  day  of-  July,  in  the  year  one  ttiousand 
eig^t  hundred  and  twdve  aforesaid,  and  liaving  the 
possesslmi  aild  command  of  said  fort  of  Detrmt,  Impi 
that  time,  eohstaatly,  until  the  ibandoBment  md  torf 


OBNIHAL  BXm^ 


xxxv^ 


«firiftlor«eneiiil  Blocks  on  thf  j|»teeBm  day  of  J^»- 

S^elv**foW«i^«iA finding  iflpopi  hli^  K£*L* 
Dethy^aferaMid^^lMt  the  woi|U^4  tlt«,»iiH.^  D«- 
^m  wore  ©Pwtty  dwBWgpd  «n^  ^»P%^  i^f*?^ 
#e  COBB  lad  guiMjiurflagpt  M^i*iW«  >W  ?*»«  '®'*  ? 
ihstMit  wei»  nbo  dtmaged  upS  q##  raaiin  ajid, 

%oi«<l1^6rf^»teU  knowiiig  tho^^i«^(K)|to^^  <S  I*?,.*!* 
fd|k!Soi^tit6  Um  Mivlce  of  flw  wnd  l^nww  SUUes 
in^N](^(^i^no^lbOjBi^  iKW^»Ip4  l|«^%  »Wae 

ii  |itf  «>d4iept/in  jfoper  ip^F  «najPspfiS|,  faa  eittty 
'^  neglei^of  ^Mr  %  iwgleeling  and  9i«ittoj5,>^- 
^  ^  M  tiii»  i^,  nii  |i98ie8^!pii  ai^  |Con|tii»nd.as 
^ifore«a^i»  ^iiij^rijtiid^^s^^      ji^iMu^^^rewir 
Mlstletyhetfj^  OMiso  to  tie  fopaire^aiid  ^rcpitjli- 
^iwdf  ^i#  *oilt8  of  tte  wild  M 
^#^%t#^n4itlni^  opitt^  and  5V!^<?4eni  BiaEm^^ 
Mi^dno^laie  lai^  Uie  aoririso  <^,  Ibe  i^i  TJiMted 
Stt^eHylo  fopair  or  oaufio  to^'do  lepdil^  ^9  "fid  guns 
i^d  ipjiheairiages,  and  g«n«aHf ;^fej  iNffew^  «?* 
ontfl^f  to  |ii|t»  or  canae  to  be  pntlbe  aaid  tort  cw!  De- 
troit iir«p>o|>6f^l«te  and  eoi^tion  for  r^^^^ 
HefiBHeo^  igf  tbe  «vopt  of  m  loi^atlonJwid  attack  by 
the  enomy;  whereby  the  said  fort  Betroit  wif  leqian 
easy  oolD^^i  to  tbe^iiemy »  t^  faid  guns  ai|d  giin- 
earrl^»  b^g  alt«rw>diMiMI  for  the  aei^ice  of 
the  aaW^flitid  Bta||»,  in.  flioirjaali  m^P^^  ^ 
^llppor  Canada^  were  st^  foimd^tviftt  for  tianaf^rta- 
^^ott>«nd^nse }  great  tipe  was  eenaumoti  in  p^e^ng 
ft^  fitting  ]^m  for  the  said  •ervko$;^jaid^he  ra 
^^DiMK^  the  w«r  werp^ JatoJJyt J>bstn|<^  and  sus- 


JNttj^n  8«aBciFicATioif .  And,  also,  in  ^^|b  : — 
Tlttt/dnrlBg  the  said  war  so  as  aforesaid  carruid  on 
nnd  pAMeottted  by  «ndbetween  the  said  tTniM^tates 
of  Ametteaand  theif  larrifod«»».and  the  said  united 
idogdom  of  fiieftl  Bfttain  and  Ireland,  and  thede- 


xxxrai 


CHARGES  AOAINST 


pendeneieB  thered")  the  said  birigadiergcporM  Wl£^ 
liam  Hidl,  dfecluing  and  ayonfiog  m  ipt^tiOQ  aid 
design*  wUh  the  aaid  nori^weSftiexB  afmj  <k  Ijtie  mm  . 
United  SM<^s  under  l^BiBpiipnn^ as  <^^  to  in^ 

vade  and  enter  the  Biltif^  pf(>vin««  ef  lT|Mier  Clftni^» 
to  invest  und  attack  i|ie  ^rit^fort  culled  Haldeii^ 
otherwise  called  Amhentbuigl|»  in  the.  said  Bri^ 
province,  and  to  mdnttyyo^d  ei^a^e  hit  pppHkai 
and  possebsipiis  inthe  saidBritiwkprpvjpfMB^.'^  wctt 
knowing  that  expeditipn,  rescjution,  and  enieigjr  were 
indi^pensihle  to  the  prosecution  i^ad  ac(|Bomp<iiJ?gieiit 
of  such  int^htion  and  de^g|B*.aiid  liaving  MidYed  at 
Detrditiiforesaid,  in  iJhe  tcriitoiy  c;f  MN^!SWa|iH» 
said,  on  th«i  seven^  idajr  of  Jwy,  in  ^e  yw  one 
thousaiid  «igh|l^,  hundred  imd  iymlfj^'Miv^^  and 
having  invadi^  the  said  Bnti^  pf|xi^ii^  UVjgigi^ 
Catiadil^  Oft  the  twelfth  da;jr  of  Jn%,  in  the  j^aip 
aforesaid^  and  tlie|^m  Inl^jpas  poBacaa»W|l  l^T  ilit^^  ^wb 
of  Sandwich  aforesaid  and  halving  lir|^  j^  ,jnfl|iii 
JiKidy  of  liis  iaid  annjT  evacuated  the  said  Bi^tj^pii^ 
vince  otUpper  Canada  on  the  eighth  dajr  «^  Au^wt*. 
in  the  yeai*  afpresaid,  was  guilty  of  ne||teeil;  9C  didy 
and  unofflcerlike  conduct,  %  n^  aeas(im|^%;i^p^ 
ingjfi^tin^,  and  ti^ai|}|iorti|ig^  or  cauauig  tobe  r^pi$rcd» 
^tte^  and  transported,  ^  guqs  and  {pp-caf|iaj|f» 
which  were  necessary  to  the  operation  m  tl^  wArin 
the  si^d  British  province  of  Uj^r  Cani^  byjMk 
•useless,  and  injurious  waste  qf  time  and  ci|H^<Hrf«q|tl7 
at  Sandwich  aforesaid,  in  the.s^  BriM^pv^m^e^ 
of  Upper  Canada,  wiihont  makHig^anftttepmt  to  re- 
duce the  said  Britiisb  fivt  caUed  Maiden,  pmerwise 
called  Amherstburgli,  by  an  unnecesnuy  consuipplicni 
of  time,  in  pngects.to  ccnciliate  the  British  inbabi- 
tanis  of  the  said  British  |>rovince  of  Upper  CaiMida, 
and  the  neighbouring  Indians,  without  resorting  to  a 
more  effectual  dlaplay  o^  a  militsury  power,  capacity, 
aud  disposition  to  maintain  the  lu^^uititionB  of  con- 
quest, and  to  perform  the  promises  of  protection;  by 
l»o6cpor>ing  in  the  first  instance^  aud  bf  abandoning 


GENERAL.  Hl/LL/ 


xxxiie 


British  fort  ealled  M«lde»,  oflierwise  called  Anih^rstr 
bdrgh,  and  fay  fioally  eVa^tii^  the  said  BrifUh  pro- 
ving bf  Vpptt  Canada,  ivhttoatlilvlilig;  provided 
effettiiaily;  ik  any  rctftect,  for  the  safety  of  the  inha- 
tdtants  titelpeof  Vrhohad  accepted  tb«  said  biicadiejr 
general  William  Httll's  invitatlcta  to  join  the  Ameri- 
can  standard,  and  without  having,  in  any  degree,  ac 
cOMplhihed  the  said  intention  aid  design  of  the  said 
brigadier  gei^rai  William  0iiU,  so  as  aforesaid  de- 
claredand  avowed  upcitt  the  invasion  of  the  said  Brit- 
ish  province  as  aforesaid;  whentiby  ba  cpportonity 
was  larded  to  the  enen^  io  bring  into  suspicion  and 
eontempt  the  power  and  tlie  cor^uet  of  the  Ameri- 
can coihrnander;  to  •  collect  ahd  dotmbine  the  British 
forces;  to  s^u^ei  itttimldate,  and  ei^gt^e  the  In- 
dians ;  t«>  awe  into  submisdon  the  waveii^g  inhabi- 
taals  of  the  liaid  Bif tbh  prcvvinee  pf  Upper  Canada; 
to  reinfotrce  the  siM^British  t6n  cabled  Maiden,  other- 
wise (Balled'Aildiar8tbui|(h;  and  to  prepare  for  invest- 
ing and  attacking  the  sfdd  fort  of  Detroit,  in  the  said 
terrftoiy  of  M icmgan ;  while  on  the  other  hand,  the 
said  «ni^  of  the  uid  lJnitc$d  States,  under  the  com- 
maiul  (rf  the  said  br^adierigrneral  William  Hull,  aa 
afi^NBsaidf  diminishing  hi  effective  numbers  in  con- 
sequeitce  of  sickness  and  other  casualtiesf  theofficera 
and  soldiers  natwaHy  became  dissatisfied  and  4is- 
gustdd"  with  a  scene  of  such  inactivity,  irresolu- 
tion, and  procrastination;  the  hope  of  support  and 
eoNjperation,  as'welt  fronr  the  Indians  as-  from  the 
British  inhabitants  of  the  said  British  province  of 
Uppei*  Caioda*  was  destroyed,  and  the  general  ardour 
of  the  troops.  In  the  prosecution  of  the  war,  insensi-^ 
biy  abated. 

PivfH  aPSGiriCATioir.  And,  also,  in  this :— That 
during-  the  continuance  of  the  said  war,  carried  oa 
and  prosecikod  as  aforesaid,  by  and  between  the  said 
United  States  of  America  and  their  territories,  aai\ 
the  said  ufiited  kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland* 
o2 


it>wftM£a!tA^ 


3h 


CHARGES  AOA^KST 


tad  the  ^epeadeEciea   Utereof,  the  mid  iNrigwIidt' 
geneml  WiUiasi  Hully  with  the  taid  nortb-weftteni 
army  of  the  «akl  United  Btatedimder  biseomiuaidaf 
aforesaid,  arrived,  at  Detroit  aforesaid)  in  iSle  tertkory 
of  MieHgan  lt£i»esBid,  to  wit:  on  tke^  aerenlb  dajr 
of  Jutyv»in  tbe  year  :one  thoosand  e^bt  hundred  and 
twelve  aforesai<i ;  thiil  wxti^  the  said  army  mider  hit 
comroand  as  aforesidd,  he  entered  irnd  invaded  the 
aaid  Kiitfsh  piovince  of  Upper  Canada*  to  Tn^t  on 
the  twf^th  day  of  Jtdy*  in  tlie  year  aforesaid;  that 
with  the  main  body  ef  the  said  army  under  l^s  cchu* 
niand  IS  aforesaid,  he  eraeuated  the  said  l&it^sh  pvp^ 
tince  of  Upper  Canada  on  the  eighth  ^y  oC«  Ai^utt* 
in  the  year  aficMresaid,  tipenoe  letumini^  lo  Dettoit 
afwesaid,  ni  the  said  tenUm^  of  Mii^gasi»  and  thirt 
he  ahandoped,  surrendered^  ittd  ga««.  ti]^  the  said  ifini 
Detroit,  with  all  the  troops,  regularaat  well  aa  mj^tia» 
under  his  command  as  aSmresaid)  to  the  British  forec» 
under  the  command  of  mtQ&r  g^ieral  fteodt^^o  wit; 
on  the  sixteenth  day  of  Augnat,  in  the  yeur  alMresidd. 
And  thnt  daring  all  tlie  movemaile  a^eesaid,  ami 
dwing  all  tlie  time  eforesidd,  to  wH;  from  the  said 
seventh  day  of  July>  in  the  year  eoe  thousand  «i|^t 
hundred  «nd  twelve  afbresaid,  to  and  in^odinfthe 
said  sixteenth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  afinPNald* 
it  was  of  high  importance  to  the  eeourity  and  tofifiy 
of  the  aaid  fort  Detroit,  and  the  s^id  .trmy  of  -tiie  iutld 
United  States,  under  the  command  of  the  said  MgeK 
^r  general  William  Hell  as  aforcsud,  that  a  free 
and  ^en  ccnnmunication  shdidd  be  had  and  preserv- 
ed between  the  said  fort  vX  Detroit  and  the  saidnmy 
of  the  said  United  St-^^es,  under  the  command  vi  Hbe 
sud  brigadier  gei  ral  William  Hall  as  aforesaid,  and 
a  certam  American  settlement   and  militaiy  post 
made-uid  established  at  the  river  Raishi^  in  the  aaid 
territory  of  Mkhigian;  and  that  the  said  brigadier 
general  William  Htdl,  well  knowing  the  premiaefv 
but  nnmindful  of  tiie  trust  reposed  in  hho^  was  goifity 
^  neglect  of  duty  and  vnolSeeriihe  eonduel,  by  mf* 


\v. 


GENERAL  HULU 


iOt. 


Ijering  tibe  enemy  to  interrapt  and  ont  off  tlie  said  oom* 
ii!Kink»tion  between  the  said  fort  of  Detroit  and  the 
■aid  amiy  of  the  aidd  United  States  under  his  eon- 
mAnd  aa  aforesaid,  and  the  said  American  settlement 
nnd  fiDJIHtaty  port  made  and  established  at  Ihe  river 
Raiidn  aforesaid,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan  aforC' 
■aid,  t(>  wit. ;  mi  the  fint  day  of  August,  in  the  year 
one  thousand  e^t  himdred  and  twelve  aforesaid,  or 
oa  some  other  day  of  the  said  month  of  August^  or 
ton  sc^e  day  of  the  preceding  month  <^  July,  in 
the  year  t^resald ;  also,  by  afterwards,  to  wit :  on  tiie 
fourth  day  criT'  August,  in  the  year  aforesaid,  detaehing; 
miE^or  Thomas  B»  Van  Hmn  of  colonel  JFames  Find* 
lay's  regiment  of  Ohio  volunteers,  with  an  inadequate 
force,  {tiie  uHA  Inriga^er  gcmeval  William  Hull  having 
suffil^ent  cause  for  knowing  or  believing  the  snooe  to 
be  Inadeqiiate)  to  attempt  again  to  ojpen  the  said  com- 
^anroicailon  between  the  aid  foK  Detroit,  and  4be  said 
Krmy  of  the  said  United  States,  under  the  command 
6[  the  said  brigadier  generid  WUtiam  H«dl  as  afore- 
said,'«nd  the:  i^id  American  settiement  and  militaij 
poet  en  said  river  Raisin,  in  the  territo'y  of  Miciiigan 
aferaaald;  also,  by  afterwardsj  to  wit ;  on  the  eightir 
da^of  August,  in  the yearaftwesaid,  detachii^  lirate- 
tiaat  -«olond  Jfames  Miller,  of  the  fifth  regiment  of 
United' States  faifanbry,  with  the  number  Or  about  the 
iiiimber  of  five'hundred  men  to  att^i|;t  ::^in  to  open 
the  said  comniunicati<m  between  the  said  fort  of  De- 
troit and  the  said  army  of  thesaid' United  States,  under 
the  comMiand  of  the  said  brigadier  general  WUliara 
'  Hull,  and  the  said  Amerieat:  settlement  and  n^Ktary 
post  at  the  said  river  Raisin,  in  the  territory  of  Mi*, 
i^chi^n  aforesaid,  and  neglectingto  furnish  and  forwarcf, 
'  or  cause  to  be  fiimished  and  forwarded,  the  said  last 
mehUoned  detachment  aft  or  near  Brownstown,  in  the 
said  tenitmy  dT  Michigan,  on  itft  march  aforesaid, 
upcm- the  service  »foresai<,%  an  adequate  simply  of  pro- 
visions, (the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull  hav- 
ing sufficient  cause  to'  know  or  to  believe  that  tHe 


M 
'I 


Wfn^ 


xm 


CHAROES  AOAIKST 


said  last  m^htidned  detachment  was  at  6\  ni 
town  aforesaid,  oa  iti  march  aforesaid,  upon  the 'si^r* 
Tice  aforesaid,  in  want  d"  proviiions,  and  that  ^ley 
could  n6t  prosecute  aiid  accooipliiih  the  said  fetrle^ 
unless  an  adequate  sttppi^  of  |>rovisb^^  waii  fiimi^^ 
«nd  forwartfef;  to  theni  iit  i^  tteiar  Browustown  iR>re- 
saidjViaid,  also,  by  aftcnrWhrds;  to  \r\ii  on  ihb  fi>ur* 
teentb  di^  of  August,  in  the  ^'Car  aforeisald.  delaichliig 
eolonet  DuncaU  Mac  Arthui^  cohmel  of  a  Kgiment  of 
Ohio  volunteers,  and  colonel  Lewis  Cass,  c^iloiiiEil  of 
another  regiment  6f  Ohio  voInntec»,  win  tito  ntifn- 
ber  or  about  the  number  of  four  hundred  men,  as 
well  to  attempt  again  to  open  the/«yid  c6ii)mQni<$a- 
,tion  between  the   said  (ort  DetA>i{  antf  the  sdd 
army  of  the  said  United  States,  tUMtt  the  conuttanH 
of  the  said  biig^er  getfcrat  William  Hull  as  iifore- 
«aid,  and  the  said  American  psttlement  a^d  mili- 
tary post  at  the  Hver  Kaisin  aforesaid^  in  the  teiti- 
tory  of  Michigan  aforesaid,  as  to  escoii  isertain  ptp^ 
visions  froift  the  said  American  settlement  and  mi- 
litaiy  post  to  Detroit  afonresaid,  without  issuing,  fur> 
nishing,  and  forwarding,  or  caiirang  tobe  issued,  fvdnilsh- 
ed  and  fiMrwarded  to  the  said  last  mention^  de^cb- 
ment  an  adequate  supply  i^pirovfidonslbr  the  service 
on  which  th^y  trerc  en^toyed  a»  aforesaid,  (the  said 
brigadier  genem)  WilHam  Hull  having  sufBcient  catiiO 
to  know  or  to  ^lieve  that  the  said  last  mentioiied  de-' 
tacbment  was  in  want  of  a  fiirther  supply  of  prd^i- 
sions  lipOn  the  service  aforesaid,  and  ttiat  they  coiild 
npt  prosecute  and  aecom|1i6h  the  said  service  Unlii^s^ 
such  further  supply  was"  issued,  fgroished,  BndtM'^ 
w:uded  to  them;)  whereby  the  said  detikcbmeht,  lin- 
ger the  sAid  mi^or  ThOmas  B.  Van  Horn,  being  en- 
countered bv  the  enemy  witit  a  superiouir  fore  ?,  waf^ 
defeated  and  returned  to ]>eti^!t  albresaid,  withoutat^"^' 
eompHshing  the  service  on  whieli  they  were  employ- 
ed as  aforesaid;  the  said  detachment  under  the  said 
lieutenant  colonel  James  Miller,  having  achieved.  i^ 
signal  victory  over  the  enemy  during  the  maielkoii 


rr^-^^^asr' 


.^ — 


GENERAL  HULL. 


loai 


Ihe  Hffviee  aftHresaid,  «t  or  naar  Brofwnitown  aiferer 
■liid,  were  nererlheleiR  compdled^  from  the  want  oC 
W  a«kqimte  supply  ot  praviiiioiiiy  to  abandon  the  ler- 
vi^e  OB  wUeh  thejr  were  enmloyed  as  ainteiaid,  and 
toretnpi  to  Detfc^t  aforaiaid$  the  viid  de^hment 
liudef  t||e  lald  c^oMlI  Duncan  Mac  Arttnr  "vaA  the 
•aid.6<4fli>el  Lewis  Cass,  firom  want  of  an  adequate 
vaf^lf^  of  iHTOvisioBi  wtsife  unable  to  prosecnie  and  a«f 
c4>Q^[$di  the  senviee  on  whlehthey  owere  empkqred 
as  albteiaid,  ait4<  weie  returning  to  Detit^  afore- 
said, «t  ttp  tinie  of  the  ab^ndraunent  and  ninen- 
der  of  the  said  ilbrt  Detroit  and  the  said  ar^Ay  of 
ihe  United  .States  to  the  British  forces  under  the 
oopuninid  of  mjw  j^neiaf  Brock  a«  aforesaid  t  and 
finally,  the.  said  eommonlcatfon  between  the  said 
fort  Detrmt  and  the  wtAA  anny  of  the  United  States, 
under  tlie  cooifliand  <^  the  said  brigadier  general  Wil- 
liam Hull,  iwd  the  said  American  setttement  and  mi^ 
litary  post  at  the  laid  riv«r  Raisin,  in  the  territcny  of 
Mitfaigan  aforesidd,'  bj  reasons  of  the  said  Jie^ects 
and  omissions  of  the  said  brigadier  general  WiUitt« 
Htttt  as  aforesaid,  was,  and  remained  interrupted  and 
totally  cut  (rff  by  the  enemy,  to  wit:  from  the  said 
first  &y  of  August,  in  the  year  afore;  aid,  or  from  some 
other  day  in  the  said  month  of  August,  or  in  the  pre* 
ce^ng  mmith^of  Ji^y*  in  the  year  fiforesaid,  to  aiui 
imslnmiit  the  said  sIxteeQth  day  of  August,  in  the  year 

&ix«n  8i*KcivicATioNw  And,  idso,  in^is  :-^Th8t 
during  the  continuance  of  the  said  war,  so  as  aforesaid 
carried  on  and  prosecuted  by  and  between  tiie  said 
United  6tat^  of  .^nerica  and  thdr  territories,  and 
the'  said^nited  kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland, 
imd  the  depemlenoies  thereof;  the  said  brigadier  ge- 
neral William  fijUtl,  with  the  iK^id  n^rth-western  army 
of  the.Q^d  Unitoil  States,  under  his  command  as  afore> 
said,  having  ittvaM  and  entered  the  said  British  pnK 
vinee  of  Upper  Canada  as  itf<n«88ud,  and  having  de- 
«Iitfed  and  avowed  mi  tot«ntion  and  deuj^n  of  invetli 


xUy 


CH ARCHES  AGAINST 


inftedattaeking  the  said  British  fort  called  Mai- 
den, otherwiie  called  Amhentburgh,  in  the  sud 
British  province  of  Upp^  Canada,  and  a  de:aeh> 
inentof  the  said  army  onder  hia  command  aa  rtfore- 
aaid,  led  by  the-  said'  eokmel  Xewia  Cass,  aiid  the 
aaid  lieutenant  colonel  James  Miller,  ha^^ng  attaek- 
ed  and  repulsed  he  enemy,  and  seised  upon  a  cei^ 
tain  bridge  over  the  river,  called  the  river  Aux  Car 
nard,  on  the  4roat  fttmi  Sandwich,  in  the  said  Bri- 
tish province  of  Upper  Canada,  to  the  said  British 
fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amfaersth**rgh, 
and-  an  opportunity  having  thereby  been  offer  r  for 
an  immediate  investment  and  attack  updn  the  said 
British  fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amp 
herstburgh;  yet  the  said  Iw^aitter  general  WilKam 
Hull,  well  knowing  the  (Mremises,  and  unmindful  of 
the  trust  reposed  in  him,'  to  wit:  on  or  about  the 
eighteenth  day  of  Ju^,  in  the  year  one  thouKand 
eight  hundred  and  twelve  afoi^esaid,  at  Sandwich 
aforesaid,  in  the  British  province  of  Upper  Canada 
aforesaid,  was  guilty  of  neglect  of  du^  and  uc- 
«fficerlike  conduct,  by  neglecting  and  omitting  to 
advance  with  the  said  army  under  his  command  as 
aforesaid,  to  maintain  or  attempt  to  maintain  the 
possession  of  the  said  bridge  over  the  said  river^  call- 
ed the  river  Aux  Canaid,  and  by  neglecting  and 
omitting  to'-proeeed  to  the  iumediate  investment 
and  attack  of  the  said  British  fort  called  Maiden, 
otherwise  called  Amherstburgh«  in  the  said  British  pro- 
vince of  Upper  Canada,  whereby  the  advanta|^  of 
acquiring  and  keeping  possessimi  <^  the  said  Imdga 
over  the  said  river  called  the  river  Anx  Canard,  laa 
aforesaid,  was  improvidently  losf,  and  the  prospeot  of 
a  successful  investment  and  attack  i^iop  the  siddr-Bri- 
tish'fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  cidledAmhertt* 
burgh j  speedily  vanished.  >,t>. 

SevENTH  spEoxFieATioN.    And,  also,  in  tbiiiTirrr' ' 
That  during  the  continuance  of .  the  said  war^aoaa 
aforesaid  carried  on  and  provecuted  by  andiietvifiea 


GENERAL  HULt. 


Hv 


Urn  Mid  United  Statee  of  AmeriM  aad  Uieir  tenitoriM, 
•od  the  laid  united  kuMMloni  of  Great  Britain  and  Ire- 
land, and  the  depeBdfficiei  thereof^  the  said  brigadier 
general  Wttliam  Hull,  with  the  said  UMrth»we>tem^ar- 
nqr  of;  ''e  said  United  States  under  his  command,  as 
afoMsald,  having  evacuaM  the  said  .Brittsli  province 
oC  Upper  Canada,  returning  thence  to  .Detroit  afore- 
said, in  the  t^muiry  pf  Michigan  afpresaidi  the  ene-  . 
my  having  aftenvMds  taken  possession  of  the  bank  of 
Ae  said -river  Detrcnt,  opposite  to  Detroit  aforesaid, 
andsthereott  erected  batteries  wherewith  to<  attack  and 
annoy  as  well,  the  sud  fort  of  Detroit,  and  the  Ameri- 
can posts  atid  batteries  erected  and  established  near 
thereto,  as  the  town  of  Detroit  in  the  said  territory  of 
Michigan;  the  enemy  havii^  also  manifested  an  in- 
tention Itnd  cfesign  to.invade  and  enter  the  said  terri- 
tory of  Michigan,  and  CO  invest  and  attack  the  said 
fortDetrcdt;  and  the  enemy  h&ving  also  afterwards, 
in  pursuanoe  of  such  intention  and  design,  landed  at  a 
plaro  called  Spring  Wells,  otherwise  called  Spring 
Hill,  in  the  neighbourbo^  of  the  said  fort  petroit, 
in  the  territory  of  Michigan  aforesaid ;  yet  the  said 
brigadier  general  Wiiliam  Hull,  well  knowing  the 
premises,  and  unraindl'ul  of  the  trust  reposed  in  him, 
to  wit:  irom  the.  eleventh  day  of  August,  to  and  in- 
dudii^  Ae  sixteenth  day  of  August,  ki  the  year  one 
tiioosand  eight  hundred  and  tufelve  afooresaid,  was 
guilty  of  neglect  of  duty  and  unofficerlike  conduct, 
by  neglecting  and  oniitting  to  prevent,  and  to  attempt 
to  prevent  the  enemy  from  erecting  the  said  batteries 
on  the  bank  of  the  said  river  Detroit,  opposite  to  the 
said  f<fft  of  Detroit,  aforesaid:  by  n^Iecting  and 
omitting  to  fortiify  the  landing  place  at  the  ssdd  Spring 
Wdls,  otiierwise  called  Spring  Hill,  in  the  territoiy 
6[  Mif^higan  i^oresdd ;  aud  by  neglecting  and  omit- 
ting to  annoy  and  attack  the  enemy  mi  and  after  his 
landing  at  Spring  Wells,  o<  '^erwise  called  Spring 
Hill  aforesaid,  in  the  territory  ^  Michigan  aforesaid n 
whereby  the  enemy  was  enabled  securely  to  erect 


■II 


-*,! 


'^f¥f^SPM 


f.V'* 


P^'-: 


m 


^M    CHARGBS  AG All^aX  GEK.  Hu LL. 

llM  Mid  l«tlMfa»iiB  tlMtaakortlieMlArhFjillflnft 
w  afoiwaid,  Ibr  attacMM  jM^iMogri^i  «tiMI  tlw 
m^^  Aft  or  JdetNlt,  jiMk  WPUiwrioaii  porti  wd 
btfierles  M«et«a  And  «iilalnfM  «iiw  UmiMoi  «  ^ 
mM  tofm  of  DtftNil,  to  i«v«de  His  said  ItinMofsr  af 
Miehigtii  wftiiocle|i|iMitfMifM'llMt»  «adl»tqipioM> 
the  Mid  ^  DctNM  with  the  air  and  eiHdldmice  «C 
alrimiiDh*  • 

A.J  BAIXAIB, 


■•WiaSsr*'! 


iaiiiiiiiir  -^y^^^^^'^  ^■''^''^^"^^'^^^^ 


BEFENCE 


»T 


V- 


BRIGADIER  GENERAL  HULL. 


Mir*  PMidBnt^ 

AadO^itlamtn  of  dw  CMurt^Mwtiai, 

I  HATE  too  long,  and  too  severely  felt  the  effects  of 
public  pr^udice,  excited  by  unfounded  reports  and 
groundless  clamours,  not  to  r^oice,  that  the  time  has 
arrived,  when  I  may  speak  in  my  own  vindication, 
before  an  tn^ftto/  and  honouraHfle  tribunal. 

The  charges,  upon  which  you  are  now  to  decide, 
have  been  propagated  through  the  union,  with  a  seiU 
and  tfuluAfry,  to  which  my  age,  my  cAfl|acter,  and  my 
former  services,  have  b<^  in  vain  oppii^fid. 

My  reputation  and  feelings  have  been  tiie  sport  of 
every  one,  who  either  from  malicious,  selfish,  or  poli- 
tical motives,  chose  to  traduce  me.  The  time  has 
been,  when  no  one  would  have  dared  to  couple^ho- 
nour  ^ith  my  name;  when  my  heart  has  exulted  to, 
find  myself  mentioned  amtHig  those  who  desei^i^ 
well  of  their  oountry.  But  since  my  jefforts  to  serve 
2 


^'0C'-"^-'.: 


-^-Tt*!^ 


^M8 


2  DEFENCE  OP 

her,  have  been  unsucceMfuI,  how  have  I  been  tortorad 
with  crnel  and  unfounded  accu^tions !— Even  con- 
scious innocence  has  not  always  given  me  fortftiide 
to  bear  with  ^his  ii\ju8tice,  unmoved.— Knowing  the 
integrity  of  my  own  motives,  and  how  lealously  I 
have  sought  to  discharge  my  duty  to  the  public,  my 
heart  lias  often  swollen  wiUi  indignation,  when  lliave 
seen  the  indefatigable  pains  that  have  been  taken,  by 
repetitions  of  the  foulest  calumnies,  to  excite,  and  k«ep 
alive,  prejudices  against  me.  Your  own  knowledge. 
Gentlemen,  of  what  has  been  passing  in  tha  world, 
will  convince  you,  that  this  id  not  declamation^;  but  I 
shall  shew  you,  in  the  course  of  my  defence,  that  men» 
from  whose  profession  and  whose  rank  it  was  not  to 
be  expected,  have  been  parties  in  this  iiyustiee. 

At  length,  however,  the  time  I  have  so  anxiously 
desired  has  arrived,  when  my  conduct  must  be  tested 
by  dddencCi  instead  of  the  misrepresentations  of  my 
enemies.  And  I  do  eel  a  confidence,  that  when 
you  hav«  pronounced  upon  that  evidence,  I  may  ap- 
peal to  your  ju^;nient  to  refute  the  clamourt-  which 
have  been  jaised  against  me. ' 


^ 


I  cannot  but  think,  IMtr.  Prerident,  thut  the  charges 
against  me  are  exhibited  in  a  form,  hitherto  unprece- 
dented in  proceedings  of  this  nature.  It  was  not  to 
be  expected^  that  in  a  court  where  the  accused* 
whatever  may  be.|hi8  infirmitieft  or  incipacity  td  at> 
tend  to  tiis  own  ifltefence,.  is  not  permnted  to  have 
the  benefit  of  counsel,  the  charges  would  be  envek^> 


( I 


f: 


'^i^^'^^^r^'tr^.'^^ 


GENERAl.  HULL. 


» 


•d  fai  toch  a  profusion  ef  words,  that  it  it  diffloult  Tur 
oiie,^iKrt  aecuttomed  to  the  teclmical  fomis  of  pleidings 
in  the  eivil  courts,  to  understand  them,  and  be  so 
eompHoated  by  repetitions,  that  it  is  still  more  diffi- 
cttlt  to  reduce  them  to  any  order  or  analysis. 

It  is  extremely  important,  however,  that  the  Court 
shoidd  ascertain,  and  always  bear  in  mind,  precisely 
of  what  I  am  accused.    The  course  of  proceeding, 
which  has  been  adopted  by  the  Court,  renders  this 
the  more  necessaiy,  as  testimony  has  been  given, 
which  certainly  cannot  be  applied  to  any  of  the  spe- 
ciAcations.    The  Court  have  thought  proper  to  ad- 
mit it,  with  an  intimation,  that  any  further  objection, 
which  I  might  offer  to  its  propriety  or  relevancy,  when 
I  arrived  at  this  stage  of  my  defence,  would  be  con* 
sidered.— In  submission  to  this  decuion  of  the  Court, 
I  have  omitted  to  make  otgections  on  this  ground  in 
•eyeral  instances. 

i  iMI  not  attempt  to  offer  an  argument  to  the 
Court,  to  plov«  the  injustice  of  making  one  charge 
against  a penon,  and  trj^g  and  coiivicting hin|0|^|- 
other,  l^d  however  understand  from  what  pHK 
when  I  fiist  submitted  to  the  Court  an  objection  of  this 
nature,  ihat  an  opinkm  was  enteitained  by  some  oi  the 
tfMmbers,  that  thoqgh  the  testimony  might  not  apply  to 
any^specificat^i,  yet  if  fte  fact  intended  to  be  proved 
would  come^^illder  dtter  of  the  general  charges,  tliejr 
iestfanony  w&  be  proper.  If  tliis'  were  so,  then 
there  woidd  be  no  Hie  in  the  specifications.    Indeed 


mm 


M 


%  ■^- 


E*> 


DEFENCE  OF 


they  vould  be  worse  than  uaeless,  for  they  would  only 
mislMid  the  accused,  and  induce  hun  to  prepare 
against  one  accusation,  when  he  might  he  tried  on 
another.  The  impropriety  of  a^teutting  any  thing  rai- 
der the  general  clnu^e,  for  which  tiiere  k  not  a  spe« 
cification,  I  think  will  appear  manifest  Let  us  sup- 
pose, that  &  general  charge  is  made  of  unofficer>like 
conduct,  and  the  only  specification,  insulting  a  supe- 
rioiir.  Suppose  that  under  this  general  charge  and 
specification,  testimony  should  be  offered  of  absence 
without  teave.  This  would  also,  be  unoffice^like  con- 
duct, and  therefore  would  come  under  the  general 
charge.  ^  But  would  it  not  be  the  height  of  injustice  to 
try  the  accused  for  absenting  himself;  a  cnn^  (^ 
which  the  chains  gave  him  no  notice.  I  trust  the 
Court  will  see  the  validity  oS  the  objection  I  am  con- 
sidering, and  that  they  will  be  careful  to  give  no 
weight  to  any  part  of  the  testimony,  which  does  not 
apply  to  some  one  of  the  specifications. 


I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  occupy  the  time  of 
the  Court  with  a  recapitulation  of  the  charges,  nor 
shall  I  exhaust  your  patience  by  attempting,  in  my 
qPH^,  to  follow  the  vobtme  on  your  tabl%  through 
all  its  reiterati<ni8. .  It  will  be  found,  for  the  most  part, 
to  be  a  repetition  of  ^e  same  facts,  displayed  in  the 
jargon  of  special  pleading,  with  an  Uicongruous  dis- 
semination of  such  -opprobrious  epithets,  as  fiincy 
might  furnish  to  heighten  the  imputatioii  of  ^t.  I 
shall  endeavour  to  arrange  and  considW  the  accusa- 
tions in  such  order  as  will  enable  me  to  bring  my  de-> 


>.^. 


GENERAL  HULL.  I, 

feiieJB  into  «one  cfnupasB,  and  fo  be  the  better  vajAet' 
stoodM-I  shall  particularly  notice  the  charges,  which 
the  Judge  Advocate,  in  his  opening,  ttkentioned  as 
those  which  he  expected  would  be  substantiated,  and 
I  ^all  not  mnitto  malce  ny  defence  i^ainst  every 
accvisaticm,  ^hich  theri^  lias  been  tiie  least  testimony 
to  support 


The  cardinal  accusations,  If  I  may  be  permitted  so 
to  express  myself,  are  founded  upon  an  alleged  delay 
at  Sandwich,  the  retreat  from  Cuiada,  and  the  sur- 
render at  Detroit.  If  I  can  sati^/y  tiie  Court  that 
tiiese  acts  were  in  tliemselves  necessary,  ot  justifiable, 
it  will  then  remain  for  me  to  answer  such  of  the  ac- 
cusations as  relate  to  the  manner  in  which  these  acts 
were  done,  and  to  answer  also  some  chaiges  not  im- 
medfately  connected  with  these  transacticns.  This 
course  will  embrace  the  whole  <^  my  defence.  "Of 
this  latter  description,  is  the  first  8pecificati<«,  under 
the  «lHffge  of  treason,  which  relates  to  the  vessel  sent 
from  the  Miami,  I  shall  therefore  give  this  a  separate 
considerati<Mi ;  and  as  it  stands*  first  and  highest  in  the 
black  catalogue  of  the  crimes  which  are  imputed  to 
me,  and  is  repeated  in  other  specifications,  I  shall,  in 
the  first  insiuice,  ask  the  attention  of  the  Court  to 
(bis  sulgect. 


> 


1  liave  already  protested  against  the  authority  of 

this  Court  io  decide  upon  this  charge,  because  trea* 

son  is  a  crime  of  which  a  court  martial  has  no  c(^- 

mzance.    Their  power  is  confined  to  such  militarv 

2* 


■v*-i 


6 


DEFENCE  OF 


crimes  -as  are  specified  in  the  articles  of  war.  And 
their  jurisdiction  rs  so  limited,  notonljr  bjr  the  ccmsti'' 
tution,  but  by  the  Teiy  articles  th<Mnselves,  I  have 
thought  it  my  duty^in  the  most  solemn  manner,  tr>  make 
and  insist  on  this  protest,  Tot  Uie  sake  of  repellkg  a 
dangerous  example,  and  not  as  it  respects  myself,  i>r 
the  case  now  onder  yeur  consideration;  for  my  only 
desire  is  to  accjuit  myself  of  the  criminal  acts  and  mo- 
tives which  liave  been  so  wantonly  imputed  to  me. 
If  I  cannot  succeed  in  this,  I  am  indifferent  as  to  the 
names  by  which  the  crimes  may  be  called,  and  if  I 
do  not  acquit  myself  €S  the  other  charges,  which  are 
the  most  wounding  to  the  feelings  of  a  solcUer,  I  am 
equally  indifferent  to  the  punishment  that  may  be  in- 
flicted. I  have  no  desire  to  preserve  a  life,  that  shall 
be  stigmatized  by  a  conviction  of  tins  Court  oh  the 
charges  of  cowardice. 


The  first  specification,  under  the  chaise  of  treasor 
^elates  to  sending  the  vessel,  on  the  first  of  July,  from, 
the  Miami,  with  hospital  stores^  sick,  Vaggage,  and 
army  documents.  As  to  sending  the  vessel  with  what 
she  had  on  board,  except  the  last  article,  it  is  not  dis- 
puted; but  that  for  the  reasons,  which  according  to 
the  testimony  of  general  Mac  Aitiiur,  I  assigned  for 
it  at  the  time,  it  would  not  have  been  an  improper 
measure  had  not  war  been  declared.  The  whole 
.ciiminality  then,  in  this  respect,  rests  on  the  truth,  of 
the  allegation,  that  I  despatched  the  vessel,  knowing 
of  the  war;  and  with  a  design  to  give  traitorous  in- 
tell^ence  to  the  enemy. 


GENERAL  HULL. 


tt  is  very  certain  that  I  had  no  direct  intell^nce 
cf  the  "^m  on  the  first  of  July,  when  the  vessel  was 
desfiatched.    I  had  ^n  the  twentf-sixth  tii  June  re- 
cdved  a  letter  from  the  Secretary  at  War,  dated  on 
the  day  war  was  declared,  the  eighteenth  of  June; 
and  I  afterwards  received  another  letter  from  him  of 
the  same  date,  announcing  to  me  the  declaration  of 
war.    It  seems  to  have  been  intimated  that  the  letter 
of  the  eigliteentb  of  June,  wMch  I  received  on  the 
twentynsixih,  was  the  letter  announcing  the  war. 
But  I  thhd^  the  testimony  of  general  Mac  Arthur 
settles  that  point.    He  acknowledges  that  I  shewed 
him  the  letter  which  I  received  on  the  twenty-sixth 
of  June  at  the  time  I  received  it.    And  also  the  letter 
which  I  received  on  the  second  of  July,  at  the  time 
that  letter  came  to  my  hands.    But  if  the  testimony 
of  general  Mac  Arthur^  »id  other  witnesses,  left  any 
douM  on  this  subject,  it  must  be  removed  by  a  reference 
to  a  letter  from  me  to  the  Secretary  at  War,  which  has 
been  read  by  the  Ju^je  Advocate,  dated  at  Fort  Find- 
lay  on  the  twenty-bixih  Jime,  which  acknowledges 
the  Kce^t  (tf  the  letter  from  him  of  the  eighteenth 
of  June,  which  I  had  then  received.    In  which  I  say, 
"in  ^  event  of  a  mar^**  it  will  be  necessary  to  pur- 
sue c^rtaiik  measures.    I  think  this  is  evidence,  not 
only  that  the  letter,  which  I  had  received  on  the  twen- 
ty-si^rlh  of  June,  was'not  the  letter  which  announced 
the  war,  but  that  the  letter  which  I  did  receive,  gave 
me  no  expectations  that  war  was  declared  when  X 
wrote;. 


■% 


N 


M 


t:*  J 


) 


Ff*'V 


i  jmvimcm  of 

It  may  be  add,  however,  in  the  bmgtkage  of  eome 
of  the  specificai&HiS,  that  thongh  I  had  no  certain  in- 
formation of  the  declaration  of  ifpff  when  I  despatch- 
ed the  vessel,  I  had  **  sufficient  cause  to  know  or  be- 
*'  lieve  that  warthen  existed."    As  I  have  said  the  first 
letter  fromthe  Secretary  at  War  dated  on  the  eighteenth 
of  June,  gave  me  no  cause  to  know  or  t>eiieve  the  fact, 
r!1  that  is  in  that  letter  which  could  hysay  possibility 
be  supposed  to  have  relation  to  sudi  an  event,  are 
these  few  w(Mrds,  "circumstances  have  recently  oc* 
"  cunvMl,  which  render  it  necessary  you  should  pursue 
*<  your  niarch  to  De^it  with  all  possible  expedition." 
This  was  hut  a  reiteration  of  my  former  CMders.    In 
the  letter  from  the  Secretary  at  War  of  the  juiuth  of 
April,  I  am  directed  ''to  repair  with  as  little  delay  as 
**  possible  to  Detroit.**    How  then  was  I  to  infer,  from 
this  letter,  that  war  had  been  declared  ?  I  did  never 
suppose,  that  if  war  was  declared,  I  should  receive  a 
peremptory  order  fnnn  Washingt<Hpi,  to  march  my 
whole  army,  in  all  events,  to  Detroit;  thereby  leav- 
ing the  enemy  at  Maiden,  eighteen  miles  in  my  rear, 
directly  on  my  line  of  communication,  with  all  the 
facilities  which  he  had,  by  reai^on  of  his  command  of 
the  waters,  to  cut  off  my  supplies.    Such  an  oivler  ap- 
peared to  me  so  inconsistent  vflih  my  military  expe- 
rience, that  I  did  not  suppose  it  could  hive  been  found- 
ed on  a  declaration  of  war,  or  even  on  a  prospect  of 
immediate  hostilities.  I  did  suppose,  that,  in  the  event 
of  a  war,  a  discretion  would  have  been  left  me,  to 
conduct  my  troops  in  such  a  manner,  as  I  might  judge 
firom  circumstances  would  be  most  conducive  to  tbei^ 


11/ 


GENERAL  HUIX. 


nectiritjr,  and  most  likely  to  effect  the  destructloii  of 
tiie  enemy;  and  that  I^should  have  been  left  at  liberty 
to  post  my  army  in  what  I  might  think  the  most  ad- 
vantageous situation.  I  did  suppose,  that  when  it  vras 
seen  that  war  would  be  immediate  and  inevitable,  I ' 
should  have  been  informed  ol  measures  taken  to  re- 
iiif(wce  me,  and  to  keep  q;ien  the  road,  which  it  was 
known  I  was  obliged  to  make  for  near  two  hundred 
miles  through  the  wilderuesa,  apd  ou  which  my  army 
must  depend  for  its  supplies.  I  did  suppose,  that  I 
should  have  been  informed  <^  eo-(^rations  intended 
for  my  support,  and  of  means  provided  for  my  eomr 
municating  with  those  who  might  direct  those  coope- 
rations. And  I  did  suppos%i,  that  I  should  have  been 
informed  of  measures,  taken  to  obtain  the  command 
<^  the  waters.  All  my  intercocrse,  as  well  previous- 
ly as  subsequently  to  my  appointment,  as  I  shall  here- 
after prove,  with  the  executive  officers  of  the  govern- 
ment, gave  me  reason  to  expect,  that  all  these  meap 
sures  would  be  pursued  in  the  event  of  a  war.  How 
then  was  I  to  understand,  from  this  simple  intimation, 
that  circumstances  had  occurred  which  required  that 
I  should  pursue  my  march  to  Detroit  with  expedi- 
tion, that  war*#a8  actually  declared  or  immediately 
expected?  Besides,  it  naturally  occurred  to  me,  that 
if  the  circumst&nces  alluded  to  by  the  Secretary  were 
a  declaration  of  war,  or  such  as  would  immediately 
lead  v^o  it,  I  should  be  told  so  explicitly.  I  could  con- 
ceive no  reason  for  making  his  communication  to  me 
in  ambiguous  terms. 

But  it  may  bet  said,  that  general  Mac  Arthur  haa 
proved,  by  the  testimony  which  be  has  given,  relative 


il.  m4 


)   -vl 


:    M 


•  •!.' ;' 


*M 


5>K*  1 


Ul 


,:  ' 


.-- 


to 


DEFENCE  OF 


to  convenatioiu  he  had  'with  me  when  !  received  Uie  ' 
letter  firom  the  Secretary  4t  War,  on  the  tiventy-Blxth 
Junej  and  when  I  despatched  the  vessel  on  the  first 
of  July,  that  I  bad  **  sufficient  cignse  to  know  or 
*'  believe  that  war  then  existed.*' 

.  General  Mac  Arthur's  testimony  on  this  sulgect  is 
AS  follows :  **  On  the  evening  of  the  twenty-sixth  of 
**  June,  an  express  arrived  ttom  Chillicothe,  bearing  a 
**  letter  for  me,  another  for  general  Hull.  I  went 
"  with  the  bearer  to  general  Hull,  who  opened  hb  let- 
**  ter  and  handed  it  to  me.  It  was  from  the  Secretary 
^*  at  War,  dated  June  eighteen,  eighteen  hundred  and 
*'  twelve.  It  stated,  that  circumstances  had  occiwred 
**  that  made  it  necessary  that  the  General  should  pro- 
^  ceed  to  Detroit,  take  measures  for  defence,  and  wait 
**  for  further  orders.    I  also  received  a  letter  from  a 

friend,  quoting  a  postscript  to  a  letter  from  general 
"  Worthington,  a  senator  in  congress,  which  iMMtscript 

said,  *  before  this  reaches  you.  War  will  be  declared.* 
V I  stated  to  Uie  General,  that  col<mel  Dimlap,  the 
*'  H  juer  of  the  express,  had  told  me,  that  before  that 
''time  war  was  dedared.  The  General  than  asked 
**  me  what  I  thought  of  the  Secretary%  letter.  I  svid 
**  I  thought  it  notice  <^  a  declaratifm  of  war.  The 
**  General  sdd  it  seemed  very  much  like  it.  The 
"  General  and  I  had  a  great  deal  of  conversation  on 
^  the  information  we  had,  from  time  to  time,  received, 
we  appeared  to  agree  that  war  was  certainly 

dwjhtfvd.** 


4< 


U 


m^ 


II 


<>• 


GENERAL  HULL.' 


If 


General  Mac  Artliur  fiirtfaer  testifies,  **  that  on  the 
« inorcing  of  the  day  on  which  we  left  the  encamp* 
**  ment  near  the  Miami,  the  General  sent  for  me  to 
*'  his  tent,  and  stated  that  he  thought  (tf  sending  the 
^  bag^ge  by  water  from  that  place.  I  said  I  thought 
"  it  hacardous,  that  possibly  the  British  might  have 
"  informatiim  of  war,  and  might  take  the  vessel. 


"The  General  replied,  he  could  not  imagine 
''^  there  was  any  duiger,  the  wind  was  fair  and  the  ves- 
**  sel  would  pass  in  a  short  time ;  adding  that  he  could 
"  not  take  upon  himself  the  responsibility  of  carrying 
"  on  the  teams  any  furUier.  I  think  there  was  a  ver- 
"■  bal  or  written  order  to  embark  the  baggage.  I  stat- 
*^  ed  to  Ae  General  that  I  did  not  like  to  send  on  my 
'*  baggage,,  but  if  it  was  a  general  order  it  must  be 
*<  complied  with.  We  proceeded  on  towards  Detroit, 
*'  and  on  the  first  or  second  evening  after,  the  com- 
**  mandants  of  cixrpB  were  called  to  the  tent  of  general 
'*  Hull,  and  were  informed,  that  a  letter  had  been  re- 
«  ceived  from  the  Secretary  at  War,  announcing  the 
*'  declaration  of  war.*'  The  witness  further  stated  in 
some  part  of  his  examination,  that  notwithstanding 
the  order,  he  sent  nothing  by  the  vessel  but  his  mesa 
boxes. 

I  mntit  beg  leave  first  to  remark  to  the  Court,  that 
thi»  t«38timony  of  general  Mac  Arthur  affords  strong 
evidence  of  the  fallibility  of  his  memory.  Foriie 
states,  that  the  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  which 
I  shewed  to  hiin  at  Fort  Findlay  on  the  twenty-sixth 


i->^'. . 


.#'' 


.■jfHiiaiiMi«i»»«»*j'i; 


I 


12 


DEFENCE  OF 


¥/•■ 


•  I 


! 

i 


'  ^  L 


] 


w 


W"'- 


\i 


hf, 


k\-.  J 


of  June,  ordered  me  to  "  proceed  to  Detroit,  tak<^  mea- 
sures for  defence,  and  wait  for  further  orders.*'  An  order 
to  prepare  for  defence  would  have  been  a  much  more 
significantintimationof  a  declaration  of  war  than  anj 
thing  the  letter  c6ntaiaed.  A  copy  of  the  letter  fur- 
nished by  the  War  Pepartment  is  before  the  Court,  and 
will  prove  how  far  general  Mac  Arthur  may  be  mis- 
taken. The  expretisions  which  he  gives,  as  having 
been  contained  in  the  letter  which  he  saw  on  the 
twenty-sixth  of  June,  are  contained  in  the  letter  an- 
nouncing the  war,  which  was  shewn  to  him  on  the 
second  of  July.  It  cannot  be  pretended,  that  he  might 
have  seen  this  last  mentioned  letter  on  the  twenty- 
sixth  of  June,  because  if  that  had  been  so,  there  could 
not  have  been,  after  the  explicit  information  contain- 
ed in  that  letter,  any  such  debate,  as  he  states  there 
was  between  us  on  the  twenty-sixth  of  June,  as  to  the 
possibility  of  war  having  been  declared.  I  do  not 
mean  to  charge  general  Mac  Arthur  with  a  wilful  mis- 
representatbn.  I  have  no  doubt  but  that  the  zeal, 
which  he  has  manifested  for  my  conviction,  has  led 
him  into  this  mistake.  As  this  is  the  highest  charge 
i^ainst  me,  he  probably  has  felt  the  most  anxiiety  that 
it  should  be  substantiated ;  and  his  mind  has  adopted 
as  the  impressions  of  his  memory,  what  are  only  the 
results  of  his  wishes.  I  mark  this  inaccuracy  of  ge- 
neral Mac  Arthur  the  more  particularly,  to  shew,  that 
inasmuch  as  he  was  so  materially  mistaken,  with  re- 
spect to  the  contents  of  the  letter  which  he  states  he 
had  in  his  hand,  and  deliberately  perused,  and  has 
confounded  what  passed  at  one  time  with  what  occur- 


'>v.^ 


^^^> 


■'m- 


-  "p  >'  *flHBLMifc^ 


%».- 


^w' 


ilM?,'B2i^ 


'i^'r*'' \^^k£"  JT^ 


^s<*^'f;fj»^ts;*  "-  -  •■ 


■1.  ■;  « 


7      ?  • 


y^ 


r    V 


u 


irfW^»V<« 


when  I  tanoa  ^  ^  ^  fi|»t  <^^.  fty«  Jjijri  had 

^«fPl|^#Bi;^  "Pff^Hipr  to  w^  w^«nevef.wv  wjm 
d^l^J^  I  w^#  p^i^^Oiiiti^  jlpif^  wliifib 
bad  l^yey^ ^cf^ipii^ifjiwa^^  py^Oiwmgli  gemdntl 
Mac  Arjiliiir,  b^  i^P,o()iar  rofv^ttoiitlifii^.^a  ni- 
moun  and  exp^.tati^nf,  w)a^b  h|u|  |lt^«i|j9|^,afloat 
throiigtMWut  the  co^nti7.-rPne  ,cfareunp|i^e,^^ai  a 
•trong  inducement  to  t»flieT§,,  U^  Uie ji(eli»U$)pi,.  Qf 
peace  with  dreat  Biita^i J^  not  b«^,ii|tiPnill(lted« 
When  I  left  Wfshlngtc^ 

to^  me*. it  was  not  eip^^ted  that  war  ¥roiild^b4,<|$h 
clared  Miinpe  the  fqiirtb  of  Juljr.  ^bi»,  if  a  facf, 
ihongb  tile  Secrdai^  at  ]Rrar  bap  answcpfe^  io)  tb«p  ^tb 
interro|atoi7  addrepsed  to  Idm,  Ibf  t  **  ll^.  Md  jMitlt  ipi«b 
/'a  fecoIle^Uqii  of. the  cpqyeii^i^n  lifit-Hfeja,  «p  i|e- 
"  specting  j^e  probable  time  of  the  declffaUon  t^yrjt^i 
*Va>  to  enable  him  to  answer  eatisfiMtorily  on  that 
^•nlject." 


^ 


a 


f  < 


,  pntaalhfdniQton  the  first  <^,.|uljr, wlwn Idea- 
patched  the  vesseli  received  ifagwU  any  infennation 
of  the  declaration  of  war,  I  was  to  presunw,  that  the 
encniy,  i^ould  npt  baye  l^^  |p[^[||p4  of  that  eyent 
It  appeared  io  me  an  iiiacfmUBil|!l^..||ptt^  9n  the 
lid|i|in||tEation,  ^m^p^  it,|^4ble,  that  they  woi^ 
f^e^,  informfition  c^inteiidf^  |9BtiUties  W  be.convey- 
ed  to  the  enemy,  before  it  could  reach  their  own  l6e- 
nerak— Yet  it  was  fourteen  days  after  war  was  der 
elared  b^fofe  ,1  bad  anjr  ^cKijiatiQn  of  it :  ItMHigb 
It  appeajs^  that  a  .letterfromtiiie  Secretary  at  War, 


■'^'^i^^KSiK^S^ 


•"^■'VPii    »P''~ 


^J««l^' 


.j«yf^; 


GENERAL  H^L. 


15 


iilMl'tIi  <)i^  liMKiigtliy^'laMi  the  ^»  eveb 

I  Drko^  ^'yiy  letter  iru''yhii!beA  t4  me  1^  ^  <t<i- 
df  die  dgmeeitli  dT  JUne,  tili  the  t^oibip^     t&e 


dd^'li^tb  itilMlM  nM  by  exprenln  fiW'^yi.  dut 
the  letter  wUehirM  to  give  me  the  int  Woriiifttioii 
of  the  war,  tt  it  left  Waaiyiiglob  t>ii  the  ^hteieiith  or 
niitetMifili  oT  Jmii^yeiiiidf  dot  liij^e  tiliv^  itt  « 
greater  rate  thin  thflfy  mflii  a  day. 


vc 


W»r, 


I  tbinic,  after  this  statement,  the  Court  viUmit  My, 
that  it  -wMtfiosmablein  me  to  conclude,  thai  it  was 
impOMible  the  adiirfhittration  should  hftve  left  ine  ig- 
norant of  the  "irar,  when  it  might  be  known  to  the 
enemy. 

I  beg  to  direct  Oie  ittention  of  the  Court  to  0 
testimony  of  genert^f  dass  upon  this  points  He  had 


^^' 


:r 


^*0 


10  DBFENCB  OP 

«  ptifBet  taowMist  «r  ill  tb»  eiramtaMM,  wlih 


VMiSV  wHBPMPVHM|VnvBOT'*Hflil|  TVMNr*0PiBv'''iMVt 
i^,^y^li*^^i>  jj^i^jj'^i^k  M^aii  jfcV^f  m  iht'iiiiiilli  iniiiiiifi 

clM|illi|^«liiilMttBiiig;  t>  9i6  iM^aMUlillMEOf  wa^, 

Ulkii-^91Um-:'  'Vm-  Mmdoet  is  entire^  faieoinbtMit 
xrUk  lli^'<Biiiiillri<  lntoiitkttt^hich  i^  hnpiiteA  to 

It  reitiaim  for  me  to  notice  that  part  of  this  charge, 
xnrUeli  •ttftit  ttet  1  ptttm  bstrd  tlie  anfy  doetnuentft 
and  (MifMrii,  %li(Bit1iy  tttb  weiny  were  niide  acqoaiiit- 
ed  wHIi  1^  Ibie^  Ipr  the  inajr;^  ^  WNMigtn  of  the 
89veni«iil^«nd  iriih  the  diiellM 

I  do  ilot  hesittite  td  ft^kiiOirle^ge,  that  it  was  im- 
proper to  tnitl  the  doeonieiitf  whkb  were  pttt  on 


.f 


'  ■^^ywwifcjLA|ihb'r ' ' 


sas^^sizr'aigt-^attiLt^'!; 


"ffli.:'  '0t.'3)-<rt,~ '■  >^'" 


GSNEHAL  HtTLL. 


17 


Im^  that  TeiMl  to  siieli  a  eoBT«yiiioe»  or  oTon  for 
BM  to  put  with  them  fai  anj  way,  whether  hi  peace  or 
war.  But  I  tnut  It  hae  aatMutoril  j  appeared  to  the 
Court,  ftoni  the  teitlmony  ofoaptalii  Hull,  that  this 
waa  owing  to  an  aieoldent,  i^hich  might  have  ha|^ 
pened  to  the  moat  careful  eommaader.  I  had  ordered 
my  baggage  to  be  put  on  board  the  veiscl,  m>t  np- 
poting  It  poaallde  that  the  trunk,  eontalidng  my  pa- 
pen,  could  have  been  considered  by  ray  aida^e^amp 
Included  In  that  order,  and  it  was  not  till  after  the  ves- 
sel had  departed,  that  with  equal  surprise  ;uid  regret  I 
leamt  that  n^  alds'^densa  ip  had,  with  rny  bi^;gag«, 
ahlpped  a  trunk  which  contained  noticing  but  papers. 
There  Is  one  allegation  In  this  charg';,  that  I  feel  my- 
self anthoriud  to  repdi  with  ome  lov^^gha&m'  becaui<ie 
I  think  H  could  only  have  been  made  with  iew  to 
exoidpate  others  fiom  misc<mduct  at  my  *  xj^ense,  by 
an  attempt  to  make  it  be  believed.  .I.?.t  the  enemy  <  - 
rived  a  knowledge  of  the  war  froM  tb-j  capture  of  thUs 
vessel.  If  this  were  so,  how  is  i^  to  be  accounted  for, 
that  the  enemy  should  have  assailed  her  in  a  hostile 
manner  before  she  was  captured  ? 


%      M 


The  Court  will  recollect,  that^lleutenant  Ooodding 
states,  that  when  the  vessel  was  offBois  Bench  Island, 
theenen^y's  armed  brig  Hunter  bore  down  upon  her, 
and  that  she  was  pursued  by  abatteau  from  Maiden, 
filled  with  armed  mer .  Rut  the  suggestion,  that  the 
«nemy  derived  their  i^.^  >wledge  of  the  declaration  of 
war  from  the  papeia  lirand  on  board  the  vessel,  is  re- 
pelled by  the  fact,  fTjallMs  vessel  had  no  documents  oji 

board  which  cc^jld  possibly  give  them  that  information. 
3*  _ 


IS 


B^BNCK  OF 


She  eoold  not  have  1|mI,  Ibr  I  M  ao  meh  d«eamiili 
in  mj  poMeanon  at  the  tine  shaiaile^fiwn  ti^e  Rii{^ 
of  the  Miami.  Itisalso'«&ir  vt^hvisnownotorioiip* 
that  the  enemy  bad  roeeived  infenu^n  o&t^e  passing 
of  the  act  declaring  war#  seveial  4ay •  b^we  I  l»d  any 
communication  front  Washington  on  the  sul^ject  It  is 
as  ungenerous  as  it  is  mymU  to  chaige  the  enmny's 
prior  knowledge  of  the  deekuraiiott  of  war  to  any  a^ 
ofndne. 

y  -■-■-■ 

I  have  now  dosed  my  defimce  on  this  ftist  spteii- 
cation  imder  tlw  chai|^  of  treason.  And  aj^hoii^i 
persistinmy  oiyectionto  tbuConrfs  taking  cQgnisaac;^ 
of  that  crime,  yet  I  have  givf»n  thechai^e  a  foU  exani- 
nation,  because  tihe  same  facts  ore  specified  iini^r«  the 
chaige  of  mu^cer^eeondttot.  Andlshallt^  ^pion 
what  I  Uave  now'  said  fwn^  vindkatjoa  apdnst  the 
specificatioii  whiiA  relatea  to  ihb  snlgiecl  nndcv  that 
<$haige. 


y 


To  sustain  fliis  charge  of  trMson  there  are  two  other 
specifications,  one  relating  to  the  supposed.deIay  in  at- 
tacking Maiden  and  tiie  retreat  from  San^ich :  the 
other  to  the  surrender  of  Detroit^  Bnt  aa  tiiore  is  a 
repetitiMi  of  these  specifications  under  the  two  other 
charges,  I  shall  not  now  notice  them  further  than  to 
Observe,  that  these  speeificatkms,  ui^r  the  chai^  of 
treascm,  allege,  that  tiie  d^y,  the  retreat,  andiba  si««* 
render,  wer«  all  in  pmniaace  of  a  traitoreos  eomttlapip 
Hon  and  c<m^baey  between  me  and  certain  eneHi^ 
Of  the  United  States,  whose  names  are  unknown.  If 
the  Court  had  cogniaance  of  this  crime  of  treason^  t 


G]QNE»4I<  gVX'L. 


10 


cooklaoi  be  <miTipt«d,  wdim 4]»e  U^fomcospiiin- 
tion-aad  coiifpir»ey  were  piovec^  I  inigbt  ask,  vhete 
js.the  evidenee  of  any  conibiiiatfoa  wt  conajpiracy  be- 
tween me  and  the  enemy  1  Bat  I  forbear  with  indignar 
tion  the  exanunation  of  such  a  questkin*»AiKi  now, 
when  the  Cc*irt  has  b^^Mre  it  all  the  testimony  that  the 
utmost  e0BMcto  of  b^  proeeentoni  have  been  able  to  brin^ 
i^nsft  mO)  I  ask  them  to  jn^e  from  what  malignant 
source  the  information  which  could  have  suggested 
this  chai^')  mu8t  have  been  drawn.  Some  of  the  wit- 
nessM  who  have  testified  «i;ainst  me*  must  hajfe  for-^ 
nished  the  materials*  bom  wliich  tl^  gentleman  em* 
pl^ed  by  the  government  to  frame  the  charges  must 
have  dtaawn  tticasn.  They  must  then  have  made  sng-- 
gestions  to  Mm,  whiefa  tiiey  dve  not  attempt  to  rnp^ 
fott  by  ^^  own  «a^  or  ]^  one  partiQle  of  i»oof ;^ 
and  which  coidd  hive  resulted  only  Irom  tlM^^attemei^ 
of  tiwirowtt  hearts  towards  me. 

Pmtwant  to  the  arrangement  of  my  defimee,  wlucli 
I  have  before  snggested,  I  shall  ne^t  consider  the  spe* 
pificationB,  which  charge  me  with  crimes,  or  miscon- 
duct,ln  delaying  toattaek  MaUteniln  wMhdrawinf  th^ 
army  from  Canada ;  and  in  making  the  final  ^unevder. 


'.fii 


i 


There  are,  as  I  hav e  aaldy  JMseBflMMa*  wli^  eie 
not  immediately  connected  with  these  transaetifnis, 
and  these  I  ahaU  notice  in  the  jcowne  of  aif  4efeiic«' 
Bat  if  i  shouU  satisfy  this  Court,  tkat  theae  cardinal 
accusations  aie^  Bnsnpported,  that  the  jaeasurc^  t» 
which  they  reier  were  fit  and  pn|ier,  and  swMaas  caf* 


1 


■i-i 


20 


DEFENCE  OF 


cumstances  required ;  (w  if  it  liioiitd  non  appear,  that 
a  different  course  in  respect  to  either  of  tliese  meas* . 
ttres  ought  to  have  t>een  adq;»ted,  yet  if  I  sliould  sa> 
tiafy  the  members  of  this  Court,  that  in  my  conduct 
upon  these  eccasitnu,  I  have  been  actuated  by  the 
purest  motives,  and  a  sense  of  duty,  I  trust  I  sluJl 
not  be  judged  criminal.  I  shall  not  pretend,  that  I 
may  not  have  erred,  but  error  and  crime  are  not  con- 
vertible terms. 

When  I  accepted  a  commission  from  the  govern- 
ment, I  pledged  to  them  my  utmost  zeal  and  abili^, 
in  discharge  oi  the  duties  of  the  <Ace  they  conferred 
upon  me ;  and  I  trust  that  pledge  will  not  be  consid- 
ered  as  forfeited,  though  it  should  >appear  to  this 
Court,  that  on  some  occasions  my  judgment  may 
have  misdirected  me.  The  pn^ession  of  a  s(ddier 
would  not  be  longer  honourable,  if  neither  the  purest 
intentions,  nor  the  most  zealous  exertions  could  shir  Id 
him^frcm  criminal  imputations  on  the  errors  (^  his 
judgmeqt 

My  defence,  Mr.  President,  on  these  ppints,  as 
well  as  all  others,  will  be  a  rdatiion  of  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances, and  an  exposition  of  the  considerations 
and  motives  which  have  governed  my  conduct 

You  cannot,  Gentlemen,  form  a  just  decision  upon 
my  case,  nor  judge  of  the  considerations  which  have 
influenced  my  conduct,  unless  you  understand  what 
were  my  views,  and  the  views  ancl  expectations  of  the 


,>:i 


£#*Ka^^^j 


6ENEHAL  HUIX. 


2i 


•xecntlTe  offieen  of  the  govemmeiit  of  the  Umted 
i>»((^  111  Mij^t  tD^he^i^^ 
tll)ii>  i&d  ot^eett^  irfaen  f  iMceptMl  my  eommlBiion  in 
Apili,'^<i^hteclii  hundred  and  twelve. 


I  ftief  tOt^illDBi^Ktham^^  in  presenting  to  yon  tiii? 
dMlH^  '  I^i«i^  #iai  a^are^  that  H  may  be 
ttt''l!XMa|^«!)  myself  by 
f  %4tt  kmiw-  foo^  that  the  political 
feelings  of  many  penooa  are  so  smsiye  aiid  warm, 
tibat  ^  slightest  fanpntation  of  miscondoct  against 
m^m0SBml&^^  pHiMI^  and 

m  ^'mitfe  Hhtol^  f»  he  imised, 
lilftrge  isi^iidi  fi^te/4i&b  pMseented 
yfM  iit^aitiifratioii    6ii4  GflHkUeiminH  I  shall  say 
liibih^  ^ISgtf  otteel^  of  thefovemroeht,  whieh  b  not 


supported  fay  irrefiragabte  testimony^*  I  sfaaH  onfypre^ 
sent  fbr  your  ftoniiideration  facts,  which  aire  prioved  by 
doeiimfnW  hilbre  you,  and  shall  midle  na  obsenrailons 
iipon  fiiem,  which  are  not  obviously  and  absolutely 
niweisafy  for  my  defeacis.  Much  Idss^hiU  I  attempt 
to  cha^  the  administration  with  any  WiU^  miscon- 
duct*  I  brieve  evwy  m«nliip  itf  4^  ^  have  been  ae* 
tuated  faf  "the  piarest  motives,  and  the  most  ardent  seal 
in  pMpamtfon^  for  tod  prosecution  of  an  Inevitable 
war.  A  law,  in  which  I  should  never  have  enlisted, 
had  I  not  believed  it  both  just  and  nece«utf> .  And 
while  my  country  is  engaged  in  such  a  ccmtest,  let  my 
former  services  to  her,  let  my  fionner  character  shield 
me  from  the  suspicion,  that  I  woul^  voluntarily  say 
one  word,"  that  shall  lessen  the  confidence  of  my 


|:   I 


m 


jm 


'■^■.v^sSffii. '•■-*»*■ 't?,. 


at 


DEI«EN€BOir^ 


countiymen  in  tJhoce,  ondlr  wttow  atui^iees  our  bat' 
tiM  mwt  be  fought, «licl#  #lJbM%lld<»m  and  tir^'^ 
our  miifortiuieB  are  to  b(^  redeemed,  and  our  honour  iii) 
to  be-  saved.  *  .     ' 


l'i),W(' 


Bntin  my  oi«m  'vtetteattdn^vna  in  d^ftnee  of  ihat 
lienoiir,  whleh^(i«ego>(heMM&eiiitlikTi/  ^iNrtibtWirtaii; 
lam  obl%edlo«iy,  tuit  thivinty  I  eMliiiMii^Mik^ 
not  that  cooperation  and  rajtport,  whlcb,%tM#'I  W 
cepted  my  commisBion,  the  govemment  gave  me  rea> 
aonf  b^Hpeet,  aUd  ^imkni^liili^^pmpUM 
BhoaM  b«v«fv  y^m  the  (M^  lliil  %l&  fi^^ 
liiy^jibiilittiBid^  hiif^iK^     of  <^ii^til|tf Mi^ 
o|»efitionB  agii^  tlj^i'  CinUffli^  ''nS  ^iriii  y^l 
plaeed  my  aiiiiy;  uid^'in  0Bib^m»^i^1^ti^ 
situation,  in  which  it  was,  after  ito'  anivarSii  tilWit^ 
ten  of  lake  Erie. 


I'^ 


When  I  aeeeptdl  the  conunand  of  the  nwth-west- 
em  army,  I  did  not  suppose,  that,  in  tibe  event  of  a 
war  wiUi  Great  Britain*  the  force  of  that  army  would 
be  ojJIbgfiNifo  to  (|<HU)iJer  Vppe^^^  nw  cttd  I  be- 

lieve, that  the  administrftton  bad  such  aokOflMiOH. 
But  on  the  contracy,  1  did  undeirstaBdi  aii#«ttcb  it 
will  appei'w  was  the  understMidb^;  of  tifie  exttimlive 
officers  of  the  government^  that  in  the  event  of  a  war, 
the  operations  of  my  amgr  ?rould  be  strei^^ened 
and  secured  by  a  competent  naval  force  on  lake 
Erie,  and  by  the  direction  of  other  forces  against  the 
enemy*H  territory. 

Had  these  expectations  been  reaUced,  instead  of 
having  lingered  out  so  many  months  as  a  prosecuted 


OENEIIAL  HITI4L.  28 

crimiiutl;  IniUe&d  of  now  standing  before  you  as  an 
accwed,  I  might  still  bave  shared  1117  country's  con- 
fidence. 

The  foul  charges,  to  ivhich  I  am  now  to  answer, 
would  not  have  thus  blasted  the  laurels  of  my  youth; 
but  even  in  the  wilds  of  Canada,  and  amidst  these 
whitened  locks,  they  might  hav^  retained  iueir  pris- 
tine verdure, 

I  proceed,  Gentlemen,  to  turn  your  attention  to  the 
documents,  by  a  reference  to  which  I  mean  to  i^ew, 
what  were  my  views  and  expectations,  and  what  I 
bad  a  right  to  suppose  were  the  views  and  expecta* 
tions  of  the  administration,  pn  the  sulyect  which  we 
are  now  ccmsidering. 

The  first  paper  read  by  the  Judge  Advocate  was  a 
memorial  addressed  by  me,  in  eighteei^  hundired  and 
nine,  to  the  then  Secretary  at  War. 

From,  this  memorial  the  following  is  an  extract  :-~ 

**  My  residence  at  Dethyit,fivf  four  yean,  has  given 
**me  some  knowledge  of  our  northern  and  western 
**  ftontlnr,  and  I  tale  the  liberty  of  conmranicating  to 
*"  ysn  such  facts  as  have  fallen  iriider  my  observation, 
**  ^cpinbn  I  have  formed,  and  the  measures,  which 
**  appGior'to  me  tl»  most  expedient  undei  the  existing' 
*<  itlR^  of  things.'* 

After  a  varied  -of  ^n^gestkoM^  and  «n»Mig  o^ers, 
Ifaat  though  war  should  not  take  place,  it  would  be 


t     VI 


.m.^^ 


^WSSfEWGUL  W 


neeennsty  ib  have  a  larger  flttce  in  VfpetOtMnik 
tlHm  wu  thcjki  ihtre*    *tlit  memoiial  to  ts  faXHmt^i^ 


"  J  would  likewise  suggest,  for  consideration,  the  ex- 
'■*  pediency  of  building  some  armed  veeselt  on  lake 
*'  Erie,  for  the  purpose  of  pre^^jrvkig  the  conmninica- 
"  tion.  CMsider,  you  hnvo  ihree  nnlUarii  posts  to  the 
"north  and  west  of  thet>e  maters,  and  sr:  other  eooi- 
"  ittunication  with  them.'' 

It  is  i>sie,  this  n?0in«rial  Was  ^vritton  Ir  dnh,  of 
\y^we,  hat  ^  saggestiou,  as  fa  the  naral  foroer  eoidd 

only'he-v5th-refeTenodtoit»wfeii»'?vaR  ■■     * 


ft 


I  do  not  Imow  ku^  ^«liat|»lrpc<;o'^s  manlorinl  was 
read  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  unless  it  w«re  to  lAiew, 
of  what  importance  I  thought  our  possession  of  De- 
troit .  tSir,  my  opimtota  on  &at  sal^et  has  eve#  haen, 
and  is  y«t  tiie  sa^ie,  JBS  etspMSM^iii  Ikat  tmmtiM. 
I  thoi^ht  the  admiiiistratleB  had  the  same  auitfrnants, 
and  tiierefore  I  wa«  the  nuMre  firmly  persuaded,  that 
fh^woaidliave  taken  eveiy  possible  aiieanslo  sup- 
port the  army,  wUch  vras  sent  for  Hs<piOtei8*lsn« 
At  the  moment  Z  was  surrenderiiq^  thai  fENrtrvw,  a 
conviction  of  its  grisafe^  hnpaatagea  lnaiMiad  the 
poignant  regret^  vrhicbllMi^lBv  the  neaeaii^  of  the 
Measore. 

<!>n^^tl««h^  Mallsh,  a^fikfeeniMiBdff^^ 
wMeh  was  altant  a  month  befbre  I  was  appointed  to 
a  cdnmBMid^  iahlkit  «a»iiqr>^J  sMMsspiMii '  aoillMr inte- 
nM9ial  to  the  adnnttistration,  whiekis  aatppovtant 


LHi^uih^'^;^ 


V""-*^ -->— I 


Sk:«ii«tt^ 


GENERAL  HULL. 


26 


losliew  my  views,  \vith  respect  to  the  force  to  be  di- 
rected iftgainst  Ui^er  Canada  in  the  event  of  a  war, 
that  1  beg  leave  to  read  the  whole  of  it  It  is  In  the 
following  words : 

(copy,) 


*<  Washington,  March  0, 1812. 


« 


Bia, 


"  The  prompt  manner  in  which  you  have  adopted 
measures  Tor  the  protection  of  Detroit,  attd  the  other 
settlements  in  the  territory  of  Michigan,  inspires  me 
with  confidence,  that  such  ulteriour  arrangements  will 
speedily  be  made,  as  the  peculiar  situation  of  that 
section  of  the  United  States  may  require. 

**How  far  the  measures  already  adopted  will  give 
security  to»that  part  of  the  cpuntry,  in  the  event  of 
war  with  Qreat-Britain,  is  a  subject  worthy  of  con- 
sideration. 

«  Officers  of  a  company  have  been  appointed,  with 
orders  to  recruit  in  the  territory. 


.■irt*» 


"The  Secretary,  acting  as  Governour,  has  been  ait* 
ihorized  to  make  a  detachment  of  four  eompauies  of 
militia,  and  call  them  into  actual  service. 


"■W 


"  The  commanding  (^Bcer  of  Fort  Detroit  has  been 
directed  to  erect  batteries  on  the  banks  c^  the  river 
Detfoiti  for  the  protection  of  the  town. 

4 


/' 


3*uJ-^„ 


WH^p*^'-, 


^t:^j:M,jLM.Mt- 


2d 


DBPENCE  OP 


W 


;'>V:(* 


•(  Tbese,  u  inoipient  oieaMirei,  I  very  muchapprove. 
and  was  pardculariy  pleated  with  the  decisive  man- 
ner tiiey  were  adopted.  li  most  be  apparent,  how- 
ever*  they  add  no  phifsiaU  strength  to  that  section  of 
the  country;  the  force  already  there  is  only  better 
organized  and  prepared  to  be  called  into,  action*.  The 
comparing  of  this  force  with  the  force  which  may  be 
opposed  to  us,  will  evince  the  necessity  of  additional 
means  of  defence,  if  the  country  is  worth  presevtii^. 

"In  the  fort  of  Detroit,  Ir  understand  by  the  last  re< 
turns,  th^re  are  less  than  ono  hun^teed'  regulars.  The 
population  of  the  territory,  is  less  than  five  thousand, 
and  this  p<^ulation  of  the  territory  principally  Of  Ca- 
nadian  character.  Connected  with  the  post  of  De» 
troit,  and  three  hundred  miles  north,  is  the  island  of 
Michilimackinac,  /vthere  is  a  fort  garrisoned  by  a 
company  of  regulars.  Near  the  south  bead  of  lake 
Michigan,  <«  the  westerly  side,  ia  Fort  Deaabon^, 
likewise  garrisoned  by  a  company  oS  regulars. 

"  Thb  is  all  the  force  on  which  we  can  at  present 
calculate,,  for  the  safety  of  ourfiontier,  and  for  the 
protection  m"  the  Indians,  which  the  United  States 
we  bound  by  treaties  to  afibcd* 

"  No  support  can  be  dcriv^  firam  tie  Indian.nations* 
even  in  the  event  of  war,  because  our  oflBcers  are  in- 
structed, to. advise  them,  to  remain  neuter,  and  iiot  to 
accept  their  servicM  if  they  should  be  offered. 


Ui.  ;fi' 


GENERAL  HULL. 


af 


**  1  will  now  conalder  the  Biitish  foree  oppoMd  to 
this  part  of  the  United  States.  A  fort  at  AulieiiiV^ 
burgh,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Detroit  riter,  gartfsoiied 
by  about  one  hundred  British  troops.  Another  foH 
<m  the  island  of  8tv  Joseph^s,  at  the  month  of  the  river 
St.  Mai7*s,  garrisoned  by  about  fifty  British  troops. 
Two  armed  ships  on  lake  Erie,  which  command  the 
watMs,  and  wouM  prevent  all  eommnnication  fbom  thi 
States  through  t|mt  channel.  A  population  ok'  at  leaist 
fifty  thousand  in  timt  part  of  Upper  Canada,  which  is 
ciMinected  with  the  DetrMt  river  and  lake  Erie;  and 
could  easily  be  brought  to  operate  against  our  settte- 
ments. 

"  About  ^^Mhwijmd  men,  principally  CrttHadiaBB 
employed  in  the  Hiimiir  ife^fe  jAfj^der 
fluenon^jundtastly  may  be  reckoned  all  the  Ihdbtfs 
ineilHpi^uanada,  and  a  large-  proportion  of  the  pow- 
erftil  hations  residii^;  in  the  territory  <tf  the  IBBMI 
States,  Who  now  hold  a  constant  and  friendly  Ihter* 
coarse  with  tiie  British  agents,  and  are  libemlty  fed 
and  clothed  by  the  bounty  of  the  British  gdvemment. 


in-  /myi^^^i 


,1    :l. 


**  It  appears,  from  this  statement,  that  the  Britkih 
force  which  can  be  brought  to  operate  against  us  in 
the  territory,  ismore  than  ten  to  one,  without  includ- 
ing the  IndiaoL. 

"  It  requires  no  difficult  reasoning  to  deterinine  what 
must  be  the  ccmsequence.  That  part  of  the  United 
States  must  fall  into  the  handi  of  the  British  goverii- 


-w.^    ■  3»fc- 


w    "^v 


28 


DEFENCE  OF 


ment,  with  all  the  inhabitants,  the  forts  at  Chicago, 
MichilimacldnaG  and  Detroit,  and  all  the  public  stores, 
with  the  public  and  private  vesseli  on  the  lake. 
This  will  give  our  enendes  the  entire  command  of  all 
the  country  north  and  north-west  of  the  Miand  of 
lake  Erie ;  and  the  settlements  on  the  western  part 
of  the  state  of  Ohio  will  be  sut\)eGt  to  the  depreda- 
tions of  the  powerful  northern  ntLtU>u '  of  savages*  * 
There  is  nothing  in  my  opinion  (in  the  event  of  war) 
can  prevent  this  state  of  things,  but  an  adequate  force 
on  the  Detroit  river,  opposite  to  the  settlements  in 
Upper  Canada. 

"It  may  be  asked,  how  is  this  force  to  b^  placed 
there,  and  how  is  it  to  be  supported  ?  If,  Sir,  we  can- 
not command  the  ocean,  we  canibommand  the  inland 
lakes  of  our  country.  I  have  alwaya  been  of  the 
opinion  that  we  ought  to  have  built  as  many  armed 
vessels  on  the  lakes  as  would  have  commanded  them. 
We  have  more  interest  in  them  than  the  British  na- 
tion, aikl  can  build  vessels  with  more  convenience^ 
If  however  there  .is  no  4ntention  of  the  kind,  that 
communication  must  be  abandoned  until  we  tak^ 
possession  of  the  Canadas. 


(( 


The  army  which  marches  into  the  country  must 
open  roads  through  the  wilderness,  and  the  supplies 
of  provisions,  and  whatever  else  may  be  necessary, 
must  pass  by  land  through  the  state  of  Ohio. 


**  If  the  conquest  of  the  Canadas  is  the  object  of  the 
Government,  they  will  there  have  an  ari^y  ia  a 


■/J 


GENERAL  HULL. 


20 


proper  siftiation  to  commenee  opeimttons,  and  at 
the  lame  time  protect  the  defenceless  inhabitant!,  and 
controul  the  Indians  within  our  territory.  The  answer 
proliably  may  be,  it  is  more  expedient  to  leave  ihp 
Michigan  territory  to  its  fate  atad  direct  the  (brce  to 
Montreal.  Thb  will  prevent  all  communication  by 
the  St  Lawrence  with  Upper  Canada,  and  it  must  of 
eoune  surrender.  In  this  expectation  I  think  it 
probable  there  ttroidd  be  a  disappointment,  if  a  force 
is  not  sent  sofflcietft  to  oppose  the  British  force,  which 
may  be  (collected  at  Amherstburgh  and  its  vicinity. 
Detroit,  Michilimackinac,  and*  Chici^o  must  fall. 
The  inhabitants  must  once  more  change  their  alle* 
glance,  and  the  Indians  become  the  exclusive  friendii 
and  allies  of  the  king,  their  great  father. 


in 


% 


fi 


**  In  the  garrisons  at  these  places  they  will  find  latge 
quantities  of  arms  and  military  stores  of  every  kind. 
Upper  Canada  and  our  countiy,of  which  they  will  be 
in  the  possession,  will  furnish  them  with  provisions. 
How  then  will  Upper  Canada  be  conquered,  by  pos^ 
sessing  Montreal?  They  will  be  in  the  quiet  posses- 
sion  of  their  country,  and  a  part  ot  ours,  nod  how  are 
they  to  be  approached?  You  cannot  approach  them 
by  water,  because  they  command  the  lakes.  In  ap-^ 
proachittg  by  land,  you  must  pass  through  a  wildeiv 
ness,  filled  With  savages,  under  British  controul,  and 
devoted  to  British  interest. — The  consequences  of 
such  an  attempt  may  probably  be  best  learned  JTrom 
^e  Mstory  of  the  cunpaign  in  that  ,veiy  country* 
««M|ductedby  generals  Haimer,  82.  Clair,  and  Wayne^ 
4*  / 


,\"A 


•/■ 


V  s 


\  . 


90 


DEFENOI   OP 


Id  Upper  Canada  ih9j  hh-  \  goveraour,  who  ii  a 
nu^or-general  in  their  army,  uua  .rho  conunandt  the 
regular  troops,  the  militia,  and  the  Indiani.  The  whole 
force  of  the  country  is  therefore  combined  under 
his  command,  and  may  be  directed  to  a  single  point 
without  any  collision. 


'i 


**  From  the  preceding  statement  of  facts  and  obser^ 
vations  it  must  be  apparent,  that  Fort  Detroit  and 
the  settlements  in  its  neighbourhood,  and  lil(ewise 
Michilimaokinac  and  Chicago,  under  present  circum- 
stances, are  in  th^  power  of  the  British,  and  that  their 
possessicm  of  them  would  be  extremely  calamitous  to 
the  United  States. 


N^ 


"  In  the  event  of  peace  with  England,  I  am  of  the 
opinion,  that  the  northern  frontier  ought  to  be  better 
(Hotected  than  it  is  at  present  In  the  event  of  war, 
and  the  (direct  being  the  reduction  of  the  provinces* 
of  tipper  and  Lower  Canada,  I  think  it  must  be  evi- 
dent,  that  the  establishment  of  an  army  at  Detroit, 
suflloient  to  defend  that  part  of  the  eountiy,  controul 
the  Indians,  and  commence  q)erationson  the  weakest 
points  of  defence  of  the  enemy,  would  be  an  incipient 
measure,  indispensably  necessary.  With  respect  to 
the  other  points  Of  attack,  I  shall  make  no  observa* 
tions,  as  I  probably  shall  have  no  agency  in  them. 


I 


r 


i 


\  dl 


**  In  considering  this  sulgect,  I  have  endeavoured  to 

divest  myself  of  all  local  feelings,  and  have  grom^ed 

y  observations  and  opinions  on  public  connderationa 


f  ' 


GENERAL  HULL. 


•1 


alone.  Two  thlngt  appear  tajne  to  be  eertaiiit  one 
if,  that  in  tiie  event  of  war,  tlie  enemj  will  attempt  to 
take  poMenion  of  that  country,  with  a  view  to  obtain 
the  ambtance  oT  the  Indians  residing  In  our  territory; 
and  the  other,  that  under  its  present  circunutancet 
of  defence  it  will  be  in  their  power  to  do  it  A  part 
of  your  army,  now  recruiting,  may  be  as  well  support- 
ed and  disciplined  at  Detroit  as  at  any  other  place. 
A  foi^e  adequate  to  the-  defence  of  that  vulnerable 
point,  would  prevent  a  war  with  the  savages,  and  pro- 
bably induce  the  enemy  to  abandon  the  province  of 
Upper  Canada  without  opposition.  The  naval  force 
on  the  lakes  would,  in  that  event,  fall  into  our  pos- 
session, and  we  should  obtain  the  command  of  the 
waters,  without  the  expense  of  building  such  a  force. 

"  The  Britbh  cannot  hold  Upper  Canada  without 
the  assistance  of  the  Indians,  and  that  assistance  they 
cannot  obtaii»  if  we  have  an  adequate  force  in  the 
8ituati<ni  I  have  pointed  out. 

"There  is  another  consideration  veiy  important.  It 
'  will  do  more  to  prevent  a  general  Indian  War  with 
the  Indians,  as  far  west  and  beyond  the  Mississiirf,  than 
any  other  measure.  The  Indians  cannot  conduct  a 
war  without  the  assistance  of  a  civilised  nation.  The 
British  establishment  at  Amherstburgh  is  the  |^at 
emporium,  flimi  which  even  the  most  distant  Indians 
receive  their  supplies.  A  force,  at  the  point  I  men- 
tioned, would  prevent  aH  commttnicati<Hi  of  the  Indians  , 
with  that  post  '  Indeed,  Sk,  in  eveiy  point  of  view 


m 


s  ■ 


^ 


dfif'BKcJs  or 


in  Vfhkih  the  Imiyeel  oftii  beettiidd^wcl,  it  appeto  td 
nie  of  tbe  first  in^pwteac^  to  ftdc4>t  ttie  meafluile. 

"  i  am  veiy  respectfuiljr, 

*'  Your  most  obedient  servant, 

"William  Hull.'* 


To  tbis  docmneiit  is  iuinexed  a  copy  of  a  letter 
from  me  tr  tbe  Secretaity  at  War,  and  the  two  tdocu* 
ments  are  certified  as  authentic  documents  in  the  fol-: 
lowing  w(Hrds : 

"  Copy  of  the  original  on  file  in  the  Waroffice. 

"D.  Parkee,  Chief  Clerk.**^ 

Can  it  be  supposed,  after  tiiis  exposition  of  my 
views  of  what  would  be  the  enemy's  force  and  situa- 
tion, that  I  could  ever  have  taken  the  command  of 
about  four  hundred  regular  troops,  and  sixteen  hun- 
dred militia,  to  effect,  by  means  of  such  a  fince,  with- 
out any  assistance  or  co-operation,  the  conquest  of  a 
province,  a  part  only  of  whic'.  I  had  represented  as 
containing  fifty  thousand  inhabitants?  That  I  could 
'  have  contemplated  an  attack  on  an  enemy ,liaving  at 
its  disposal,  a  body  d  regular  troops,  the  controul  over 
countless  savages,  and  the  great  advantage  Of ,  the 
command  of  the  lakes  and  waters?  This  memorii^ 
was  received  and  approved  by  the  Government.  Thi» 
in  Ljself  is  proof  of  their  adoption  oi  its  sentiments, 
and  that  it  was  their  opinion,  as  well  ae  nune,  that 
in  the  event  of  a  war,  such  an  army  as  was  pirt  under 
my  command  could  do  nothing  (tensive,  unless  we- 


Ml 


(i 


Wl 


"of  I 
"thj 

*wi 


GENERAL  HULL. 


33' 


had  a  naval  foree  en  the  upper  lakes;  and  without  a 
co-operatknM>n  other  parts  of  the  eneuiy's  territory^ 
which  should  dutract  hjs  attention,  and  prevent  his 
bringing  the  greatest  weight  of  his  power  on  a  single 
point. 

A  few  days  after  I  was  appointed  to  the  command 
of  the  north  western  army,  I  presented  another  me* 
morial  ta  the  President,  4l>n>ugh  the  War-  Depart- 
ment, in  which  I  was  explicit,  as  to  what  might  be 
expected  from  such  a  force,  as  I  was  tO-  lead;  as. 
to  the  necessity  of  reinforcements;  of  our  com- 
manding the  lakes ;  and  of  a  co-operation  in  other 
quarters.  My  drafSt  of  this  memorial  I  have  lost,  in 
the  way  which  I  shriti  hereafter  explain.  The  ex- 
istence of  the  original,  and  its-  general  purport,  is 
proved  by  Mr.  Eustis,  who,  in  his  answer  to  the  sixth 
and  seventh  interrogatories,  addressed  to  him,  say8« 
**  I  have  a  perfect  recollection  of  your  having  present- 
'*  ed  the  memorial  referred  to  in  the  interrc^atory.  I 
**  recollect,"  he  adds,  '*  your  attendance,  by  :'ppointp 
"  ment,  at  the  War  Office.  The  memorial,  or  that  part 
**  of  it  which  related  to  the  naval  defence  of  lake  Er*e, 
^*  was  referred,  or  communicated,  to  the  Secretary  of 
**the  Navy,  who  was  present.  The  bi%  Adams, 
"  which  had  been  employed  as  a  transport,  under  di- 
"  rection  of  the  War  Department,  became  the  sulgect 
**  (rf*  conversation.  Whether  she  was  (being  then  on 
'*  the  stocks  repairing)  actuaUy  transferred  to  the  Navy 
<*  Department,  I  do  not  distinctly  recollect.  If  that 
^  was  the  case,  the  evidence  is  on  rtcord,'' 


m 


I .... 


■^v*-* 


.F 


% 


■'. 


34 


DEFENCE  OF 


Yet  Hub  menuNriiil,  or  a  citpj  of  it,  I  have  neve^' 
been  aUe  to  obtain.  I  hare  applied  foibit  to  the  Se- 
cietaiy  at  War.  He  referred  me  to  the  SecretMy  of 
the  Navy;  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  Mr.  Dallas; 
to  him  I  applied^  and  he  referred  me  to  the  present 
Judge  Advocate,  who  knows  nothing  of  it. 

And  finally,  when  my  tiial  commenced  in  this 
city,  I  addressed  a  lette||  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  requesting  Mm,  to  inteipose  his  wotho- 
rity  to  procure  me  a  document,  which  I  considered 
so  important  in  my  d^ence* 


I    I 


It  was,  Sif,  too  much  f<Mr  me  to  have  expiated  an 
answer  ^m^;the  JPresident  himself,  though  the  time 
has  been,  when  such  an  answer  would  not  have  been 
considered  as  c<Htfening  too  ^at  an  honour. 

The  President  referred  my  lettw  to  the  gentlemen 
at  the  head  of  the  War  and  Navy  Departments.  They 
also  would  not  (Condescend  to  adswer  my  letter,  but 
handed  it  ov^r  to  tiieir  clerks.  The  elevation  q(  these 
gentlemen  seems  to  have  rendelred  them  giddy.  .  I 
ask,  would  it  not  have  conlported  witii  the  importance 
of  the  oceision,  the  dectHrum  due  to  an  old  man,  and 
a  veteran  soldier,  not  yet  convicted  of  any  crime,  for 
the  Secretaries  themselves  to  have  addressed  me  ? 


** 


But' in  answer  to  my  letter,  I  i«cdved  a  letter  frona 
the  ChiefGIerkin  the  War  Office,  datled  twdfth  of  Fe* 
bruary,  one^thousand  eight  hundred  ahd  fourteen;  with 


\-  ^fl 


GENERAL  HiTLL. 


30 


a  certificate  from  the  chief  oleiHk  in  the  Navy  Depart-, 
ment  The  letter  from  the  War  Office  is  in  the  fol>- 
lo^iog  worth : 


«'  Wak  Office,  Febmaiy  12th,  1814. 


am, 


¥oua  letter  of  the  first  instant,  addressed  to  the  Pre- 
sident of  the  United  States,  has  been  referred  to  me.  In 
answer  to  which,  I  have  the  honour  to  state,  that  aH 
your  eomnninicati(«s  to  theWar  Department,  after  you 
were  appointed  brigadier  general  in  the  array,  have 
been  kuismitted  to  P.  S.  Parker,  esquire,  judge  advo- 
cate of  the  court-martial,  now  sitting  at  Albany,  togeth- 
er with  such  otlien  as  you  had  required,  as  far  as  they 
could  he  fdund  on  the  files  of  this  office.  The  pub- 
lic records  of  papers  of  the  War-  Department  have 
been  constantly  within  my  observation  and  chaige  for 
several  years  past,  and  I  assure  you.  Sir,  I  have 
never  seen  or  heard  of  a  memoir,  pointing  out  tiie  ne- 
cei^fity  of  a  navy  on  lake  Erie. 


"  Since  the  receipt  ofyour  letter,  I  have  carefully 
examined  the  files,  and  Inquired 'of  every  gentlemaa 
attached  to  the  Department,  without  being  able  to 
give  any  information  on  the  subject. 

**  I  have  the  honour  to  k  ,  Sir, 

"  Veiy  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 
*^  Daniel.  Parksr,  C.  C 


"  BRIO.  GEN.  WILUAM  HULL, 
"  ALBANt." 


I 


* 

i 


m 


•  t 


-  n 


30 


DEFENCE  OF 


w-  ^ 


J<?\ 


I 


P 


IV    '■ 


It  is  unaccountable,  Mr.  President,  that  a  puUie 
document  of  this  nature  should  be  lost.  That  it  did 
f  xist,  and  was  on  the  files  of  the  War  Office,  is  proved 
beyond  controversy,  by  the  deposition  of  the  late 
Secretary  at  War,  who  swears  that  he  has  a  petfeet 
recoUectUm  cf  U.  But  a  most  extraordinary  part  of 
this  letter  from  the  War  Department,  is  that  which 
states,  that  the  writer  has  had  the  public  records,  and 
papers  of  the  War  Department,  constantly  under  his 
charge  and  observation  for  several  years  past;  yet, 
that  he  never  knew  or  heard  of  a  memoria%  pointing 
out  the  necessity  of  a  navy  on  lake  Erie.  Mr.  Pre- 
sident, it  is  a  fact  hardly  to  be  credited,  that  the  copy 
of  the  memorial  of  the  sixth  of  March,  e^hteen  hun- 
dred and  twelve,  from  which  I  made  that  copy  which 
I  have  just  read  to  the  Court,  is  certified  aa  a  true 
copy  from  the  files  d*  the  War  Office,  by  the  very  gen- 
tlematty  who  writes  me  the  letter  of  the  twelfth  c^ 
February.  L<ot  me  quote  from  the  memorial  of  the 
sixth  of  Marc'a,  q^  rather  from  the  copy  certified  as  I 
have  mentiorj-t  1  above,  a  passage  which  is  in  the  fol- 
lowing word^ : 

**  If,  Sir,  we  cannot  command  the  ocean,  we  can 
"  command  the  inland  lakes  of  our  country.  /  have 
''always  been  of  opinion  that  we  orAghi  to  have  built 
"  as  many  armed  vessels  on  the  lakes  as  wr/uld  have 
*'  commanded  them.  We  have  more  interest  in  them 
**  than  the  British  nation,  and  can  build  vessels  with 
**  more  convenience.    If,  however,  there  is  no  iiten- 


GENEilAL  HULL. 


3t 


*'  tion  of  the  kind,  that  communication  must  be  aban* 
"  doned  until  we  take  possession  of  the  Canadas." 


When  the  writer  of  t^ie  letter  h?d  ccfrtified  a  copy 
of  this  memorial  but  a  few  days  ago,  how  could  he 
say,  that  he  never  knew  or  heard  of  a  memorial  point- 
ing out  the  necessity  of  a  navy  on  lake  Erie  ? 

I  will  not  presume  5  Sir,  that  the  writer  of  the  letr 
ter  intends  an  equivocation,  and  designs  that  his  mean- 
ing shall  turn  upon  the  use  of  the  word  necessity. 
This  I  think  would  not  be  consistent  with  the  solem- 
nity of  the  occasion  on  which  his  letter  is  written ; 
nor,  Sir,  would  it  serve  Mm  -.  because  it  is  impossible 
to  read  ray  memoir  of,  the  sixth  of  March,  without 
perceiving,  that  I  do,  from  the  beginning  to  the  end, 
point  out  the  necessity  of  a  navy,  in  every  sense  in 
which  the  word  necessity  can  be  ap|i4ied  on  such  a 
autgect.  I  am  very  far,  Sir,  from  meaning  to  insinuate, 
in  the  remotest  degree,  that  the  letter  from  tlie  Clerk 
of  the  War  Department  contains  any  intentional  mis- 
representation. His  character  and  station  protect 
him  from  such  a  suspicion,  and  as  the  memorial  which 
proves  the  inconsistency  of  the  letter  has  been  fur- 
nished, the  declaration  in  the  letter  could  not  have 
been  made  with  any  sinister  design ',  and  I  have  only 
trespassed  on  the  patience  of  the  Court  with  these 
observations  on  this  subject,  to  shew,  that  as  the  me- 
morial of  the  sixth  of  March,  eighteen  hundred  and 
twelve,  has  been  so  entirely  forgotten  at  the  War 
Office,  the  certificate  from  thence,  that  a  memorial 


iffli 


'■■•'I 


1^ 


38 


DEFENCE  OF 


pointing  out  the  necessity  of  a  navy  on  lake  Erie, 
wfi!!  never  read  or  heard  of  there,  is  no  sort  of  evi- 
dence that  another  such  memorial  may  not  have  ex- 
isted as  Mrell  as  that  of  the  sixth  of  March. 

The  certificate  from  the  Navy  Department  lias  been 
read.  It  will  appear  in  the  minutes,  and  I  shall  trou- 
ble the  Court  with  no  remarks  upon  it. 

In  respect  to  this  memorial  I  can  now  only  rest 
upon  my  own  declarations,  which  I  think,  when  I  am 
in  this  manner  deprived  of  the  benefit  of  the  paper, 
I  am  authorized  to  make.  It  did  contain  a  represen- 
tation, in  the  most  explicit  and  strongest  terms,  of 
the  necessity  of  our  having  a  naval  force  superiour  to 
the  enemy  on  the  lakes ;  and  that  without  it,  asd  un- 
less the  army  I  was  to  command,  was  strengthenecl 
by  additions  to  its  numbers ;  and  unless  it  were  fol- 
lowed by  detachments,  to  keep  open  the  communica- 
tion, and  insure  its  supplies  from  Ohio ;  and  unless  it 
was  supported  by  co-operations,  on  other  quarters,  my 
army  could  not  be  able  to  maintain  itself  at  Detroit, 
much  less  carry  on  offensive  operations  in  the  enemy's 
country. 


.»/." 


That  such  were  the  views  and  sentiments  of  the 
government  as  to  my  expedition,  as  well  as  my  own, 
and  that  I  was  not  expected  to  do  more  tlian  protect 
Detroit,  and  that  quarter,  and  to  keep  in  awe  the  In- 
dians, will  further  appear,  from  the  facts  and  docu- 
ments, to  whicli  I  shall  now  refer. 


«, 


GENERAL  HULL. 


30 


Upon  this  Bulyect,  I  beg  to  turn  the  attenion  of 
the  court  to  the  testimony  of  general  Porter.  It  will 
prove,  how  pressing  I  was  on  the  subject  of  a  naval 
force,  not  only  with  the  Secretaries,  but  with  the 
President  himself. 


The  deposition  of  captain  Charles  Steward,  of  the 
navy,  states,  that,  at  an  interview  he  iiad  with  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  in  the  beginning  of  April 
eighteen  hundred  and  twelve,  the  Secretary  informed 
him,  "  that  it  was  contemplated  to  give  him  the  com- 
"  mand  on  the  lakes ;  that  a  naval  force  superiour  to  the 
"  British  on  the  lakes,  had  been  strongly  urged  by 
*'  general  Hull,  as  essential,  and  as  a  certain  means 
*'  of  insuring  to  the  army  success.'* 

I  beg  the  court  to  notice  that  it  is  here  stated,  that 
I  had  strongly  uiged  that  the  command  of  the  lakes 
was  essential  to  success. 

The  first  letter  which  I  received  from  the  Secretary 
of  War,  after  my  appointment,  and  which  is  dated 
the  ninth  of  April,  eighteen  hundred  and  twelve, 
describes  the  force  which  was  to  be  under  mv  com- 
mand.  The  description,  of  itself,  I  presume,  must  pre- 
clude an  idea,  thai  i«  could  have  been  intended  for 
invasion  or  conquest.  But  its  objects  are  expressed 
in  this  letter.  I  am  directed,  as  the  commander  of  that 
force,  to  "  adopt  such  measures  with  the  chiefs  of  the 
"  several  tribes  of  Indians,  as  might,  in  my  judgment. 


J.' 


i}-rii 


* 


40 


DEFENCE  OF 


"  app^r  to  ht  best  calculated  to  secure  i'Se  peac6  of 
"  Ihe  country." 

In  the  first  letter  nvhich  I  received  from  the  War 
Department,  dated  the  eighteenth  of  June,  and  which 
was  delivered  to  me  on  the  twentynsixth  of  the  same 
month,  I  am  directed  to  pursue  my  march  to  Detroit 
with  all  possible  expedition ;  and  the  second  letter 
from  the  Secretary  at  War,  of  the  same  date,  which 
announced  to  me  the  war,  gives  me  the  sane  positive 
oommand  to  proceed  to  that  post  If  the  army  I 
commanded,  had  been  deemed  competent  to  carry  on 
offensive  operations  against  the  enemy  without  any 
assistance  or  suppwt,  my  orders  would  certainly  have 
been  of  a  different  nature. 

ft  wduld  have  been  left  to  my  discretion,  to  pur^ 
sue  such  measures  as  I  might  have  judged  most  effi- 
cacious. With  an  army,  competent  to  make  an  invap 
sion,  Detroit  would  not  have  been  the  point  from 
which  it  should  have  been  made. 

A  station  apposite  Amherstburgh  would  have  been 
on  many  accounts  a  preferable  position,  bat  Detroit 
was  the  proper  situation  for  the  army,  for  the  purpose 
of  protecting  the  i.errito;y  and  inhabitants  of  Michi-^ 
gan,  and  of  keeping  in  awe  the  savage  tribes. 

I  beg  that  it  may  be  observed,  that  I  do  not  pre- 
tend, that  it  was  not  contemplated,  that  the  army  I 
commanded,  when  I  was  appoii^ted  to  it,  might  be 


'ft 


GENERAL  HULL. 


4t 


employed  in  offensive  operations  against  the  British, 
in  the  event  of  a  war;  but  I  am  endeavouring  to 
shew,  and  I  trust  shall  satisfy  the  Court,  that  neither 
myself,  nor  the  officers  of  the  government,  ever  sup- 
posed it  would  be  competent  to  act  as  an  offensive 
army,  unless  it  was  assisted  and  supported;  or  unless, 
as  was  supposed  might  be  the  case,  such  a  defection  ot 
the  inhabitants  of  Canada  to  the  government,  and  a 
union  of  the  Indians  with- us,  should  happen  on  the 
appearance  of  my  army,  as  would  in  a  great  measure 
destroy  the  enemy^s  means  of  resistance. 

The  next  letter  I  received  from  the  Secretary  at 
War,  b  dated  the  twenty^burth  June,  eighteen  hun- 
dred and  twelve.  This  letter  informs  me,  that  I  am 
authorised  to  commence  offensive  operations.  This 
would  not  have  been  the  language  addressed  to  me 
a[ipn  this  occasion,  if  the  government  had  supposed 
I  had  a  force  sufficient  to  commence  such  operations. 
In  that  case  I  should  have  received  a  command  in- 
stead of  an  authority. 


In  this  letter,  the  Secretary  adverts  to  my  taking, 
possession  of  Maiden ;  but  not  as  if  he  supposed  1 
had  the  power  of  doing  it .  I  am  not  to  make  the  at- 
tempt, unless  the  force  under  my  command,  should  be 
equal  to  the  enterprise,  nor  unless  I  could  do  it,  con- 
sistently with  the  safety  of  my  own  posts. 

The  caution,  which  it  is  thought  necessary  to  com- 
municate to  me,  by  thb  letter,  lb  be  limited  in  ifty 

5* 


■% 


:\j''h. 


4ft 


DEFENCE  OP 


assurances  of  protection  to  the  CanadUin«,  and  tlm 
notice  tliat  it  conveys  me,  that  an  adeouat®  forcef 
cannot  be  relied  upon,  for  the  reduction  of  t.ie  enemy^s 
posts  below,  is  evidence,  that  my  army  was  not  thought 
•ufficient  to  maintain  itHeif  in  the  enemy's  country, 
without  assistance  and  co-operation. 

In  my  letter  to  the  Secretary  at  War  of  the  ninth 
of  July,  eighteen  hundred  and  twelve,  which  is  in 
answer  to  that  I  have  last  mentioned,  in  which  I  am 
told,  that  I  am  autJiorized  to  commence  offensive 
operations,  I  expressed,  in  the  mos  explicit  terms, 
my  opinion  of  the  inadequacy  of  my  force  to  the 
only  offensive  operation  which  could  be  undertaken 
from  that  quarter.  My  words  are,  "  the  British  com- 
**  mand  the  water  and  the  savages;  I  do  not  think 
"  the  force  here  equal  to  the  reduction  of  Amherst- 
"tnogh;  you  must  not  therefore  be  too  "anguine." 


I  beg  the  Court  to  remark,  that  this  letter  was  writ* 
ten  immediately  after  my  arrival  at  Detroit,  and  a 
few  days  before  I  passed  into  Canada ;  of  course  l»e- 
fwe  I  had  any  knowledge  of  the  foil  of  Michili- 
mackinac,  an  event  which  had  so  decisive  an  inflv 
ence  on  my  subsequent  operations. 

On  the  tenth  of  July,  I  wrote  two  letters  to  the 
Secretary  at  War,  both  on  the  subject  of  provisions 
■^  for  the  army.  I  mention  to  him  in  i\t£  first,  that  the 
contractor  could  not  furnish  the  supplies,  on  account 
of  the  lakes  being  Closed  against  us,  by  the  British 
naval  force.     In  the  second  letter,  I  reiterate  tb^ 


tfa{ 


■1: 


GifiKEftAL  HULL. 


45 


Mme  iofomiition;  and  alio  infonn  th€  Secretaiy, 
that  I  have  made  a  new  contract  for  provisions,  which, 
at  they  cannot  be  transported  on  the  lal^e,  must  be 
carried  on  horses  from  Ohio*  through  the  wilderness. 
My  letter  concludes  with  these  words :  "  The  com- 
"  munication  must  be  secured,  or  this  army  will  be 
**  without  provisions.  Troops  will  be  absolutely  ne-~ 
**  cessary  on  the  road,  to  protect  the  provisions.  This 
"must  not  be  neglected.  If  it  is,  this  army  will  perish 
"  by  hunger." 

The  receipt  'e  letters  is  acknowledger!  by 

the  Secretary  n  bis  letter  to  me  of  the  twen- 

ty>sixth  of  Jul;  n  hundred  and  twelve.     To 

this  letter,  from  the  War  l^epartmeAt,  1  wish  particu- 
larly to  direct  the  attention  of  the  Court. 

It  shews,  that  the  government  well  understood  the 
situation  of  my  army,  and  how  much  it  stood  in  need 
of  assistance  and  support. 

By  this  letter  I  am  informed,  that  govemour  Meigs 
has  been  directed  to  furnish  troops  to  guard  the  road, 
and  insure  the  transportation  of  provisions; — that 
general  Winchester  had  been  ordered  to  reinforce 
me  with  fifteen  hundred  men;—- that  a  force  w^s 
collecting  at  Niagara; — that  the  conmiander  in  chief 
would  be  apprised  of  my  situation,  and  directed  to 
take  measures  to  afford  me  the  necessary  suppwt 

It  is  not  my  intention,  at  this  moment,  to  shew, 
that  none  oi  the  expectations,  which  this  letter  au- 


ii 


i 


IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


1.0 


1.1 


11.25 


■JO   ■="     ■■■ 


m 

u 


no 


U   il.6 


Photographic 

Sdeoces 

Corporadon 


23  VMBT  MAIN  STRUT 

WnSTiR,  N.Y.I  4SM 

(716)«72-4S03 


44 


DEFENCE  OF 


thorized,  wiere  ever  realized.  I  now  rder  to  it,  onlf* 
as  I  have  mentioned,  to  prove,  that  the  officen  ci  the 
executive  government  must  have  coiuidered  n.  7  army, 
situated  as  it  was,  incompetent  to  carry  <ni,  of  itself, 
effectual  operations  against  the  enemy.    ., 

In  my  letter  to  the  Secretary  at  War,  of  the  nine- 
teenth of  July,  eighteen  hundred  and  twelve,  ure  the 
firilowing  paragraphs  : 

"  If  you  have  not  a  force  at  Niagara,  the  whole 
force  of  the  province  will  be  directed  against  th^? 
army.'* 


"  It  is  all  impoitont.  that  Nii^ra  should  be  invest* 
ed — all  our  success  will  depend  on  it.** 

There  has  been  read  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  a 
letter  from  the  Secretary  c^  War  to  me,  dated  the  first 
ofAi]^rt.  This  letter  I  never  received.  It,  however, 
shews  no  less,  on  that  account,  how  necessary  it  was 
thought,  that  a  diversion  should  he  made,  in  favour 
of  the  army  I  commanded.  I  therefore  extract  from 
it  the  following  paragraph : 

*'  On  the  twenty-sixth  July,  your  letters  of  the' se- 
venth and  tenth  were  enclosed  to  general  Dearborn, 
with  a  copy  of  mine  to  you,  of  the  twenty-sixth,  ac- 
companied with  a  request,  that  he  would  mi^e  a  di- 
version in  your  favour.  The  General  must  have 
received  this  letter  at  Albany.  By  the  mail  of  this 
evening,  yours  iji  the  twenty-ninth  is  enclosed  to 


«.. 


M 


it 


H 


GENERAL  IIULL. 


4« 


e 


him,  with  an  instmction,  to  make  a  divenkm  at 
Niagara  and  KingttxHi,  as  soon  as  practicable." 

In  another  tetter  firom  the  Secretary  of  War  of  the 
first  of  Ai^nitrhe  acknoivledges  the  receipt  of  way 
proclamatimi  tr  the  Canadians.  I  now  refer  to  tliat 
proclamation,  merely  to  direct  the  attention  of  the 
Court  to  that  part  in  which  I  say,  that  fte  force  I 
commanded  was  "  Imt  the  vanguard  of  a  much  great- 
er.'' I  do  this  to  shew  the  c<nifidence  I  then  had, 
that  the  corps  I  commanded  was  to  be  reinforced  and 
siq)ported« 


t- 


a 

rst 
er, 
ras 
»ur 
>m 


Be- 
rn, 
ac- 
di- 
,ve 
lis 
to 


On  the  twentieth  o(  August,  the  Secretary  of  War 
addressed  a  letter  to  me,  which  I  did  not  receive,  l)ut 
firom  which  I  hoe  quote  a  paracraph,  to  shew  how 
necessary  he  thought  co^eradon  was  fiv  my  ax^ 
port.    The  paragraph  is  in  the  following  w<Hrds : 

"  Orders  have  been  given  to  general  Dearborn  to 
*^  attack  the  enemy's  posts  at  Niagam  and  Kingston, 
**  as  soon  as  may  be  pra<*'kaUe.  Our  force  at  Nia- 
**  gara,  ace(»ding  to  general  Dearborn's  account,  will 
**  amount  to  twenty-four  hundred,  and  he  wHl  notify 
**  you  of  such  movements  and  qperatitms,  as  he  may 
•^onter." 

itliftom  iftese  doeumoits^  which  have  all  been 
hitroduced  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  that  I  prove  what 
I  undertook  to  do^  that  when  I  took  command  of  the 
north-western  amy^  it  '.^as  understood  by  the  ad* 


'n- 


-^i 


^•m 


46 


DEFENCE  OF 


ministration,  as  well  as  by  myself,  that  in  the  event 
of  a  war  with  Great-Britain,  my 'force  was  to  be  au^ 
mented ;  that  my  communication  with  the  state  of 
Ohio  was  to  be  preserved,  by  troops  from  that  quar- 
ter; that  the  lakes  were  to  be  commmded  by  us; 
and  that  my  operations  were  to  be  facilitated  by  di- 
versi<ni8  on  the  frontiers  below  me; 


The  Court  will  hereafter  perceive,  what  an  impor- 
tant influence  a  disappointment  in  all  these  particu- 
lars had  on  the  events  under  consideration ;  and  will 
not  therefore,  I  hope^  think  I  hav^  uselessly  trespass- 
ed on  their  time,  by  detaining  them  so  long  on  this 
part  of  the  subject. 


r    ' 


I  cannot,  however,  omit  one  farther  remark.  I 
would  ask^he  Court,  if  subsequent  events  do  not  ex- 
clude a  supposition,  that  the  administration  did  ex- 
pect, that  my  army  was  in  all  events  to  be  of  itself 
adequate  to  the  invasipn  and  conquest  <^  the  enemy's 
country ;  unless  it  be  admitted,  that  there  was  an 
entire  ignorance  of  what  was  necessary  to  accomplish 
these  objects?  For  we  have  since  seen  general 
Harrison,  with  an  army  more  than  quadruple  to  that 
which  I  led,  for  more  than  a  year,  threatening  the 
enemy  on  the  same  point,  at  which  h^  ^as  invaded  by 
my  army ;  and  though  ten  thousan*  ops  were  co- 
operating with  him,  on  the  poxatb  wu^re  I  had  been 
led  to  expect  co-operation,  yet ;  ki;=  dared  not  to  set  his 
foot  on  the  enemy*s  shore,  till  after  our  glwious  naval 
victory  on  lake  Erie,  and  was  then  obliged  to  content 


.:.  ■^.ftt.j.i'i 


iiii'' 


^^s^m 


GENERAL  HULL. 


49 


himself  with  tlie  possession  of  no  greater  territory 
than  his  troops  could  cover. 

I  must  intreat  the  CoLrt,  before  I  proceed  to  the 
consideration  of  other  matters,  to  indulge  me  with 
the  repetition  of  a  remark  which  is  bo  necessary  for 
understanding  the  subsequent  parts  oi  wy  defence, 
that  I  am  anxiouB  to  impress  it  on  their  minds. 


It  b,  that  though,  as  I  have  said,  and  I  trust  I  have 
proved,  it  was  understood  both  by  the  administration 
and  by  myself,  that  the  force  which  I  commanded 
would  not  in  all  events,  in  case  of  war,  be  competent 
to  the  invasion  and  conquest  of  Canada,  yet  both 
the  officers  of  the  executive  government  and  myself, 
did  contemplate,  that  in  certain  events,  I  mi^ht,  with 
the  army  which  I  led,  subdue  the  enemy's  posts  in  the 
Upper  Canada.  It  was  contemplated  and  believed, 
that  there  would  be  a  very  general  defection  of  the 
inhabitants  of  that  province,  and  that  many  of  them, 
would  arrange  themselves  under  the  American  stan- 
dard ;  ifnd  it  was  also  coittemplated  and  believed,  that 
it  would  be  possible  for  me  to  draw  from  them  the  aid 
of  the  savages.  When  I  landed  in  Canada,  and  pre- 
viously to  the  fall  of  Michilimackinac,  there  was  every 
reason  to  suppose,  that  thesMiKpectations  would  be 
realised.  Until  that  event  took  place,  of  which  the 
enemy  had  notice  about  the  second  of  August,  I  had 
those  sanguine  hopes  of  success  which  I  expressed  in 
my  proclamation,  and  in  my  communications  with 
the  War  Office.    But  after  that  misfortune,  the  scen» 


It; 


I  ' 


>.>-.■>.'?*«■• 


'f^*«*'S*5p«'«*; 


^. 


>?!'■ 


'h 


4a 


DEFENCE  OF 


uras  entirelj  changed.  From  that  moment,  I  saw* 
that  although  it  was  poasible  that  I  might  obtain 
temporaiy  advantages,  yet  that  theyt^ould  eventuate 
in  the  greatest  disasters,  unless  I  was  aided  and  sup- 
ported from  other  qnarters. 


il 


Thus,  Gentlemen,  I  have  endeavoured  to  shew  you, 
that  I  took  the  command  under  the  expectation,  that, 
in  the  event  of  a  war,  the  operations  of  my  army 
wouhl  be  assisted,  by  a  competent  force  upon  the 
lakes,  by  detachments  to  keep  clear  the  communica- 
tion wldch  I  had  opened  through  the  wilderness,  and 
liy  the  coH^ration,  or  at  least  such  a  demonstration 
of  force  against  other  parts  of  the  enrasy's  territones, 
as  would  prevent  his  directii^  all  his  energies  to  the 
point  where  I  might  meet  him*  But  it  unfortunately 
happened,  that  none  of  these  expectations  were  fdl- 
filled.  The  effects  of  these  dit^appointments  will  after- 
wards be  considered. 

1  now  resume  my  vindication  oi  the  measures,  which 
form  ihe  most  prondnent  features  in  my  accusation ; 
that  is  to  say,  the  dday  at  Skndniek  ;  the  retreat  Jrom 
thence  s  voiA  the  surrender  at  DOreit. 


«. 


It  is  necessaiy  fo^ipe  to  expIaSn  the  views  and 
intentions  I  had,  wheb  T  yielded  to  the  importmiities 
€i  my  officers,  and  crossed  to  the  enemy's  country. 


It  must  be  recollected,  that  the  order  I  recernM  in 
ihe  letter  of  the  eighteenth  c^  June,  which  annoaiical 


^ 


■/'^r'v..;. 


GENERAL  HULL. 


m 


the  war,  directed  me  to  proceed  to  Detroit,  and  (here 
to  wait  for  furtber  mrden. 

Finding  that  an  impatience  to  croM^  had  betti  ex- 
cited in  the  armyt  which  was  Hkely  to  be  extremely 
inguriom  to  my  authority,  and  the  discipline  of  the 
troops,  I  called  a  cooncil  of  war,  and  lud  before  Uie 
officers,  the  orders  by  which  I  was  then  hwmd;  and 
asked  their  admcy  as  to  the  expediency  of  crossing. 
The  council,  notwithstanding  my  orders,  were  of 
opinion,  that  I  ought  to  cross.  I  did  not  feel- myself 
at  liberty  to  follow  their  advice,  and  determined  not 
to  do  so.  But  on  the  same  day,  I  received  the  Se- 
cretary  of  War*s  letter  of  the  twenty-fourth  of  June, 
in  which  he  says,  <*  should  the  force  under  your  com- 
"  mandbe  equal  to  the  enterprise,  consistently  with  the 
"  safety  of  your  own  posts,  you  will  take  possession 
"  (^  Maiden,  and  extend  your  conquests,  as  circum* 
"stances  may  justify.*' 


in 


'  I  did  not  think  the  force,  under  my  command,  equal 
to  the  conquest  of  Maiden,  nor  did  I  think,  that  with 
such  a  2m^fc  of  Une  tf  communicatimt,  as  it  was  re* 
quisite  for  me  to  keep  open,  I  oi^t  to  make  the  atr 
tempt  My  letter  to  the  Secretary  at  War,  dated  on 
this  same  ninth  <^  July,  which  I  have  already  quoted, 
expresses  this  opinion  of  the  incompetency  of  my 
force,  in  terms  not  to  be  ndaunderslood. 

Tet,  as  soon  as  I  had  received  this  last  mentioned 
letter  from  the  Secretary,  I  detennined  to  Uk<t  post 
6 


\ 


.,^m^4ijj3i^af».-r''^w 


,^'1 


50 


DEFENCE  OF 


in  the  enemy's  country.  My  reasons  for  this  detei^ 
mination  were,  that  I  hoped  thereby  to  satisfy  the 
impatience  of  my  officers,  and  preserve  the  confidence 
of  my  army;  which  expressions  of  discontent  were 
likely  to  impair.-^!  should  command  the  streights, 
and  thereby  prevent  the  enemy  from  sending  succoUrs 
to  their  northern  posts,  or  carrying  on  the  important 
trade  of  their  nwtli-westem  company. 


^.  % 


I  knew,  that  it  would  have  a  great  effect  upon  the 
Indians,  to  shew  them  the  American  flag  flying  on 
both  shores;  and  I  hq)ed,  by  establishing  nkyself  at 
Sandwich,  to  facilitate  and  increase  the  defection  from 
the  British  standard,  which  had  manifested  itself 
among  the  inhabitants  and  militia,  and  their  Indian 
allies.  My  views,  in  taking  post  in  the  enemy's  ter- 
ritory, are  expressed  in  my  letters  to  the  Secretary  of 
War.  In  my  letter  of  the  ninth  of  July,  I  had,  as  I 
have  above  mentioned,  told  him,  I  thought  my  force 
incompetent  to  attack  Maiden.  In  my  letter  of  the 
thirteenth,  written  from  Sandwich,  I  say,  **  1  consider 
"  the  possession  of  this  bank  as  highly  important;  by 
"  erecting  one  or  two  batteries,  opposite  the  batteries 
**  at  Detroit,  the  river  will  be  completely  ccfmmanded. 
"  In  the  rear  of  the  army,  on  the  Detroit  rivers  lake  St. 
*  Clair,  and  the  river  Le  Trench,  is  a  populous  and 
**  valuable  part  of  the  province.  It  is  likewise  pro- 
"  bable,  when  the  Indians  see  the  American  standard 
*'  on  both  sides  the  river,  it  will  have  a  favourable 
"effect."  I  intended,  nevertheless,  without  ||bs  of 
time,  to  make  preparations  for  putting  in  a  s4te*  of 


* 


r      iiii^i^ii   II  Mi 


GENERAL  HULL. 


5i 


•ervice  my  field  artillery,  for  an  attack  on  Maiden; 
and  whenever  that  shoidd  be  ready,  and  I  should  find 
that  the  enemy's  force  was  not  likely  to  be  further 
weakened  by  desertions,  I  would  make  the  attack,  if 
I  had  a  prospect  of  co-operation  and  support  from 
below,  without  which  I  ihoughtt  and  I  think  recent 
events  will  prove  that  I  thought  correctly,  I  could 
neither  preserve  my  own  posts  on  our  side  of  the 
river,  nor  that  which  the  enemy  then  possessed,  if  I 
should  be  so  fortunate  as  to  wrest  it  from  him. 

My  officers,  however,  were  not  less  importunate, 
for  proceeding  immediately  against  Maiden,  than  they 
iiad  been  to  cross  the  river. 


I  felt  myself  compelled  to  yield  to  their  in^rtur 
nity,  and  had  appointed  a  day  for  ihe  attack.  But, 
before  that  day  arrived,  I  received  intelligence,  that 
determined  me  to  postpone  the  enterprise,  and  to  re- 
cross  to  Detroit. 


0 


As  preliminary  to  my  vindication  of  these  measures, 
it  is  important  to  considerr  whet  numerical  force  I 
could  command  when  I  crossed  into  Canada;  its 
nature;  and  the  probable  force  and  strength  of  the 
«ja/emy. 

In  every  stage  of  this  trial,  I  have  felt  as  a  great 
misforiune,  the  want  of  that  documentary  evidence, 
which  might  he  expected  from  me.  This  arises  from 
the  loss  of  the  packet,  which  sailed  from  the  Miami; 


•* 


«!«i(iy«»f«^««*«^-»l 


■•-•ir^'** 


52 


DEFENCE  OF 


and  from  the  more  recent  lost  of  all  my.  baggage,  and 
moit  of  my  papers.  When  I  left  Detroit,  a  prisoner, 
I  left  my  baggage  with  my  daughter}  Mrs.  Hickman, 
to  be  carried  to  my  hwne  by  her.  She  soon  after 
embarkfd  in  the  enemy's  brig  Adams,  for  fort  Erie. 

On  her  arrival  there,  she  was  permitted  to  go  to 
Buffalo,  leaving  her  own  and  my  baggage  on  board 
the  brig.  The  same  night  the  brig  was  taken  by 
commodore  Elliot,  retaken  by  the  enemy,  and  burnt 
with  all  my  baggage  pn  board. 

This  loss  o(  iny  docqmenta  has  left  the  witnesses, 
who  testified  against  me,  to  speak  on  many  imp<wtiNit 
points,  from  estimation  and  conjecture,  and  they  seem- 
ed, to  have  availed  themselves  of  t&e  liberty,  so  as 
always  to  make  their  estimates  such,  as  would  be  most 
against  mf.  I  shall  myself  be  obliged,  often  to  speak 
of  numbers  from  coi\jecture  and  esiimate,  but  whei|  | 
do  so,  I  shall  endeavour  to  present  to  the  Court  the 
data,  on  which  my  estimates  are  founded* 

Mi^jor  Jessup,  the  brigade  migor,  says,  |bat  we 
moved  into  Canada  with  sixteen  or  eighteen  hundred 
men.  Now>  neithejr  the  Michigaii  legion,  <»  the  Michi^ 
gan  militia,  crossed  with  the,  army  into  Canada..  And 
besides,  there  were,  as  the  Court  will  recollect  has 
been  testified  by  several  of  the  witnesses,  a  portion  of 
the  Ohio  T<Amteen  who  refused  U>  cross.  This  magar 
>ber  wae  about  one  Jmndred  and  eighty. 


.:* 


-"^PC 


-*KK,^-^?WiWKf 


5^* 


'  -k 


GENERAL  HULL. 


53 


mitfor  JetBup  further  tettifles,  "  That  Bome  time 
"early  in  August,  a  few  days  previous  to  leaving 
"  Canada,  he  was  called  into  a  council  of  war,  to  et- 
"  plain  a  report  of  brigade,  and  that  there  were  then 
"  eighteen  hundred  effective  men  in  Cmmia  mtd  at 
"DUrtit,  The  Michigan  legion  were  included  in 
"  the  eighteen  hundred,  but  the  Michigan  militia  were 
"not" 

Now,  if  there  were  but  eighteen  hundred  belonging 
to  the  brigade  at  this  time,  including  all  that  were 
either  with  ale  in  Canada,  or  at  Detroit,  and  includ- 
ing  the  legion,  how  could  sixteen  tir  eighteen  hun- 
dred  have  crossed  with  me  ?  At  the  time  that  this 
report  of  mi^r  Jessup's  was  made,  we  had  lost  but 
few  of  the  troops  that  had  crossed;  and'^from  the 
Amount,  which  he  gives  of 'tiie  whole  forces,  at  that 
time,  to  ascertain  what  was  the  number  that  crossed, 
'  must  be  deducted  the  Michi|an  legion,  and  Ihe  Ohio 
volunteers  that  refused  to  jifM  the  river.  Thil  will 
leave  an  amount  much  short  of  the  sixteen  or  eighteen 
hundred,  with  which,  nuyor  Jessup  says,  we  passed 
into  Canada. 

The  Court  will  remember,  that  by  a  muster  roll  and 
return,  made  af  Fort  FiQdlay  on  the  twentynsixth  of 
June,  which  has  been  exhibited  by  the  Judge  Advo- 
cate, the  whole  force  which  I  then  had  under  my 
tsommand,  amounted  to  one  thousand,  nine  hundred 
and  lUty^>  I  was  obliged  to  leave  detachments,  at 
Mac  Arthur's  Block-house,  at  Fort  Findlay,  and  at 
6* 


■■;*      *! 


'ip'i 


■^ 


54 


DEFENCE  OF 


the  Miami.  T>i«re  were  about  forty  invalids -talten 
in  tlie  vessel,  that  sailed  Arom  the  Miami.  I  left 
some  sick  at  the  river  Raisin,  and  the  whole  force 
with  which  I  arrived  at  Detroit,  I  am  convinced,  did 
not  exceed  fifteen  hundred  men.  And  I  am  conft* 
dent,  that  the  force  with  which  I  passed  into  Canada, 
did  not  exceed  fourteen  hundred.  What  proportion 
of  the  militia,  which  I  had  with  me  at  Sandwich^ 
would  have  been  effective  to  lead  against  the  enemy, 
the  Court  may  judge  from  general  experience. 


: 


Mijor  Van  Horn  has  testified,  that  when  detach- 
ments were  ordered,  it  was  always  found,  that  not 
man  than  two  thirds  of  the  command  ordered  could 
be  marched.  I  do  not  believe,  that  at  any  time,  I 
could  have  led  thirteeen  hundred  eflbctive  men  against 
Maldeq.  Of  these,  there  was  only  colonel  Miller's 
regiment,  of  less  than  three  hundred,  that  had  seen  any 
service.  The  rest  were  militia,  who,  though  they 
were  very  ardent  and  j^atriotic  in  their  expressions 
liad  had  no  experience,  and  neither  men  nor  offlcers, 
had  ever  been  tried.  It  is  not  extraordinary,  that  I 
sVouId  have  felt  some  want  of  confidence  in  these 
raw  troops,  for  such  a  contest,  as  we  must  have  ex- 
pected before  Maiden;  when  it  appears,  by  the  testi- 
mony of  colonel  Miller,  that  their  own  <^eers  were 
not  willing  to  be  responsible  for  their  firmness  in  an 
assault  Colonel  Miller  states,  that  In  a  cotmcil,  in 
which  the  propriety  of  attacking  Maiden  w'as  discuss- 
ed, at  Which  general  Mac  Arthur,  generalCass,  and 
colonei  FindtJly»^were  present;  ** General  Hull  said,. 


^rfe^- 


>r 


^  OENBBAL  HULL. 


45 


<*  if  tM  wcMdd  AiMwer  for  our  men,  he  would  lead  in 
"  to  Maiden.  I  told  him,  I  would  aniwer  for  the  men 
"  I  commanded ;  but  the  others  tald,  they  wouM  not 
**  be  retponiible  for  their  men,  but  belicTed  they  would 
"  behave  well."  ^ 

1  know,  sir,  that  it  may  be.iald,  that  my  proclama- 
tion to  the  Canadians,  and  niy  letters  to  the  Secretary 
at  War,  hold  a  different  language.  That  in  these  I 
speak  with  confidence  of  attacking  Maiden,  and  of 
the  excellence  and  sufficiency  of  my  force.  And  I 
presume  the  specifications  refer  to  my  proclamation, 
and  to  these  letters,  when  they  allege  that  I  had 
declared  and  avowed  my  intention  of  attacking  and 
subduing  Maiden.  I  cannot  conceive,  that  these 
declarations  could  prove  me  guilty,  if  my  measures 
without  them  would  not  luwe  bufi  so,  I  do  not  see, 
that  they  can  in  any  way  be  made  the  test  of  the 
propriety,  or  impropriety,  of  the  course  I  pursued. 
It  would  be  hard,  indeed,  if  every  general  were  to  be 
judged  criminal,  who  did  not  accomplish  aU  the  in- 
tentions he  may  have  avowed — ^this  would  be  a  rule, 
which  1  presume  there  are  mmy  generals  would  not 
consent  to  establish.  If  it  were  adopted,  no  change 
of  circumstances  would  justify  the  relinquishment  of 
a  design,  once  formed. 


I  think,  whe^  it  is  considered  undef  ^|hftt  circum- 
stances mjr  proe^mation  was  publisheji,4iwill  not 
be  thought  just,  io  adduce  i|  as  eviden|j||ig9il|Mt  me 
on  this  occasion.  I  was  then  in  an  eneinyV  country, 
the  inhabitants  of  which  wei«  sufficient,  independent 


''     '.-(.■■if 


56 


DEFENCE  OF 


k(. 


iv 


of  his  regular  force,  which  was  establbhed  near  me, 
and  of  his  Indian  allies,  to  overwhelm  the  army  1 
commanded.  I  had  no  prospect  of  even  maintaining 
myself,  much  less  of  making  conquests; unless  I  could 
induce  a  great  portion  of  those  inhabitants  to  forsake 
his  standard.  4t  was  incumbent  on  me  to  use  all 
means  to  deprive  him  of  aid  from  the  savage  tribes. 
I  knew  that  these  two  objects  could  only  be  effected 
by  representing  myself  as  having  the  utmost  confi- 
dence in  the  force  I  commanded,  and  that  it  was  able 
to  overcome  all  opposition.  With  these  views  I  pub- 
lished the  proclamation.  And,  indeed,  the  force  I, 
commanded,  would  have  been  equal  to  all  I  represent- 
ed, had  the  same  spirit  of  desertion  and  defection  con- 
tinued, which  had  manifested  itself  in  the  enemy's 
countiy,  when  we  first  invaded  Canada. 

But  unfortunately,  before  we  retreated,  all  calcula- 
tions founded  on  this  basis  had  failed. 

In  my  letters  to  the  War  Department,  down  to  the 
latter  end  of  July,  I  speak  with  confidence  of  attack- 
ing Maiden,  whenever  the  field  artillery  shall  be  pre- 
pared. But  I  beg  the  Court  to  recollect,  that  this 
confidence  was  grounded  upon  the  expectation,  that 
I  then  entertained,  that  the  enemy  would  be  weaken- 
ed by  the  desertion  oi  his  militia,  and  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  Indians.  In  all  my  lettcfs,  which  speak 
(^  the  intended  attack,  I  mention  also  the  didly  de- 
sertions frtHU  the  enemy's  standard.  That  I  did  not 
rely  on  the  competency  of  my  own  force,  till  the  ene- 
my's should  be  reduced,  must  appear  from  my  letter 


.^■iJBW 


GfiKTERAL  HULL. 


57 


of  th«  ninth  ot  July,  to  yrbich  I  have  more  than  once 
referred. 

Ahout  the  first  of  August,  we  received  the  account 
of  the  fall  of  Michilimackinac.  On  the  fourth,  I 
wrote  a  letter  to  the  Secretaiy,  from  which  the  follow- 
ing are  extracts. 

"  At  the  time  the  army  under  my  command  took 
*^  possession  of  this  part  of  the  province  of  Upper 
"  Canada,  every  thing  appeared  favourable,  and  all 
"  the  operations  of  the  army  have  been  successful. 
"  Circumstances  have  since  occurred,  which  seem 
"  materiany  to  change  our  future  prospects. 

«  The.  unexpected  tnine^iider  of  Michilimackinac, 
**  and  the  tardy  operations  of  the  army  at  Niagara, 
**  are  the  circumstances  to  which  I  allude.  I  have 
"  every  reason  to  expect,  in  a  very  short  time,  a  laige 
''  body  of  savages  from  the  north,  whose  operatit^na 
"  will  be  directed  against  this  army,"  &c, 

After  these  observations,  I  do  not  believe,  that  the 
Court  will  think,  that  it  is  to  be  justly  inferred,  either 
from  my  proclamation,  or  from  my  letters,  that  I  ctm- 
sidered  my  force  under  any  circumstances,  whicii 
existed  before  we  left  Canada,  competent  to  the  re- 
duction of  Maiden. 

The  force  of  the  enemy,  lieutenant  Forbish  states, 
was,  towards  the  last  of  July,  about  one  hundred  and 


^T... 


.u*^" 


Si 


'$■■ 


DEFENCE  OF 


Reventy  regulars,  and  five  hundred  and  fifty  militia. 
The  Indian  force  could  never  be  ascertained  with 
any  precision;  it  could  not  have  been  less  than 
near  a  thousand.  I  always  supposed  the  enemy's 
force  greater  than  this  information  makes  it.  But 
tv  hatever  may  have  been  the  force  of  tho  enemy,  it 
must  have  been  estimated  as  very  considerable,  by 
some  of  my  officers,!^  well  as  by  myself.  The  Court 
will  recollect,  that  when  I  made  the  detachment  under 
colonel  Van  Horn,  to  the  river  Raisin,  and  colonels 
Cass  and  Mac  Arthur  remonstrated  with  me  against 
the  sufficiency  of  his  force,  they  each  proposed  to  go 
on  that  expedition  with  his  regiment.  If  tiie  enemy 
had  not  appeared  ta  be  somewhat  formidal^e  to  them, 
they  could  never  have  advised  me  to  makfe'  so  large 
a  detachment  as  six  hunditd  men,  on  a  service  in 
which  they  could  only  have  expected  to  meet  a  small 
part  of  his  force.  Colonel  Mac  ArUiur  has  afforded 
other  evidence  of  his  opinion  of  the  power  of  the 
enemy.  For  when  I  proposed  to  leave  him,  with  his 
regiment,  on  the  Canada  shore,  he  charged  me  with 
having  an  intention  to  sacrifice  him,  by  leaving  him 
with  such  a  force  at  that  post ;  although  he  would  have 
been  in  an  entrenched  camp  with  artillery,  where  he 
would  also  have  had  scmie  protection  from  the  gims 
at  Detroit,  and  would  be  in  reach  of  instant  support 
from  thence. 

The  fort  at  Maiden,  I  was  well  acquainted  with. 
In  time  of  peace,  I  had  often  been  in  it:  I  knew  that 
it  was  capable  of  being  made  a  place  of  strength,  and 


.-^■'^ 


■'-.  / 


''W-'ii:^- 


GENERAL  HULL. 


60 


that,  in  contemplation  of  a  Var,  the  British  for  some 
time  had  been  *k'  ,  great  exertions  to  put  it  in  the 
best  possible  statv  ni  defence.  I  knew,  that  for  near 
twenty  years,  a  field  officer  had  commanded,  and 
about  an  hundred  regular  troops  had  constantly  been 
stationed  in  it ;  and  that  there  always  had  been  a  regu- 
lar corps  ai  British  artillery  attached  to  the  com^ 
mand.  The  question  was,  whether,  with  the  troops 
I  had  under  my  command,  so  few  of  whom  had  ever 
been  tried,  I  was  to  attempt  to  carry  this  fortress'witb 
the  bayonet  ?  For  myself,  particularly,  when  I  con- 
sidered, what  would  |pave  been  the  consequences  (tf 
an  unsuccessful  attempt,  I  had  a  strong  conviction 
that  it  would  be  wrong  to  make  the  effort,  till  we 
could  have  the  advantage  of  heavy  artillery.  But 
finding  that  many  of  my  officers,  who  had  seen  no 
service,  were  impatient  at  delay,  and  were  destroying 
my  influence  with  the  arm;^  and  its  discipline,  by 
their  complaints  and  censures — for  their  satisfac- 
tion, and  not  for  my  <mm,  nor  for  my  mvnjusHJication, 
two  days  after  I  crossed,  that  is,  on  the  fourteenth  of 
July,  I  called  a  council  of  war,  in  which  it  was  decid- 
jed,  that  no  attempt  ought  to  be  made  an  Maiden,  with- 
out the  heavy  artillery. 


My  utmost  exertions  were  then  used,  to  get  in 
readiness  the  two  twenty-four  pounders,  and  two  how- 
itzers, which  were  at  Detroit.  Carriages  were  to  be 
made  for  them  entirely  new.  Though  a  delay,  in  these 
preparations,  is  one  of  the  charges  made  against  me, 
not  a  witness  ha?  attempted  to  support  it.    Indeed, 


DEFENCE  OF 

Gentlemen,  I  dare  appeal  to  every  officer,  ^ho  \iraf 
with  me,  and  "who  is  billing  to  jpeak  tlie  truth, 
ivhether  I  did  not  use  all  possible  means,  and  make 
all  personal  exertion,  to  accomplish,  as  speedily  as 
possible,  this  desirab)e  olyect.  I  several  times  cross- 
ed the  river  myself,  to  inspect  and  hasten  the  STtificers. 
I  ordered  planks  to  be  taken  off  mj  own  house,  to  fur- 
nish  a  necessary  part  of  the  materials  for  the  gUn 
carriages. 

Captain  Dallaba,  in  his  second  examination,  states, 
that  he  received  an  order  to  prepare  th^eavy  ar- 
tillery, after  the  army  had  crossed  to  Canada;  be 
thinks  it  was  on  the  fifteenth  or  sixteenth  of  July. 
My  recollection  is,  that  the  order  was  given  on  the 
fourteenth,  that  is,  the  day  after  we  crossed;  and  on 
the  very  day  that  the  council  of  war  advised,  that  the 
attack  should  not  be  made  without  the  heavy  can- 
non. From  that  time,  it  is  not  pretended  there  was 
any  delay  in  preparing  them  for  service,  and  could 
not  have  been,  without  the  fault  of  the  officer,  who 
was  trusted  with  the  service.  Till  we  crossed  to 
Sandwich,  the  artificers  were  employed,  as  appears 
by  the  testimony  of  the  same  witness,  in  mounting 
the  guns  of  fort  Detroit.  I  beg  the  Court  also  to 
notice  the  testimony  of  colon^  Miller  on  this  point- 
he  says,  he  saw  no  want  of  exertion  in  preparing  the 
artillery. 


The  necessary  field  artillery  was  not  prepared  till 
the  seventh  of  August.    Two  days  previous  to  this, 


\ 


GENERAL  BULL. 


et 


the 
till 


I  haA  called  another  conneil-.  Il'he  menkben  defer* 
mined  it  would  be  adyisable  to  wait  two  daya  for  . 
the  artillery,  and  if  it  was  not  then  ready,  the  attack 
ought  to  be  made  without  it.  I  did  not  concur  in  tide 
idphiifMi.  Indeed,  the  opinimi  of  the  oflBcen  in  this, 
and  the  former  council,  appeared  to  me  ineonsiatent 
For  if,  according  to  the  decided  opinion  of  the  tint 
council,  it  wat  then  improper  to  male  the  alkack 
witbDut  heavy  ordnance,  why  wai  it  not  as  neoeesaiy 
when  the  last  mentSnied  touncil  sat  ?  And  if  it  were 
proper  to  wait -two  days  for  the  artillety,  according  to 
the  opinion  of  the  lait  council,  why  Was  it  not  proper 
to  widt  knigeir  ? 

It  may  be  Mid,  that  between  the  first  and  second 
^council,  the  enemy's  fince  had  diminished  by  deser- 
tion. No  doubt  it  had  ai  to  numbers.  Great  part  <tf 
the  militia  had  left  them,  and  many  Cf  their  Indittb 
allies ;  but  the  fort  of  Maiden  retained  all  its  strength, 
and  there  was  no  doubt,  but  that  their  regular  force, 
(of  which  net  an  individual  had  deserted,)  and  their 
remaining  niilitia  Were  sufficient  to  man  it  Indeed, 
reinfor<^ments  had  errived  from  Fort  George,  bofli  in 
the  brig  Hunter  and  one  other  vessel.  At  this  coun- 
cil, I  found  that  nothing  Would  satisfy  my  offic^n,  or 
the  army,'but  a  movement  towards  the  enemy.  I  felt 
myself  obliged  to  yield  to  the  advice  of  the  council, 
and  did,  as.  general  Cass  had  testified,  declare  that  X 
woiild  lead  the  army  againiit  Maiden,  as  soon  as  the 
-artillery  should  be  completed^ 


■"rVA 


ll\ 


k 


82 


DEVENCfi  OF 


My  opinion  was,  that  in  attempt  on  Bfalden  shoiild 
never  be  made  until  there  wai  an  absolute  certainty 
of  auecess.  This  opinion  was  founded,  not  only  on 
considerations  which  I  shall  hereafter  mention,  but 
upon  the  orders  I  had  received  from  the  War  De- 
partment, in  the  Secretary's  letter  of  Uie  twenty-fourth 
of  June,  which  I  have  so  often  quoted ;  and  by  which 
I  yni  directoft  not  to  attack  Maiden^  unless  I  judged 
my  (otee  was  equal  to  the  enterprise,  nor  unless  I 
C(Nifd  do  it  consistently  with  the  safety  of  myiown 
posts.  I  thought,  by  delay,  1  was  eveiy  day  strength- 
ening the  probability  of  sitecess  in  the  enterprise, 
because  the  force  of  the  enemy  was  daily  diminishing 
by  the  desertion  of  his  militia  and  Indians. 


■.i 


t 
)■ 


V 


But  I  thought  myself  bound  to  delay,  till  I  had 
possessed  myself  of  every  possible  means  of  insuring 
sqccess,  from  a  consideration  of  what  would  be  the 
consequences  of  a  defeat. 

r 

The  army  would  have  been  destroyed ;  if  not  by 
the  tomahawk  of  the  Indians,  they  must,  after  a  de- 
feat, have  perished  for  want  of  supplies.  A  defeat 
would  have  been  the  signal  fw  all  the  hordes  of  sa- 
vages in  the  surrounding  wilderness,  to  fall  upon  the 
unsuccessful  troops.  Every  path  would  have  been 
filled  with  these  remorseless  warriours.  But  it  was 
not  <»ly  the  fate  of  the  army  that  I  anticipated  on 
such  an  event ;  the  horrours  that  it  would  let  loose  on 
the  neighbouring  country^  and  throughout  our  exten- 
eive  borders,  were  presented  to  my  mind.    I  knew, 


w 


I 

t 

m 

1 

r 

a 

1- 


id 

le 


>y 

e- 
at 

Mi- 
he  ' 
en 
a* 
on 
on 

Or 


GENERAL  HULL. 


99^ 


that  if  the  army  I  commanded  were  beaten  in  battle, 
th^re  would  be  nothing  to  restrain  the  ravages  of  that 
part  of  our  enemy,  which,  when  a  battle  is  decided  in 
their  favour,  makes  the  vanquished,  and  their  de* 
fenceles8,^ountry  and  people,  their  prey.  , 

'  In  the  ungenerous  letter  which  colonel  Cask  wrote 
to  the  government,  (and  which,  as  I  ttdak,  waa  mojit 
unwarrantably  published)  he  seems  to  think*  that 
these  are  philanthropic  considerations,  unworthy  a 
soldier.  But,  Sir,  though  brought  up  in  the  field,  and 
though  I  have  seen  something  of  the  hoirours  of  war, 
I  am  not  yet  such  a  <«Uler,  av  that  I  can  think  of 
such  scenes  with  indifference.  When  I  considered 
what  would  HI  the  condition  of  the  territory,  over 
which  I  had  ae  long  presided,  and  Qver  which  I  was 
then  Govemour,  in  case  the  force  I  ccmimanded  should 
be  beaten  in  battle,  and  the  inhabitants  be  left  to  the 
mercy  of  the  savages,  without  any  stipulation  or  fofee 
for  their  protection,  I  thought  I  should  deserve  the 
heaviest  curses,  if  I  risked  a  battle,  before  I  had  taken 
livery  means  in  my  power  tq  insure  victojfy. 

These  were  the  considerations,  that  induced  me  to 
resist  the  ui^encjt  of  my  oflBcers  to  mova  to  ti<«:  attack 
of  Maiden,  till  the  eighth  of  August*  It  had  Ijeen 
ascertained  on  the  sixth,  that  the  cannon  would  be 
ready  on  the  eighth;  and  on  the  sixth  I  issued  an 
order  for  the  army  to  prepare  to  move  to  the  attack 
on  the  e^hth.  Every  thing  was  in  readiness  for  the 
enterprise  on  the  seventh.    But  on  that  evening,  I 


^.dM^ 


*9»       "•■•*■:. 


3«w(aBr»s 


«^ 


ll 


j''<mft*m»>i«i'»' 


H 


DEFENCE  OF 


crosied  with  the  whole  army  |o  Detroit,  except  a  de* 
tachment  of  about  three  hundred  men,  under  mi^jor 
Denny,  which  was  left  intrenched  at  Sandwich,  and 
which  was  also  moved  over  on  the  eleventh. 


-ie  ' 


This  retreat  froin  the  enemy's  shore  is  ote  o(  the 
acts  of  treason,  cowardice,  and  unoflRcer-like  conduct, 
of  which  I  am  accused.  I  proceed  to  submit  to  your 
consideration  my  answer  to  this  accusation,  and  the 
reasons  which  then  governed  my  conduct,  and  which 
I  yet  believe  to  have  been  correct 


v*» 


About  the  first  of  August,  as  appears  by  my  letter 
of  the  fourth,  I  received  an  account  of  the  fall  of  Mi^ 
chilimackinae.  Lieutenant  Hanks,  wSh  his  men  and 
some  Indians,  hptd  arrived  at  my  encampment.  The 
effect  of  this  great  misfortune  was  immediatdy  seen 
and  felf  in  the  vicinity  of  my  post.  The  Wyandot 
InTdians  settled  at  Biownstown,  who  had  previously 
shewn  the  most  friendly  dispositions,  and  given  the 
strongest  assurances  of  their  neutrality,  joined  the 
Brituh.  For  though  they  passed  over  under  the 
pretence  <^  having  been  made  prisoners,  the  circum- 
stances which  then  occurred  left  no  doubt  but  that 
they  had  formed  an  alliance  with  the  enemy.  This 
procedure  of  this  tribe  of  Indians,  was  not  only  evi> 
dence  of  their  own,  but  ct  the  defection  of  the  sur-* 
rounding  nations,  who  are  all  united  by  some  sort  of 
confederacy,  in  w  hich  the  Wyandots  have  a  superiouF 
influence,  which  is  acknowledged  b^^  the  other  tribei^ 
speaking  of  them  as  their  faihers^    When,  theire(os^. 


f 


f 


{ 
I 
1 
1 
t 
t 

in 

8 
t 

II 

b 
I 
t 


c 

U 
a 

0 


??^SS^,^-'— 


..--/. 


QSNERAL  HULL. 


M 


I  letriied  that  thii  natkn  Bad  joined  tha  itandaid  of 
the  enemy,  I  knew  that  the  Chi[nMwayt»  OttaHrayt, 
Pottawattainief,  Mudaees,  the  Shawaneei,.  Senefcaa, 
and  other  tribes,  who  altogether  cnold  Aimiah  between 
two  and  three  thousand  warriours,  would  alio  be  an 
addition  to  his  force.. 

Atjfhe  same  time  I  received  intelUgence,  as  ap- 
pears by  another  letter  of  mine  to  the  Secretary  at 
War  of  the  same  date,  (fourth  of  Aagust,)  that  a 
iBrltish  officer,  with  fifty-five  r^ular  soldiers  and  two 
brass  field  pieces,  had  landed  on  the  west  part  of  lake 
Ontarioi  had  penetrated  to  the  head  waters  of  the 
river  Le  Trench,  and  was  collecting  the  militia  and 
Indians  in  that  quarter  to  lead  them  against  my  army. 
From  the  information  I  had  received,  I  had  reason 
to  think,  and  so.  I  mention  in  my  l«tter.  to  the. Secre- 
tary, his  force  would  amount  to  six  or  seven  hundred. 
The  fall  of  Michilimackinac  also  changed  the  dispo- 
sition <^  the  inhabitants  of  Canada,  and  from  the  time 
that  accounts  were  received  ot  that  event,  there  were 
no  more  d"  their  militia  came  over  to  us.  I  had  also 
been  informed  <^j  the  arrival  c^  the  British  colonel 
Proctor  at  Maiden,  and  it  wiA  generally  believed, 
that  he  had  brought  with  him  some  reihCbrcementB,  as 
well  naval  as  military.  To  the  enemy's  naval  force 
I  had  nothing  to  oppose.  By  it,  the  enemy  might 
command  the  lake;  obtain  his  supplies  without  the 
least  intenruption ;  transport  his  troops  at  his  pleasure, 
and  co-operate  with  land  movements  on  the  margin 
of  the  waters.  I  had  also  intercepted  a  letter  fitun  a 
7* 


66 


DEFENCE  OF 


■V 


-*> 


ii 


{( 


Ui*  Mm  KMttie»at  Fort  W^|Mun,  to  a  Mr.  MMlntMb, 
«t  4aBdwi«b»  dtt«d  the  iiilteteentli  ^of  July,  firaoi 
wblefc  tlw  folkmiBg  are  cgrtrutib :  ^.^ 

■   ■       .    .  ■■•J'L:/  ■    -^vsr 

**  The  declantkm '  of  war  leached  .jm  on  t^  J^- 
"  toenth  instant,  but  we  are  neitbel  «itoliiihod  nor 
alarmed.  Our  agents  ordered  a  general  muater,  which 
amounted  to  twelve  hundred,  eveluaive  iHjtbtinl 
**  hundred  of  the  natives.  We  are  now  equal;  in  all, 
''to dxteen  or  seventeen  hundred  strong.  Om  (^ 
"  our  gentlemen  started  on  the  seventeenth,  #rith 
**  several  light  eaaoes,  for  the  interlonr  eouhtiy,  to 
**  roino  the  natives  to  activity,  which  Is  not  hai(d  to 
**  do  on  the  present  oocasion.  We  likewise  despateh- 
**  ed  messengers  in  all  directions  with  the  npm.  I 
**  have  not  the  least  doubt  but  our  foree  will,  in  ten 
**  dl^s  Innee,  anwunt  to  at  least  five  thousand  effec- 
'*  tiff)  niiBn<  Our  young  gentlemen  and  engi^;ees 
'*  oflfenid  most  handsomely  to  march  imndl^tely  for 
*'  Miehilimaekinac.  Our  chief,  Mr.  Shaw,  expressed 
**  ids  gratitude,  and  drafted  one  hundred — they  are  to 
"prd^^  tUs  evening  for  St.  Joseph's.  Betakes 
**  about  as  many  Indians.  Could  the  vessel  eontiin 
"them,  he  might  have  had  four  thousand  iBkiitlB,  It 
"  noW' depends  on  what  accounts  we  rerelve  fNMn  St. 
'*  J6Beph%  whether  these  numerous  trioes  flrom  the 
^  Interiour  will  proceed  to  St.  Joseph's  or  not 


^. 


At  the  tiine  that  this  intercqited  letter  fellinto  hi^ 
hands,'  I  was  informed  liy  lieutenant  Hanks^Hilt  be>> 
fore  he  left  Miehilimaekinac,  levetal  agentto  bf  ^ 


■**■*. 


.  ■'.>■■ 


%  ' 


->fc. 


^n. 


GENERAL  HULL. 


67 


lidHlftiritt  tertitoiy  hail  «Mved  at  that  poat,  after  Ita 
aitnulii,  fron  Fort  Wiittam,  on  the  north  aide  of  like 
8ii|Mrtoar,  wMMated,  that  a  large  force  of  Oan«iiaw 
■hd  Indiana  m^  colleeted  at  Fort  William,  read/  to 
dtoMBd  the  takea,  and  that  there  was  alio  a  force  of 
the  same  description,  collected  at  the  outlet  of  lake 
Supoioor.  I  was  further  informed  by  lieutenant 
Hanki^^t  immediately  after  the  surrender  of  Michi- 
limackinae,  wMch  was  on  the  eighteenth  of  July,  the 
British  commander  had  sent  an  express  to  Little 
To4t ;  tt^d  it  was  supposed,  that  on  the  return  of  the 
express,  all  the  forces  which  had  been  collected  and 
w<el9e  collectfng  in  the  northern  rq^ns,  wovld  be 
ordered  to  Maiden.  The  death  of  lieutenant  Hanks 
deprH^  me  of  the  benefit  of  his  testimony.  But 
this  is  sufficiently  supplied  by  the  evidence  of  Mr. 
Stone,  and  doctor  Day,  gentlemen  who  were  at  Mi- 
chilimacldnac  when  it  surrendered,  aind  trho  aceom- 
panied  lieutenant  Hanks  to  my  head  quarters  at  Sand- 
wich, and  doctor  Day  was  present  when  lieutenant 
Hanks  made  the  communication  to  me. 


.1 


?■  •! 


I    vj 


*■' 


It  taiay  be  said j  that  this  information  oogl^  not  to 
have  hod  any  influence  iip6n  my  conduct,  because 
tht^. northern  Indians  could  not,  and  in  fact  did  not 
arrive  in  a  great  Iengl|i  of  time. 

I  prenime  that  no  testimony  is  wanting  to  prove 
to  iids  Court,  that  itfm  the  jpoints  where  they  were 
eollectedt  they  might  have  descended  in  a  very  few 
Utiiit*    1^  savages  of  our  cpontry  have  an  ad  van- 


s' 


i 


1  r 


^'!l 


''7 


*■: 


.#* 


IL 

^**,: 


j'*^ 


'M 


■'."*1 


■rig 


^4 

i 


08 


DEFENCE  OF 


tag«  of  all  other  troops^  !•  the  celerity  and  Ikcilitf 
with  wlrteh  thejr  make  their  movementt.  These  too, 
were  to  be  aided  by  the  means  of  the  north-west 
company,  which  were  partiealariy  adqtted  to  tAns- 
portation,  fVom  the  nature  of  their  trade  upon  the 
waters  of  the  lakes. 

As  to  the  fact,  that  the  northern  savagesjUd  not 
arrive  at  Maiden  till  long  after  the  surrender. 

-   •  ,  "** 

The  testimony  of  captain  Eastman  is,  that  he  re- 
mained at  Detn^t  twenty-four  days  aCter  the  eapitu- 
lation;  that  the  Sa^anau  Indians,  with  about  sixty 
warriours,  arrived  three  days  after  the  surrender ;  that 
the  Michilimackinac  Indians,  with  about  eleven  or 
twelve  hundred  warriours  arrived  about  the  tenth  or 
eleventh  of  September.  It  may  be  well  to  remark 
here,  bow  formidable  this  force  piovod  to  be,  although 
it  was  but  a  small  portion  of  that  which  would  have 
come,  had  not  Detnrft  been,  surrendered.  But  can  it 
be  concluded,  that  this  force  would  not  have  arrived 
eariiier,  had  not  intelligence  of  the  fall  of  my  army 
reached  them,  which  it  must  have  d<»e  a  few  days 
after  the  event  happened  ?  When  information  of  so 
many  adverse  circumstances  had  reached  me  ftom 
various  quarters,  the  fate  of  my  anniy  aj^icared  in- 
evitable. I  had  but  one  of  two  courses  to  pursue,  and 
either  seemed  to  me  almost  a  desperate  alternative. 
I ,  must  either  advance  or  retreat.  If  I  had  leen 
nothing  that  I  was  to  regard,  but  the  power  of  the 
enemy,  I  had  no  doubt  but  that  1  ought  to  have 


J- 


4 


0 


^f 


GENERAL  HULL. 


^ 


Adqited  the  former  expedient.  I  vrat  obliged  to  eon* 
■ider  tlie  effect  •  retreat  wolild  ha  ve  in  my  ow»  eamp. 
T  .:  young  and  inexperienced  officviv  T  had  wider 
my  coowiand,  who  could  see  no  danger  that  was  not 
« immediately  before  their  eyes;  who  thought  and  aaid 
that  they  were  very  brave,  but  with  a  few  exceptioni,>^ 
do  not  know  it  to  thii  day  from  any  triaU  of  their 
courage  I  ivho  detpisedall  prec^tion,  and  thought  all 
generrivhip  eonaisted  in  inconsiderate  and  impetuous 
advances—I  knew  well,  would  pursue  the  condtact 
wbkh  they  afterwards  did,  and,  by  representing  a  re- 
treat as  proceeding  from  the  most  unworthy  and  u»< 
justifiable  motives,  destroy  the  efficiency  of  the  army, 
by  robbing  me  of  its  confidence.  The  cabals,  which 
had  riien  to  such  a  hei^t  as  to  mature  a  plan  of  nm* 
tiny,  in  which  ray  chief  officers  were  to  be  the  ring- ' 
UaderSt  could  not  be  entirely  concealed  from  me; 
although,  till  I  saw  the  confession  published  to  the 
world,  by  one  of  the  conspirators,  I  did  not  know  the 
extent  of  their  design. 

Under  these.awfbl  ciroumstances,  dangerous  as  the 
attempt  on  Maiden  appeared  to  me  to  bet  I  thought 
it  might  be  less  so,  than  a  retreat.  I  determined  to 
attack  Maiden,  and  on  the  sixth  of  August  Issued 
orders  to  have  every  thing  prepared  for  the  move* 
ment  of  the  army  on  the  eighth.  And,  Gentlemen, 
there  is  no  part  of  my  conduct,  since  I  have  been  a 
joktter,  that  I  reflect  opMi  with  so  much  self  c<mvic^ 
tlon  of  enonr,  as  I  do  upon  this. 


k] 


t' 


:i 


uf 


n 


■  V 
^'1 


4'? 


i>fe.»;Vr^?"-  '  *'.'^'.""<^"'  ■    "^  -L 


-^. 


.i-ot**,-*..,,^,] 


M 


w 


DEFENCE  OF 


I  look  back  with  regret  upon  the  moment  when  l 
yielded  to  the  councils  of  the  inexperienced  officers 
I  commanded,  <and  determined  to  make  an  attempt, 
which  my  own  judgment  did  not  approve,  which  was 
contrary  to  all  military  knowledge,  and  which  even 
success  might  not  justify.  I  thought,  however,  it  was 
possible',  that  if  I  were  successful,  and  should  possess 
myself  of  ihe  enemy^  fortresi,  I  might  possitriy  main- 
tain myself  there  for  some  short  time ;,  and  in  that  time 
I  hoped  I  might  have  some  succour  and  security  from 
my  own  country,  and  her  armies,  that  I  had  been  led^ 
to  expect  woidd  be  operating  below  me. 


:] 


k  U 


f^^^^- 


i 


Vsf, 


''\ 


On  the  seventh  of  Aii^st  every  thing  was  in  rea- 
diness for  the  intended  movement,  but  on  that  day 
at  about  one  o'clock,  an  express  arrived  with  tetiers 
to  me  from  the  commanding  officers  on  the  Niagara 
frontier,  two  from  major-general  Hall,  and  the  other 
from  general  P.  B.  Porter.  These  letters  were  sent 
to  me  by  express,  to  inform  me,  that  a  lai^e  force  from 
the  neighbourhood  oS  Niagara  were  moving  towards 
my  army.  But  what  was  more  decisive  in  its.  influ- 
ence on  my  measures,  was,  that  \  learned  from  those 
letters,  that  I  was  not  to  expect  that  tiiese  movements 
of  the  enemy  were  to  be  checked,  or  that  my  army 
would  be  suftained,  by  any  operations  against  the 
enemy  in  any  quarter.  I.  found  that  the  invasion  of 
Canada,  and  the  whole  war,  was  to  be  carried  on 
by  the  three  hundred  regidar  troops  under  colonel 
Miller,  and  the  twelve  or  fourteen  hundred  militia, 
which  had  been  placed  under  my  command.    I  must 


■  \ 


GENERAL  HULL. 


ft 


here  agftili  beg  leave  to  turn  the  attention  of  the 
Court  Martial  to  the  correspondence  between  the 
Secretary  at  War  and  myself,  to  remind  the  Goivt 
Martial  (^  the  reasons  I  had  to  expect  supplies,  as- 
sbtance,  and  co-operation,  -when  I  took  the  command 
of  tile  north-western  army.  When  I  received  these 
letters  from  generals  Hall  and  Porter,  my  situation 
became  embarrassing  and  distressing  to  a  great  de- 
gree. I  had  but  a  few  hours  before,  with  what  re- 
luctance appears  from  the  testimony  <tf  general  Cass, 
yielded  to  importunities  of  my  officers,  and  given 
them  expectation,  that  I  would  lead  the  army  against 
Maiden.  I  had  issued  orders  for  making  the  neces- 
sary preparations,  and  fixed  a  time  for  *he  movement. 
I  knew  well  what  would  be  the  Heflfect  of  disappoint- 
ing tl^e  expectations  which  those  measures  had  rais- 
ed. But  as  general  Mac  Arthur  has  testified)  I  told 
him,  as  commander  of  that  anny,  I  felt  myself  re9* 
ponsible  for  its  movements,  and  its  fate*  Under  an 
awful  sense  of  that  responsibilttyy  I  determined  to 
recross  the  river,  with  the  greater  part  <^  the  army. 
In  making  this  movement,  I  had  no  design  of  relin- 
quishing the  attack  oi  Maiden.  My  intention  was  to 
take  post  at  Detroit,  and  there  to  wait  until  some  na- 
val force  on  the  lake,  and  a  co-operation  from  below, 
which,  f nun  4he  beginning,  I  had  relied  upon,  and 
which  the  letters  I  had  received  from  generals  Hall 
and  Porter  gave  me  reason  to  expect,  would  com- 
mence at  some  future  but  probably  distani  period, 
afforded  some  hopes  of  success,  and  of  advantage 
from  succcsB.    My  further  intention  ras  to  concen- 


i 

\    'I 


i     '1 


\i' 


'  I  I 


V\.i 


-•»r-«ll|»U^, 


!>*■-■  ■'■'-ti^^* 


^,ll&iL«''3^, 


\k 


K-   ! 


i^ 


DEFENCE  OP 


*  1 


?;<*■■ 


trate  my  forces  at  Detroit,  that  I  might  from  ikelndt 
open  and  secure  my  commimteatioii  with  the  state  olf 
Ohio;  upon  which,  in  my  judgment,  the  salvation 
of  the  an^y  dq[)ended.  This  considenitiom  had  so 
much  influence  on  my  measures,  not  cmly  at  this  time^ 
but  throughout  the  canq>aign,  and  in  the  final  surren- 
der, that  it  will  be  proper  to  present  it  to  the  Courts 
in  such  a  view,  as  that  they  may  judge  of  its  imp<»^ 
tance. 

from  Urbana  to  the  lHliami  of  the  lake,  ife  a  per* 
feet  wilderness.  Throi^h  this  wUderneiSt  a  distance 
fX  a  hundred  and  twenty  miles,  and  through  a  country 
of  which  the  Indians  wei^  the  inhabitants  and  pny* 
prietors,  the  army  had  to  cut  a  road,  when  they  ad* 
vanced  i;  and  it  was  the  only  road  by  which  supplies 
bf  any  kind  could  be  received.  Frotal  the  Miami  to 
the  settlements  On  the  Detroit  river,  the  country  is 
little  better  than  a  wilderness,  there  being  only  two 
Or  three  little  settlement*.  Along  the  D^etroit  river 
the  country  is  partially  cleared  and  cultivated.  The 
improvements  extend  from  half  a  mile  to  a  mile 
back  from  the  river,  and  in  part  oi  these  improve^ 
ments,  on  the  margin  of  the  streights,'  is  the  road  to 
the  town  of  Detroit  The  whole  country  from  Ur* 
bana  to  the  toWn  of  Detroit  is  filled  with  savages, 
all  of  whom,  with  very  unimportant  exceptions,  be- 
ldame hostile  to  us,  and  infested  every  part  of  the 
road  which  was  not  protected  by  an  armed  force. 
From  the  Miami  to  Detroit,  a  distance  of  seventy- 
two  miles,  the  road  runs  so  near  the  waters  of  lake 


U'f 


14 


'i  I 


GENERAL  HULL. 


n 


i-m 


£rie,  and  of  the  streights,  that  the  enemy  having  the 
command  of  those  waters,  could,  with  the  greatest  fa- 
cility, transport  from  their  shore,  and  from  one  point 
to  another,  detachments  to  intercept  the  communi- 
cation. Their  vessels  too,  would  always  afford  them 
a  secure  retreat,  in  case  of  disaster.  There  were,  in 
the  whole  Michigan  territory,  less  than  five  thousand 
white  inhabitants;  about  two  thousand  or  whom  were 
settled  <||ong  the  Detroit  river.  The  soil,  though 
fertile,  was  but  little  cultivated:  the  inhabitants 
greatly  relying  for  their  support  upon  the  supplies  of 
fish  and  venison,  which  the  woods  and  waters  afforded. 
The  territory  has  never  furnished  sufficient  provi- 
sions for  its  own  inhabitants ;  there  are  annually,  as 
appears  from  the  testimony  before  you,  large  quanti- 
ties of  pork  and  beef  brought  in  from  the  state  of 
Ohio;  and,  notwithstanding  the  testimony  of  some  of 
the  witnesses,  I  assert,  that  at  the  time  the  army  was 
in  that  quarter,  they  could  not  have  taken  the  neces- 
sary supplies  from  the  country  for  any  length  of  time, 
without  distressing  the  inhabitants.  It  has  been 
proved,  that  even  in  time  of  peace  the  few  troops 
who  were  stationed  at  Detroit  were  fed  by  supplies 
from  Ohio.  The  country  must  afford  insufficient 
provisions  for  an  army,  or  there  could  be  no  necessity 
for  furnishing  general  Harrison  from  the  western 
states,  at  the  immense  expense,  which  his  supplies 
have  cost.  The  testimony  of  general  Mac  Arthur 
affords  some  evidence  of  the  state  of  the  country  in 
respect  to  provisions.  He  stated  that'  from  the  morn- 
ing of  the  fourteenth  of  August,  when  he  marched 
8 


"7   ■  '.(.'I 


■(    i, 


I 


'^'•''•1 


74 


DEFENCE  OF 


s 

.1 

si' 
m 


from  Fort  Detroit  with  a  detachment,  till  the  sixteenth, 
when  they  met  with  and  killed  an  ox,  in  a  march  of 
near  thirty  miles,  he  saw  nothing  that  was  footl  for 
man,  except  some  unripe  corn  and  some  honey.  The 
opposite  shores  of  tfie  enemy  were  not  more  produc- 
tive in  supplies.  The  whole  of  the  country  border- 
ing on  the  straights  and  on  the  lake,  is  a  wilderness, 
except  the  Settlement  at  Amherstburgb,  and  a  very 
thin  population  on  the  banks  of  the  DetBttt  river, 
and  a  small  place  on  lake  Erie,  known  by  the  name 
of  the  New-settlement.  Above,  on  the  river  Trench, 
at  about  the  distance  of  sixty  miles,  is  the  most  fruit- 
ful and  valuable  part  of  the  country.  Independent 
of  these  settlements,  which  had  been  exhausted  by  the 
two  armies,  the  whole  is  wilderness.  After  the  fall 
of  Michilimackinac,  when  all  the  hives  of  northern 
Indians  became  hostile,  and  were  let  loose  upon  us, 
when  the  north-west  company,  as  appears  by  the  let- 
ter of  Mr.  Mac  Kenzie,  had  arrayed  against  us  their 
numerous  retainers,  and  when  the  navigation  of  the 
upper  as  well  as  of  the  lower  lakes  was  free  to  the 
enemy,  no  supplies  could  have  been  obtained  from 
the  river  Trench,  or  the  bordering  country. 

It  must  be  remarked,  that  from  the  time  the  army 
arrived  at  Detroit,  not  one  pound  of  provisions  had 
been  received.  From  the  moment  the  declaration  of 
war  was  known  to  the  enemy,  he  had  intercepted  the 
only  line  of  communication,  nnd  thus  cut  off  all  sup- 
plies. 


'  ••■>"««9f;»^ 


GENERAL  HULL. 


7J 


It  appears  from  a  return  made  on  the  day  the  army 
arrived  at  Detroit,  and  which  is  mentioned  in  the 
minutes  of  a  council  of  >var,  held  on  tlie  ninth,  that 
there  vrere  then  in  store       * 

125,000  rations  of  flow,  and 
70,666  rations  of  meat. 

This  stock,  as  it  wa^^  never  replenished,  must  have 
been  proportionately  exhausted,  at  the  time  of  the  re- 
treat from  Canada,  and  at  the  time  of  the  final  surren- 
der. And,  indeed,  would  have  been  entirely  so, 
had  we  not  drawn,  as  far  as  we  could,  our  supplies 
from  the  country,  which  every  day  became  the  more 
stripped,  and  the  less  able  to  afford  them. 

A  return  made  to  me  by  the  contractor,  on  the 
twenty-fifth  of  July,  shews  not  only  the  quantity  of 
provisions  on  hand  at  that  date,  but  it  shews,  by  a 
comparison  with  the  return  of  tlie  ninth  of  thd  same 
month,  the  rate  at  which  the  provisions  were  con- 
sumed. This  return  has  been  proved  and  read  in 
evidence.  It  is  as  follow!^:  *'  Provisions  on  hand  at 
, "  Fort  Detroit,  twenty-fifth  of  July,  eighteen  hundred 
"  and  twelve — 

"  70,000  rations  flour, 
"  21,000  sa/led  meat, 
"  100,000  whiskey." 

It  has  been  said  by  generals  Cass  and  Mac  Arthur, 
and  by  other  witnesses,  that  they,  never  heard  com- 


ll 


i 


■  .i^j 


a 


m 


"««S9r^wif.. 


VI 


70 


DEFENCE  OP 


plaints  of  a  want  of  provision.  This  is  certainly  tlrae. 
There  was  not,  previously  to  the  surrender,  an  actual 
want  or  deficiency  of  provisions.  Our  stores  were 
not  then  entirely  exhausted;  but  there  was  a  certain- 
ty that  they  would  soon  be  so. 

Such  then  was  my  situation  when  I  determined  to 
retreat  from  Canada.  I  had  above  me  hordes  of  hos- 
tile savages.  I  had  below  me  an  enemy  in  a  fortress, 
which  I  believed  to  be  a  work  of  strength,  and  suf- 
ficiently manned  for  its  defence.  I  found  that  he  had 
been  left  at  liberty  to  augment  his  force,  by  drawing 
his  troops  from  all  other  points.  I  commanded  an 
army,  the  troops  of  which  (except  a  few  regulars  of 
the  fourth  regiment)  had  no  experience,  and  had  never 
been  tried;  and  this  army  was  otficered  by  men,  the 
chief  of  whom  had  not  hesitated  to  express,  in  the 
most  indecent  terms,  his  want  of  confidence  in  me.  I 
was  told,  that  I  must  not  expect  any  co-operation  or 
assistance ;  I  saw  that  my  provisions  would  be  soon 
exhausted,  and  that  neither  my  own  nor  the  enemy's 
country  would  afford  supplies  for  any  length  of  time.  I 
saw  that  my  only  communication  was  cut  off,  and 
unless  it  were  opened  the  army  would  be  subdued  by 
want. 

Under  these  circumstances,  1  determined  torecross 
the  river,  take  the  principal  part  of  the  army,  not 
with  an  intent,  as  I  have  said,  to  relinquish  the  en- 
terprise against  Maiden  and  the  Upper  Province,  but 
to  wait  for  a  co-operation  and  assistance,  which  might 
afford  more  favourable  prospects,  and  in  the  mean 


■o. 


^^^mm^- 


GENERAL  HULL. 


n 


_  time,  which  I  considered  a  duty  of  the  first  impor- 
tance, to  open  the  onfy  communication  by  Tvhich  I 
could  obtain  supplies.  An  attack  en  Maiden  was  an 
alternative,  which,  as  I  have  said,  presented  itself  to 

^  my  mind.  It  was  one  which  I  had  the  most  powerful 
inducements  to  adopt.  I  well  knew'  what  rewards  of 
honour  and  glory  awaited  an- achievement,  which  my 
country  had  been  led  to  expect  with  so  much  certain- 
ty and  anxiety.  I  knew  what  were  the  expectations 
of  my  officers,  and  what  resentment  a  disappointment 
would  create.  I  knew  a  retrograde  movement  would 
expose  me  to  censures,  and  to  the  malice  of  my  ene- 
mies ;  but  in  deliberating  on  this  alternative,  I  could 
not  but  take  into  view  the  possibility  of  a  defeat  in 
the  attempt,  ahd  the  consequences  which,  as  I  have 
before  mentioned,  would  result  not  only  to  the  army, 
but  to  the  people  of  the  territory.  A  more  decisive 
consolation,  however,  induced  me  to  reject  this  al- 
temaflVe,  I  then  felt  confident,  and  I  do  now  feel 
most  confident,  that  if  I  had  attacked  Maiden,  and 
had  been  successful,  it  would  have  been  but  a  useless 
waste  of  blood.  It  would  have  been  utterly  impossible 
to  have  maintained  the  fortress.  It  must  have  fallen 
for  want  of  supplies.  It  must  be  remembered,  that  the 
waters  of  the  lakes  were  shut  against  us.  There  could 
have  been  no  possible  communication  with  the  fortress, 
but  by  the  road  whicn  I  had  c  iit  through  the  wilder- 
ness.    How  was  that  road  to  have  been  kept  open  ? 


Most  probably,  after  an  engagement,  or  after  car- 
rying the  works  by  storm,  I  could  have  taken  into 

8* 


■y*| 


^ 


:.*!*- 


•■'"    -^^"^mmiimF 


i' 


"mr-' 


78 


DEFENCE  OF 


Maiden  but  a  few  hundred  men.  Could  I  hav0 
made  sufficient  detachment«  from  the  garrison,  to  have 
performed  this  service  ?  Let  it  be  remembered,  that 
generals  Mac  Arthur  and  Cass  censured  me  for  sendr 
ing  so  small  a  detachment  as  two  hundred  men  in  this 
duty;  and  thought  the  force  ought  to  have  been 
double  or  equal  to  one  of  their  regiments.  And  when 
colonel  Miller,  with  six  hundred  men,  two  hundred 
and  eighty  of  whom  were  almost  the  whole  of  the 
regular  force  under  my  command,  had  defeated  the 
enemy  near  Maguago,  he  thought  it  necessary  to  send 
to  me  for  a  reinforcement  of  one  hundred  and  fifty,  or 
two  hundred,  to  enable  him  to  secure  hia  passage  to 
and  from  the  river  Raisin,  though  his  loss  in  the  bat- 
tle did  not  exceed  eighty,  and  though  he  knew  at  the 
river  Raisin  he  was  to  be  Joined  by  the  detachments, 
under  captain  Brush,  and  the  companies  under  cap- 
tains Campbell  and  Rowland.  ^^ 

If  the  road  <:ou7d  have  been  opened,  still  no  sup- 
plies could  have  passed  into  the  fort,  without  crossing 
tlie  water,  and  on  that  the  British  had  a  force,  to 
which  we  had  nothing  to  oppose.  If  we  had  possess- 
ed the  fort,  it  would  have  been  pressed  by  the  north- 
west company,  and  its  retainers  from  the  north,  with 
all  the  hosts  of  savages  of  those  regions.  A  British 
force  no  doubt  would  have  approached  it  from  lake 
Ontario,  by  the  river  Le  Trench.  On  the  water  it 
would  have  been  attacked  by  the  naval  force,  and  all 
this  it  must  have  encountered,  without  the  possibility 
of  obtaining  supplies,  and  without  the  lea^t  prospect 
ofrelief  or  assistance. 


o 
o 


^"^^'^W^iWj 


■■■f*. 


Hfr 

GENERAL  HULL. 


Td 


My  judgment,  Mr.  President,  may  mislead  me  now, 
as  it  did  then;  but  yet  I  think,  that  if  I  had  led  the 
army  I  commanded  to  the  conquest  of  Maiden,  under 
such  circumEtances  as  I  have  stated,  it  would  have 
been  as  great  a  crime  as  any  of  which  I  am  accus- 
ed. Certain  I  am,  that  I  should  have  wanted  that 
consciousness  of  having  acted  from  the  purest  motives, 
and  according  to  my  best  judgment,  which  has  been 
my  only  consolation  in  all  I  have  suffered. 

If  it  be  true,  as  I  have  stated,  and  as  I  think  the 
testimony  proves,  that  my  army  had  not  provisions 
for  4vny  length  of  time,  and  that  neither  my  own,  nor 
the  eneiny's  country  would  have  been  capable  of  fur- 
nishing them,  I  need  hardly  state  to  the  members  of 
this  tribunal,  how  important  it  was  for  me  to  keep 
open  the  road  I  had  made  through  the  wilderness,  the 
only  communication  by  which  supplies  could  approach 
me. 

In  modem  warfare,  the  first  great  object  of  each 
contending  party,  'is  the  resources  of  his  enemy.  The 
fate  of  armies  is  found  to  depend  upon  the  abundance 
of  their  resources,  on  their  security,  and  in  the  facility 
of  keeping  up  a  communication  with  them.  It  has  be- 
come a  principle  to  manoeuvre  in  such  a  manner,  as  to 
cover  the  places  from  whence  supplies  may  be  drawn; 
not  to  go  far  from  them,  but  with  great  caution,  and  ne- 
ver to  cease  preserving  with  them  those  connections,  in 
which  the  strength  oS  an  army  consists,  and  on  which 
its  success  depends.    These  are  the  sentiments  of  a 


\  \: 


•1  i-i 


'ini»»i|)i,iWBff_ji3PW«i'^  S,*f*** 


so 


DEFENCE  OF 


modern  military  writer  of  great  celebrity.  Tlie  ex- 
perience of  all  military  movements  in  latter  times, 
proves  their  correctness.  I  always  felt  the  force  of 
them.  It  was  a  ^eat  violation  of  these  principles, 
and  therefore  as  I  considered  a  great  mistake,  to 
march  the  army  I  commanded,  after  the  war  had 
commenced,  to  Detroit,  leaving  a  British  garrison 
eighteen  miles  in  our  rear,  directly  upon  our  line  of 
communication,  which  from  Hi  proximity  to  the  lake, 
and  his  force  upon  the  water,  the  enemy  had  the 
meanr  of  intercepting  with  peculiar  facility.  But  the 
orders  I  received  in  the  letter  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  which  announced  to  me  the  declaration  of 
war,  were  positive  upon  this  point.  They  lefl  iie 
no  discretion.  I  was  to  march  to  Detroit,  and  there 
to  wait  for  further  orders.  I  had  seen  the  necessity  <^ 
keeping  open  the  communication,  when  I  was  on  the 
march,  and  therefore  I  built  and  garrisoned  block- 
houses on  the  road.  When  in  the  enemy's  country, 
I  felt  every  day,  more  strongly,  the  force  of  this  ne- 
cessity, and  therefore  detached  major  >ran  Horn  on 
that  service.  Whether  that  was  a  proper  detachment, 
as  it  is  made  a  separate  charge,  will  be  a  subject  of 
sepajrate  consideration,  in  a  subsequent  part  of  my  de- 
fence. After  the  defeat  of  major  Van  Horn,  and 
when  I  found  the  situation  of  my  army  immediately 
before  I  left  Sandwich,  such  as  I  have  before  describ- 
ed, I  was  perfectly  convinced  that  no  success,  riot 
even  the  capture  of  Maiden,  could  save  it  from  even- 
tual destruction,  if  my  communication  with  Ohio  was 
not  opened. 


.  --taaia 


■^vmmitfm 


4  t 


GENERAL  HULL. 


81 


The  Court  will  recollect,  that  general  Mac  Artliur 
and  general  CaBS  have  stated  in  their  testimony,  that 
when  they  olyected  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  force  I  de- 
tached under  mfyorVan  Horn,  they  each  recommended 
that  I  should  send  him  with  his  regiment  on  that  duty. 
This  shews  what  force,  in  their  estimation,  was  ne- 
cessary for  the  purpose.  What  force  colonel  Miller 
thought  necessary,  I  have  already  stated.  If  these 
gentlemen  were  correct  on  this  point,  my  army  could 
not  be  in  a  proper  situation,  when  I  must  have 
stretched  back  with  nearly  half  and  the  most  efficient 
poft  of  my  command,  to  insure  me  supplies.  It  must 
be  recollected  also,  that  it  was  qot  a  temporary  de- 
tachment, that  would  have  answered  any  purpose.  I 
must  have  kept  always  sepafated  from  the  army,  a 
sufficient  force  to  have  kept  open  the  road  from  De- 
troit to  Ohio,  a  distance  of  about  two  hundred  miles. 
I  do  not  believe,  that  after  the  fall  of  Michilimackinac, 
when  the  savages  became  arrayed  against  us,  and  in- 
fested every  part  of  the  road,  that  my  whole  force 
would  have  been  sufficient  to  have  protected  so  ex- 
tensive a  line. 


Ill 

.A 


If 

Id 


■  T 


These,  Gentlemen,  were  the  grounds  on  which  I 
made  a  retrograde  movement,  with  a  part  of  the  army, 
to  Detroit.  It  was  from  thence  to  open  the  only 
channel,  through  which  it  could  derive  the  means  of 
its  existence.  I  repeat,  my  judgment  may  have  mis- 
led me.  If  it  did,  it  continues  yet  to  mislead  me ; 
for  every  day  that  I  have  lived  I  have  become  more 
confident,  that  I  did  right  to  leave  the  enemy's  coun- 


III 


I 


-I 


*>?" 


'<i^ 


sa 


DEPENCT  OP 


try.  Had  I  followed  the  dictates  of  my  ownjudg* 
ment,  I  should  have  made  my  retreat  to  the  Miami 
and  there  waited  for  co-operation  and  assistance.  The 
distance  from  thence  to  the  Ohio  would  have  been 
comparatively  short;  I  should  have  had  no  enemy 
in  my  rear  but  scattering  savageii,  and  he  could  not 
then  have  availed  himself  of  the  great  advantage  h^ 
derived  from  the  command  of  the  waters. 


!  '■■  .  . 


For  the  reason  that  I  did  not  do  so,  let  me  appeal 
to  the  testimony  of  the  two  officers  next  in  command. 

When  I  propose^  this  measure  to  colonel  Cass,  his 
answer  was,  that  if  I  did  under  the  then  existing 
circumstances,  every  jnan  of  the  Ohio  volunteers 
would  leave  me.  His  language  in  substance  wafe,  as 
he  states  it  himself,  that  the  volunteers  would  retreat 
with  me,  if  they  thought  a  retreat  necessary.  But  as 
they  undertook  to  judge,  that  it  was  not  then  necessa- 
ry, they  would  leave  me  and  not  a  man  would  retreat 
under  my  command.  Colonel  Cass's  testimony  on 
this  subject  is  in  the  following  wonis :  "  1  tecoUect  a 
"conversation  -with  general  Hull,  after  the  retreat 
"  from  Canada,  and  before  we  went  to  the  river  Rai- 
"sin,  in  which  general  Hull  suggested,  that  as  he 
"  heard  of  no  co-operation  from  below,  it  might  be 
"  necessary  to  take  post  at  the  Miami.  I  think  I  told 
"  general  Hull,  that,  if  under  existing  circumstances, 
*'  he  took  such  a  step,  the  Ohio  militia  would  desert 
*'  him  to  a  man.  Whether  I  told  general  Hull  so  or 
"  not,  I  am  confident  it  would  have  been  the  case.'* 


■oaf:.  .-,»:»-.»'-  ■ 


itfyjWrw.lSf  M'ftJSISd*  f-v*-'-'.*." 


.i,    '■ 


GENERAL  HULL. 


83 


It  may  be  weil  td  remark,  that  this  testimony  of 
colonel  Cass  is  evidence  or  the  insubordination  that 
VTM  among  the  troops.  By  vrhom,  and  by  what 
means,  it  had  been  encouraged,  the  Court  may  judge. 

Upon  this  part  of  (he  subject,  that  is  to  say,  the  re- 
treat from  Canada,  I  have  but  a  few  words  more  to 
say.  I  retreated  for  the  purpose  of  being  enabled  to 
take  effective  meac*«re»  for  opening  my  communica- 
tion. The  importance  of  accomplishing  this  design, 
I  have  endeavoured  to  shew.  But  it  seems  that  the 
government,  or  whoever  it  may  have  been  that  drew 
the  charges,  that  are  now  before  you,  were  also  sensi- 
ble of  this  importance ;  for  one  of  the  accusations,  that 
- 1  am  to  answer,  is,  that  I  did  not  keep  open  th?s  com- 
munication, and  yet  the  measure  I  took  to  accom- 
plish this  object,  and  w-.jich  was  the  only  measure 
that  afforded  any  prospect  of  success,  that  is  to  say, 
withdrawing  the  army  from  Canada,  is  also  made  a 
ground  of  crimination. 

I  beg  the  Court  to  notice,  that  these  reasons  for  the 
retreat  are  such  as  I  a^  gned  for  it  at  the  time,  as  well 
as  now.  For  the  evidence  of  this  I  refer  to  my  let- 
ters to  the  Secretary  at  War  of  the  fourth  and  eighth 
of  August.  My  letter  to  governour  Scott,  of  the 
ninth  of  August,  and  my  letters  to  governour  Meigs 
and  colonel  Wells  of  the  eleventh  of  August,  ajl 
shew,  that  I  abandoned  Canada  because  I  had  as- 
certained that  I  should  soon  be  surrounded  by  an 


^»^3t*^)i«<<:- 


84 


DEFENCE  OF 


overwhelming  force;  because  my  communkatioii,  if 
I  remained  where  I  was,  would  inevitably  be  cut  off; 
and  because  I  found  that  the  few  regulars  and  militia 
I  commanded,  were  to  be  left  to  carry  on,  without  any 
assistance  or  co-operation,  the  offensive  war,  which 
the  United  States  had  declared  against  one  of  the 
most  powerful  nations  on  earth. 


:'. 


It  appears,  that  the  view  which  my  officers  had  of 
our  situation,  about  the  time  of  the  retreat  and  sur- 
render, was  very  different  from  what  it  would  appear 
to  have  been,  from  the  testimony  they  have  given 
before  you ;  at  least,  this  observation  applies  to  ge- 
neral Cass.  The  testimony  of  Mr.  Sillimai^,  (the 
general's  brother-in-law,)  of  Mr.  Mills,  and  of  Mr. 
Converse,  his  neighbour,  proves,  that  in  letters  writ- 
ten by  him,  at  the  times  to  which  his  testimony  re- 
lates, he  had  different  sentiments  from  those  he  has 
here  expressed. 


In  a  letter  of  the  third  of  August,  at  which  time 
we  were  in  possession  of  the  enemy's  territory,  and 
all  the  resources  that  might  be  drawn  from  thence, 
general  Cass  tells  Mr.  Silliman,  that  provisions  would 
become  necessary  for  the  existence  of  the  troops. 

In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Silliman  after  the  fall  of  Michili- 
mackinac,  general  Cass  says,  that  the  iispression  made 
l)y  the  fall  of  Michilimackinac  could  scarcely  be  con- 
ceived.   In  the  same,  or  some  other  letter,  according 


■if 
W 


GENERAL  HULL. 


85 


[.it* 
itia 


to  the  teetimony  of  Mr.  Silliman,  general  Cass  pressed 
bim  to  use  his  influence  to  procure  reinforcements  for 
the  army,  and  e!^resses  his  surprise,  that  we  were 
left  without  cooperation,  by  putting  to  bis  correspon- 
dent the  following  interrogation :  "  Is  there  nothing 
**  to  be  done  in  the  lower  end  of  the  lakes,  to  make  a 
**  diversion  in  our  favour  V*  In  a  letter  from  general 
Cass  to  the  same  gentleman,  dated  on  the  twelfth  of 
August,  general  Cass  says,  **  think  our  situation  as 
bad  as  you  may,  it  is  still  worse.'* 


«( 


It  is  most  unfortunate  for  me,  that  I  have  in  the 
course  of  this  prosecution  so  often  to  feel  the  want  of 
documents.  I  ^ant  to  prove  the  contents  of  a  me- 
morial, whieh  was  filed  on  record  in  the  War  Depart- 
ment. I  ask  for  the  record,  and  it  is  lost  I  am  im- 
peached for  not  havii^  regula^y  issued  orders  to  the 
army.  The  witnesses  who  are  to  support  this  ciharge 
prove,  that  there  were  orderly  books  in  which  .my  or- 
ders were  entered;  but  they  have  either  been  lost,  or 
what  is  more  extraordinary,  left  at  heme.  Captain 
MacCommick  has  an  orderly  book,  but  when  he  was 
called  here  as  a  witness,  he  left  his  book  behind  him. 
Other  <^cere  seem  very  unaccountably  to  have 
thought  the  order  to  ship  their  baggage  at  the  Miami 
included  their  CHrderiy  books,  and  they  have  been  lost 
by  th>t  means.  And  now  these  lettens  fnno  general 
Cass  to  Mr.  Silliman,  the  contents  of  which  it  might 
be  so  impmiant  to  me  to  contrast  with  the  General'^ 
testimwiy,  it  i^pears,  were  intrusted  to  the  General** 
mfe,  and  they  too  have  been  lost. 
9 


"'-V*  ■! 


n 


86 


DEFENCl:  OF 


But  I  ask  the  Court,  do  not  even  the  slander  a«!* 
couDts  which  we  have  had  of  the  ctmtents  of  these 
letters  shew,  that  general  Cass,  at  the  time  they  were 
written,  did  believe  that  the  army  would  be  in  want  of 
provisions  ?— that  reinforcements  were  necessary  "i—m 
that  the  fall  of  Michilimackinac  was  to  have  a  decisive 
operation  on  the  fate  of  the  army  ?•— that  our  hopes 
rested  on  co-operation  from  below,  and  that  the  situ-, 
ation  of  the  army  was  critical  in  the  exteeme  ? — If 
these  were  general  Cass*s  sentiments,  when  he  wrote  , 
the  letters,  I  must  leave  it  to  the  Court  to  reconcile 
them  to  the  testimony  he  has  given. 


The  sutrender  of  the  fortress  of  Detroit,  and  of  the 
forces  in  the  Michigan  territory  under  my  command, 
is  another  charge,  against  which  I  am  now  to  defend 
myself.  I  beg  the  court  to  observe,  that  the  course  I 
am  pursuing,  is  to  examine,  in  tfie  first  instance,  the 
propriety  or  necessity  of  these  principal  measures ; 
the  circumstances  attending  their  accomplishment  be^ 
ing  ground  of  distinct  accusation,  I  propose  to  give 
them  distinct  considerations. 


-i 


A9  to  the  point,  on  which  I  am  now  about  to  makf 
my  defence,  I  must  beg  the  Court  to  bear  in  mind 
what  I  have  said  in  relation  to  the  delay  in  attacking 
Maiden,  and  to  recrossing  the  river ;  much  of  wl"*t  I 
have  said  upon  these  subjects  will  be  applicable  to  the 
cliarge  now  nnder  consideration.  The  isame  fi^ *8  are 
reiterated  in  the  specifications  in  so  many  different 
forms,  that  it  is  difficult  to  analyze  them,  fmd  might 


\ 


GENERA'    HULL. 


n 


excuse  repetition.  But  I  shall  endeavour,  as  much  as 
possible,  to  avoid  trespassing  on  the  patience  of  the 
Court ;  and  shall  not  repeat  what  I  have  already  said, 
further  than  may  be  absolutely  necessary  io  make  my- 
self clearly  understood. 

..•■'■•■■     is^it?***"  "       .■ 

The  extent  and  state  of  the  force  under  my  com- 
mand,  at  the  time  of  the  attack  on  the  fifteenth  and  six- 
teenth of  August,  must  be  ascertained,  before  my  con- 
duet  can  be  duly  appreciated;  The  detaclmients  under 
colonels  Mac  Arthur  and  Cass,  consisting  of  foinr  hun- 
dred <^  the  most  effective  men  of  their  regiments,  were 
ahsMit  on  the  expe^tion  to  tlie  river  Raisin. 

^  On  the  mormitg  of  the  sixteenth,  the  brigade  nsajor 
Jessup,  as  appears  by  his  cross  ^lamination,  had,  by 
my  order,  made  a  report  of  the  effieetive  men  under  my 
command.  He  stated  the  number,  as  appears  by  a 
document  before  yon,  in  the  three  Ohio  reginients,  to 
be  seven  hundred,  inclndkig  .the  Michigan  legion  and 
waggoners,  iNit  not  the  Michigan  miliUa.  The  arm- 
ed inhaUtants  Which  some  of  the  witnesses  have 
mentioned,  I  presume  were  not  intended  to  be  includ- 
ed, and  indeed  should  not  have  been.  For  althongh  it 
may  have  been  agreeable  to  the  disposition  crif  some 
who  have  testified  in  this  cause,  to  mention  them  here, 
that  they  might  swell  my  numbon  th  the  eyes  of  the 
Court,  yet  I  believe  it  wilt  not  be  thought,  that  I 
ought  te  have  taken  them  into  calcnlaticm  in  estimat- 
ing my  means  of  defence.    In  the  field  they  were 


•r? 


1 

'Hi 


II: 


I. 


I '  >i 


f* 


■  r^^.-—"  '-.,■,■»!";?»■ 


B8 


DEFENCE  OF 


m 


only  likefy  to  be  the  first  to  set  an  example  of  dif(n> 
dcr,  and  in  a  siege  tbey  would  only  liave  inmeaied' 
the  consumption  oC  provisions. 

Miyor  Jessup  says,  that  on  the  fifteenth  he  received 
an  estimate  from  one  of  the  adjutants  of  the  number 
of  men  fit  tor  duty^  He  thinks  it  exceeded  one  thou- 
sand. This  estimate  was-  not  delivered  to  me,  but  wa» 
given  to  general  Cass  the  day  after  the  battle,  for  what 
purpose  does  not  appear.  I  w'sh  general  Cass  bad 
produced  it  on  this  occasion. 

.  Of  the  one  thousand^  if  there  were  so  many  «f40- 
tive,  only  three  hundred  and  twenty  were  regulars; 
that  being  nugor  Shelling's  estimate  of  the  effective 
fome  of  the  fourth  regiment  on  the  day  of  the  surren- 
der. The  rest  (^  this  thousand  consisted  of  the  Ohio 
volunteers  and  Michigan  militia..  In  my  letteis  ta 
the  government,  and  in  myoflBcial  account  of  the 
iiinfortunate  tennlnati^m  of  the  expedition  under  my 
commandv  I  have  always  spoken  of  the  zeal  and 
bravery  of  these  tro<^s^  in  terms  (^respect;  and  I  still 
think  they  merited  all  I  have  said  of  ih«n  in^ these  re- 
spects. Yet,  in  estimating,  their  pvobable  services  in, 
an  arduoiiL  conflict,  I  could  not  Itot  consider  their  real 
character.  My  experience  in  the  revolutionarv  war 
had  fixed  in  my  mind  a  mistrust  of  the  serv.  es  of  un- 
disciplined militia,  however  wrdent  and  valerou»  they 
might  by  lai^^uage,  and  evep  by  actions,  when  not 
befcre  the  enemy,  make  themselves  appear.    Indeed 


I 


(^UNfiRAL  HULL. 


89 


tjie  organization  of  tli«s  militia  eorps  I  had  with  me 
1^88  particularly  calculated  to  create  distrust  -with  re- 
spect to  them.  All  their  officers  held  their  commhh 
sions  in  virtue  Of  an  election,  mediate  or  immediate^ 
ctf  the  men  of  whom  theywere  the  nominal  comman- 
ders. My  seccmd  in  command^  colonel  Mac  Arthur, 
has  prefaced  his  testimony,  by  telling  you  that  at  such 
a  time  he  was  elected  eolonel. 


Colonel  Van  Horn  was  elected  mijor;  Mr.  Mac 
Commick  was  elected  a  lieutenant.  From  what  sta- 
tions or  what  occupations  these  gentlemen  were  elect- 
ed to  high  military  rank,  I  do  not  know*  It  would 
seem,  however,  that  notwithstanding  all  the  experi'^ 
ence  they  have  had  in  the  field,  they  have  not  yet 
learr:9d  even  miiitary  language ;  or  foi^otten  what 
were  probahly  the  phrases  of  thdr  former  occupa- 
tions. * 

General  Mae  Arthur,  m  describing  the  disposition 
he  intended  to  make  of  his  regiment  in  case  of  an 
attack,  spoke  as  he  would  of  the  gate  of  a  cow-pen — 
of  swinging  it  into  the  rear  line  of  a  hoUow  square. 
And  most  of  the  witnesses  against  me  have  spoken 
of  the  balance  of  a  detachment,  al>  they  would  of  the 
foot  of  an  account  in  a  shop  book.  Elected  officers 
can  never  be  calculated  upon  as  great  disciplinarians^ 
In  every  station,  the  elected  will  be  unwilling  to  in.* 
cur  the  displeasure  of  the  electors.  Indeed,  he  will 
often  be  found  to  court  their  favour,  by  a  famili..Jty 
And  condescension,  which  are  totally  incompatible- 


M 


:i1 


'^'l.'^ 


ii 


.  1 


00 


DEFENCE  OF 


» 


/* 


wkh  military  discipliae.  'The  man  wli&  votes  his 
officer  his  commission,  instead  of  being  implicitly 
obedient,  as  every  soldier  oi^ht  to  be,  will  be  dispor 
sed  to  question  and  ccmsider  the  propriety  of  the  offi- 
cer's ccmduct,  before  he  acts.  This  sv^tem  has  not 
only  an  injurious  effect  upon  the  soldiers,  but  it  has  a 
retro-actiTe  effect  lipon  the  officers.  They,  knonving 
how  far  they  are  responsible  to  their  electors,  and 
what  deference  is  due  from  them  to  a  miycMrity  of 
votes,  are  under  the  influence  of  their  own  feelings, 
in  intercourse  with  their  superiours. 


The  Court  must  have  observed,  with  what  confi- 
dence, the  officers  who  have  testified  against  me,  have 
pronounced  every  thing  to  have  been  done  wrcug,  that, 
was  not  dcme  according  to  their  advice.  They  «eem 
to  have  thought,  that  when  a  Council  of  War  was 
called,  it  was  to  be  governed  by  the  laws  of  a  town 
meeting ;  and  that  a  general  was  absolidely  bound  by 
the  voice  of  a  majority. 

The  tesiimoiqr  of  mi^or  Van  Horn  is  a  remarkidble 
elucidation  of  the  ideas  of  some  of  my  officers  in  this 
respect.  He  seems  to  think,  that  I  was  guilty  oS  great . 
vifriation  of  duty,  in  not  being  careful  to  ascertain 
aecurately  the  votes  of  Jie  members  then  presenk 
Though,  as  was  actually  the  case,  I  had  omitted  to  , 
take  the  vote  of  a  gen  Jeman,  whose  opinions  co|iij^ 
cided  with  my  own. 


Mr.  President,  my  iceas  oi  a  Council  of  War  are> 
that  it  is  called  to  advis  ?  the  responsible  officer  es  to 


OfiKERAL  HtLL* 


or 


any  question  which  h6  may  think  proper  to  subttiit 
to  its  memben  i  that  he  ou^t  to  hew  and  wei*^,  with 
what  deliberation  ciromnstances  will  admit,  their 
sentiments  and  qiinions.  But  that  after  all,  he  is 
bound  to  act  accordiig  to  the  dictates  of  his  own 
juc^pnent,  be  the  q>iiii(ms  of  his  officers  what  they 
may.  And  inasmuch^  as  the  advice  of  a  council  will 
not,  in  all  cases,  justify  misconduct,  I  liope  it  will  not 
be  considered,  that  a  measure,  althov'igh  it  should 
have  been  wrong,  or  turned  out  unfortimate,  must  be 
condemned,  because  it  was  not  sanctioned  by  a  ma- 
jority of  votes. 

These  are  cimsideratJons,  wbich  I  think  it  neces- 
sary to  impress  strongly  upon  the  minds  of  the  Court. ' 
It  unfortanately  happened,  that  on  most  questions, 
which  I  submitted  to  the  deliberation  of  my  officers,: 
their  <^inicn  and  mine  did  not  cmncide,  and  many  of 
the  witnesses  seem  to  think,  that  therefore  they  must 
lie  condemned.  But  such  a  principle  will  not,  I  hope, 
be  adopted  by  this  Court.  The  decisions  of  the 
C(Nmcils  should  have  the  less  influence,  because  it 
must  be  recollected,  that  I  could  not,  with  the  ex- 
ception only  (oS  the  officers  of  the  fourth  regim<£nt, 
call  (or  tiie  advice  <^  any  tme  who  had  seen  the  least 
service,  or  liad  the  least  experience.  For  though 
most  of  the  witncoses  who  have  been  produced  on 
the  part  of  the  government,  have  appeared  with  tfce ; 
titles  and  baclg^  of  high  military  rank,  yet  it  is  cer- 
tain, that  most  of  these  gentlemen  when  they  joined 
my  army,  knew  no  more  of  the  duties  of  a  soldier ; 


^1 


.  ^f  -•'^inSftfS 


^■i—i^iii " ' -trfia-ji»im,ii 


Ml  DEFENCE  OF 

ihtn  wai  t»lw  learned  from  militia  mmten  and  pa-? 
radea  about  their  own  homes.  What  services  they 
may  liave  since  p«rfonBed  to  entitle  them  to  the 
honours  they  hav^  attained,  I  tan  ignorant;  and  only 
hope,  that  their  elevated  rank  (as  it  ongL  to  be  pre- 
sumed it  was  not  intended  it  should,)  will  not  give 
them  any  other  weight,  than  they  would  have  had,  if 
they  had  remained  in  their  former  subordinate  situa- 
tions until  they  had  given  their  testimony  against  me. 


i 


These  observations  are  made,  in  reference  to  the 
principal  part  of  the  troops  I  had  under  my  command  $ 
and  to  shew,  that  although,  as  men,  they  might  be 
brave  and  patriotic,  as  I  have  always  believed  they 
were,  and  as  I  have  always  spoken  both  of  the  officers 
and  soldiers,  yet  from  the  manner  of  thdr  (nrganisation, 
and  from  their  want  of  discipline  and  experience, 
they  were  not  that  kind  of  force  upon  which  a  com- 
mander could  feel,  in  an  arduous  conflict,  the  firmest 
reliance.  So  far  as  we  had  any  <ipportunity  of  judg- 
ing from  trial,  this  want  of  confidence  in  forces  of 
this  description  was  justified. 


,  The  expedidon(|.  under  mi^w  Van  Horn  was  the 
only  instance  in  which  the  volunteers  acted  by  them;' 
selves  in  any  affair  of  consequence ;  for  the  rencontre 
at  the  Aux  Canard  bridge,  (althoi^h  both  the  officers 
and  men  behaved  well)  was  but  a  skimnsh,  which 
could  hardly  be  a  test  either  of  coujrage  or  discipline. 
The  detachment  under  nuyor  Van  Horn,  as  he  has 
lestifiet?,  were  sot  surprised.    He  had  fully  prepared 


IX 


<#> 


GENfiRAL  HULL. 


03! 


y 


if 


(hem,  according  to  his  statement,  to  expect  their  foe« 
and  yet  his  party  was  disordered  by  tlie  first  fire  of 
the  enemy.  Notwithstanding  all  the  gallant  exer- 
tions which,  as  he  has  stated,  he  madcv  he  was  unable 
to  rally  them,  or  to  preveui  iheir  flying  in  confusion 
in  the  very  first  moments  of  attack  by  nothing  but 
savages. 


'*< 


In  submitting  to  your  consideration,  Gentlemen* 
the  state  of  the  forces  under  my  command,  I  must  not 
omit,  painful  as  it  is  to  me,  U»  advert  to  the  un- 
happy terms  in  which  I  was  with  my  oflRcers.  They 
took  RO  pains  to  conceal  what  they  have  here  testified 
lo,  that  they  had  lost  all  confidence  in  me ;  many  of 
them  maidfestci  it,  as  af^ears  from  their  own  testi- 
mony, by  the  moat  indecent  conduct  and  expressiobs. 

The  Court  must  recollect  the  language^  which  I 
forbear  to  repeat,  that  my  second  in  commaid,  colouel 
Mac  Arthur  {turn  BrigaSer  Oentrdl  Mac  Artimr^ 
represents  that  he  addressed  to  me,  when  I  pn^posed 
to  him  to  remain  with  his  regiment  at  Sandwidi. 
Let  it  be  remembered  too,  that  the  Brigadier  General 
has  stated,  that  when  we  were  in  the  face  of  the  ene- 
my, and  he  might  hourly  be  expected  to  be  called  to 
battle,  he  used  this  language  with  an  expectation, 
^jjfXii  he  should  be  arrested :  with  an  expectation,  that 
at  such  a  moment,  he  would  be  put  in  a  situation  that 
he  Goidd  not  be  called  iqion  to  use  his  swordt  Briga- 
dier General  Mac  Arthur  has  sari*^,  that  these  ex  res- 
»i0D9  were  extorted  from  him)  by  insinuations  of  ^ow. 


) 


•■"■•iJfit-.vMWiWS!'* 


ommf 


94 


DEFENCE  OF 


urdice.  I  meant  no  such  insinuation.  Hiideciaraliou, 
that  he  felt  hit  single  self  aHe  to  cany  the  fortress 
at  Sandwich  against  any  garrison,  left  no  room  to 
doubt  his  own  good  opinion  of  Jus  prowess.  When 
general  Mac  Arthur  addressed  such  language  to  me, 
1  had  never  seen  any  thing  thatWv<Mild  hav^  warrant- 
ed such  an  insinuation  as  he  conceives  I  made.  But 
if  any  thing  would  justify  an  impeachment  of  that 
oCBcer^s  courage,  it  would  be,  suck  conduct  at  4Mfifc  altm^. 
It  may  be  thought,  that  I  ought  to  have  arrested  ge^ie- 
ral  Mae  Arthw.  It  is  not  one  of  the  char|^;,agaipi»t 
me  that  I  did  nol}  and  therefore  I  shall lu^  dlgpresa 
further  from  the  courae  of  my  defepfC^,  thaiArti^gay,  tb^e 
pect^arity  of  my  situation  akme  pre¥«!iittd«a^  doing  it. 


If  I  had  taken  such  a  step,  I  have  no  doubt  his 
men,  who  had  elected  him  a  colonel,  would  have  turn- 
ed their  arms  i^ainst  me,  with  as  much  alacrity  as 
they  professed  to  use  tbem  ai^ainat  the  enemy.  I 
might,  and  beUeire  I  dioidd  have  had  a  civil  war  in 
my  captp.  Bnito  draw  what  was  the  disposition  of 
my  ofBcers  lowaids  me,  I  have  only  to  refer  the  Court, 
omw  more  to  Colonel  Cass's  (tutw  Brigadier  Qeneral 
Cass)  letter  to  the  Oovermnent,  of  the.  tenth  of  Sep- 
tember, in  which  he  statea,  that  A^,  aoA  sAirSt  had 
farmed  a  conspiracy  to  vrett  the  ccnumaad  from  me* 
Whether  thia  was,  or  waa  not; » treasonable  design,  j|^ 
not  tor  me  to  detenmne.  But  what  ccwfidence  could ' 
I  place  in  offioeie,  whxMte  conduct  had  been  tucb  is 
they  thenaelvea  have  described?  ^» 


GENERAL  HULL. 


00 


I  know,  Mr.  President,  that  my  letters  to  the  Sec- 
retary at  War,  and  my  official  account  of  the  surren- 
der, may  be  appealed  to  on  this  sulgect.  I  wish  they 
may  be— what  I  have  written  Of  the  volunteers  and 
their  officers  is  just,  and  what  I  yet  say.  They  were 
brave,  sealous  men.  It  Is  my  pi.  le,  that  in  the  very 
hour  of  ?.';isfortttne,  I  had  the  magnanimity  to  give 
them  all  the  credit  that  was  due  to  them,  and  to  take 
upon  myself  the  whole  responsibility  of  ^a  measure 
which  I  knew  would  be  the  subject  of  so  much  cen- 
eure.  Would,  sir,  that  I  could  have  observed  a  little 
of  the  same  spirit  in  my  accusers !  That  they  had 
been  willing  to  take  some  share  of  the  blame  that  is 
justly  due  to  them !  And  that  they  had  not,  in  the  tri- 
umph of  their  own  elevation  on  my  depression,  repre- 
sented, wiUi  the  most  uncharitable  bitterness,  a  man 
whose  smiles  they  once  courted. 


I  mv'st  be  pardoned,  Mr.  President,  for  yielding  to 
my  feelings,  in  these  digressions.  I  have  stated  to 
you,  the  numbers,  nature,  and  situation,  of  the  force 
which  I  had  to  oppose  to  the  enemy.  I  shall  now 
state  what  force  he  brought,  or  might  bring,  against 
me.  I  say.  Gentlemen,  mght  brings  because  it  was 
that  consideration  which  induced  the  surrender,  and 
not  the  force  which  was  actually  landed  on  tlie  Amer- 
4^n  shore  on  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth.  It  is 
^)08sible,  that  I  might  have  met  and  repelled  that 
force,  and  if  I  had  had  no  farther  to  look  than  to  the 
event  of  a  contest  at  that  time,  I  should  have  trusted 
t»  the  issue  of  a  battle.    I  beg  leave  first  to  examine, 


);,*■ 


i 


f 


i 


DBIPBNCB  OF 


Spring  Wells  on  th*  moinA«i  «  ">• 
,o«nt  the  «>"»y  • '!^^«ny  «M«~.  f  ''"'" 

wm«if  .*««  th.  ««"  *r  •J^."  i,,  ao«  ««««. 

b  very  evMent,  thtt  WWc  »    „„  court  ■«  tap«»- 

.,«.,  ttet  they  oo»M««' ^  ;^  ^^^  And  y.t 
,ig„ific».,  both  » •»  r^'X.  my  «»*«>»•<«'* 
it  i.  very  »«T''"^  jX,I»*»ft»«« »»  «»» 

po^er  rf  th.  BriU.h  "^^'^a'Tw-.- "«»«>"■ 

^  1  .m  a^  '**  v»  H*--    •*»  I^^'  ""' 
detachment »»«»«""»«  "^  u-t  .ccotding  to 

I  did  «.,  «he  n»jor  ^'Tr^^  hundied  Into" 
,     th.lntonn.tlonh.«eM«d.*«  ^^ 

c«««d  f«m.  «h.  BriUA  *«^*J  ^     cTtadnriyn 

a,.t  to  one  to^- *•  ^"^  ,„.^5,d6«»..  "* 
-        nppwr  to  be  ve.y  .n-U  "^  '^    ^  f«mdd»ble. 

Ittamnia.o»f>>.bo"e«''*»*  •" 


.J 


_\ 


OENEiykL  HULL. 


07 


tto 
I  no 

IuH' 

lain. 

ifted, 

KNne 

IniU, 

ckof 

lutlt 

other 

apres- 

iry  tar 

td  yet  ' 

would 

intlie 

nerotts 

kvaaU  a 

vethat 

Aing  to 

Indians 

rty  vras 

dnal 

e 

uit>  and 

inldable. 

IS  in  that 


"J  ' — 
inaiy^ 


quarter  had  immediately  after  the  fall  of  Miehili 
mackinaCi  joined  the  British.  I  had  had  in  couneil, 
between  the  fourteenth  and  twentieth  of  July,  the 
chiefs  of  nine  nations,  whose  warriours  amounted  to 
between  two  and  three  thousand,  or  more.  Is  it  not 
extremely  improbable,  that  with  a  large  force  of  this 
nature  at  their  disposal,  the  British  should  have  em- 
ployed but  a  small  part  of  it  in  their  enterprise  against 
Detroit  ?  Is  it  not  rather  to  be  presumed,  that  in  an 
undertakinti;  in  which  they  must  have  been  very  am- 
bitious of  success,  they  ihonid  have  employed  all  their 
disposable  force,  whether  wldte  or  red  ? 

The  force  brou^t  against  me,  I  am  very  confident, 
was  not  leu  than  one  thousand  whites,  and  at  least 
as  many  savage  warriours. 

But  it  was  not  only  against  this  force,  on  our  own 
shores,  I  was  to  defend  myself.  Their  batteries  from 
Sandwich  were  effectually  co-operating  with  them, 
amd  their  ships  ci  war  were  ready  to  lend  them  assis- 
tance in  the  moment  of  attack,  to  cover  their  retreat, 
and  to  afford  them  shelter  in  case  of  defeat. 

If  the  British,  landed  at  Spring  Wells,  were  not  much 
more  numerous  than  my  own  troops,  I  knew  they 
^mtilt  have  a  powerful  force  in  reserve,  which  they 
llolitd  bring  to  operate  upon  me,  either  by  crossing  them 
above  the  town  of  Detroit,  or  by  transporting  them 
in  their  ships  to  that  point,  and  thus  atttick  the  fort 
on  all  sides,  and  place  my  army  between  their  fire. 
10 


m 


98 


DEFENCE  O^ 


I  should  not,  however,  have  yielded  tO  all  these  eon* 
fiderations,  hisd  the  war  1  was  canyiiig  od,  been  only 
against  civilized  men.  In  that  ease,  those  only  who 
were  in  the  contest,  would  have  sufferedi^  But  I  knmf 
how  sah^inary  and  remorseless  the  savages  would 
be,  should  my  army  be  subdued,  and  the  fortress  be 
obliged  to  yield.  The  whole  country  would  have 
been  deluged  with  the  blood  of  its  inhabitants— nei- 
ther women  nor  children  would  have  been  spared* 
The  large  detachment,  which  was  out  under  the  com- 
mand of  colonels  Mac  Arthur  and  Cast,  of  which  I 
could  get  no  intelligence,  and  the  detachment  under 
captain  Brush,  at  the  river  Raisin,  would  most  pro- 
bably have  bees  the  victims  of  savage  fury,  which  is 
always  excited  by  battle,,  and  rendered  more  sangui- 
nary by  victory.  These  appeared  to  me  the  certain 
and  dreadful  consequences  of  unsuccessful  resistance. 
If,  after  a  conflict,  I  should  have  been  able  for  that 
time  to  have  repulsed  the  enemy,  I  might  have  pur- 
chased feme,  and  have  avoided  all  I  have  sufiiered, 
and  what  I  now  suffer,  in  being  obliged  thus,  at  my 
time  of  life,  to  vindicate  my  honour,  and  plead  my 
cause  before  you.  But  at  what  price  should  I  have 
done  this  ?  How  many  oi  the  lives  of  the  brave  men 
I  commanded,  would  it  have  cost?  How  many  of  the 
persons,  who  now  appear  to  witness  against  me,  m^ht 
I  not  have  sacrificed  ?  It  might,  indeed,  Mr.  Presi-i 
dent,  have  given  me  an  honourable  grave— and  if 
mine  were  the  only  life  concerned,  I  wish  it  had  been 
so,  rather  than  that  the  foul  crimes  d*  Which  I  am' 
accused  should  be  coupled  with  a  name,  to  which  my 


■i 


f 


GEKERAL  Ht^LL. 


99 


eounUry  of  kto*  as  well  as  heretofore,  has  acknow* 
ledged  sooie  oblations.  ^ 

But  I  had  rather  •▼en  that  this  should  he.  I  rather 
stand  before  you  ac^nued^  as  I  am,  than  have  useless- 
ly and  wantonly  sacrificed  i:.,  single  life,  though  it 
phould  have  insured  me  immortal  fame. 


If  the  attack  of  the  enemy  had  been  repelled,  our 
triumph  would  have  been  but  temporary.  My  nunn 
hers  must  have  been  diminished  by  losif  in  battle. 
^hey  would  have  daily  lessened  by  the  cannon  of  the 
enemy  trom  the  opposite  shore.  The  force  of  the  ene- 
my, augmented  as  it  was  by  reinforcements  under 
colonel  Proctor,  miyor  Chambers,  and  the  commander 
in  chief  general  Brock,  would  have  lieen  daily  aug- 
menting. The  force  from  Michilimackinac  and  Bt* 
Joseph's,  which  would  have  amounted  to  several  thou- 
sand savage  warriouro ;  the  savages,  with  the  addi- 
tion of  some  hundred  white  men^  mentioned  in  the 
intercepted  letter  of  Mr.  MacKenzie;  collected  at 
Fort  William,  would,  in  a  few  days,  have  descended 
v*>ou  us.  The  Canadian  militia  had  aU  .returned  to 
their  allegiance.  The  enemy's  naval  forctrand  means 
of  transportation  on  the  lakes  firere  augmented. 
There  was  no  co-operation  v^ith  my  a.  iiy  from  any 
quarter.  The  letters  I  had  received  from  geneirals 
Hall  and  Porter  had  not  only  satisfied  me  that  my 
expectations  in  this  respect  were  disappointed,  but 
that  no  diversion  in  my  favour  w^as  soon  to  be  expect- 
ed.   My  army  was  in  a  comer,  surrounded  by  a  wil- 


100 


DEFENCE  OF 


m. 


y 


fe«- 


II  ' 

r  i 


ftemera  of  wat€rs,  and  a  wilderness  of  woods.  All 
•pommimieation  with  my  coiratry,  either  by  land  or 
water,  cut  off,  my  stores  of  provision  and  ammunition 
hut  sufficient  for  «  sh«>rt  duration  i  add  to  all  this,  that 
at  the  moment  of  expected  conflict,  I  received  infw* 
mation  that  a  part  cf  my  wm  troops  had  gone  over  to 
the  enemy  t  and  that  a  larger  hoAf  mere  about  to  join 
him.  Under  such  a  combination  and  pressure  of  ad- 
verse circumstances,  the  army  muet  have  yielded  in 
a  little  time,  notwithstanding  any  temp<Nrary  success. 
I  did  not  think  I  should  be  justiftable  or  even  excus- 
able, if  I  risked  a  battle  when  victory  could  purchase 
no  real  good.  And  when  the  consequence  d*  defeat, 
or  even  the  consequences  of  being  driven  into  the 
fort,  would  be  to  submit  the  whole  country  which  I. 
was  sent  to  protect,  and  that  part  of  my  force,  which 
•was  on  detachment,  to  "  the  ruthless  ferocity  of  sav- 
"  ages,  armed  with  the  horrours  oi  those  instramenta 
^^  of  cami^e  and  torture,  which  are  known  to  spare 
neither  age  nor  sex.*' 


a 


From  such  calamity,  I  knew  a  capitulation  would 
be  A  protection.  The  British,  if  made  masters  of  the 
country  without  a  battle,  would  be  able  to  restrain 
their  merciless  alKes,  which  they  could  not  do  after  a 
contest,  even  if  it  should  be  only  so  far  successful  as  to 
oblige  us  to  retreat  into  the  fort.  A  savage  will  have 
blood  for  blood,  though  he  draws  it  from  the  veins  of 
the  defenceless — victory  only  heightens  his  inhuman 
thirst. 


■■*% 


■** 


GENERAL  HULL. 


Tol 


I  oflbred  a  capitulatkMi  and  surrendered.  "  I  veil 
*«knew  the  high  respfmsibilitf  of  the  measure,  and 
'*  take  the  whole  of  it  upon  myself.  It  was  dictated 
"  by  a  sense  <^  duty,  and  a  full  convictibn  of  its  ex- 
<ipediency.  If  aught  has  taken  place  during  the 
<*  campaign,  which  is- honourable  ^to  the  army,  my 
"  officers  are  entitled  to  a  large  share  of  it.  If  the 
'"last  act  should  be  disapproved,  no  part  of  the  cen- 
''^  sure  belongs  to  them.'* 


These,  Sir,  are  the  words  of  my  o£Bcial  communi- 
cation of  this  unhappy  event  to  the  Secretary  at  War. 
I  repeat  them.  It  was.  Sir,  a  sense  of  duty  which 
drove  me  to  the  measure.  It  was  a  sense  of  what 
IjOwed  to  the  protection  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
territory  I  had  so  long  governed.  I  felt  myself  bound 
to  sacrifice  every  private  feeling,  and  iu  spite  of 
*l  .  i^-^lves,  to  save  from  useless  waste  the  blood  of 
tiW  ''-rAve  men  I  commanded.  Nor,  Sii,  will  I  con- 
ceal, that  in  the  midst  of  the  cami^e  th&t  might  en- 
eue  a  battle,  my  parental  feelings  saw  a  daughter  and 
her  offspring,  who  were  with  me  in  the  fort,  bleeding 
under  the  tomahawk  of  a  savage^ 


i^Si:;''' 


If  these  be  considerations  unworthy  of  a  soldier,' 
then  I  am  without  excuse.  Then,  indeed,  you  may 
pronounce  your  utmost  doom.  But,  do  not  let  me 
transmit  to  my  posterity  a  name,  tarnished  by  the 
foul  crimes  imputed  to  me.  I  say,  I  am  as  free  from 
the  sins  of  that  black  catalogue  as  any  man  who 
hears  me.  But  if  a  propitiation  Sje  necessary,  and  it 
10* 


"^1 


'.i& 


•^: 


102 


DEFENCE  Of* 


must  be  the  remnaiit  of  the  life  <^  a  man,  whose  eoun' 
try  has  hcretof<Nre  acknowledged  his  claims  to  her 
gratitude,  and  who  has  not  ceased  to  deserve  it-i- 
here  is  one  that  I  offer.  I  would  freely  part  with  it, 
if  you  will  not  takci  from  me,  and  from  my  family  and 
posterity,  my  fa&nour  aoid  character. 

I  now  appeal  with  iiiome  confidence,  to  this  tribunal, 
for  their  decision  upon  the  accusations  which  I  have 
hitherto  considered.  Was  either  of  the  acts  to  which 
the  attention  of  the  Court  has  been  directed,  In  (hem- 
selvesy  and  abstractedly  considered,  ui^ustifiaUe,  or 
rather  (and  this  is  the  true  question)  was  either  of 
them  so  manifestly  wrong,  so  ^regiously  erroneous, 
that  it  is  oi  itself,  evidence  of  treason,  cowardice,  or 
unoflBcer'like  conduct  ?  Are  there  not  so  many  rea- 
sons for  my  conduct,  in  regard  to  these  transactions^ 
that  1  may  be  supposed  to  have  acted  himestly,  though 
It  should  now  appear  to  the  Court  that  it  was  erro' 
neously  ? 

If  an  act  may  have  proceeded  frcnn  pure  intentions, 
it  would  be  the  height  of  injustice  and  misanthropy, 
to  impute  it  to  bad  motives. 


i 


■»>" 


I  shall  now  proceed. to  make  my  defence  against 
the  other  accusations.  I  shall  endeavour  to  arrange 
them  in  the  order  of  time  in  which  the  facts,  bj  the 
specifications,  are  supposed  to  have  oecurredL 

Hitherto,  Mr.  President,  nqr  defence  has  chiefly 
rested  on  documentary  evidence,  or  upon  facts  of 


m 


U- 


v.. 


GENERAL  HULL« 


103 


general  notoriety.    At  to  all  that  follows,  the  chaiges 
depend  entirely  UfKni  parole  testioMHiy. 

It  seems  extraordinary,  that  there  has  not  been  a 
witness  examined  on  the  part  of  the  prosecution  who 
hrjB  not  been  promoted  since  he  was  "under  my  com- 
mand. 


A  f^reat  minority  of  the  young  gentlemen  who  have 
been  u&lied  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  have  af^eared 
decOT9ted  with  their  two  epaulets.  These  have  been 
bestowed,  and  sometimes  with  the  augmentation  oi  a 
star,  upon  gimtlemen  who  began  their  milita^^r  ca- 
reer with  my  unioitunate  campaign. 


By  what  services  many  €i  these  gentlemen  have 
merited  such  rapid  promotion,  I  have  not  learned. 
But  if  it  all  arises  out  of  their  achievements  while 
imder  my  command,  I  must  say,  that  it  appears  to 
me  that  my  expedition  was  more  prolific  of  promo- 
tion, than  any  other  unsuccessful  military  enterprise 
I  ev^er  heard  of.  r 


It  cannot  be,  that  it  has  been  intended  ti  give  a 
weight  to  the  testimony  of  these  witnesses,  by  giving 
them  ranks  and  honours,  which  ii  would  not  other- 
wise have  had.  But,  Sir,  when  my  military  charac- 
ter »nd  measures  are  to  be  tested  by  the  opinions  of 
gentlemen,  with  high  sounding  titles  of  militaiy  rank, 
I  think  it  necessaiy  to  remind  the  •Court,  that,  with 
the  exception  of  a  few  of  the  younger  officers,  there 


4 


•^fei*Ssa£:;^^.;.. 


r 


104 


DEFENCE  OF 


are  none  of  them  who  have  not  been  promoted  tc 
their  h^gh  stations,  without  havii^  had  any  military 
experience*  and  without,  so  far  as  I  liave  heard,  ever 
having  discovered  any  militMj  talents  or  genius. 

If  the'  opinions  of  witnesses  on  military  conduct 
ought  in  any  case  to  be  listened  to,  (which  I  conceive 
ought  not  to  ^je,)  yet,  I  think  the  opinions  of  men 
<^  these  descriptions,  ought  to  be  received  with  the 
greatest  caution. 

The  extraordinary  promotions  which  the  witnesses 
against  me,  have  generally  attained,  I  think  may  be 
accounted  for  by  a  recurrence  to  the  fact,  of  which 
this  trial  has  afforded  the  most  conclusive  evidence ; 
which  is,  that  each  of  the  witnesses,  from  the  gene- 
rals to. the  youngest  and  lowest  officer  that  has  been 
called  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  is  himself,  in  his  own 
opinion  at  least,  a  htro. 


!•    f^' 


From  general  Mac  Arthur,  who  thought  himself 
capable  of  fighting  a  whole  garrison,  down  to. the 
lowest  rank,  every  officer  seems  to  have  thought,  that 
if  he  had  been  the  commanding  general,  or  if  I  had 
taken  his  advice,  all  would  have  gone  well.  No 
doubt,  they  have,  in  justice  to  themselves,  made  these 
representations  to  the  government.  And  their  rank 
must  be  considered  as  a  reward  for  the  great  things, 
which  they  smd  they  wouid  have  done,  rather  than 
to  have  been  acquired  by  any  actual  /services. 


t 


'^i^^^" 


■^'T^i^jr 


iiajtH***^  1 


GENERAL  HULL. 


105 


But,  Gentlemen,  before  I  proceed  to  examine  the 
parole  testimony,  let  me  call  your  attention  to  anotlier 
subject  connec'e^  "with  it. .  I  mean  the  indefatigable 
pains,  ndiich  have  been  taken,  to  propi^te  and  keep 
alive  the  most  hateful  pri^dices  against  me.  Sir,  I 
believe  there  never  was  a  greater  outrage  committed 
on  the  adminbtration  of  justice,  and  towards  an  in- 
dividual, than  was  the  publication  of  colonel  Cass's 
(now  brigadier-geneiul  Cass,)  letter  to  the  government 
of  the  tenth  of  September. 

That  'yuch  a  letter  should  be  pubHshed,  under  the 
sanction  of  the  administration,  against  a  man,  whom 
the  administration  was  about  to  put  upon  trial  for  his 
life,'!  belieire  if  d  proceeding  of  which  no  country 
on  earth  has  before  afforded  an  example. 

Thaic  the'  administration  should,  under  such  cii^ 
cumstances,  permit  the  publication  of  snclltft  letter 
as  general  Cass*s,  one  that  labours  to  represent  my 
conduct  in  the  mvi,*.  odious  point  (^  view,  and  takes 
pains  to  heighten  the  public  resentment  i^ainst  me, 
by  a  colouring  which  colonel  Cass  could  nil  ktaow 
of  his  own  knowledge,  was  true,  appears  to  nJA  t»  be 
a  violation  of  every  principle  of  justice.  ) 

The  Court  will  please  io  recollect,  that  colonels 
Casfi  and  Mac  Arthur  left  Detroit  with  the  detach- 
ment to  the  river  Raisin  on  the  fourteenth  oi  August, 
and  did  not  return  to  the  fort  till  the  evening  of  t!.e 
sixteenth;  of  course  they  could  not  know,  of  their 
own  kdO^ledge,  what  passed  in  the  interim^ 


A 


--*-*».-*»iji4M»»»*»-*-« 


loe 


DEFENCE  OF 


■■>< 


i 


No  person,  reading  colonel  Cassis  letter,  but  would 
suppose,  he  was  an  eye  witness  of  all  he  relates. 

It  is  ini[M>s8ible  to  discover,  that  he  was  absent 
in  the  expedition  to  the  river  Raisin.  Tet  general 
Cass  states,  as  if  it  was  a  matter  within  his  own 
knowledge,  that  when  the  troops  received  orders  to 
retreat  into  the  fort,  **  one  universal  burst  of  indigna^ 
"  tion  was  apparent  upon  the  receipt  of  this  order.'* 
I  beg  to  quote  from  this  letter  another  paragraph,  to 
shew  what  was  the  spirit  with  which  it  wae  written ) 
the  desigE  oi  its  publication  I  must  leave  the  Court 
^o  infer. 


:  .■;*:■  H 


*> 


"  To  see  the  whole  of  our  men  flushed  with  victory, 
'*  eagerly  awaiting  the  approaching  contest;  to  see 
'■*  them  afterwards  hopeless,  dispirited,  and  despond- 
"  ing,  at  least  five  hundred  shedding  tears,  because 
"  they  were  not  allowed  to  meet  their  country's  foe, 
*'  and  to  fight  their  country's  battles,  excited  sensa- 
"  tioDs,  which  no  American  has  ever  before  had." 

Would  not  every  one  imagine,  that  colonel  Cass 
was  here  describing  a  scene  which  passed  before  hia 
own  eyes  ? 

Did  he  actually  see  at  least  five  hundred  men  shed- 
ding  tears,  or  does  the  Court  believe  that  this  is  a 
representation  of  a  fact  which  really  occurred  ?  If  it 
were  so,  it  is  extramdinary  that  not  a  witness  has 
testified  to  it.    Captain  Mac  Commick  says,  he  ob- 


■m 


OENERAX.  HULL. 


loi 


k  absent 
general 
liiB  own 
orders  to 
indigna- 
»  order." 
.grapb,  to 
written  j 
the  Court 


h  victory, 
jl;  to  see 
I  despond- 
•8,  because 
intry's  foe, 
ited  sensa- 
e  bad." 

tonel  Cass 
\  before  bis 


a  men  sbed- 
hat  tbis  is  a 
urred?  If  it 
^tness  bas 
says,  be  ob- 


served some  men  shedding  tears,  but  tbis  falls  greatly 
short  of  general  CassN  five  hundred.  But  who  were 
these  weeping  troops  ?  it  is  not  to  be  presumed,  that 
it  w>u  intended  that  we  shoi^ld  believe  they  were  the! 
regulars ;  they  are  not  commonly  mucb  given  to  weep.: 
ing.  They  were  not  the  Michigan  militia,  because  a 
part  of  them  deserted,  and  the  rest  were  disposed  to 
go  over  to  the  enemy  rather  than  fight  him.  The 
men  then  who  shewed,  this  very  extraordinary  sensi- 
bility, must  have  been  colonel  Cass's  patriotic  volun- 
teers. The  same  vohmteersy  who  mutinied  in  the 
camp  at  Urbana,  and  would  not  march  till  they  were 
compelled  to  do  so  by  the  regular  troops.  The  same 
volunteers,  who  rode  the  officers  of  one  of  their  com- 
panies on  a  rail.  The  same  volunteers,  one  hundred 
and  eighty  of  whom  refused  to  cross  into  Canada ; 
and  the  same  volunteers,  who,  when  they  had  an  op- 
portunity, under  major  Van  Horn,  to  gratify  their 
eager  wishes  to  meet  the  enemy  in  combat,  ran  away 
at  the  first  fire,  and  left  their  officers  to  be  massacred. 

If  general  Cass  did  not  witness  this  scene,  why  did 
he  make  such  a  representation  ?  There  can  be  no 
other  reason,  than  that  this  kind  of  inflated  descrip- 
tion was  intended  to  reconunend  hiuweif  to  the  go- 
vernment, by  representing  himself  and  his  troops  in 
the  most  favourable  point  of  view,  and  me  in  the  most 
nnfavourable,  that  even  hyperbolical  language  would 
admit.' 

* 
Sir,  this  is  not  the  only  means  that  have  been  re- 
sorted to,  to    excite  and  keep  alive   the  popular 


t1 


N 


.if-jsmtut-^ 


IM 


DEFENCE  OF 


('  -• 


clamour  against  me.  Othen  of  my  oflScert  finding 
what  favour  the  publication  of  liis  letter  gave  him,  in 
the  eyes  of  the  administration,  have  seen  that  the 
tame  road  of  preferment  was  open  to  them  $  and  the 
news-p^iers;  from  one  end  of  the  continent  to  the 
other,  have  been  filled  with  letters  concerning  me* 
expressed  in  terms  which  neither  truth,  justice,  nor 
even  the  !aws  of  decorum  can  sanction.  Down  to 
this  very  tame,  8ir,  the  same  system  is  pursued.  Now, 
while  I  have  been  on  my  trial,  publications  have 
appeared  in  the  public  prints  of  this  city,  commend- 
ing the  principal  and  leading  witness,  for  the  manner 
in  which  he  gave  his  testimony  against  me,  that  those 
who  were  to  come  after  him  might  be  encouraged  to 
follow  hu  example. 


And,  Sir,  at  this  very  mom/ad^  at  the  veiy  dow  oT 
this  buildingi  is  hawked  for  sale,  a  work  printed  within 
this  few  days  in  sight  of  this  capitol,  entitled  Views 
of  the  Campaigns  of  the  North-western  Army,  in 
which  my  conduct  or  motives  are  most  grossly  mis- 
represented. Who  are  th^  that  thirst  so  for  my 
blood,  and  take  these  means  to  obtain  it? 


^  It  is  not  the  ostensible  author  of  this  performance. 
His  msignijicancei  and  the  contemptible  talents  em- 
ployed in  the  work,  shew  him  to  be  too  mean  to  have 
a  motive  of  his  own.  I  know  not  who  may  be  the 
authors  or  instigators  of  such  outrages  upon  justice. 
If  such  things  are  permitted,  and  can  have  any  influ- 
ence, then  the  sades  ought  to  be  torn  from  the  hand 


GENERAL  HULL. 


100 


I  him,  in 
that  the 
I  and  the 
nt^the 

ming  in«» 
iBtice,  nor 
Dovrn  to 
Bd.    Now, 

lon«  tav® 
commend' 

the  manner 
s,  that  those 
kcouraged  to 

very  Aoot  oi 
tinted  within 
kUttedViewt 
m  Army,  in 
grossly  mia- 
it  80  for  my 
■  ? 

^  • 

i  performance. 

|e  talents  em- 
L  mean  to  have 

lio  may  he  the 
upon  justice. 
Lave  any  infln- 
I  from  the  band 


of  the  figure  which  adorns  the  hall  wherein  you  sit. 
She  ought  only  to  be  left  the  sword  with  which  she 
is  decorated,  and  she  ought  to  wave  that  as  an  emblem^ 
that  vengeance^  anfl  not  justice,  is  administered  under 
this  roof. 

But,  Gentlemen,  for  whatever  purpose  these  acts 
may  have  been  intended,  1  rely  with  a  perfect  confi- 
dence that  you  will  rise  superiour  to  them.  If  I 
wanted  other  assurance  o  it  than  that  which  is  de- 
rived from  your  characters,  I  should  have  it  in  the 
patience  and  impartiality  with  which  this  proseci»> 
tion,  80  far  as  depended  on  you,  has  been  conducted. 

Before  I  enter  on  an  examinatimi  of  the  paiole 
testimony,  I  must  be  permitted  to  remark,  that  I  can- 
not but  think  that  the  course  which  has  been  pursued, 
of  examining  each  witness  in  the  presence  of  the  rest* 
has  been  unfortunate  for  me.  Till  this  Court  de- 
cided that  it  should  be  so,  I-  did  think  it  was  a  well 
estahtished  rule  of  martial  law,  that  the  witnesses 
should  be  examined  separately.  The  justice  and 
propriety  of  this  rule,  I  have  very  sensibly  felt  on  this 
occasion.  In  a  tase  where  so  much  may  depend 
upon  the  language  or  phrases  in  which  the  witnesses 
express  themselves,  it  would  have  been  desirable, 
that  each  should  have  been  left  to  the  necessity  of 
selecting  his  ovm  language  to  express  his  meaning. 
But  according  to  the  course  pursued,  each  witness 
was  at  liberty  to  adopt  the  words,  which  had  been 
used  by  any  other  witi&ess  on  the  same  point.  Thfc 
11 


«9(*'- 


110 


DEFENCE  OF 


disposition  of  several  of  the  witnesses  to  do  so,  hat 
been  very  plainly  manifested  by  their  answering, 
when  interrogated  as  to  my  personal  behaviour,  that 
it  was  the  same  as  had  been  represented  by  a  prior 
witness. 


t\ 


It  is  true.  Gentlemen,  that  the  Judge  Advocate 
would  not  accept  these  answers,  and  I  presume  has 
not  taken  them  down,  but  they  nevertheless  shew  the 
natural  disposition  of  the  witness  to  borrow  the  words 
of  another,  and  I  have  no  doubt  they  have  very  con- 
scientiously, and  often  without  knowing  it,  borrowed 
ideas  also. 


Gentlemen,  in  these  Courts  Martial,  where  the 
members,  among  Whom  there  may  be  great  inequality 
of  grades,  are  intended  to  be  put  upon  an  equal  foot- 
ing as  judges,  care  has  been*taken,  to  avoid,  as  far  as 
possible,  the  influence  likely  to  arise  from  authority! 
It  is  on  this  account  that  the  opinion  of  the  youngest 
member  is  ahtrays  first  taken.  And  it  was  on  the 
same  account,  as  I  conceive,  that  the  rule  was  es- 
tablished, that  witnesses  should  be  examined  sepa- 
rately, that  the  younger  might  not  be  influenced  in 
his  testimony  by  what  might  be  said  by  his  superiour. 
It  would  be  contrary  to  experience  of  the  human 
disposition,  to  suppose,  that  after  a  subaltern  has 
heard  two  or  three  generals  and  oflScers-  of  higher 
rank  than  himself  testify,  to  whose  authority  he  is 
perhaps  subservient,  or  to  whose  good  word  he  may 
have  owed  or  expects  to  owe  his  promotion,  he  will 


■>  /. 


GENERAL  HULL. 


Ill 


lo  «o,  hat 
nsweringv 
riour,  that 
t)y  a  prior 

Advocate 
esume  ha» 
18  shew  the 
V  the  words 
e  very  con- 
It,  borrowed 

,  where  the 
sat  InequaUty 
^n  equal  foot- 
old,  as  far  as 
om  autliorityi 
the  youngest 
it  was  on  the 
rule  was  es- 
:amined  separ 
influenced  In 
his  superiour. 
of  the  human 
subaltern  has 
cers  of  higher 
authority  he  Is 
I  word  he  may 
motion,  he  vrlU 


be  willing  to  contradict  what  his  superiours  have  said, 
or  even  to  make  a  representation  which  will  vary 
from  theirs. 

If  on  any  ease,  Sir,  the  weight  of  this  sort  of  influ- 
ence could  be  felt  on  the  testimony,  the  course  pur- 
sued on  this  occasion  would  give  it  the  fairest  scope. 
For  the  witnesses  seem  to  have  been  arranged  and 
produced,  in  the  first  instance,  very  much  according 
to  their  rank,  (except  colonel  Miller.)  After  the  Ge- 
nerals had  been  examined,  then  uame  the  subordi- 
nates. The  exception  to  this  general  co:i>;se  as  to 
colonel  Miller  struck  me  as  a  little  singular.  I  did 
not  know  why  he  should  have  been  examioed  the 
last,  particularly  as  he  was  the  highest  officer  of  the 
regular  army  which  had  been  engaged  in  the  cam- 
paign. He  was  with  me  during  the  whole  time,  and 
had  the  most  intimate  knowledge  of  the  transaction  < 
to  which  the  other  Gentlemen  testified.  But  when 
I  found  that  colonel  Miller's  testimony  was  much 
less  unfavourable  to  me  than  the  testimony  of  the 
witnesses  who  had  preceded  him,  and  that  he  would 
not  support  them  in  the  most  materi<|part8  of  their 
testimony,  I  was  at  no  loss  to  account%r  this  course 
of  proceeding. 

The  next  accusation  which  I  shall  consider,  is  spe- 
cified under  the  charge  of  imofficer-like  ^'>i«r;ict,  and 
refers  to  the  commencement  of  the  march  of  the  ar- 
my. It  is  in  substance,  that  from  the  time  I  took  the 
command,  I  omitted  to  exercise,  inspect,  train,  review. 


•*W^"" 


■  -V 


K^il. 


112 


DEFENCE  OF 


ll 


ri 


and  order  the  troops.    I  cannot  believe,  dentleilien, 
that  it  win  be  necessary  for  me  to  say  much  on  this 
sulgect.    I  did  expect,  that  if  any  part  of  n./  conduct 
could  have  escaped  the  censure  of  my  enemies,  it 
would  have  been  the  manner  in  which  I  led  the  troops 
through  the  wilderness.    When  it  is  recollected,  what 
an  extent  of  road  it  was  necessary  for  me  to  cut; 
that  a  great  proportion  of  the  men  were  constantly 
employed  in  this  duty ;  that  those  who  were  not  so, 
were  mcst  generally  fatigued  with  their  turn  of  this  la- 
borious service,  I  believe  the  Court  will  think  with 
colonel  Miller,  that  there  was  neither  time,  nor  op- 
portunity, for  that  sort  of  discipline  and  exercise, 
which,  under  other  circumstances,  would  have  been 
proper.    The  commandants  of  regiments  have  testi- 
fied, that,  as  to  their  respective  commands,  there  was 
no  omission  of  what  was  their  duty  in  this  respect. 
The  fault  charged  to  me  is  then,  that  in  the  depths  of 
the  forest,  through  which  we  were  marching,  I  did 
not  call  off  my  fatigue  parties,  guards,  and  advances, 
and  go  through  the  ceremonies  of  military  parade. 
And  yet,  as  if  every  thing  that  I  could  have  done, 
must,  in  the  opinion  of  my  officers,  be  condemiied, 
my  omissions  to  have  these  parades  are  not  more 
severely  censured  than  my  conduct    has  been  for 
making  some  display  of  the  troops,  and  passing  them 
in  review  on  some  few  occasions,  when  I  thought  it 
was  consistent  with  our  "ituation.    When  the  corps 
passed  me  by  sections,  after  we  had  crossed  the  Miami, 
general  Mac  Arthur  thinks  it  was  not  a  review,  be- 
cause I  was  not,  according  to  his  experience,  in  the 


^. 


GENERAL  HULL. 


113 


atlemen, 

I  on  ttaiB 

conduct 

emies,  it 
;he  troops 
;ted,\vhat 
e  to  cut; 
sonetantly 
re  not  80, 
kofthiftla- 
think  with 
le,  norop- 
d  exercise, 
have  been 
have  testi- 
»,  there  was 
his  respect, 
the  depths  of 

>hing,  1  did 
d  advances, 
tary  parade. 
I  have  done, 

condenuicd, 
ire  not  more 
las  been  for 
passing  them 
i  1  thought  it 
len  the  corps 
led  the  Miami, 

a  review,  be- 
erience,  in  the 


fitdation  which  a  reviewing  general  ought  to  have 
been ;  though,  be  admits  that  the  officers  at  the  heads 
of  sections  saluted  me,  and  he  admits  that  it  is  possible 
he  might  have  saluted  me  himself.  At  the  river 
Raisiu,  I  also  passed  the  troops  in  review.  I  did  the 
same  at  Spring  Wells,  and  mar\;hed  the  troops  from 
thence  to  Detroit  and  back.  But  these  parades  seem 
to  have  excited  the  indignation  of  general  Mac  Ar- 
thur, as  it  did,  according  to  his  testimony,  of  other 
officers  i  but  for  what  reason  I  have  not  been  able  to 
learn.  The  truth  is,  that  from  the  moment  we  com- 
menced our  march,  the  troops  were  always  under  my 
eye.  I  saw  them  on  their  line  of  march.  I  saw  them 
in  their  working  parties,  and  in  their  encampments.  I 
thought  it  would  be  as  ridiculous  as  useless  to  make 
parades  in  the  midst  of  the  woods.  Whenever  the 
country  opened,  so  that  there  was  any*room  for  dis- 
play, I  availed  myself  of  it;  not  only  that  I  might 
see  the  troops,  and  |.<ut  them  in.  military  array,  but^I 
thought  it  would  have  a  good*  effect  to  shew  our  line 
to  the  best  advantage  at  the  little  settlements  which 
we  passed,  and  on  our  arrival  in  the  neighbourhood 
.of  Detroit. 

I  shall  trouble  the  Court  with  nothing  further  in 
relation  to  this  charge,  than  the  following  quotation 
from  general  Cass  and  colonel  Miller's  testimony :  ge- 
neral Cass  states,  that  "  from  the  time  they  left  Urbana, 
'*  the  march  was  conducted  with  all  possible  expedition. 
"  There  was  no  time  to  discipline  the  troops."  Colo- 
nel Miller,  on  his  cross-examination,  says,  "  On  the 
11* 


,  J  ..    •  ..  •  'i 


►«\^  .-i  ;-*"*--'*- 


...1. 


•  f^ 


114 


DEFENCE  OF 


*<  march  there  was  no  opportunity  to  discipline  the 
"  troops.  The  fatigues  of  the  march,  and  cutting  tlie 
"  road,  and  making  the  encampments,  were  as  much 
"  as  the  trdops  could  endure.'* 


i   ^i... 


Connected  with  the  accusation  which  I  have  last  an- 
swered, is  another  which  is  in  substance,  that  I  did  not 
during  the  march,  prepare,  and  make  known,  an  order 
of  battle.  That  I  prepared  and  published  an  order  of 
march  is  admitted ;  a  plan  of  it,  which  has  been  proved 
by  several  witnesses,  is  before  you.  This  plan,  as  ap- 
pears from  the  testimony  of  general  Van  Rensselear, 
and  other  witnesses,  is  that  which  was  adopted  by  gene- 
ral Wayne,  in  tue  expedition  which  he  commanded 
and  marched  through  the  same  country.  This  order 
of  march  was  in  fact  an  order  of  battle,  or  at  least,  so 
little  change  Of  the  disposition  of  the  troops  was  ne- 
cessary, in  case  of  an  attack,  that  it  could  be  made 
in  a  moment,  and  was  so  obvious  that  it  could  never 
foe  mistaken.  It  is  remarkable,  that  the  commanding 
officers,  whose  testimony  was  expected  to  support 
this  accusation,  all  say,  that  they  knew  how  their  re- 
spective corps  were  to  form  in  case  of  attack;  though, 
as  they  say,  they  never  heard  of  any  order  of  battle. 
It  seems  then,  that  an  order  of  battle  was  made  known, 
and  the  accusation  must  then  rest  upon  the  allegation, 
that  the  order  was  not  made  or  published  by  me. 


General  Cassis  testimony  on  this  subject  is  as  follows: 
"  I  think,  when  we  arrived  near  the  river  Huron,  or 
^'between  that  and  Swan  Creek,  the  commanding 
"  officers  of  regiments,  under  an  expectation  of  an 


♦v 


'w^ 


w^ 


y\ 


m 


GENERAL  HULL. 


lU 


line  the 
Ltlng  the 
B8  much 


reUstaur 
I  did  not 
I,  an  order 
n  order  of 
jen  proved 

ilan,  as  ap- 
lensaelear, 
Bdbygene- 
lommanded 
This  order 
at  least,  so 
ops  was  ne- 
Idbe  made 
Bould  never 
sommanding 
I  to  support 
jow  their  re- 
ack;  though, 
er  of  battle, 
made  known, 
he  allegation, 
shed  by  me. 

t  is  as  follow, 
ver  Huron,  or 
commanding 
ectation  of  an 


^^  attack,  applied  to  the  general,  and  he  permitted  them 
*'  to  form  an  order  of  battle.  I  do  not  recollect,  that 
"  the  general  assisted  in  making  the  order.  I  think 
**  the  plan  originated  with  colonel  Miller.  I  do  not 
"  recollect  that  the  order  was  afterwards  submitted  to 
"  general  HulK  I  presume  there  was  an  orderly  book, 
"as  orders  were  issued." 

General  Mac  Arthur^s  testimcmy  on  this  point  is  as 
follows :  **  On  the  day  we  passed  the  river  Raisin  our 
"  march  was  about  nine  miles,  and  we  encamped  near 
"  Swan  Greek.    Rumours  were  among  the  inhabitants 
"  that  we  should  be  attacked  by  Indians,  who  were  ' 
"  assembled  at  the  Huron,  about  six  miles  in  advance. 
"'  Myself,  and  colonel  Findlay,  called  on  the  General, 
"and  stated  that  some  plan  of   battle  ought  to  be 
"  agreed  upon.    In  the  march  my  regiment  was  di- 
"  vided ;  a  battalion  marched  on  each  side  of  the  road, 
"  in  the  rear  of  colonels  Findlay  and  Cass.  I  mentioned 
"  to  the  General,  that  thus  situated,  it  was  impossible 
"  fci  me  to  be  with  both  my  battalions,  and  I  wished 
"  to  be  permitted,  in  case  of  attack,  to  form  them  in 
"  one  line.    The  General  thought  it  would  be  well 
"  enough  to  do  so.     I  suggested  the  propriety  of  my 
"  battalions  being  so  formed  on  the  march,  in  the  rear 
"  of  the  regiments,  as  that,  in  case  of  an  attack,  I 
"  mi^ht  snmg  my  regiment  round,  and  form  the  rear 
"  line  of  a  hollow  square.    The  General  gave  me  his 
"  permission  to  adop|  this  plan,  I  then  left  him,  mhether 
^'■lUfiUu  other  €0cers  nUh  him  or  not^  I  do  not  knom."" 
Major  Jessup  testifies,  that  I  issued  orders  on  the 


I 


M 


i 


•■'**-.Sfc.l 


m 


119 


BEFEKCE  OF 


f  i 


'?   " 


'•■%■ 


\  ' 


march;  that  they  were  generally  sent  to  him  by 
one  of  my  aide-de-camp;  that  he  Lssembled  the 
adjutant; .  and  cominunicated  to  them  my  orders.  He 
further  stated,  that  the  orderly  books  generally  were 
surrendered,  but  that  captain  Mac  Opmmick  and 
captain  Futleff,  who  were  at^jutants  of  Mac  Arthur 
and  Firdlay's  regiments,  had  preserved  theirs.  It  un- 
fortuD  'el;  liappens,  that  these  books  have  not  been 
brought  on  by  these  gentlemen.  Had  they  been  so, 
it  would  then  have  appeared  what  orders  I  did  issue, 
and  this  matter  would  not  have  been  left  to  the  un- 
certain recollection  of  witnesses. 

As  I  am  accused  of  having  (Hnitted  to  issue  orders, 
and  of  having  given  improper  orders,  I  submit  to  the 
Court,  whether  I  had  not  a  right  to  expect,  that  the  or- 
derly books,  which  were  in  the  possession  of  witnesses, 
brought  forward  by  the  proslBCution,  would  have  been 
produced;  especially  as  I  requested  miyor  Jessup 
might  be  summoned,  with  a  tktces  tecuntf  to  bring  be- 
fore the  Court  all  the  official  documents  in  his  posses- 
sion, and  the  orderly  book.  But  I  proceed  to  exa- 
mine the  testimony  in  relation  to  the  order  of  battle. 

Colonel  Miller  testifies,  "  I'hat  an  order  of  march  . 
<*  was  published  at  Urbana,  and  was  generally  known 
**  to  the  army ;  that  the  army  commonly  marched  ac- 
"  cording  to  that  order.  It  was  my  understanding, 
*-'  says  colonel  Miller,  that  in  case  of  an  attack  in 
''  front,  my  regiment  was  to  form  the  line  in  front.  In 
^'case  of  an  attack  on  the  right  flank,  we  were  to 


.-- ff-- 


# 


GENERAL  HULL. 


117 


him  by- 
led   the 
(W.    He 
lly  were 
Ick   and 
c  Anhur 
J.    Itun- 
not  been 
been  uo, 
did  iBBue, 
)  the  un- 


\ne  ordcw, 
hiit  to  the 
hat  the  or- 
'witnesaes, 
have  been 
jor  JesBiip 
a  bring  be- 
bis  posBes- 
eed  to  exa- 
of  battle. 

er  of  march  > 
■ally  known 
narched  ac- 
lerstanding, 
m  attack  in 
in  front.  In 
^e  were  to 


*  form  by  facing  the  enemy;  and  bo  in  case  of  an  at* 
**  tack  on  the  left    This  was  a  general  understanding, 
*'  but  I  do  not  recollect  to  have  seen  any  order  to  this 
*'  purport,  either  written  or  verbal.    I  understood  it 
"  from  conversations  with  general  Hull,  and  I  believe 
"  it  was  so  understood  by  the  other  officers.    The 
*^  General  told  me,  that  the  order  of  march  which  he 
"  had  adopted,  was  that  which  bad  been  pursued  by 
**  general  Wayne.    I  know  nothing  to  the  contrary." 
Colonel  Miller  adds,  *\of  the  General's  having  been 
"  almost  always,  when  we  were  on  the  march,  in  a 
*'  situation  to  direct  the  movements  of  the  troops.  For 
"  the  greatest  part  of  the  time,  the  General  rode  near  me 
*<^  in  front.    Sometimes  he  passed  to  the  rear.    Gene- 
**  rally  the  army  encamped  in  a  hollow  square.  After 
"we  apprehended  danger,  we  commonly  formed  a 
"  breast-work,  and  encamped  within  it.    By  a  general 
"  order,  each  line  was  to  form  in  front  of  its  (ents,  if 
"  attacked  in  camp.    There  was  also  a  general  order 
"  for  turning  out  the  troops  by  taps  of  the  drum,  pro- 
"  ceeding  from  head-quarters  along  the  lines.    This 
"  method  was  practised,  and  the  troops  were  called  to 
**arms  every  morning,  before  dawn,  by  these  signals." 

I  believe,  Gentlemen,  that  this  19  the  whole  of  the 
testimony,  on  this  point,  which  can  be  considered  as 
of  any  importance.  It  cannot  be  disputed  then,  but 
that  there  was  an  ord.ec  of  battle ;  but  general  Cass's 
testimony  seems  intended  to  leave  an  impression,  that 
the  order  did  not  originate  with  me,  but  that  it  was 
suggested  by  my  officers,  and  adopted  by  them,  with 


I:] 


'I 


1 

i 


1 ,1 


<' 


•^    i* 


ns 


DEFENCE  OF 


h    '  I 


■\: 


my  asseii\^,  without  my  having  given  myself  much 
trouble  about  it.  T  cannot  but  think,  that  in  thit*  in- 
stance  there  is  a  display  of  the  spirit  with  which 
much  of  tBBtimony  has  been  given  in  this  cause.  It 
seems  to  have  been  determined,  that  I  shall  not  even 
share  in  ihe  credit  of  any  thing  ihd  wor<  done  that 
o«j;;ht  to  have  been  done.  My  oflieer*  c  'aim  every 
thing  that  is  meritorious)  as  ti<eirs. 

General  Cass  says,  Ii<?  does  not  recollect  whether  I 
assisted  in  making  the  order,  or  whether  it  was  sub- 
mitted to  me  after  it  wrs  maiie.  This  is  one  of  the 
instances  in  which  it  is  extremely  uufbrtuHati?  for  nie, 
that  the  recollection  of  the  witnesses  entit<*iij^  fails 
t]iem  as  to  matters  of  the  greatest  importance,  and 
Tviikb  might  be  decisive,  if  in  my  favour,  as  to  the 
;  articular  accusation;  while  their  memories  serve  them 
with  remarkable  correctness  and  minuteness,  as  to 
circumstances  which  are  unfavourable  to  me. 

I  hope  I  may  be  permitted  to  <]igres8,  so  far  as  to 
remark  another  instance  of  the  same  unfortunate 
want  of  recollection,  though  it  relates  to  a  diflferent 
point.  ' 


upr' 


?n 


Major  Jessup,  after  having  stated,  that  he  came  to 
me  in  the  fort,  after  the  flag  was  hoisted  on  the  six- 
teenth of  August,  adds,  **  1  inquired  of  the  General  if 
"  it  were  possible  we  were  aiout  to  surrender.  The 
*'  General  said  something  about  the  enemy's  force,  and 
'*  something  about  terms,  which  I  do  not  recollect,'' 


GENERAL  HULL. 


119 


Miyor  JesBup  then  goes  on  to  state  very  particular* 
\y  what  he  said  to  me,  to  express  his  strong  aversion 
to  the  surrender.  I  hmfe  surely  great  reason  to  re- 
gret, that  major  Jessup's  memory  would  not  enable 
him  to  state  what  I  said,  when  it  might  have  been  so 
important  to  shew  the  motives  of  my  conduct,  while 
every  thing  that  he  said  to  me,  which  was  calculated 
to  set  his  own  conduct  in  the  most  favourable  point  of 
view,  made  so  deep  an  impression  on  his  mind,  that 
he  could  undertake  to  reiate  the  very  expressions  h6 
had  used.  But  to  return  to  what  respects  the  order  of 
battle. 


fi 


General  Mac  Arthur  states,  that  after,  on  his  sug- 
gestion, he  had  settled  with  me  how  he  was  to  swing 
his  regiment  in  case  of  an  attack,  '*  I  then  left  the 
*'  General ;  whether  I  left  the  other  oflScers  with  him, 
"  or  not,  I  do  not  know."  It  appears  then,  that  this 
arrangen:  mt,  about  the  order  of  battle,  was  concluded 
in  thf  presence  of  other  officers ;  what  others,  general 
Mb'j  Arthur  does  not  state. 


^? 


Colonel  Miller  says,  he  understood,  from  conversa- 
tions with  me,  what  was  to  be  the  disposition  of  his 
corps,  in  case  of  an  attack. 


Thus  it  appears,  that  colonel  Mac  Arthur,  colonel 
Cass,  coh>nel  Findlay,  and  colonel  Miller,  all  knew 
what  they  were  to  do,  if  an  enemy  was  to  approach 
us.    What  foundation  is  there  then  for  a  charge,  that 


t 


^n 


120 


DEFENCE  OF 


¥r   ' 


IS. 


no  order  of  battle  was  made  known  ?  If  the  subordi- 
nate officers  were  not  instructed  as  to  their  duty,  in 
the  event  of  an  attack,  was  «it  not  the  fault  of  these 
commandants  of  corps  and  not  mine  ?  Suppose  there 
had  been  no  written  order  of  battle;  but  that  after  the 
order  of  march,  which  so  nearly  approached  the  order 
of  battle,  had  been  formed,  I  had  explained  to  the 
commandants  the  disposition  I  intended,  in  case  of  an 
attack;  could  any  man  say,  I  was  deficient  in  duty, 
because  I  had  not  explained  my  intentions  in  a  writ- 
ten order  ?  I  believe  no  one  acquainted  with  military 
history  or  practice,  will  think  a  general  is  bound  to 
make  an  exposure  of  his  plansy  in  every  orderly  book 
in  his  army.  If  the  witnesses,  in  whose  opinions 
'  these  charges  and  specifications  have  been  framed, 
have  entertained  such  erroneous  idea^  of  the  duties  of 
a  commander,  as  this  accuention  seems  to  indicate,  I 
hope  now,  that  some  of  them  have  attained  a  rank 
which  may  give  them  the  command  of  aimies,  they 
•  will  learn,  that  to  give  a  general  publicity  in  their 
orderly  books  to  their  designs  in  case  of  an  attack, 
will  be  a  departure  from  their  duty,  and  that  they 
may  often  thereby  afford  their  enemy  an  opportunity 
of  gaining  information,  which  he  ought  not  to  have. 


As  to  the  order  of  battle  at  night,  it  is  proved  by 
the  testimony  of  colonel  Miller,  that  that  was  settled 
by  a  general  order,  which  was  made  known  to  all; 
and  when  the  Court  considers  what  was  the  nature 
of  our  lines  of  march ;  how  neariy  it  approached  the 
only  order  of  battle,  which  could  have  been  proper. 


'  .!* . ,  .^s'^ivti*^- 


OEKlSlliil)  BViL. 


tH 


fitiuitfy  the  o^r  of  inarch  ^Wu  mitdelhe  order  t>f  bat- 
tle; and  consiSier  alto,  that  I  was  alwayii  at  the  head 
of  th<^  timopi  while  thegr  wer6  on  the  manch,  I  am 
p(»rsiiailia'tii6t;dttM^ll  thM,  th^  id  no  foundation 
foVtblfitecilifttieii.  IfftliftiK  Aottnriglnatedtamaliee, 
ire^rtaihlf  haij  Ittlgkio^ftiifie/ 

Faiii  tm^lliiig-tb  ^ei^  ifi^  CTduit  loikger  on  a 
^flitff^i'whichy  iii  mfowtk  of^liiifni;  ii  nilBfd^iitly  ain- 
jlWeredf  bttt  I  kno#  I  ought  not  to  place  io  much 
«onfldenc^  in  niy  own  opinion,  as  not  to  avail  myseir 
of  anything  which  ^^7  have  an  influence  on  the 
ophifoifte  ttf  othent.  t^iitlBt  th^iefo^  advert  to  other 
ii»tiiiiOn^,  whiJBli  I  h^i^ti  ou^hi  (o  be  cohclusive  on 
this  point;  I  mean  ndy  lettevt)%the  War  Department. 
ThO««i"td  vrhi4^  t  ill^i  refer  for  This  purpose,  the 
CoUrt  will  fecotleet  were  riead  by  ^is  Judge  A^6^ 
t;ate.  If  I  had  offered  theni,  they  certainly  wolildnot 
have  been  conclusive  evidence  in  my  favour;  but 
when'lhtrbduced  oil  ttt^  part  dr.  the  prosecution,  so 
far  as  they  establiilli  any  thing  in  my  favour,  they  are 
as  good  evidence  as  l^e^'  are  to  prove  any  thing 
against  me.'  It  would  be  a  manif*^t  violation  of  jus- 
tice, if  this  sort  of  tebtimcny  should  be  resorted  to  for 
my  crimination,  and  t  should  not  he  permitted  to 
avail  myi^lf  of  it,  so  fkr  as  it  might  serve  for  my 
exculpation.  It  is  a  general  rule,  which  applies  to  the 
administration  of  justice  in  all  courts,  Ibfit  wterever 
«  document  is  reail^by  one  side,  the  whole  of  it  be- 
comes evidence,  of  which  either  party  niay  avail 
142 


<W(*»»W«»* 


■»S3»<^.*i 


122 


DEPENCB  W 


himseir.  I  beg  leave  to  Ifefnind  (he  Court  thtt  tMl 
rule  has  been  acknowledged  b^  the  JvAge  Advocate. 
The  Court  will  recollect,  that  .la  the  ednneorthe 
examination  of  captain  Fuller,  tn^jor  Parker  objected 
totakedovrii  hit  Wveir  tb>''iqii««tie^  which  I  put 
to  the  witness,  as  beting  nnnedlBiss&rjr,  because  the  fa<it 
as  to  which  I  interrogated  hiln,  was  ^suflteientiy 
proved  by  my  letters  to  the  Beciiettl^  tttWiir. 


In  my  letter,  dated  SoIom(tti*s  Town,  'eighte^t& 
June,  eighteen  hundred  and  twelve,  I  say/  **My  dr^ 
*'der  of  march  is  in  two  dotomns,  witli  strong  front 
**  and  rear  gnurdi ;  the  cctlaniiis  flanked  by  the  rifle- 
**  men  and  cavaliy,  where' the  gi^mid  wHl  KdlMltl  the 
**  baggi^e,  provisions,  &c.  b[^<ien  tike  dOlttmits;  The 
"army  has  been  practised  from  the  tiro' colujdiijts  to 
<*  form  two  likies,  either  in  front,  i^t*,  of  i^r  either 
"  flank,  or  toibrm  a  square  fodng  outwwd.  My  order 
**  of  encampment  at  night  is  a  s^uhir^rfacfaig  outward 
*'with  all  the  baggage  in  the  t^Utrtf^a^^.*' 


# 


My  letters  of  the  twenty-foiirth  June,  ei^teen 
hundred  and  twelve,  from  near  Blanchard*s 'Cl«ek, 
enclosed  to  the  Secretary  at  W&t  the  ordi^r  Of  march 
which  has  been  given  in  evidence.  Among  the 
manuscript iiotes  subjoined  fo  that  order,  is  one  ifi  the 
following  words :  "  The  (iblumns  are  in  a  situatioh  to 
**  form  two  lines  in  front,  rear,  or  on  either  flank,  or  to 
"form  a  square."         '  ''  ■^^^u.*.#--^«^^>'A...  ,-., 


n 


After  these  observations,  I  cannot  but  be  satisfied, 
that  the  Court  will  th^ik  that  there  was  no  ground 


5,-  Ji9*tia^"*' 


GENERAL  HULL. 


1^3 


for  charging  me  with  neglectii.^  to  discipline  and  re- 
view my  troops,  or  omitting  to  j^repare  and  make 
linown  an  order  of  battle. 

Tlie  next  accusations  tliat  I  shall  consider  are,  th^ 
I  neglected  to  repair  and  put  in  order  the  cannon  at 
Detroit ;  and  to  put  the  place  in  a  state  of  defence : — 
that  I  did  not  seasonably  repair,  and  put  in  a  state 
of  service,  the  artillery  necessary  for  the  operations  in 
Canada;  and  that  1  did  not  transport  tliem  to  the 
enemy's  shore,  so  soon  as  I  ought  to  have  done.  I 
have  already  had  occasion  incidentally  to  notice  thete 
accusations,  and  I  shall  give  no  further  answer  to 
them  than  to  refer  the  Court  to  the  testimony  of 
captain  Dallaba.  He  states,  that  when  I  arrived  at 
Detroit,  "  the  fort  was  generally  in  good  order,  and 
**  in  a  good  state  of  repair."  On  his  cross-examina- 
tion, captain  Dallaba  says,  "  the  fort  was  in  the  state 
"  of  defence  I  liave  described,  except  as  to  some  im- 
"  material  matters,  on  the  fourth  day  of  July,  before 
"lh6  arrival  of  the  army.  Afterwards,  something 
''  was  done  with  the  ordnance  stcnres,  and  mounting 
^Hhe  cannon;  but  every  ihhfig  designed  for  the  de- 
"  fence  of  the  fort  exclusively,  was  completed  on  the 
".  fourth  of  July.  After  the  generars  arrival  at  De- 
*'  troit,  industry  and  exertions  were  used  to  put  in 
"  order  .the  field  pieces  and  heavy  artillery  for  the 
<'  siege  of  Maiden.  This  was  done  (says  the  witness) 
**■  under  my  superintendance,  and  by  order  of  gener$iii 
<•  Hull." 


# 


124 


DEFENCE  OF 


Tbii  wltneM  \va8  examined  on  the  m  .>  tk  al  Fe- 
bniaiy :  four  days  aftenvards,  on  the  twelflh,  he  i»agBin 
called,  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  and  then  he  testifies 
u  follows,  V I  have  before  slated,  that  no  altenitions 
^nad  been  made  subsequently  to  the  fourth  of  July, 
**  for  defence  of  the  fort. 


If:  '.■ 


"  Some  few  artificers,  immediately  after  the  arrival 
"  of  general  Hull,  went  to  work  to  repair  and  mount 
**  some  heavy  cannon  on  trueks,  to  be  placed  in  the 
"  batteries  on  the  banks  of  ^  liver.  And  some  re* 
"  pairs  were  made  to  three  bnSs  field  pieces,  and  a 
"  small  quantity  of  ammunition  was  fixed  for  them. 
'*  But  iio  order  was  received,  to  my  knowledge,  to 
"  prepare  the  heavy  field  artillery,  till  after  the  army 
"went  to  Canada.  I  have  the  order,  and  think  it 
"  was  dated  on  the  fifteenth  or  sixteenth  of  July.'* 

I  hftve  already  made  some  remarks  on  this  test]* 
mony,  and  stated,  that  the  onler  was  in  fact  given  on 
the  fourteenth  of  July.  Till  that  time,  the  artificers 
hadJieen  otherwise  employed.  I  will  remind  the 
Court  here  of  the  otgectiqn  I  offered,  and  which  was 
overruled  by  the>^Coiirt,  to  this  mode  of  re-examining 
a  witness.  If  to  examine  the  witnesses  in  the  pre- 
sence of  each  other  be  a  dqiarture  from  the  usages  of 
Corurts  Maitial,  it  is- certainly  a  much  wider  and  more 
important  deviation  from  that  usage,  to  call  up  a  wit- 
ness, and  to  allow  him  to  make  important  alterations 
in  his  testimony,  after  he  has  been  listening  for  days 
\o  the  testimony  of  other  witnesses.     ]  now  mork 


GENERAL  HULL. 


125 


,neii»agatn 
lie  testifies 
alterations 
til  of  July, 


this  irregularity,  ai  I  eonceive  it  to  be,  for  the  lake 
of  presenting  it,  as  ivell  as  the  ftwt  of  all  the  witnesses 
having  been,  pursuant  to  a  determination  of  this 
Court,  examined  in  the  presence  of  each  other,  to  the 
attention  of  the  Jiigh  officer,  who  has  authority  to 
review  these  proceedings. 


:  the  arrival 
r  and  mount 
need  in  the 
Lpd  some  re> 
ieces,  and  a 
;d  for  them, 
lowledge,  to 
ter  the  army 
and  think  it 
of  July.'* 


Colonel  Miller  testifies,  that  he  "discovered  no 
''  want  of  exertion  in  respect  to  preparing  the  heavy 
''  and  lighted  rid  artilleiy,  after  the  amy  arrived  at 
"Detroit." 

General  Taylor  says,  "  I  believe  no  time  was  lost 
<>'  ia  prepanilonB.  Timber  and  some  large  wheels  were 
"got  out." 

Again,  the  same  witness  says,  that  he  visited  the 
artificers  every  day,  to  hurry  the  preparations,  with 
orders  from  general  Hull ;  "  and  I  mu«t  say,  (adds  the 
*'  witness)  that  general  Hull  shewed  great  anxiety  in 
"  getting  the  artillery  ready." 

I  pray  leave  t6.  make  one  remark  on  this  language 
of  general  Taylor's,  which  I  am  aware  may  have  the 
appearance  of  being  hypercritical ;  but  I  beg  the  in- 
dulgence of  the  Court,  till  I  have  explained  my  rea- 
sons for  noticing  a  circumstance  apparently  trivial. 
Why  should  general  Taylor  preface  his  testimony  of 
this  fact  in  my  favour,  with  the  phrase,  "  I  must  say  ?" 
It  seems  as  if  to  state  any  circumstance  favourable  to 
me  was  the  result  of  a  compulsion,  to  which  his  mind 
12* 


46 


*V 


U9 


DEFENCE  OF 


unwillingly  submitted.  In  this  instance,  he  speaks  like 
apftiUent,  whose  conscience  obliges  him  to  make  the 
acknowledgment  of  a  foct,  which  his  inclination  would 
prompt  him  to  conceaL  I  had  a  right  to  exp4>ct,  th^t 
when  the  witnesses  could  testify  any  thing  in  my 
favour,  tiiey  would  qieak  in  the  same  unreserved 
language,  which  they  used,  when  they  intended  to 
expose  my  misconduct 


s- >, 


h- 


I 


lytr- 


Upon  most  occasions,  observations  0D  circum- 
stances apparently  so  light,  m^ht  not  be  proper  or 
necessary.  But,  Gentlemen,  I  beg  you  to  recollect, 
that  the  witnesses  have  undertaken  to  interpret  my 
lookst  And  have  ventured  to  infer  from  my<9«urUenance, 
from  my  appearance  and  manner,  what  was  passing  .in 
my  mind,  and  hy  what  motives  I  was  actuated.  They 
have  not  hesitated  to  express  opinions  derived  from 
no  other  indications,  when  they  knew,  that  these 
opinions  might  affect  my  honour  and  my  life,  tf 
cannot  be  improper  then,  that  I  should  ask  you  to 
remark  even  the  slightest  expression  of  a  witness, 
which"  I  may  think  will  betray  the  dispositioa  with 
which  he  testifies.  It  is  with  reluctance  that  I  at- 
tempt to  impeach  the  testimony  of  any  witness  who 
has  been  called  against*me.  I  have  been  taught  to 
iienerate  a  soldier  from  my  infancy.  I  know  that 
the  profession  of  arms  generally  adds  histre  to  the 
most  noble  virtues.  But  I  know  that  men  do  not 
change  their  natures  by  becoming  soldiers,  nor  by 
attaining  the  most  elevated  rank.  And  when  they 
ean  rec(mcil«  to  themselves  to  accuse  me  of  coward 


.it*- 


GENERAL  HULL. 


127 


ice,  from  appearances  bo  fallacious,  surely  I  may  re-^ 
mark,  that  expressions  they  have  used  indicate  bias, 
partiality,  or  prejudice. 


|f 


Without  detaining  the  Court  with  a  particular  re-^ 
capitulation  of  more  of  the  evidence  on  this  point, 
I  shall  content  myself  with  referring  it  to  the  very 
important  and  decisive  testimony  of  captain  Dyson, 
to  the  testimony  of  captain  Bacon,  and  finally  to  the 
testimony  of  Mi  Watson;  who  says,  that  after  my 
arrival  at  Detroit,  no  man  could  have  been  more  in- 
dustrious and  indefatigable  than  I  was. 

I  proceed  to  a  v.  jv  subject,  and  shall  now  make 
my  defence  against  the  accusation,  which  is  in  sub- 
stance ;  that  I  did  not  avail  myself  of  the  opportu- 
nity, which  the  defeat  of  the  enemy  by  colonels  Casr 
and  Miller,  and  their  possession  of  the  bridge  over 
the  river  Aux  Canards,  on  the  eighteenth  of  July  af- 
forded of  making  an  attempt  on  Maiden ;  and  that  I 
did  not  maintain  possession  of  the  bridge.  This 
forms  the  sixth  specification  under  the  chaise  of  un^ 
officer-like  conduct. 

-The  exposition  I  have  already  presented  of  my 
views  and  designs  when  I  crossed  to  Canada,  would, 
1  humbly  conceive,  afford  a  sufficient  answer  to  these 
accusations.  I  did  not  think  it  expedient  to  attack 
Maiden,  under  any  circumstances,  which  existed 
previous  to  our  leaving  Canada.  Why  I  thought  it 
inexpedient  I  have  already  explained.    The  advAa- 


i1 


i 


l(. 


m 


m 


i 


128 


DEFENCE  OF 


\w 


tages  which  I  thought  were  tQ  be  gained  by  delay ; 
a  regard  which  my  orders  compelled  me  to  pay  to  the 
security  of  my  own  posts ;  the  necessity  of  keeping 
open  my  communication ;  the  certain  consequences 
of  defeat,  and  the  probable  consequences  of  victory, 
have  all  been  considered,  in  making  my  defence 
against  the  charge  of  undue  delay  in  Canada.  If  I 
was  justifiable,  or  even  excusable,  in  deferring  the  at- 
tack on  Maiden,  I  must  be  so  in  having  omitted  to 
avail  myself  of  the  possession  of  the  bridge,  and  in 
not  having  attempted  to  maintain  it.  It  wt>uld  have 
been  absurd  to  have  attempted  to  maintain  a  post  so 
far  in  a  Ivance,  unless  it  was  with  a  view  to  an  im- 
mediate movement  on  Maiden.  But  I  beg  the  Court 
to  advert  to  the  date  of  this  transaction.  It  was  not 
on  the  eighteenth  of  July,  as  mentioned  in  the  speci- 
fication, but  on  the  seventeenth,  as  appears  by  my 
letter  to  colonel  Cass.  This  was  the  fifth  day  after  we 
moved  into  Canada.  At  that  time,  the  deliberations 
of  my  officers  in  Canada  had  uniformly  resulted  in  the 
expression  of  an  opinion,  that  the  attempt  on  the 
enemy's  fortress  should  be  deferred,  till  the  artillery 
was  prepared;  and  it  was  immediately  aft'er  the 
council  at  Sandwich,  in  which  colonel  Cass  himself, 
as  appears  by  the  testimony  of  judge  Witherill,  had 
advised  that  the  attack  on  Maiden  should  not  be  made 
without  cannon. 

My  views  in  sending  this  detachment,  or  rather  in 
permitting  general  Cass  to  march  it,  appear  from  his 
testimony.    1  meant  it  as  a  reconnoitring  party,  and 


!l^f> 


m 


# 


• .-». 


GENERAL  HULL. 


129 


by  no  means  intended  that  the  commanding  officer 
should  pursue  measureis  which  might  expose  the  de- 
tachment to  be  sacrificed,  or  oblige  me  to  abandon 
the  system  I  had  adopted,  by  leading  my  whole  army 
to  its  support.  Colonel  Cass  testifies,  that .  a  day  or 
two  after  colonel  Mac  Arthur  was  detached  to  the  river 
Trench,  he  (colonel  Cass,)  requested  me  to  permit 
him  to  reconnoitre  the  ground  between  Sandwich  and 
Maiden ;  that  I  did  permit.it,  and  a  detachment  of 
two  hundred  and  eighty  men  were  ordered  for  that 
service. 


General  Taylor  states,  that  hfi  was  present  when 
news  arrived  that  colonel  Cass  had  taken  the  Aux 
Canards  bridge.  "  That  I  expressed  my  astonishment, 
*'  that  colonel  Cass  should  have  commenced  hostilities, 
*'  as  I  was  not  ready  with  the  artillery ;  that  I  appeared 
"  to  be  irritated,  because  colonel  Cass  had  taken  upon 
**  himself  to  act,  without  my  authority :  the  detach- 
"  ment  having  only  been  sent  out  for  observation." 


r 


It  cannot  be  doubted,  but  that  general  Cass  knew 
my  views,  and  the  objects  of  his  detachment.  How 
far  he  was  justifiable,  in  pursuing  measures  &o  con- 
trary to  them,  not  only  in  making  an  atiack,  ,,  ich 
might  have  forced  me  to  a  general  and  decisive  action 
for  his  support,  but  after  my  verbal  orders  to  retire, 
persisting  to  maintain  his  situation,  till  ^c  tried  the 
effect  of  a  written  remonstrance  to  me,  it  is  unneces- 
sary now  to  consider.  I  do  now  believe,  that  the 
whole  of  this  proceeding  was  a  wonoeuvrc,  to  afibrd 


S\ 


y 


1^ 


DEFENCE  OF 


^•'  /  'W. 


\  ' 


Fiv'    ; 


it 


ri  1 ' 


grounds  for  new  clamours  against  me,  and  weaken 
my  authority.  My  officers,  long  before  they  bad  ma- 
tured their  conspiracy  to  wrest  the  command  •from 
me  by  actual  violence  to  my  person,  had  formed  a 
plan,  of  whir.h  I  firmly  believe  this  was  a  part,  to 
place  me  in  such  situations  as  would  oblige  me  to  be 
obedient  to  their  schemes.  If  any  thing  successful 
was  done,  they  would  claim  all  the  merit.  In  case 
of  disaster,  the  blame  could  easily  be  thrown  on  the 
commanding  general.  If  I  had  led  the  army  to  the 
Canards,  which  probably  I  must  have  done  to  have 
maintained  the  bridge,  instead  of  its  being  alleged 
against  rae  as  a  crime,  that  I  did  not  do  so,  do  you 
not  believe.  Gentlemen,  in  case  we  had  been  defeated, 
I  should  have  been  charged  with  misconduct,  in  hav- 
ing acted  in  opposition  to  the  advice  of  all  the  coun- 
cil, not  to  move  on  Maiden  without  artillery  ?  And 
when  it  is  considered,  that  colonel  Mac  Arthur  was 
absent  with  a  large  detachmr  nt ;  that  I  had  received 
no  intelligence  from  him ;  tla .  I  was  under  great  un- 
easiness on  his  account,  I  do  think  tb^t  if  I  had  left 
him  in  my  rear,  and  with  only  a  part  of  my  army  had 
taken  ground,  which  might  have  been  the  field  of  a 
general  action  with  the  enemy's  whole  force,  which 
was  then  either  in  respect  to  its  regulars,  militia,  or 
savages,  unascertained,  and  at  that  time  but  incon- 
siderably weakened  by  desertion,  I  should  have  been 
highly  culpable. 


!,:  i 


-i -^ 


Colonel  Miller's  account  of  this  transaction  is  as 
follows :  ''  in  answer  to  a  message  sent  to  general  Hulj^ 


'^ 


GENERAL  HULL. 


131 


<'  he  sent  us  an  order  to  return.  The  purport  of  his 
"  message  was,  that  he  could  not  soon  be  rei\dy  for 
"  the  attack  on  Maiden,  and  could  not  think  of  divid- 
"  ing  the  army.  We  then  wrote  to  him  and  pressed 
^'in  strong  terms  the  necessity  of  maintaining  the 
"  bridge,  in  answer  to  which  he  sent  a  written  di«- 
"  cretionary  order  to  us,  expressing  his  anxiety  about 
"  general  Mac  Arthur,  &c." 


This  order  has  been  proved.   It  is  in  the  following 
words  : 


Sandwich,  July  17,  1812. 


Sir, 


I  have  received  your  letter  of  this  raom- 
ing.  To  my  astonishment  I  have  received  not  the 
least  infoFmafion  from  Mac  Arthur.  It  is  possible 
something  unpleasant  has  taken  place.  It  will  pro- 
bably be  a  week  before  the  cannon  will  be  mounted. 
I  am  sensible  of  the  advantt^s  of  holding  the  bridge. 
I  would  not,  however,  hazard  too  much  for  the  pur- 
pose. The  enemy  may  pass  the  ford  above,  and 
come  in  the  rear.  I  will,  however,  leave  it  to  your 
discretion,  and  colonel  Miller's,  under  all  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case  to  do  that  which  you  judge  most 
expedient.  Twelve  miles  is  a  great  distance,  and 
the  enemy  can  either  land  in  boats  above  the  mouth 
of  the  river,  or  pass  at  the  ford  to  attack  you.  You 
know  the  ground  better  than  I  do,  and  as  I  before 
observed,  I  will  leave  the  measure  and  the  force  td 


1  'I  I 

1 


!    . 


*  ' 


'ni 


132 


DEFENCE  OF 


f 


your  discretion  and  colonel  Miller's,  and  the  best 
mode  of  security  to  the  party. 

I  am  very  respectfully, 

your  most  obedient  servant. 

William  Hull, 

firigadier  Ocneml,  commanding. 

Colonel  Cass. 


Colonel  Miller  further  testifies,  that,  "  upon  the  re- 
''  ceipt  of  this  letter,  the  officers  were  called  together, 
"  and  it  was  decided,  that  unleiss  the  bridge,  being 
''  twelve  or  fourteen  miles  from  our  camp,  and  only 
"  four  or  five  from  the  enemy,  could  be  supported  by 
"  our  whole  force,  we  had  better  return ;  aud  that  «f 'We 
"  had  not  the  disposition  of  the  whole  force,  which 
"  was  thought  necessary,  we  ought  nof  "t6~  take'  the 
*' responsibility." 

This  testimony,  I  think,  developes  tod  plahily  to 
be  misunderstood,  the  design  of  these  proceedings. 
1  was  to  be  compelled  to  abandon  my  own  [iUins,  and 
to  adopt  those  of  my  officers.  I  was  to  be  cofripelled 
to  lead  my  whole  force  in  a  manner  under  th«  walls 
of.Malden,  without  being  provided  with  artillery,  and 
I  was  urged  to  do  this,  by4he  commandant  of  the  de- 
tachment, who  but  a  day  or  two  previously  had  giveh 
a  decisive  opinion,  in  council,  that  the  attack  oa 
MaViien  sf'^uld  not  be  made  till  the  ordnance  was 
prepared. 


.^;     i -1 


GENERAL  HULL. 


133 


il  the  best 


ervant. 


upon  tii«  fi- 
lled together, 
>ridge,  being 
(ip,  and  only 
supported  by 
ludlbatiiC^e 
fbroe,  wMch 
iftb  take  *he 


too  plaittly  to 
»  proceedings, 
iwn  plilna,  and 
►  be  cooapelled 
nder  the  walls 
a  artillery,  and 
dant  of  the  de- 
UBly  had  given 
the  attack  on 
ordnance  waf» 


.  But  when  it  was  found,  that  my  order  left  the  offi- 
4cers  oi  the  detachment  a  discretion,  and  that  if  an 
attempt  to  maintain  the  bridge  should  be  attended 
urith  any  disaster,  the  officers  must  share  the  respon- 
sibility, then  there  was  no  doubt  as  to  the  measures 
to  be  pursued.  It  would  have  disappointed  the  whole 
design  if  I  should  escape  any  part  of  the  odium. 

But  however  this  affair  of  the  bridge  has  been 
magnified,  it  is  a  fact,  that  the  possession  of  that  pass 
by  the  enemy  never  was  contemplated  as  an  obstacle 
to  a  movement  on  Maiden.  They,  in  truth,  never 
•attempted  to  maintain  possession  of  it.  Colonel 
Cass's  rentibntre  was  only  with  a  reconnoitring  party. 
According  to  the  testimony  of,  colonel  Si^pr,  they 
saw  no  more  than  fifty  of  the  enemy.  He  says  they 
had  about  twenty  five  men  on  the  bridge,  and  about 
twenty  five  on  our-side,  and  that  some  men  were  dis- 
covered in  the  wotfi  After  this,  there  were,  as  ap- 
peurafrom  the  testimony  of  colonel  Cass,  repeated  de- 
tachments sent  from  Sandwich  to  the  bridge.  They 
always  found  it  unoccupied  by  the  enemy.  It  could 
then  have  been  no  object  to  have  moved  the  army  to 
that  post,  until  the  attack  on  Maiden  was  determined 
upcMi. 

It  is  curious  to  observe,  what  trivial  and.  irrelevant 
circumstances  ingenuity  ca.it  bring  together  to  create 
false  appearances.  Some  of  the  gentlemen,  who 
were  prisoners  with  the  enemy  at  the  time  of  this 
transaction,  have  been  produced  to  testify,  that  when 
13 


» 


r    *» 


n 


%i 


*!&.., 


134 


DEFENCE  OF 


\!i 


<*- 


accounts  reached  Amhentburgh  that  our  detachment 
.  had  appeared  in  the  Aux  Canardt,  it  created  great 
consternation ;  and  it  was  intended  that  it  should  be 
believed,  th&t  the  enemy  were  ready  to  abandon  their 
post  at  our  approach.  But  it  turns  out,  upon  further 
explanation  from  witnesses  of  the  same  description, 
that  the  disposition  to  fly  was  only  manifested  by  the 
town's  people,  who  thought  it  unnecessary  to  expose 
their  persons  and  effects  in  a  place  which  was  likely 
to  be  invested.  This,  so  far  from  being  evidence  of 
au  intention  to  yield  the  place  witliout  contest,  is  not 
an  unfrequent  measure  when  the  most  obstinate  re- 
sistance is  intended.  «'  ' 

In  nllNetter  to  the  Secretary  at  War  of  the  nine- 
teenth of  July,  I  mention  the  affair  at  the  Aux  Ca- 
nard bridge,  and  say,  great  credit  is  due  to  colonel 
Cass  and  his  detachment.  For  firmness,  to  colonel 
Cass  and  the  other  volunteers,  i^j||pn  supported  by  the 
proportion  of  regulars,  which  wec^  with  them  in  this 
first  encountre  with  any  enemy,  I  did  think  credit 
was  due,  both  to  men  and  officers. — ^But  when  I  wrote 
that  letter,  I  had  not  the  same  view  of  the  designs 
formed  against  me  which  subsequent  circumstances 
have  expressed.  I  did  not  then  see,  that  a  plan 
which  has  been  so  successful,  was  settled  to  make 
my  destruction  a  merit,  which  was  to  give  another 
my  place,  and  some  of  his  occomplices,  rank  and 
fortune. 

T 

I  am  charged  with  unofficer-like  conduct  in  suffer- 
ing  my  communication  with  the  river  Raisin  to  be 


GENERAL  HULL. 


135 


cut  off.  This  imputation  is  among  the  last  tliat  I  •X" 
pected  to  find  in  the  catalogue  of  my  accusations. 
If  it  had  been  intended  to  shew,  tliat  nothing  that^I 
did,  or  intended  to. do,  could  escape  censure,  this  spe- 
cification would  afford  strong  evidence  of  such  a  dis? 
position.  Fcur  the  means  that  I  toolc  to  open  this 
communication  are  also  made  the  sulyects  of  accusa- 
tion. The  detachment  under  colonel  Van  Horn, 
the  retreat  from  Canada,  the  detachment  under  co- 
lonel Miller,  and  under  colonels  Mac  Arthur  Mid 
Casi^filthough  they  were  all  measures  which  were 
dictated  by  the  strong  necessity,  which  I  saw  and 
felt,  to  keep  open  the  communication  in  question,  are 
all  set  down  as  instances  of  misconduct.  But  I 
would  ask  those,  at  whose  instigation  these  charges 
have  been  made,  what  measures  I  should  have  pur^ 
sued  to  have  effected  this  olgect  ?  It  must  be  remem- 
bered, that  it  was  utterly  in  vain  to  have  opened  the 
communication  to  the  river  Raisin  only.  No  sup- 
plies could  come  from  thence  that  were  not  drawn 
from  the  western  states.  I  must  therefore  have  pro- 
tected the  road  all  the  way  from  Ohio.  Was  this  to 
have  been  done  by  stretching  back  so  great  a  dis- 
tance with  a  sufficient  force?  If  so,  my  whole  army 
would  have  been  insufficient  for  the  purpose.  The 
two  hundred  men  I  sent  under  major  Van  Horn  my 
two  senior  officers  thought  insufficient.  In  their 
opinion,  i^nght  to  have  detached,  for  this  duty,  one 
of  their  regiments.  Colonel  Miller,  after  he  had  de- 
feated the  enemy,  had  more  than  five  hundred  men 
left,  and  was  within  fourteen  miles  of  his  destination. 


1 


m 


wfT  y  . 


ISO 


DBFENCE  OP 


He  thought  it  necessary  to  send  back  to  me  Cur  a  re- 
jnrorcement  of  one  hundred  and  fifty,  or  two  hundred, 
Ik  fore  he  could  pixweed,  althoi^h  be  knew  that  at  the 
river  Raisin'  he  was  to  be  joined,  tnH.  -would  be 
strengthened  in  bis  march  back,  by  \\^^  detachment 
under  captain  Brush,  -which  bad  escorted  the  provi- 
sions \a  the  river  Raisin.  If  ^  great  a  numtyr  of 
men  was  requisite  merely  to  force  a  paoMge  to  the 
river  Raisin  and  back,  how  great  a  portion  of  my 
army  would  have  been  necessary  to  keep  open  the 
road  to  Ohio,  <Mr  even  that  portion  of  it  wbici|!waB 
between  Detroit  and  the  river  Raisin  ? 


I  think  it  must  appear  to  the  Court,  that  I  could 
not  have  kept  open  this  extensive  line  of  communi- 
cation, without  distributing  my  whole  army  along  the 
road ;  and  yet,  according  to  the  inferences  to  be  drawn 
from  the  chaises  and  specifications,  I  was  criminal 
in  not  carrying  fm  an  offensive  war  in  Canada,  and 
in  not  performing,  at  the  same  time,  another  service, 
which  would  have  required  all  my  troops. 


# 


That  this  communication  ought  to  have  been  kept 
open  is  most  certain,  I  cUd  expect  it  would  have  been. 
I  did  suppose  that  a  force  would  have  been  sent  after 
me,  adequate  not  only  to  this  purpose,  but  to  augment 
my  army.  The  grounds  I  had  for  these  expectations 
will  appear  from  documents,  which  are  %eft>re  the 
Court,  to  some  of  which  I  have  already  adverted. 

'  It  is  alleged,  that  I  was  guilty  of  misconduct  in 
sending  the  detachment  under  mtyor  Van  Horn,  be- 


•'> 


■•^~. 


GENERAL  BULL. 


137 


oauseit  was  inadequate  to  the  purpose  for  which  it 
wai  intended.  The  proof  of  the  inadequacy,  I  presume) 
i«,  that  it  was  defeated.  It  appears,  however,  that  it 
was  not  owing  to  want  of  numbers  that  this  defHit 
happened.  According  to  major  Van  Horn's  own  ac- 
count,  the  party  that  attaclted  him,  lie  judged  from 
the  fire,  was  from  one  hundred  and  fifty  to  two  hun- 
dred. Tliis  was  conjecture,  for  more  than  forty  sav- 
ages were  not  seen.  But  these  volunteers,  the  same 
patriotic  men  who  are  said  to  have  v  >  bitterly 

because  they  were  not  allowed  to  *   Detroit, 

fled  in  the  first  moments  of  an  attack,  utmost 

disorder  and  precipitation.     Had  m  t.  ^n  the 

case  tlmietachment  wa«  sufficient,  li  it  had  fought 
the  eaemy,  there  can  be  no  doubt  but  it  would  have 
made  its  way  good  to  the  river  Raisin,  where  it  would 
have  been^  joined  by  a  large  detachment  under  cap- 
tain Brush.  If  the  detachment  had  been  ever  so 
large,  it  would  have  been  insufficient,  if  the  men  be- 
haved no  better  than  those  m^jor  Van  Horn  com- 
manded did  upon  this  occasion.  But,  Sir,  the  true 
foundation  for  this  charge  is,  that  I  did  not  think  pro- 
per to  be  obedient  to  the  advice  of  ray  two  senior 
officers.  It  was  placed  in  this  black  catalogue,  solely 
for  the  purpose  of  giving  them  an  opportunity  of  pro- 
claiming to  the  world  their  own  superiour  si^city 
and  judgment.  It  was  to  give  them  an  opportunity 
to  prove  by  their  own  testimony,  that  whatever  I  did 
was  wrong,  and  that  whatever  they  advised  would 
have  been  right. 
13* 


H'^ 


s^. 


o  *^*>. 


IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


1.0 


1.1 


1.25 


12.5 

m  """  ^" 
>tt  Ui   12.2 

2.0 


■It 

m 
u 


KO 


—  lis 


—    6" 


s 


'•^ 


/ 


7 


PholDgrajdiic 

Sdenoes 

CarporatiQn 


4^ 


^Jk 


<> 


^. 


33  MIST  MAIN  STRHT 

VinnSTII,N.Y.  I4SM 

(716)l7a-4503 


A, 


^ 


^\ 


I3g 


Bfif'BKCl!  OF 


Bat  possibljr  I  ought  to  have  tuifered  flie  advice  o^ 
these  oflcen  upon  this  oeeatioii  to  have  had  nuMfe 
it^lht.  I  should  have  rdlected,  that  they  had  the 
bOTI  eppOTtunlty  of  Idiowk^  the  eharacter  of  their 
6Wii  tnx^  and  inight  have  anttcipated  their  ^ame- 
fnl  cfmductf  but  Uim  I  ttink,  I  have  reason  to  o<mb«' 
plain,  tiiat  eolmiels  Cais  and  Mac  Arthur  vnn  not  at 
this  time  as  eandid,  as  they  were  -when  it' was  pro^ 
posed  to  attempt  Maiden  oy  assault,  and^iat  Ihey  did 
not  tell  me, as  tiiey  ^d  then,  that  they eoidd notbe 
responilble  ftw  iheir  men*  If  they  had  tcrfd  r^e  tiiis, 
I  might  have  thought  it  rig^  to  increase  the  force  of 
the  detachment,  and  to  have  added  to  it  some  regu^ 
laMM  whose  prssenee  might,  as  if  did  at  the^^ix  Ca- 
nards, have  enooun^ed  the  volunleers  to  hava<kced 
the  enemy,  w  ndide  them  more  afraid  tft^  wvtt  tmt^ 
than  tofight*-^  ^'■'*-<^'-'' ■  '     ■  .■■v-.v-.^r^;  >,..^ -vi 


The  sext  aoeusatiAa  is  cne,  that  caa  only  have 
been  set  down  to  switi  the  list  c^  offieinces  imputed 
to  me;  for  it  is  without  any  manner  of  foundatikm. 
It  eharges  me  witii  unofBceMike  eonduet^  in  having 
det»BhedcdloiM  Miller  on  the  eighth  of  August,  and 
not  having  iuppHed  him  with  provisions^  whm  he  was 
uo^  Browastowtt* 

WtHm  Bir,  I  feel  myse'f  bound  to  aclnowl^agfe  ih# 
liberality  with  which  I  have  been  treated  hy  ^b^ 
Jd^  Advocate,  tit  the  course  of  this  trial,  and  the 
delicacy  with  which  he  has  in  general  teflrained  fren 
repeating  the  odious  epithets,  which  are  so  prafiucly 


GENERAL  HULL. 


ISO 


and  w/tkanAj  UMd  in  the  tpedlleatioiis,  I  cannot  bat 
regret,  that  he  has,  in  respect  to  thiicliarge,  departed 
from  his  general  observance ;  and  that  be  should,  upon 
Bach  evidence  as  was  before  him,  have  thought  him- 
self Juslifiabie  in  impntiog  to  my  misconduct,  on  this 
occasion,  an  useless  waste  of  Anuneon  hUod,  Sir, 
the  American  blood  fliat  uras  spilled  in  the  contest  at 
Brownstoivn  was  glOfkfMty'  shod.  U  purchased  a 
victory-  that  did  honour  to  Our  ums.  True,  it  was 
ineffiectually  sheA— but  to  lay  the  feikire  of  the  enter> 
prise  to  me,  and  to  reproach  me  with  this  waste  of 
blood,  is  as  ai\iast  as  it  is  inbonan. 


I  do  not  midferstand,  l^t  I  am  suiHpoBed  to  hare 
done  wrong  in  sentKng  ^  detachment;  or  in  not 
making  it  of  gteater  force.  "By  the  testiniMij  of 
ccAonel  BIfliM  it  appears,  that  he  iharched  with  s^ 
hmidred  men,  instead  of  ive  hundred,  as  is  mentioned 
ita  the  specification.  But  the  misconduct  imputed  to 
me  is,  «w  I  understand^  solely,  that  I  omitted  to  sup> 
ply  toloart  Milter  wtHi  uroviirfons  after  Ae  battie  at 
Browastown.  With  respect  to  the  want  of  proviskNn, 
It  appears,  that  the  detaohlH«nt  was  amply  provided 
When  it  left  Detrdt.  The  maith  tiiey  vrere  to  per* 
ftMn,  was  iibont  thirty  miles;  and  eolonel  Millar 
states,  flj^  they  were  furnished  with  a  supply  for  two 
days  wh(^  th^  set  dnt  But  he  says,  fiiat  tiie  pro* 
visions  were^rolm  away  with  the  men's  knapsacto 
Tfhen  they  Were  attacked,  and  though  he  represent 
the  enemy  td  hUve  beeii  entirely  beaten,  and  so  fiir 
driven  from  off  %is  toot,  tiiat  captito  Maxwell  went 


''tA 


140 


DEFENCE  OF 


S^' 


B'l 


from  him  to  Browiutown  and  back,  and  M^Mrted* 
that  the  enemy  were  all  gone;  and  though  colonel 
Miller  states,  that  he  returned  to  the  battle  ground 
with  hb  whole  force,  and  was,  in  fact,  undisturbed  on 
that  ground  nearly  two  days,  jwthe  says  in  his  cross- 
examination,  that  the  provisions  were  not  recovered, 
because  he  could  not  suffer  his  men  to  separate  to 
take  them  up.  I  cannot  conceive  what  necessity 
ttiere  could  have  been  for  his  men's  separating.  It 
appears  to  me,  that  he  would  only  have  had  to  march 
bis  whole  detachment  over  the  ground  where  tiie  at- 
tack was  made,  and  the  provisions  might  have  been 
recovered  with  as  much  security  to  the  detachment,  as 
when  they  were  remaining  inactive  in- the  position  to 
which  they  had  retrograded.  C<rionet  Miller,  in  Ms 
account  of  this  transaction,  Btate»,  that  he  considered 
that  his  victory 'opened  the  communication  to  the 
river  Raisin  sufficiently  for  him  to  have  proceeded— 
that  on  the  evening  of  the  day  <m  whidi  ^e  battle 
was  fought,  that  is,  the  nkith,  he  senfmiuor  Snelling 
to  make  a  repcnrt  to  me,  to  infonm  me  <tf  the  loss  .of 
the  provisions,  and  to  request,  that  J  would  send  boats 
or  waggirais  with  provisions,  and  to  take  liack  tile 
wounded.  He  was  also  to  reijpiest  a  reinforcement  for 

'^iller,  on  his  cross-ex- 
uld  be  from  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  to  two  li'jndroA  men.  Coh^el  Miller 
also  states,  thbt  colonel  Mac  Arthur  came  down  the 
'wxt  morning  (that  is  an  the  tenth)  with  eight  or  nine 
boats,  and  brought  with  him  no  mwe  than  tvN>.harrels  of 
flour,  one  barrel  of  pork,  and  half  a  baml  of  whiskey  j*^ 


colonel  Miller,  which  colonr 
amination  says,  he  suggesteo 


GENERAL  HULL. 


141 


that  the  place  where  the  battle  was  fought  wa» 
about  fourteen  miles  from  Detroit,  and  sixteen  to  the 
river  Raisin,  between  M(\guago  and  Brownstown ;  it 
bdng  late  in  the  day  before  the  wounded  men  coidd 
be  got  on  board  the  boats,  he  knew  that  he  could  not 
get  through  before  the  next  night,  (that  is  the  eleventh) 
moving  as  cautiously  as  they  ought  to  do ; — ^that  the 
men  still  compiaining  of  hunger,  he  concluded  that 
he  could  send  to  Detroit  that  evening,  (that  is  the 
tenth)  and  have  provisions  the  next  morning; — ^that 
he  accordingly  sent  an  express  to  me  on  the  evening 
of  Uie  tenth,  requesting  that  I  would  send  him  two 
day's  provisions;— that  no  messenger  from  me  came 
to  him  till  sun  down  the  next  day,  (that  is  the  eleventh) 
that  the  messenger  informed  him,  he  had  been 
detained  by  losing  his  way;— -that  tUs  messenger 
brought  him  an  order  from  me  to  return  to  Detroit, 
and  informed  him  that  he  would  find  provisions  at  the 
river<Ecc»ce; — ^that  oa  the  same  evening  he  took  up 
his  march  for  Detroit,  andurived  there  the  next  day, 
(the  tiivUih^that  hi !  force  was  two  hundred  and 
eighty  regulars,  afid  tiiree  hundred  and  twenty  militia, 
8(»ne  of  the  Michigan  B^Htia,  and  some  of  the  Detroit 
hwse;— that  the  militia  behaved  well;— that  his  loss 
was  seventeen  killed,  and  sixty<foiU'  wounded. 


8ir,  it  has  always  appeared  to  me  most  unaccirant- 
aUe,  tl^t  C(4onel  Miller,  after  he  had  disposed  of  his 
wounded  men  on  tt»  tenth,  and  when,  according  to 
his  own  tesj^thony,  he  considered  that  his  victory  had 
opened  hisfwrnmuaicatidii^l^  the  river  Raisin,  did  not 


-.4.t,.\ 


4# 


*■    -i^^ 


t'^'Jf 


142 


DEFENCE  OF 


m\ 


proceed.    He  had  but  sixteen  milei  to  inarch.   He  re- 
mained in  the  position  he  liad  taken  from  the  even- 
ing of  the  tenth,  when  he  had  embarked  his  wounded 
il|en,  till  the.  evening  of  the  eleventh,  that  it  twenty- 
four  hours,  when  he  might  have  accomplished  his 
mareh,  as  I  should  think,  in  four  or  five  hours.  At  the 
end  of  it  he  was  sure  not  only  to  meet  the  provisions 
he  was  sent  tq  escort,  but  a  strong  reinftwcement  from 
the  detachment  undcfr  captain  Brush.    He  says,  how- 
ever, that  on  the  evening  of  the  tenth,  he  determined 
to  halt  when  he  was,  and  to  wait  the  return  (tf  an  ex- 
{NresB  from  me,  bectuse  he  should  be  obliged  to  move 
with  so  much  caution ;  that  he  knew  he  could  not  get 
through  until  the  next  night — a  very  extraordinary 
caution  indeed  must  have  been  necessary,  that  could 
have  retarded  for  so  long  a  time  the  mareh  of  a  body 
of  troops  for  sixteen  miles,  through  a  space,  which  it 
had  been  ascertained  by  the  report  of  ci^tain  Maxwell, 
was,  as  far  as  Brownstown  at  least,  free  from  an  ene- 
my.   But  if  the  want  of  provisions  was  a  reason  for 
not  proceeding  to  the  river  Raisin,  w||r  did  not  colo- 
nel Miller  push  on  to  Brownsiown-^there  was  an  In- 
dian settlement,  which,  without  doubt,  was  at  least 
capable  of  supplying  his  immediate  wants,  and  from 
which  he  could  not  have  been  distant  but  a  veiy  few 
miles.    If  there  he  could  have  got  but  one  meal  titt 
his  troc^,  it  does  appear  to  me,  that  there  would  not 
have  been  any  great  enterprise  in  undertaking  the 
rest  of  the  mareh,  which  might  have  been  twelve  or 
fourteen  miles,  without  any  further  provisions.    It  did 
appear  to  me  not  less  extraordinary,  that  ikhen  colonel 


•-'■='^*w»^l'1iyj«?!WW»WMiWt'i'»«iiWiiwi » . . 


GENERAL  HI^LL, 


143 


Uilier  advised  me  when  ho  had  gained  so  dedsive 
a  vict(H7  that  lie  considered  hb  road  to  the  river 
Raisin  as  opened,  and  he  had  ascertained  that  there 
was  no  enemy  between  him  and  Brownstown,  that 
he  should,  at  the  same  time,  have  made  a  demand 
on  me  for  a  reinforcement  of  one  hmidred  and  fifty  or 
two  hundred  men — ^when,  after  his  battle,  he  had  five 
hundred  and  twenty  effective  men,  two  hundred  and 
eighty  of  whom  were  of  his  own  regiment,  and  were 
almost  the  whole  force  of  that  description  which  I 
had  under  my  command.  Let  me  here  remark,  if  so 
great  a  force,  that  is  to  say,  between  seven  and  eight 
hundred  men,  were  necessary,  to  force  their  way  to 
the  river  Raisin,  what  pn^rtion  of  my  troops  must 
have  been  necessary,  not  only  to  keep  open  the  com- 
munication for  that  distance,  but  to  guard  the  line  all 
the  way  to  the  state  lliiphio  ? 


But  it  is  hot  my  busiilBB  to  examine  the  conduct 
of  colonel  Miller,  further  than  to  shew,  that  when  I 
despatched  him  with  so  large  a  detachment,  with  ra- 
tions for  two  days,  I  had  made  every  provision  which 
I  had  any  reason  to  think  his  exigencies  would  re- 
quire. ,5. 


'--^M 


When,  how  ver,  I  received  his  demand  for  provi- 
sions, I  tdok  eveiy  measure  that  the  duty  of  my  sta« 
tion  required  to  supply  him.  Cdofkel  Mac  Arthur 
was  charged  w[ith  this  service,  and  I  beg  to  present 
to  the  Court  his  account  of  the  manner  in  which  he 
performed  it. 


m 


:m 


,.r— 


V>4L' 


n 


0  N 


144  • 


DEFENCE  OV 


"  Oa  the  i|ay  we  CMMued  from  Canada,"  say*  eolo- 
nel  Mae  Arthur,  (that  U  the  eighth  of  August,)  «*  Colo- 
^  nel  Miller  was  sent  with  a  detachment  for  the  pur- 
**  pose,  as  waa  stated,  of  opening  a  communication 
**  with  the  river  Raisin.  The  night  succeeding  colo- 
**  nel  Miller^s  battle  at  Maguago,  (pertu^ps  the  ninth,) 
**-  the  General  sent  for  me— the  night  was  wet;  he  in- 
"  formed  me  of  the  battle,  and  directed  me  to  take  one 
**  hundred  of  my  regiment,  to  take  the  boats  al<»ig 
"  the  river,  and  to  descend  to  c<4onel  Miller^s  en- 
"'Campment,  for  the  purpose  of  brinf^g  up  the  wound- 
**  ed  men.  He  directed  me  to  get  one  day*s  provision 
*'  foi  cdk>nel  Miller's  detachment.  I  called  at  the 
**  commissary's  and  was  detained  three  or  four  hours 

in  getting  it— I  got  what  I  could.'* 


«t 


It  has  been  my  misfortunlipt  Sir,  that  I  have  not 
been  able  to  obtain  the  testimony  .of  Mr.  Beard,  the 
commissary.  He  has  be^  regidariy  summoned  by 
the  Judge  Advocate,  at  my  lyquest;  and  I  have  se- 
veral times  written  to  him»  but  he  has  not  made  his 
appearance.  The  Judge  Advocate,  however,  with 
hu  woht«ld  candour,  has  admitted  a  document  which 
in  somemeasure  supplies  his  testimony.  It  is  an  order 
which  I  issued  to  the  contractor  on  the  ninth  oS  Au- 
gust, fw  delivering  rations  to  colonel  Mae  Arthur  for 
<ioIonel  Miller's  detachment  The  receipt  of  which 
order  is  acknowledged  by  the  contractor,  or  a  Cf^y 
thereof,  which  is  in  the  following  words :  ^ 

% 
"  The  contractor  will  issue  six  [hundred  rations 

'"  of  bread  or  flour,  six  hundred  rations  of  poric,  and 


,HS1,. 


'-■4^ 


iwW 


4- 


*• 


QE)7ERA1.  HI7LL. 


145 


**  twelve  hundred  ratioin  of  whbkey,  to  be  lent  to  the 
"detachment  onder  the  command  of  lieutenant  goU>> 
*'nel  Miller. 

"  By  order  of  brigadier  general  Hull, 

"  H.  H.  Hickman, 

Ati|pMt9th,lSU.  "  Captain,  Infimtry." 

"  (cOaRECT  COPY.) 

"D.  Beard.'* 

Now,  Sir,  it  appears  that  general  Mac  Arthur  knew, 
that  one  purpose  of  sending  him  to  colonel  Miller's 
detachment  was  to  cany  provisions.  He  says,  I  di- 
rected jiim  to  take  one  day*s  provisions  for  colonel 
Miller's  men;  that  he  was  detained  by  the  contractor 
three  or  four  hours,  and  took  what  he  could  get.  ^  And 
it  appears  that  he  arrived  at  colonel  Miller's  encamp- 
ment with  only  two  barrels  of  flour,  one  barrel  of 
poik,  and  half  a  barrel  of  whiskey.  When  I  had 
given  the  order  to  colonel  Mac  Arthur,  to  take  the 
provisions;  when  I  had  issued  the  order  to  the  proper 
o$cer  to  issue  them  to  him,  had  I  not  done  every 
thing  diat  was  incumbent  on  me,  as  commanding 
officer?. Was  it  my  duly  to  go  to  the  commissary's 
store,  and  to  superintend  the  issues?  If  colonel  Mac 
Arthur  found  the  commissaiy  disobedient  to  my  order, 
and  unduly  detaining  him,  why  did  he  not  report  to 
me  ?  How  will  colonel  Mac  Arthur  excuse  his  having 
departed  on  this  service,  without  having  with  him  the 
quantity  c^  provisions  I  had  ordered  ?  Is  it  sufficient 
forJiimtosayt  that  he  took  what  he  could  g^t?  If 
14 


»^!».^'^(r?V'^~-»  p-^ 


•-^^^ 


i; 


•/ 


146 


DiSPlSMOE  OF 


there  wai  any  defleiencj  he  ought  to  have  informed 
me  of  it;  he  eooM  have  had  communication  with  me 
in  five  minutei.  If  want  of  provisions  was  the  rea* 
son  why  the  AnMrican  blood  that  was  spilled  at  the 
battle  of  ^  Brownstown  was  ahed  in  vain,  I  again  ask, 
was  it  not  mostoi^ust  to  charge  that  waste  to  me  ? 


¥■'■■' 


On  the  tenth  of  August,  I  issued  another  order  for 
provisions  for  colonel  Miller's  detachment  Thirhas 
also  been  read,,  and  is  in  the  fc^owing  words : 

**  Detroit,  August  loth,  1812. 

'*The  extractor  wiU  issue,  for  colonel  Miller*s  de- 
<*  tacbment,  two  thousand  complete  rations. 

«  A.  P.  Hull, 

These  provisions  were  sent  by  the  contractor  to 
colonel  Miller's  detachment  Colonel  Miller  met 
them  on  his  return,  and  brought  them  back  with  him. 


An  accusation  of  the  same  juiture  with  that  which 
I  last  considered,  is,  that  I  also  oinitted  to  supply  with 
psovisions  the  detachment  whiclhleft  iletioit  on  the 
fourteenth  of  August,  under  colonels  ||ae  Arthur  and 
Cass.  General  Mac  Arthujr's  testimony  On  this  sub- 
ject is  as  follows :  That  on  the  fourteenth  of  Au- 
gust, atkwt  noon,  as.  he  thought,  I  sent  for  him,  and 
informed  him,  that  I  had  just  received  intelligence 
from  captain  Brush,  that  he  had  arrived  at  the  river 
Raisin  with  provisions,  and  aaid,  I  wished  to  send 
out  a  detachment  to  meet  him*    That  he  replied,  he 


■'^»*^6^» 


^ 


rVX; 


OfiNERAU  HULL. 


141 


■^■ 


WM  TMuly  to  obey  my  order.  OoliDel  Cass  jiAid  the 
same  thtiig.*  That  they  (th#  #lllien  and  eoloBel 
Cass)  then  retnfned  to  camp,  and  ahortly  after  receir- 
ed  an  ovdet  to  detach  one  bundled  and  ftfly  men  from 
each  of  their  cqiiments.  That  in  tiie  evenhig  I  eamo 
along,  and  airicedir  they  were  realty  to  marcfar.  The 
witness  answered,  that  they  were  not,  but  aa  usua}  had 
not  a  bite*  of  any  thing  to  eat '  That  I  said  the  de- 
tachment  must  not  be  delayed,  and.  I  would  send 
provisions  after  them.  The  witness  (hen  give*  an 
account  of  the  proceedings  of  the  detachment  till  lU 
return  to  DetM>it,and  states,  that  they  never  received 
any  provisions  firom  the  fort. 

I  canltot  but  think,  that  thb  account  of  geneial 
Mae  Arthur's  conduct,  thou^  given  by  himself,  will 
excite  the  sui^prise  of  the  Court. 

He  was  ordered  to  march  a  detachment  at  about 
twelve  o*clook.  He  does  not  move  till  evening,  and 
I  thte  find  that  he  has  not  obeyed  the  order.  He 
gives  me  to  undcntand  tbtkt  he  has  been  waiting  for 
provlsioosi  irihel^was  noerderfiori[»rovisiQna»wby 
did  he  not  apply  to  me  on  thesnl^eet?  But  theiewae 
one,  and  I  think  genend  Blae  Arthur^s  testimony 
■hews  it 


'4'-' 


I 


:M 


When  he  sees  me,  he  does  not  Complain  ol  the 
want  of  an  order,  but  %t  he  cannot  get  the  provi- 
sions. If  there  was  a^^iderj^iid  the  proper oiBcer 
did  not  obey  it,  why  wariet  the  disobedience  report-' 


148 


DEFKVCE  or 


rf     » 


ed.to  nip ?  Iwteitt  of  pOnuliig  id  obrkm  a  eowie, 
cokMMl,  Mte  Artlnir  c6om  nther  to  reiMin  in  hit 
ounp  ftve  or  six  hours,  and  if  I  had  not  aceldOntaHy 
met  with  hini,  Imw  much  longer  he  w oald  Iwve  eon- 
•Idered  hb  delay  warranted  by  the  tame  came,  it  is 
impoiilble  to  say.  It  does  appear  to  me»  that  thto 
•onduet  of»general  Mae  Arthur  is  veiy  unacconnta- 
bte.  Peihaps  he  had  no  inettnati<m  for  the  service 
he  had  Iwen  ordered  to  perffHrm,  or  it  may  be,  he 
thought,  that  by  the  delay,  or  liy  going  without  pro- 
visions, he  lAiouId  bring  blame  on  me.  The  beha- 
viour of  general  Mac  Arthur  upon  these  two  occar 
slons,  that  is  to  say,  in  respect  to  the  provisiona 
vlflMt  he  was  to  take  for  colonel  Miller,  and  in  re- 
spect to  provisions  for  his  own  detachment,  it  appears 
to  me,  manifests  very  strcmgly  that  there  was  some 
hidden  motive  for  his  conduct.  And  in  tiiia  last  in- 
stance! there  Is  a  mystery,  which  I  am  sure  is  not  ax- 
plained  by  any  thing  he  has  said.  It  never  can  be 
believed  that  he  waited  so^manyJiours,  solely  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  an^  order  for  provbions,  <n>  tf  he 
had  vt  order,  that  his  delay  was  merely  for  the  pur^ 
pose  of  having-  it  executed,  irhft  wily  oiyaci  had 
been  to  procure  provisions,  the  means  of  doing  so,  by 
an  application  to  me,  were  so  obvious  tod  (ttveet,  that 
he  could  not  have  hesitated  to  pursue  it.  But  if  the 
Court  will  recollect  that  at  this  time  the  conspiracy 
had  been  formed  to  take  the  command  finom  me,  and 
that  general  Gass*  in  Ms  letter  to  the  government^haa 
stat^i  that  the  execution  of  it  was  only  prevented  by 
his  and  general  Mac  Arthur's -having  been,  sent  otk 


.■:V 


GBKBRAL  HULL. 


140 


this  detachment,  it  may  Mcoiuit  (br  the  eondnet  of 
these  DAcen.  l^he  delay  ^vas  pmalbly  to  mtare 
their  pl4>t,  and  to  put  it  in  practice.  ^ 

If  general  Mae  Arthur  wtn  on  hb  trial  for  mbeml- 
dnet  in  relation  to  these  transactions,  I  am  perMUiried 
that  hie  testfanOny  ought  rather  to  conviet  him  than 
me* 


But  I  did  take  measures  for  sopplyhig  the  detaell* 
ment  witti  the  necessary  provisions.  My  information 
from  eaptahi  Brush  was,  that  he  \ronld  be  on  hii 
mareh  wltb  the  provisions  under  his  escort,  with  the 
expeotation  of  meeting  a  detachment  from  Detroit 
for  his  support* 

It  appeared  to  me,  that  not. a  mmneiy;  ought  to  be 
lost,  in  sending  a  force  to  meet  him ;  and  when  I 
found  tiiat  general  Mac  Arthur  had  delayed  to  exe^ 
cnte  my  orders  fbr  so  many  hoars,  I  determined  that 
the  departure  of  the  detachment  shoOld  not  be  longer 
postponed.  Tthersfare  drderM  It  to  march,  and  d»> 
terminedio  sent  pUDfVilipiiB- after  It  on  pack  horses. 
I  Immedlatoly  gavtf  tJM  neeessairy  orders  to  tfaeaoUng 
Commlssiay  dehe^ifer  that  ptirpose.  This  la 
proved  by  the  testhn0By»df  general  Taylor.  He  says 
that  on  the  fourteenth  qf  August,  I  did  give  him  an 
Older  to  Ihffhish  pack  hoiikes'  to  oany  provisions  for 
the  detachment  going  to  the  river  Raisfai,  under 
oMcmels  Mae  Arthur- and  Cass*  That  he  did  not 
know  wbofher  the  protMoos  were  sent*  but  that  pack 
14* 


r 

Sa 


iff 


-,. !;,.,''».,, 


■,*..l'v~S 


'■"*^fSl., 


V... 


150 


l)^EN€£  OF 


hones  were  funiished  for  fhe  parpose,  and  1m  pnv 
somes  tile  provisions  were  sent.  Tlmtl  gave  all 
tlie  necessary  orders  for  sending  them  is  certain,  and 
if  my  orders'  were  not  complied  with,  I  do  not  think 
I  am  the  person,  that  ought  to  be  called  to  an- 
swer for  it.  It  never  can  be  expected,  that  a  eom- 
inainding  officer  Should  not  only  give  erden>  bat 
lihould  attend  to  the  execution  df  the  details. 
There  was,  as-  Mr.  Watson  has  testified,  a  want  of 
system  in  every  department  of  the  army,  which  it 
was  impossible  for  me  to  remedy,  because  the  heads 
nS  them  were  tbtally  inexperienced*  Howeverr  the 
fact  is,  that  the  provisions  in  this  case  were  sent. 
But  as  the  detachment,  pursuant  to  my  orders,  took 
an  unusual  and  obscure  road,  the  guides,  as  I  havie 
heard,  misled  the  provisions,  and  they  were  not  heard 
of  before  the^urrender. 

tnfhe  sevdnth  specificatlourmiderthe^  Charge  of 
onolflcer-like  conduct,  is  assembled  a  variety  of  accu- 
sations* The  first  is  a  little  incragraous  in  its  lan- 
guage. It  is  stated,  that  the  enemy  having  erected 
hatteries  opposite  to  Detroit,  I  was,  Dram  ttie«leventh 
day  of  August,  to  and  including  the  sixteenth  dajr  of 
the  same  month,  guilty  of  «  neglect  of  duty,  in  not 
preventing  the  enemy  from  erecting  the  said  batteries. 

# 
It  would  be  an  answer  to  this  charge  to  say,  that  I 

couM  not  have  prevented  the  orection  of  batteries^ 

which  it  is  stated  were  already  in  existence.  ■  But 

though  I  think  there  are  many  inoongintiticsi  of  tie 


y 


OENERAL  fiULt. 


151 


tame  nature  in  the  specifieations,  I  have  not  attempteil 
to  avail  myself  of  them,  and  shall  no  further  notice 
this.'  ,.        '■'  ■  '■■',■ 


V 


The  Court  will  ubserve,  that  this  accusation  la 
connected  with,  and  indeed  entirely  rests  upon  a  pre* 
vious  allegation,  that  I  well  Icnew  these  batteries 
were  erected  by  tin  en^ny  with  an  intention  to  an- 
noy Detroit,  and  with  a  design  to  facilitate  the  in- 
vasion of  the  Michigan  territory^  The  fact  is,  I 
had  no  such  knowledge.  I  had  a  firm  persuasion 
that  the  enemy  Would  not  invade  our  tendtory.  I 
did  believe  that  the  war  on  their  part  would  be  enr 
tirely  a  defensive  war,  and  that  these  batteries  were 
only  intended  for  the  defence  of  their  own  shores.  I 
admit.  Sir,  that  my  qpiniom  in  this  respect,  subseqiieni 
events  have  proved  wers  entirely  enoneous.  But  I 
cannot  believe  that  a  mistake  in  <^iiniott  or  judgment 
is  to  be  puidshed  as  a  crime.  This  would  be  less  a. 
drfenee  to  an  accusation  of  this  nature,  was  not  the 
charge  so  connected,  as  I  have  mentioned,  with  the 
allegation,  that  I  knew  bow  the^enemy  intended  to^ 
employ  their  battel^s.  The  questicMi  must  be  first 
asked,  had  I  thb  knowledge  ?  There  is  not  a  particle 
of  evidence  that  I  had;  and  4f  this  questiuc  must  be 
answered  in  the  nq^ve,  tiie  accusation  is  not  8up> 
ported.  But  I  do  not  rest  thb  part  of  my  defence  on 
this  ground. 

That  the  enemy  did.  erect  batteries  opposite  ta 
Detroit,  and  that  I  did  not  attempt  to  aanoy  them,, 


V.2 


•r.'.: 


ij^Bsi^MiiiJt  1 


■'"•»afJS<:i 


152 


VBvwcn  on 


i 


ie-.T' 


tiU  tkeyeommeneed  their^lN  on  the  fifteenth,  ui 
tu^tonoi to  be  disfiotedr  I  did  not  annoy  them  fiir 
the  reason  I  have  idwve  mentioned,  that  I  considered 
them  as  more  defensive  woils.  But  a  desire  to  pre^ 
■erve  my  own  anmmnition  was  thn  principal  reason 
for  tiiis  ccmdaet  I  m^ht  have  hindered  tiie  enemy 
from  pn^ressing  in  the  day  timet  but  kt  the  night) 
tmj  annoyance  I  eoidd  have  given  them  would  Jmhub 
been  ineffeetuaL  Captidn  Dailaha  has  g^VMi  a'state» 
meat  of  the  ammnnitiotti  €apti^  Dgwm  of..utbe 
«rtiU«y  supposes  it  would  not  have  lasted  laore 
ttan  throe  m  four  days,  if  we  had  ciHumenced  and 
cmtinued  firing.  The  filed  anununitikm,  he  says, 
eonld  not  have  knted  mfure  thaii'two  di^^  Captain 
Bacon  tesdfies,  that  oa  the  mon^ag  of-thesixtectftt^ 
he  examined^l^  my  orders  the  nu^sarine^  «i|d  could 
find  but  one  box  of  twenty«four  pbond  ca^til^es^ 
and  that'  he'^t^qKiiied  to  ne  they  were  nearijr  ex- 
pendsid.  The  testimony  of  aU  the  witnesses  wlur 
have  qpoken  diews,  ttiatiwy  mind  was  ifii|»essed  with 
the  necesrity  of  qntfa^  Uie  ammnldtlon,  and  that  tMki» 
aaweH  as  the  expectatiim '^t  the  enemy  ^ttd  not 
intend,  as  long  as  I  did  not  provoke,  offenriveoiNmh 
tions,  were  the  reasfriw' wl^*  I  <Bd  not  «anncMmde  the 
enemy  while  they  wei^  fmrfifying  mi  the  oj^posito 
shcMe.  Mi^  Trimble  testifies,  ^tiut  when  he  (mto- 
peeed  to  me  to  fire  on  a  party  of  the  enemy,  whidi 
made  its  q»pearanee  cm  the  fourteenth  of  August  at 
Sandwich,  I  answered  that  it  would  not  do  to  expend 
the  ammunition  uselessly.  Captain  Bacon  says,  that 
on  the  morning  of  tfao'^teeDtb^  he  was  difeeted  by 


••#* 


OfiKERAL  mJtL. 


n 


tnrio'go  to  etrrf  Dysotir  at  the  battery  where  he 
eonmiaiidecl,  &i»^  ^Jbnn  him  that  ""the  twenty-four 
poind  ammunitioik  was  nearly  exhafttted,  and  that  he 
muft- not  fire  bat  when  there  was  a  prospect  (tf  hit 
doteg  execution.  .-•/ 


'ki 


1  M 

•^■■I,'^ 


Another  <^  the  accusations  which  are  assembled  in 
tl^^specificatlon  {%  that  I  omitted  to  Cwtify  Si»uig 
WeHs.  I-dOBOt  know  why  it  might  not  as  well  bav:* 
aUig#d  that  I  on^ed  to  fortify  any  other  positi<»i  in 
the#r«r  DetioH.  »    ^    / 

It  is  not  in  proof  ttiat  that  spot  was  particularly 
adapted  to  a  f<»tification.  If  it  had  been  fwt^ed,  the 
eiilmy  would>  not  piebaUy  have  selected,  it  as  their 
place  of , .debarkation;  almost  uiy  other  spot  within 
tbe>s|H|ie  ^s^xice,  i^ve  or  below  the  fortr.waa  aa 
well  jcalculated  to  aflford  them  a  landing.  This  q»e^ 
eification  also  accuses  me  of  having  neglected  to  .uir 
uoy  the^enemy  after  he  had  landed  at  8prii^  Wells.. 
Genflf^nen,  the  Wfumefjio^  this  specification  is.  em* 
braced  in  the  dcCf n^^  I  bave  made  as  to  the  final, 
suirrendca'.  : 

I  bad  made.4)reparations  for  attacking;  the  troops 
were  drawn  out,  and  formed  in  line  of  battle;  but 
heS^xe  the  enemy  cune  up,  I  determined  to  surrender. 
My  o^asons  for  this  measure,  I  have  already  explaiur 
ed.  I  shall  not  repeat  them.  I  will  only  beg  you  to 
observer  that  the  reasons  I  have  offered  have  not 
been  auggeited  uerely  fcqr  the  present  occasion.    Ma* 


'< 


;■'■  1 


N, 


'*#*f. 


.<,vi-' 


w 


1114 


DBFSNCB  OF 


jor  MmiMni'  tMtiftes,  tb«t  h»  law  me  the  day  ftftar  the 
•umnder;  that  i  told  hhnJ  existed  to  be  eenrafed 
for  what  I  had  dime,  but  ii^  *f  I  have  done,  what 
**  under  all '  cirounwtanees  was  most  proper,  and  I 
«« have  saved  Detroit  and  the  territory  firom  the  1kv> 
"  fours  of  an  Indian  massacre." 


ft^But  I  am  accused-ef  having  made  Ae  surrender  in 
an  umMeer^Iike  manner  f  in  having  made  it  befiMre 
the  articles  oC  capitulation  were  signed;  in  not  stipu- 
lating for  the  honoun  of  war,  <»  for  the  seevriiy  of 
the  friendly  inhabitants  of  Canada,  who  had  taken 
protection  from  us.  Befiwe  1  make  observations  on 
this  snigect,  1  bq;  leave  to  present  to  the  Court  col- 
lectedly, Uie  testimony  which  rdates  toil. 


MiQor  Sn^ing  testifies- in  siibstanee^>that  inunedi- 
ately  after  Uie  second  shot  which  did  executimi  in 
the  fort  was^  fired,  captain  HuH  was  sent  acress  the 
river  with  a  flq;,  and  thsA  he  (mi||or  SnellU^)  was 
sent  to  mder  colonel  Findlay  into^  the  foft*  The 
witness  having  peifonned,  this  du^,  went  to  <Mie4>f 
the  batteries;  while  .there,  a  British  officer  with  a 
flag,  came  to  inquire  what  was  the  meaning  of  send- 
ing the  flag  across  the  river,  whmi  genend  Brock  was 
on  the  American  side?  Lieutenant  Hunt  then  went 
with  the  information  to  me,  and  retinned  wiUi  a  seidcd 
letter,  and  orders  that  he  (the  witness)  should  cany 
it  to  general  Brock.  That  the  iritness  met  goieral 
Brock  at  the  head  (tf  his  troops,  about  three  quarters 
of  a  mile  from  the  fort,  where  they  were  aot  in  sight 
from  the  fort. 


''',*. 


OBKERAL  HULL^ 


155 


The  witness  having  delivered  the  Setter,  of  whieh 
he  was  the  bearer,  general  Brock  asked  'be  witness 
^^ifhe  was  auOurixed  to  agree  en  temu^*  The  witness 
ssld  not  'General  Brock  then  asked  two  cf  his  offi- 
cers to  go  with  the  witness  to  the  fint. 

« 
As  they  approached  the  fort,  they  were  met  by 

some  persoB«.  who  conducted  thMn  to  a  tent,  which 
had  been  erected  by  my  orders,  where  they  were  met 
by  eoI<mel8  Mill^  and  Br\ish,  commissioners  ap- 
pointed by  me,  and  tJie  eqiitulation  was  there  signed 
by  the  commisnoners.  . 

The  contents  of  the  note,  the  witness  says,  were  no 
more  tlmn  tliese  words:  **  Sir,  I  agree  to  surrender 
**  the  town  and  f<Mrt  of  Detroit'*  He  would  not  un- 
dertdce  tosay,  that  the  words  he  gave  were  the  whole 
substance  of  the  note,  but  >he  believed  they  were. 

Migor  Qnelling  further  testifies,  that  before  the  ca- 
pitulaticm  was  signed,  he  saw  me  near  ihe  marquee 
in  cfmversatioB  with  colonel  Fnidlay,  and  with  the 
British  officers,  cohmel  Mac  Donald  and  captain 
Clegg,  who  were  within  the  marquee.  The  witness 
said,  he  dMi  not  recollect  that  I  took  any  part  in 
drawing  up  the  capitulation.  That  I  ordered  off  a 
immber  iX  oiv  officwrs,  who  were  collected  about  the 
marquee,  and  among  the  rest  the  witness. 

In  a  subsequent  part  i^  his  examination  he  says, 
that  before  the  capitulation  was  signed,  colonel  Find- 


(f: 


1 


11 


u 


% 

■ 


^  '^ 


***-^M****.*-»^""^'**t.  .*^--»-»  - 


*■*-**.  ■^*«  >^  -■• ..  i*^ 


i&a 


DBFENCB  OF 


lay'lngkiiiiit  was  marched  into  the  fort,  which  wa« 
T-eiy  much  crowded. 


i 


n: 


4- 


Captain  Mac  Commick  testifiei,  that  after  coI<mel 
Findlajr'a.  regiment  had  beeh  ordered  into  the  fytt,  he 
met  colonel  Findlay  as  4ie  was  going  into  the  fort; 
that  they  there  saw  me;   that  I  requested  colonel 
Findlay  to  join  colonel  Miller,  to  treat  :witb  the  ene- 
my, and  said  that  we  could  thcai  get  better  terms 
than  we  should,  if  we  waited  till  they  attempted  to 
storm  the  fort    Ciqitain  Mac  Commick  further  testi- 
fies, that  as  he  went  out  of  the  fort,  he  saw  the  British 
officers,  colonel   Mac  Donald  and  obtain.  Clegg, 
coming  towards  the  fort    Some  one  said,  it  wa8..im- 
proper  they  should  be  permitted  to  come  in,  and  they 
went  to  the  tent.    Shortly  after  the  British  ^officers, 
with  colonel  Miller  and  colonel  Brush,  came  into  the 
fort,  and  were  there  together  in  Dyscm's  quarters, 
where,  as  he  supposes,  the  capitulation  was  signed. 
The  witness  further  testifies,  that  before  this,,^d  at 
about  the  time  the  British  officers  and  colonels  Miller 
and  Brush  went  into  Dyson*s  quarters,  nearly  all  the 
troops  were  marched  into  the  fort 

In  his  cross-examination,  captain  Mae  Commick 
says,  it  m^ht  have  been  ten  minutes,  half  an  hour,  or 
more,  after  the  firing  ceased,  before  the  troops  wfve 
ordered  to  march  into  the  fort  That  he  himself  did 
not  come  into  the  folrt,  till  half  an  hour  after  the  firing 
had  ceased. 


,.y* 


GENERAL  HULL. 


157 


Ms^r  Van  Horn  testHiefl,  that  on  theiaorniiig  of 
the  sixteenth,  captain  Hall  came  to  the  tent  (^  colo- 
nel Findlay,  In  which  the  witness  also  quartered,  and 
informed  colonel  Findlay,  that  it  was  my  brders  that 
his  regiment  should  move  to  and  form  on  the  soutlh 
west  of  the  fort. 

The  witness  then  descrfties  the  position  of  colonel 
Fin^ay*8  regiment  in  the  line,  and  the  manner  in 
which  the  whole  line  was  formed.  He  then  further 
testlAes,  that  after  the  lino  was  formed,  and  about  an 
hour,  or  half  an  hour  before  the  flag  was  hoisted,  I 
came  to  the  line.  That  this  was  during  the  can- 
nonade. 


British  officers  wei%  then  Been  passing  to  and  from 
the  Indians.  That  I  appeared  satisfied  with  the  po- 
sitions of  the  troops.  That  the  witness  said  to  me, 
we  shall  be  able  to  give  a  good  account  of  them. 
About  the  time  the  firing  ceased,  witneas  turned 
round  and  saw  a  flag  hobted  in  the  fort,  and  at  about 
the  same  time,  captain  Snelling  came  with  orders 
from  me  to  colonel  Find^  to  march  his  regiment 
into  the '  fort,  and  said,  that  it  was  my  directlu:?':*  that 
as  the  flag  was  out  it  should  not  be  violated. 

The  witness  further  testifies,  that  I  remained  at 
the  line  formed   by  the  troops  about  three,  or  it 
might  have  been,  five  minutes;— that  colonel  Find- 
lay  expressed  dissatisfaction  with  the  order,  but  &aid, 
15 


M 


i' 


»^   •■■-- 


'■•^.i'*-. 


■*•  ■.  -"■  •41  ^■"^ 


vi*-*-.* 


158 


DEFENCE  OF 


it  must  be  obeyed,  and  directed  the  witness  to  march 
his  battalion  towards  the  fort,  which  he  did,  but  halt- 
ed  near  the  fort    some  minutes  ;>— that  finally  he 
marched  his  men  into  tlie  fort,  and.they  there  staoked 
their  arms  ;~that  colonel  Findlay  did  not  come  in 
till  some  time  afterwards.    The  witness  further  testi- 
fies, that  when  he  got  into  the  fort  he  saw  me,  but 
was  not  certain  that  I  was  there  when  he  entered  f — 
that  some  time  after  the  witness  had  been  in  the 
fort,  I  addressed  him,  and  several  other  officers  at  the 
same  time,  and  invited  them  into  the  room  of  one  of 
the  ofl&cers ;  that  I  told  them  I  had  surrendered  the 
fort,  and  was  about  to  make  the  terms  ; — ^that  I  asked, 
if  they  thought  of  any  thing  as  a  condition,  I  should 
be  glad  to  know  what  it  was ; — that  the  witness  did 
not  go  into  the  room ; — that  when  he  first  saw  me  t 
was  on  the  steps,  going  into  one  nX  the  rooms ; — ^that 
some  time  after  this,  colonel  Mac  Donald  and  captain 
Clegg  rode  up,  came  into  the  fort,  and  went  into  the 
room  where  I  was; — that  the  witness  does  not  know 
whethier  I  did  or  did  not  go  into  the  marquee  before 
the  British  officers  came  in ;    that  our  whole  lijie,  as 
he  believes,  had  marched  into  the  fort  and  stacked 
their  arms ; — ^that  this  had  taken  place  before  the  Brir 
tish  officers  came  in. 


i 


Major  Jessup  testifies,  that  he  had  observed  our 
troops  retreating,  and  saw  the  flag  flying;  lie  met 
colonel  Findlay,  who  requested  him  to  ride  towards 
the  fort,  and  learn  the  reason  of  the  retreat; — ^that 


■^^- 


►*f»,7-*^:»ls.'i 


H 


GENERAL  HULL. 


15» 


he  (ionnd  me  In  the  fort,  and  thought  me  very  much 
frightened;— that  after  a  con  venation  with  me,  of 
whieh  h?  has  repeated  his  own  gallant  expressioas,  but 
unfortunately  cannot  recollect  what  I  said,  he  went 
out  and  met  colonel  Findiay,  and  said  to  him  all  was 
lost ;— that  when  ^  saw  me'  at  the  time,  the  terms  ol' 
capitulatitm  had  been  agreed  upon,  that  he  met  me  in 
a  pkua,  before  captain  Dyson's  quarters;— that  I  was 
then  perfectly  composed. 

*  '  ■  .  • 

He  then  relates  a  conversation  with  me,  which 
concluded  with  a  request  that  he  would  continue  to 
act  in  his  station,  till  the  troops  were  marched  out  of 
the  fort; — that  he  consented  to  this,  and  received 
from  me,  or  one  of  my  aids,  a  copy  of  the  capitulation, 
wMch  I  directed  him  to  read  to  the  tnxqis ;  and  that 
he  did  this  when  the  troc^is  were  marched  out  at 
about  twelve  o'clock.  -  ^     '■■..■ 

-  The  witness  further  states,  that  he  thinks  a  detach- 
ment of  the  enemy  came  into  thc^  fort  before  the  ar- 
ticles of  capitulation  were  signe<(;  but  that  he  is  not 
certain  whether  the  enemy's  troops  marched  in  before 
the  American  troops  marched  out,  but  knows  that 
tUe  American'  troops  <na  not  mmvti  our  till  ftQer  the 
capitulation  was  signed. 

Captain  Burton  testifies,  that  he  knew  when  the 
capitulation  was  agreed  upon;— that  it  was  done  in 
captain  Dyson's  quarters*  where  he  saw  me,  general 


-'.rJ 


100 


Pfiir£NO£  OF 


Brook,  and  two  or  tbree.Britiili  oae«rt{— that  they 
>vere  writing  -and  preparing  the  articiet  of  capi- 
tulation;—>that  he  heard  remarka  whicli  induced 
Iiim  to  believe^  tliat  the  artielet  of  capitulation 
-were  not  agreed  upon;— •that  he  could  not  lajr, 
whether  the  American  troops  w^ye  then  in  the  fort, 
but  there  were,  at  that  time,  one  hundred  and  fifty 
British  troops  standing  with  advanced  arms  in  the 
fort;— the  enemy  were  at  ornbout  this  time  placing 
guards  in  and  about  the  fort;— that  the  reason  why 
he  supposes  that  the  articles  were  not  at  this  time 
finally  agreed  upon,  was,  that  he  saw  general  Brook, 
witii  a  paper  from  which  he  struck  out  two  or  three 
lines,  which  as  he  understood  related  to  the  regular 
troops  returning  home,  vrfaich  genoral  Brock  said  he 
-would  not  agree  to ;— that  at  about  this  time^  h»saw 
one  of  the  British  officers  writing,  Befei»  this  he 
had  seen  the  Briflp  officers  and  Am«ican  officers  at 
the  marquee,  and  thdt  I  also  had  been  there ; — that 
it  was  about  three  quarters  of  an  hour  after  he  saw 
the  British  officera^  going  with  me  to  the  marquee, 
before  he  saw  the 'British  officers  in  Dyson's  qua^ 
ters. 


On  his  crosi-esftihitiation  bj  he  VoOrt,  m^  Jes- 
sup  says,  when  the  terms  of  the  capitulation  were 
discussing,  the  Americian  troops  were  crowded  in  the 
fort,  in  the  utmost  disorder,  and  the  enemy  were  per> 
milted  to  approach  so  near  the  fort  as  to  be.  able  to 
tak«  possession  of  the  batteries. 


GfiKEllAL  HULL. 


iei 


Captain  FoHer  testiftes,  that  soon  after  the  whit6 
flag  was  hoisted,  he  went  to  the  fort,  and  there  met 
eolonel  Mac  Donald  and  mivi<^  Clegg;<^that  I  was 
standing  near  the  gate,  one  of  the  British  officers  said 
to  met  that  they  were  sent  by  general  Brock  in  con- 
sequence of  seeing  a  flag  hoisted,  to  receive  any  com- 
munications;—that  I  replied,  that  J  should  surrender, 
and  desired  them^togo  to  the  marquee^  where  I  would 
go  or  send  to  them  ^— that  mi^or  Clegg  requested  the 
witness  to  go  with  him  to  the  marquee  for  fear  our 
militia  might  fire  on  him  ;>~that  he  went  with  him 
to  the  marquee ;— they  were  furnished  with  pen,  ink, 
and  paper  by  major  Sneliing ; — that  soon  after  they 
got  to  the  marquee,  I,  colonels  Miller  and  Brush 
came  ^— that  he  stdd  near  the  marquee  about  ten 
minutes,  and  then  went  to  the  fort,  leaving  me  at  the 
marquee ;— that  when  he  returned  to  the  fort,  he 
found  our  troops  were  in  and  had  stacked  their  arms  $— 
that  some  time  after  he  saw  the  British  officers, 
Mac  Donald  and  Glegg,  come  out  of  Dyson*s  quar- 
ters, one  of  them  having  a  paper,  which  he  said  had 
been  signed  by  me,  and  that  he  was  going  to  take  it 
to  general  Brock  for  his  approbation,  and  wisheii  the 
witness  to  go  with  him  for  the  same  purpose ;— that 
he  accompanied  him  to  the  marquee ;.— that  the  wit- 
ness went  and  found  the  British  column  led  by  colo- 
nel Proctor  about  half  a  mile  below  the  fort; — that 
he  left  colonel  Mac  Dpnald  and  returned  -to  the  fort. 

Colonel  Miller  testifies,  thatpn  the  morning  of  the 
sixteenth  I  was  io  tfee  fort ;— that  it  was  reported  to 
15* 


102 


DEFENCE  OP  ;> 


iM  that  the  enenny  w«m  advaaolng,  tad  that  part  of 
the  Miehlgao  militia  had  joined  the  enemy ;— that 
upon  thla  I  asked  him  if  1  had  not  better  Mnd  oiit  a 
flag.  He  UAd,  me  lie  dkl  not  know.  I  had  bettercm- 
ault  the  oflieen  who  weie  without  the  fort,  that  ikuj 
had  the  bett  opportunity  of  Judging}— that  I  Wiid 
there  was  no  time  for  consultation,  that  1  would  send 
a  flag,  and  that  I  did  so;— that  some  time  after  this, 
colonel  Findlay's  regiment  marched  into  the  gar- 
rison f— that  I  went  to  a  tent  and  sent  for  Idro ;— that 
when  he  approached  the  tent,  I  was  standing  in  the 
tent  with  my  back  towards  him; — that  he  heard  me 
say  to  the  British  oOicers  in  the  tent,  **  I  will  surreit* 
der  ;**— that  I  then  requested  him,  with  colonel  Brush, 
to  assist  in  dmwing  up  some  articles  of  capiUdatioa;— 
that  he  remained  at  the  tent,  lying  on  the  ground) 
in  a  violent  fit  of  the  fever  and  ague,  while  cokmehi 
Brush  and  Ifae  Donald  were  penning  the  articlef. 

The  original  articles  of  fi^PiituIatioa  were  then 
shewn  to  the  witness,  and  he  said  he  believed  them 
to  be  those  which  he  had  signed,  but  said  he  was 
strongly  impressed  with  a  belief  that  when  they  were 
read  to  him,  and  he  signed  them,  they  ecmtained  a 
provision  that  the  garrison  should  march  out  with  the 
honours  of  war. 


# 


In  ins  crosarexamination  by  the  Court,  colonel 
Miller  states,  that  acc(»ding  to  his  best  recollection, 
he  went  to  the  tent  between  ten  and  eleven  •^ctodh 


OElfBRAL  HULL. 


169 


on  the  moning  of  the  sixteen  th ;— >t)Mt  bo  ramoiBtd 
-^'MMit  threo  quorton  of  an  hour; — that  after  ho  had 
•ignod  tho  capitulation,  he  went  to  the  i'ort  and  went 
to  bod.  Theio  worn  then  no  Brlthh  troopi  in  tho 
fort,  bnt  he  eaw  at  ho  went  lu,  a  eompany  of  about  one 
hundred  Britiih  aoldiera,  itanding  near  the  gate  of  the 
fort.  In  a  Mbeequent  part  of  hla  oroMkoxamination, 
he  itatee,  that  I  told  him  I  was  willing  that  he  should 
make  a  sttrreoder  the  baais  of  e  treaty,  and  that  he 
must  get  the  best  terms  he  eoirid.  He  further  says, 
that  when  I  sent  out  the  flag,  I  mentioDed  to  him  that 
I  did  it  to  gain  time;  that  I  expeeted  to  procure  a 
cessation  of  hostilities,  and  that  I  might  in  the  mean 
time  hear  from  colonels  Mac  Arthur  and  Cass.  Colo> 
nel  Miller  was  called  ^^n  a  few  days  after  his  first 
examination,  and  be  then  stated,  that  after  the  first 
flag  was  sent  out,  and  beftMre  an  onswer  was  letumed^ 
colonel  Brush  came  to  me,  and  having  been  infiomi- 
ed,  that  Knagg's  men,  who  had  the  advanced  post  be- 
low the  fort,  had  deserted  to  the  enemy,  cokmel 
Biosh  exclaimed,  that  "  By  God,  or  that,  he  believed 
*'  by  God,  his  men  would  desert  toa  man.*' 


% 


V:. 


I  believe,  may  it  (rfease  the  Court,  I  have  here  col- 
lected all  the  testimony  that  is  material,  whether  it 
be  for  or  against  me,  which  in  any  wise  relates  to  tho 
matter  now  under  consideration.  I  do  not  pretend 
that  I  liave  0ven  the  very  wMds  of  the  witnesses  in 
all  instances ;  but  I  have  done  so,  as  nearly  as  mj 
own  recflttection,  and  the  notes  of  my  counsel,  would 


%< 


104 


DEFENCB  OF 


i,:~^< 


U 


•^   I 


■^ 


u 


permit.  If  there  be  anj  errours,  or  omissionB,  they 
certainly  canhot  be  intentional ;  because  I  know  that 
the  members  of  the  Court  will  have  recourse  to  their 
own  minutes,  and  to  the  record  of  th%  Judge  Advo- 
cate ;  and  if  it  should  appear  that  I  have,  in  any  re- 
spect, wilfully  perverted  the  testimony,  it  would  be  an 
artifice  from  which  I  would  derive  no  benefit. 

In  reviewing  the  testimony,  the  Court,  I  think,  must 
at  once  perceive  a  strange  variety  in  the  statements 
of  the  different  witnesses.  Though  the  times  at  which 
the  different  transactions  took  place  are  all  impor- 
tant, hardly  any  two  of  the  witnesses  agree  iii  this 
respect. 

The  Court  will  recollect,  that  there  are  three  docu- 
ments in  evidence,  which  appear  to  form  the  articles 
of  capitulation.  These  are  all  dated  on  the  sixteenth 
of  August  One,  purporting  to  be  the  articles  of  capitu- 
lation; the  other  ptirporting  to  be  a  supplement  to  the 
articles;  and  the  third  purporting  to  be  an  addition 
to  the  supplemental  articles.  There  is  also  a  fourth 
document,  being  a  letter  directed  to  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  Rapids,  which  purports  to  be  an  expla- 
nation of  the  articles  of  capitulation.  Before  I  make 
any  observations  on  this  testimony,  I  will  give  the 
Court  a  relation  of  my  conduct  in  respect  to  the  sur- 
render, nnd  state  the  motives,  which  influenced  me. 
If  a  departure  from  the  forms,  ceremonies,  and  eti- 
quette of  modern  warfare,  where  civilized  men  a^  the 


a 


GENERAL  HULL. 


165 


belligerents,  viiU  condbmii  me,  I  mittt  submit  But  I 
do  persuade  myself,  that  this  Court  will  consider  my 
peculiar  situation,  and  the  character  of  the  enemy 
which  was  opposed  to  me ;  and  that  I  will  be  thought 
excusable,  if  I  permitted  a  precipitation  to  which 
some  forms  and  pageantry  were  sacrificed,  with  a 
view  to  save  from  the  cruelty  of  the  savages,  many 
brave  men,  and  many  families  of  parents  and  chil- 
dren. 


As  soon  as  I  found  that  the  enemy  intended  a  se- 
rious attack  upon  Detroit,  I  knew  that  sooner  or  later 
my  army  must  fall.  I  knew,.that  even  victory  would 
not  save  me,  and  could  be  but  a  temporary  advantage. 
The  certain  consequences  of  defeat  I  could  not  con- 
template without  hwrour.  It  presented  a  scene,  which 
I  need  not  attempt  to  describe.  It  is  obvious,  that 
it  would  have  left  our  savage  enenues  to  indulge,  with- 
out restraint,  their  passion  for  rapine  and  cruelty. 
The  small  body  of  regulars  which  I  had  with  me,  I 
was  obliged  to  keep  in  the  fort,  for  its  protection.  I 
had  no  other  troops  Uiat  understood  the  management 
of  cannon.  With  one  third  cS  the  residue  of  my  fwce 
absent,  and  with  nothing  to  rely  upon  out  of  the  fwt, 
but  untried  and  undisciplined  militia,  officered  by 
men,  most  of  whom  were  in  hostility  to  me,  and  had, 
even  conspired  against  me,  what  was  I  to  expect  from 
a  contest  ? 


I  det€finined  at  any  rate,  that  I  omght,  if  it  were 
possible,  to  ward  off  the  attack,  and  gain  time,  till  the 


^ 


M 


166 


DEFENCE  OF 


detachment  under  colonels  Mac  Arthur  and  Cass, 
ivho  were  my  two  senior  officers,  m^ht  return. 

The  Court  will  recollect,  that  I  had  sent  an  ex> 
press  for  them,  as  soon  as  I  received  general  Brook's 
summons  on  the  fifteenth.  After  the  line  was  formed 
on  the  sixteenth,,  as  appears  by  the  testimony  of  ci^ 
tain  Mac  Commick,  colonel  Van  Horn,  and,  major 
Snelling,  I  visited  the  troops  where  they  were  drawn 
up.  I  then  went  to  the  fort,  in  expectation  of  hear- 
ing of  the  absent  detachment ;  but  receiving  no  intel- 
ligence  from  them,  I  determined  to  propose  a  cessa- 
tion of  hostilities  to  treat  of  a  surrender.  I  accord- 
ingly sent  a  fli^  over  the  river,  and  when  the  British 
officer  came  tor  inquire  the  meaning  of  that  flag,  I 
sent  the  note  to  general  Brock,  of  which  niijor  Snel- 
ling^speaks.  That  these  were  my  views  when  I  sent 
this  flag,  appears  by  the  testimony  of  colonel  Miller, 
to  whom  I  explained  myself  on  the  subject  I  do  not 
recollect  what  were  the  precise  words  of  this  note, 
but  I  think  it  will  appear  very  evident  to  the  Court, 
that  the  contents  of  it  could  not  have- been,  as  m^r 
Snelling  has  stated,  neither  more  nor  less  than  an 
offer  of  unconditional  surrender.  For,  according 
to  m^jor  Snelling,  the  first- question  general  Brock 
put  to  him,  after  he  had  read  the  note,  was  to  ask 
nuyor  Snelling  if  he  "  was  authorized  to  agree  on 
terms.'*  No  such  question  would  have  been  asked  if 
I  had  offered  to  surrender  without  terms. 

As  soon  as  I  had  determined  to  negotiate,  I  also  de- 
termined to  change  my  positions  for  defence.  1  thought 


-.1 


* 


GENERAL  HULL. 


16t 


it  better  to  draw  the  troops  to  the  fort,  and  if  I- made 
a  resistance,  it  was  my  opinion  that  I  could  do  it  to 
most  advantage,  by  manning  the  fort  with  a  full  comr 
plemeht,  and  forming  a  line,  supported  on  the  right 
by  the  fort,  and  on  the  left  by  the  citadel  and  the 
batteries  cm  the  bank  of  the  river;  having  in  front  a 
line  of  pickets  which  extended  from  the  fort  to  the 
citadel,  and  which  was  intended  to  cover  the  commu- 
nication between  one  and  the  other.  With  these 
views  and  intentions,  I  ordered  the  troops  to  the  fort, 
intending  to  post  them  from  thence  before  the  negoti- 
ation should  break  off,  if  there  should  be  no  terms 
agreed  upon.  When  these  orders  were  given,  I  had 
appointed  colonels  Brush  and  Miller  to  repair  to  a 
tent  without  the  fort,  and  treat  with  the  enemy.  At 
this  moment  I. received  the  intelligence,  that  the  two 
companies  mentioned  by  miyor  Anderson,  Knagg's 
and  Shover^s,  had  gone  over  to  the  enemy ;  and  heard 
from  colonel  Brush,  the  declaration,  that  "6y  OotT 
eveiy  man  of  hu  regiment  had  or  would  desert  The 
consequences  of  such  a  defection  immediately  occur- 
red to  me.  Colonel  Brush's  troops  had  been  posted 
to  guard  the  upper  part  of  the  settlement.  If  they 
made  no  resistance,  there  was  nothing  to  hinder  the 
British  and  their  savages  from  landing  above  the 
town ;  and,  while  we  should  be  engaged  with  the  in- 
vaders from  the  south,  the  savages  would  be  making 
indiscriminate  slaughter  of  the  inhabitants,  through 
the  whole  extent  of  the  northern  part  of  the  settle- 
ment, ^i 


v^^-.-'?^f^  -•-•-^«^'^f^^>^. 


\, 


108 


DEFENCE  01^ 


'?■■ 


I 


«■**%/■ 


f 


1 


From  this  moment  I  determined  taranreiider  on  the 
best  tenm  I  could  obtain.  I  told  colonel  Miller,  tfaat 
this  was  my  determination.  I  went  to  the  teht.  Colo- 
nel Miller  had  not  arrived  there.  1  had  mentioned  to 
colonel  Brush  and  the  British  officers,  the  terms  I 
should  insist  upon,  and  concluded  by  saying,  *'  I  shall 
surrender;'*  meaning,  cm  the  terms  I  had  previously 
mentioned.  This  was  the  declaration  colonel  Miller 
heard.  After  I  had  explained  the  terms  I  had  ex- 
pected, I  left  the  tent  and  returned  to  the  fort.  On  my 
arrival  there,  I  found  to  my  surprise  that  all  the  troops 
had  crowded  into  the  fort-,  had  stskftked  their  arms,  and 
were  in  a  state  of  entire  insubordf  nation.  Let  it  be 
remembered,  that  neither  of  these  steps  had  been 
taken  by  my  orders.  1  had  ordered  coltmel  Findlay's 
regiment  only  into  the  fort;  and  it  is  not  proved,  or 
pretended,  that  I  gave  any  orders  for  stacking  the 
arms.  I  now  became  impatient  to  put  the  place  un- 
der the  protection  of  the  British.  I  Icnew  tiiat  there 
were  thousands  of  the  savages  around  us.  Every  mo* 
ment  reports  were  brought  to  me  of  their  depredations, 
and  in  the  situation  in  which  my  troops  then  were,  I 
could  afford  no  protection  to  the  inhabitants.  I  was 
anxious,  that  our  enemies  should  have  the  command 
and  government,  that  they  m^ht  be  able  to  put  a  re* 
straint  on  their  savage  allies,  which  I  had  no  powei^  to 
do.  An  additional  weight  on  my  mind,  that  had 
great  influence  on  my  conduct,  was  what  I  considered 
might  be  the  dangerous  situation  of  the  detochment 
under  colonels  Mac  Arthur  and  Cass.  1 4p|hght  it 
possible  it  might  be  at  a  distance,  and  might  be 


fv 


'./ 


S./.L'  :.„ 


GENEllAL  HULL. 


169    W 


cut  off.  If  we  Blioald  udi uiccesBfiilly  resist^  I  was  sure 
it  would.  Intlill  itate  of  thii^,  the  articles  of 
capitulation  were  brought  to  me  from  the  tent,  .signed 
and  executed*  I  accepted  them.  I  gave  a  copy  of 
them  to  miyor  Jessup,  as- he  has  testified,  and  he  after- 
wards read  them  to  the  troops,  when  they  marched 
out  at  twelve  o'clock.  These  must  be  considered 
as  the  articles  of  -capitulation,  and  by  these  my  con- 
duct must  be  tested.  For  the  two  other  documents, 
the  one  styled  supplemental  articles,  and  tlie  other  an 
addition  to  the  supplemental  articles,  are  rather  to  be 
considered,  as  an  agreement  between  myself  and  the 
enemy's  general  than  as  parts  of  the  capitulation.  I 
admit,  that  when  these  were  signed  1  had  no  power 
to  resist  if  he  had  not  chosen  to  agree  to  them,  and 
therefore  they  are  no  more  to  be  considered  as  a  part 
of  the  capitulation,  than  the  letter  which  bears  date 
the  next  day.  It  was  these  supplemental  articles, 
which  were  signed  in  captain  Dyson's  quarters,  and 
most  of  the  witnesses,  who  speak  of  what-was  done 
before  or  after  the  capitulation  was  signed,  obviously 
speak  witb  reference  to  the  execution  of  these  instru- 
ments. 

God  knows  the  articles  are  not  what  I  would  have 
wished  to  have  had  them.  If  I  had  been  warring 
.w|th  civilized  man,  where  the  blood  (tf  combatants 
only  6oidd  be  8he(S».I  ought, not,  I  would  not  Iiave 
accepted  them.  But  wheaigigi^  the  consequences  of 
refusing  them,  depended  the  lives  of  <somany  innocent 
people,Jfe  did  not  feel  myself  authorize4  to  reject 
theih. 

16 


■-^. 


.Hfc^iML---''^-'<:']r  •  "**■ 


r> 


nn 


DSFENCR  OF 


Having  pat  before  tiie  Cowrt  tiie  tettimdiiy  wblch 
iclstee  to  this  apeeifica^on,  «|d  Igiven  my  own  ac- 
cooBt  <^  the  tramaetkMM  to  whidb  it  relates,  I  will 
again  notice  the  acciitations»  and  make  some  few  ob- 
servations upon  them.         • 


*  ■       ^ 


The  first  accusation  is,  that  I  surrendeirecl  before 
the  capitulation  was  signed.  This  is  certainly  dis- 
piov«»l.  There  was  not  an  enemy  in  the  fort  before 
the  capitulatixMEi  was  brou^t  to  me  from  the  tent,  nor 
before  I  delivered  a  cq)y  of  it  to  miyor  Jessup.  The 
testimony  of  cofonel  Miller  is  conclusive  upon  this 
point.  He  says,  there  were  no  Britii^  troops  in  the 
fort  when  he  brought  me  the  capitulation  from  the 
tent 


A  second  accusation  is,  that  I  did  not  stipidate  for  the 
honours  of  war.  Among  the  tf^ariety  of  circumstances, 
in  my  situation,  which  I  had  to  deplore,  and  which 
agitated  n^  mind  to  a  great  de^e,  there  was  none 
that  excited  my  own  feelings  more,  tibus  to  find}  that 
ihoii^h  this  provisicm  had  been  inserted  in  the  articles, 
as  originally  drawn  by  the  commissioners,  it  had  been 
stricken  ovit.  J.  thought  of  rejecting  the  articles  on 
this  account.  I  must  Have  then  opened  a  new  iiego^ 
elation.  I  liave  already  stated  what  i^peand  to  me  a« 
the  consequences  of  fortheji^delayy  The  savages  wm« 
unrestrained.  I.€ie^te||||0id  not  to  expose  the  lives . 
of  the  inhabitants' to  their  fuiy  for  the  sake.of  obtain- 
ing so  useless  a  piigeM&tiy. 


,.._s^..-.. -*--'> — 


*^^  ""-.^^-v 


'•..^•.,j»v 


%..  * 


■♦fr 


GENERAL  RHIX. 


171 


The  articl«t  ftie  abo  condeniMd*  beoanne  they  oon- 
tained  no  stipoUi*^  ^  <1^  Mooity  of  the  frlendlj 
inhabitants  of  Ctmila.  With  respect  to  the  people 
of  Canada  who  had  been  friendly  to  us,  and  4rho  had 
remained  in  their  own  country  when  we  retreated,  no 
stipulation  in  their  favour  was  necessary.  The  Bri- 
tish had  offered  full  pardon  to  idl  their  sut^ects  who 
had  shewn  any  disaffection;  and  when  the  eapitnla-  ^ 
tion  was  signed,  there  were  ncme  in  Canada  who  had 
not  availed  themselves  of  this  oflbr.  With  respect  t» 
those  wlio  were  with  us,  the  ci^itulationdoes  c<mtain 
an  article  in  their  favoiv.  They  are  unquestitmably 
included  in  the  third  article,  which  provides  that 
**  fNrivate  persons,  and>  pn^rty  of  every  tkaer^ptumt 
"shall  be  respected*** 


% 


But,  Sir,  a  stipulation  in  favour  of  Canadians,  who 
were  with  us  at  the  time  of  the  surrender,  was,  in  fact, 
mtliely  a  matter  of  superen^tion;  because,  accord- 
ing to  the  best  of  my  recollection,  there  was  but  one 
person  of  that  description  with  us,  at  the  time  of  the 
capitulation,  and' he^is  now  an  officer  of  rank  in  our 
army.  . 


•  The  evidence,  ^at  any  stipidation  for  the  security 
of  |he4iJaoadians,  other  than  what  the  articles  con- 
ta^ed,  waa  unnecessary,  is,  that  it  is  the  undoubted 
feet,  that  ftom  the  time  we  ^treated  from  Canada, 
no  ittdlaridtel  has  suflfered,  either  in  his  person  or  pro- 
perty, ?gp  account  of  any  part  he  may  have  taken 
againstl^is  own  government,  or  op  account  of  any 
connection  which  be  may  have  had  with  our  army. 


o^ 


172 


DEFENCE  OF 


i^, 
^'*. 


The  speciftcation  itatet  other  ol^tioiM  to  (he 
capitulation,  but  a»  they  are  of  an  iifferiour  nature,  and 
must  be  excusable  if  those  I.  have  noted  are  so,  I 
shall  not  trpuble  the  Court  with  any  remarks  upon 
them.       ,        .. 


i- 


Something  has  been  said  in  the  course  of  the  trial, 
as  to  my  having  after  the  capitulation  consented  to 
the  surrender  of  some  distant  posts.  It  might  be 
enough  to  say,  that  ttiere  is  no  specification  (m  this 
subject;  but  I  will  only  observe,  that  so  far  from  this 
being  a  concession  to  the  enemy,  it  originated  in  my 
suggestion.  I  reflected,  that  if  they  should  ^ear  of 
tile  capitulation,  before  they  vrere  informed  that  they 
were  included  in  the  surrender,  they  might  retreat,  if 
they  should  judge  it  in  their  power  to  do  so—but  if 
early  intelligence  (tf  the  surrender  should  not  reach 
them,  they  wouid  be.  exposed  to  the  whole-  savago 
force  of  the  enemy^  and  might  be  sacrificed,  unless 
they  were  protected  by  the  capitulation.  Much  tes- 
timony has  also  been  given  in  relation  to  the  situation 
of  the  British  troqis  before  the  surrender,  and  to  shew 
that  they  were  suffered  to  approach  too  near  our  works 
before  the  capitidation  was  signed.  It  would  be  easy 
to  shew  the  strange  contradiction  of  testimony  on 
this  point,  and  to  prove  that  such  an  accusi^n  would 
be  without  foundation.  But  certainly  the  accusations 
against  me,  and  which  I  am  obliged  to  answer,  are 
sufficiently  numerous.  7he  Court  would  hardly  think 
me  excusable  in  trespassing  ca  their  poiMjMBe,  to 
make  a  defence  against  accusrtions  not  preferred-*- 


OENCRAL  HtLL. 


173 


I  ikail  tkeffeftiTO  tc/  notliliig  ftartlito  m  to  this  lUg- 
l^itiOB,  than  tiwt  a  specificatioB  founded  iq;K)n  it  It 
BOt  to  be  fomd  liBder  any  of  the  chaises. 

There  is,  Gentlemen,  one  other  chai^  viMeh  I 
have  to  answer.  It  is  an  accusation  which  has  been 
the  most  wounding  to  my  feelings,  and  the  discussion 
of  which  is  the  most  painAil  task  I  have  yet  had  to 
perform.  Not  because  I  have  any  doubt  but  fliat  I 
shall  convince  you  it  '.s  as  much  without  foundation 
as  any  other,  but  because  it  imposes  upon  me  the  ne- 
cessity of  examining  testimony,  which  no  man,  how- 
ever innocent  he  may  be,  can  repeat  without  disgust. 

If  in  the  embarrassing  and  difficult  situations  in 
which  I  was  placed  during  xny  late  command,  I  have 
comnutted  stHne  errours,  surely  what  I  have  suffered 
by  thu  prosecution,  and  what  I  must  now  suffer  in 
making  this  part  of  my  defence,  will  be  some  atone- 
ment. 


For  mere  tiian  half  p  century  I  supported  a  charac- 
ter without  reproach.  My  youth  was  devoted  to  the 
service  of  my  country.  I  fbught  her  battles  in  that 
war  which  achieved  her  liberty  and  independence, 
and  which  was  ended  before  many  of  you,  Gentlemen, 
who  are  py  judges,  were  bc»ii)  ' 

>    If,  upon  any  occasion,  a  man  may  speak  of  his  own 
pierits,|pis  at  such  a  time  as  this,  and  I  hope  I  may 
be  permitted  to  present  to  you,  in  very  few  words,  a 
16* 


m 


DBFENOB  OF 


namttlye  of  my  Uf«v  wMIe  Iwat  engaged  la  m«ic0 
whtoh  ivere  etlcQlated  to  provo  a  OMn'ik  ftfiiinM»^aiid 
courage.  I  sliall  do  it  witk  the  leM  rehietaiiee^  tiecavie 
the  teftimooy  I  have  offered  of  the  venerable  men 
who  served  with  me  in  the  rev<rfutionary  war  will 
▼ouch  for  all  I  have  to  lay. 


'■■/He  ,■ 


In  the  year  seventeen  hundred  and  aeventj-five,  at 
the  age  of  about  twenty-one  yean,  I  was  appointed  • 
captain  In  one  of  the  Conneetieut  regiments.  During 
ih&t  campaign,  and  until  March,  seventeen  hundred 
and  seventy-sir,  when  the  enemy  evacuated  Boston, 
I  served  with  the  army  at  Cambridge  and  Roxbury, 
under  the  immediate  command  of  general  Wafliington. 
I  was  with  t)iat  part  of  the  army  in  March,  seventeen 
hundred  and  seventy-sup,  ^hich  took  possessiou  of 
Dorchester  fidghts,  the  ra^vement  which  compelled 
the  en^y  to  evacuate  Boston.  The  next  day,  the 
regiment  to  which  I  belonged  marched  for  Ne>ir-York. 
I  was  on  Long  Island  when  the  enemy  landed,  and 
remained  until  the  night  the  v,'hoie  army  retreated. 
I  was  in  several  small  skirmishes:  both  on  Long 
Island  and  York  Island,  before  the  ^rmy  retired,  to 
the  White  Plains.  I  then  beloim;ed  to  cfdonel  Charles 
Webb's  regaiieiit»  of  Cotuieeticut 


This  r^^ent  was  in  ^e  severest  part  of  the  ac- 
tion on  Chatterdon*s  Hill,  a  little  advanced  of  the 
White  Plains,^  a  few  days  after  the  main  botty  of  the 
army  abandoned  New-York.  This  battle  Mpemora- 
ble  in  the  hiatory  of  our  country^  and  the  re^ment  to 


QENlSRAL  Htll/t. 


XU 


whkhl  betocgtd  leceiTed  th«  pirtteular  (hanlm  of 
genend  Watbington,  in  bit  piMie.  orden,  for  iti  bi»>. 
very  and  good  «oiidiwt  on  the  oee«doii>  It  wai  par^ 
ticularly  dittingpUthed  from  all  the  other  troops  en- 
gaged in  the  actiw*  I  received  a  alight  wound  by  a 
nMsket  baU  in  my  aide,  but  it  did  not  prevent  me 
from  remaiaing  at  the  head  of  my  company.  I  waa 
in  ^e  Jiattle  at  Trenton,  when  tjie  Hesaiani  were 
taken,  in  December,  seventeen  hundred  and  seventy- 
six,  and  being  one  of  the  youngest  captains  in  tlte 
army,  was.  promoted  by  general  Wasbingtopt  the  day 
after  the  battle,  to  a  m^jori^,  for  my  conduct  on  that 
occasion. 

The  firstof  January,  se yenleen  :hundred  and  seven- 
ty-seven, I  was  in  the  batila^of  Princeton.  In  the 
campaign  of  the  same  yewr^w  rejpiment  to  which  I 
belonged  served  in  the  northern  army.  I  was  early 
in  the  spring  ordered  to  Ticonderoga,  and  commanded 
the  regiment  (being  the  senior  oflEicer  present)  under 
general  Saint  Clair,  and  I  was  with  that  officer  in  his 
retreat  iironi  that  post  After  funeral  Saint  Clair's 
army  formedLikjnneition  with  gen^ri^^cbuyler's  army, 
6n  the  North  river,  at  F^  Ednvafd^  the  rei^ent  to 
which  I  belonged  was  detached  and.  nuNrched  to  Fort 
Schuyler,  and  relieved  that  post  which  was  besieged 
by  general  Saint  Ledger.  On  the  retreat  of  general 
Schuyler'aarmy  from  Fort  Edward,  I  commanded  the 
rear  guard  of  the  army,,  and  being  two  miles  in  the 
rear,  lil^tacked  by  a  large  body  of  British  troops 
and  Indians  at  dayi^t  in  thi  nprning,  in  which 


;«   >J 


.*. 


.M 


9 


^iE^k^- 


iMt:  ...    Ji 


•If" 


»»'.>,. 


170  DSfE^^el  w 

mUm  w«m  UIM  Mid  mmnMi  bMwtwi  ibirty  ttd 
forty  «faqr  giMidr  Mii  I  r«Mlv«l  tke  pwtlmilar  llMok» 
of  feneral  SolNgriir  Ant  ay  ««BdMt  <»  tiM  oemiloB. 

I  VTM  Is  th»  tw*  OMMomUe  bstUM  mi  *^  Bhw- 
tMnth  of  BeptcMbtr,  Mid  tke  Mventh  of  OetobM*,  on 
Bhenuu't  Uelghti,  •gaintt  geRenil  BufgogriM*t  mj, 
prevloift  to  ito  lurrender.  In  tiie  Mtion  of  the  nlao- 
teeath  Sefitember,  I  eemmftiided  a  doHibhmeiit  of 
three  hundred  men,  who  fought  the  prinolpal  part  of 
the  afiemoim.  Mid  move  thai  one  half  of  them  were 
killed  and  wounded. 

On  the  seventh  of  October  I  likewise  commanded 
a  detachment  from  the  brigade,  which  assisted  in  at- 
tacking the  enemy  on  tlif^^  of  our  position,  defeated 
bim,  followed  him  to  the  right  of  his  lines,  stormed 
bis  entrenchments,  and  took  and  held  possession  of 
the  right  of  bis  positicm,  which  compelled  him  to  re- 
treat to  Saratoga,  and  there  capitulate. 

After  the  memorable  event  of  the  capibdation  of 
gennal  Burgoyne*s  army,  the  regiment  to  which  I 
belonged  was  ordered  to  Pennsylvania,  to  join  the 
array  under  tbe ccmwiMidof  geneijal  Washington. 

I  r^naiaed  with  the  army,  the  winter  of  seventeen 
hundred  and  seventy'Seven,  at  Valley  Forge,  and  in 
the  spring  of  seventeoi  hundred  and  seventy-eight, 
when  the  British  army  evacuated  Philadelpbi||»I  was 
IB  the  battle  of  Monmouth.    From  December,  leven- 


t 


v..^J 


0ENERAL  HULX. 


177 


teen  hundred  and  seventy-dght  lo  May  feventtta 
hundred  and  wventy-nlne,  I  eommanded  the  Aaierl>' ' 
can  poata  In  advance  of  the  White  Plains,  near 
Kingsbrldge,  during  which  time  I  had  varioui  lidr- 
mithes  with  the  enemy.  In  May,  leventceu  hundred) 
and  tevinty-nine,  the  principal  part  of  the  Britiah 
army  advanced  up  the  North  river  to  V erplancks 
and  Stony  Point,  and  I  waa  ordered  to  retreat  before 
them  to  Weft  Pdnt. 


l! 


^.• 


,  i.l 


■X  ii 


I  then  joined  the  light  infkntry  uilder  the  command 
of  general  Wayne,  and  was  in  the  memorable  attack 
on  Stony  Point,  with  a  separate  command  of  four 
hundred  light  infantry. 

For  my  conduct  on  thiji  oecaaicm,  I  received  the 
particular  thanks  of  general  Wayne,  general  Wash- 
ington, and  Congress. 

In'  the  summer  and  autumn  of  seventeen  hundred 
and^elgh^Al  commanded  the  advanced  posts  of  the 
army,  attain  Dec^nber  of  that  year  I  commanded 
an  expedition  against  the  enemy  stationed  at  Morri- 
siana,  which  was  successful,  and  for  which  I  re- 
ceived the  thanks  of  general  Washington  in  hia 
general  orders  to  the  army,  and  likewise  the  thanks 
of  Congress. 

General  Washington  in  his  orders,  I  weH  remember, 
made  ugto  of  these  words,  **he  thanked  me  for  my  ju- 


J 


-'^ 


¥;ii 


I 


Its 


DEFENCE  OF^ 


u 


"dieiomainwigeilieiitt  in  the  plui  of  opemtion,  and 
"fo»  my  intrei^ty  and  valour  in  the  raceeutioit." 

Fnnis  the, conclusion  of  the  reT<dutionaKy  varl 
iMtve  lived  with  the  respect  of  my  coontiymen,  and 
have  ei^oyed  repeated  marks  of  their  confidence  in 
the  offices  which  have  been  bestowed  upon  me. 
When  I  found  that  the  independence  for  which  I  Iiad 
so  (^ten  fought  was  assailed ;  that  again  my  country 
must  appeal  to  arms  to  avenge  her  wrongs,  and  to 
protect  her  rights,  I  fell  that  I  might  yet  do  her  some 
service.  For  though  many  years  had  passed  since  I 
had  fought  under  her  standard,  and  though  my  arm 
might  not  have  its  wonted  strength^  yet  my  spt- 
rit  was  unbroken,  and  my  devotion  to  her  unimpaired. 
I  thought^  in  the  field,  whejre  there  could  be  butfew 
who  had  any  military  experience,  what  I  had  learned 
in  the  most  active  scenes  of  a  seven  years  w«r,  might 
be  useful.  I  fondly  hoped  that  in  my  age,  as  well  as 
in  my  youth,  I  might  render  services  that  should  de- 
serve the  gratitude  of  my  country.  That  Jf  I  fell  by 
the  sword  of  her  enemies,  my  grove  would  be  moist* 
ened  with  the  tears  of  my  countrymen,  that  my  de- 
scendants would  be  proud  of  my  name  and  flime :  but 
how  vain  is  anticipation!  I  am  now  aecused^of 
crimes  which  would  blast  my.  former  hoiMNirs,  and 
transmit  my  memory  with  infamy  to  posterity.  And 
in  that  hideous  catalogue,  there  is  none  from  the  im- 
putation of  which  my  nature  and  my  feeJings  have 
more  recoiled  than  from  that  of  cbwardice,  t»  which 
I  am  now  to  answer.    I  shall  confine  myself  under 


OCNERAL  HULL, 


V19 


this  change  to  the  nqiecificatKniB,  or  to  such  part  of 
ihe  specifications,  as  relate  to  my  personal  deport> 
ment. 

Almost  every  omission  or  commissioii  during  the 
campaign,  which  it  has  been  thought  proper  to  cen- 
sure, has  been  assembled  under  this  charge,  and 
they  have  all  been  imputed  to  ctwardice.  But  as 
most  of  the  acts  have  been  specified  in  si^port  of 
other  charges,  I  shall  not  again  notice  them,  but  con- 
fine myself  to  the  allegation  that  I  shewed  personal 
fear  and  a  want  of  courage.  ' 

.However  painful  the  recapitulation  of  the  testknony 
on  this  point  must  be  to  me,  it  is  so  necessary  that  it 
should  l^e  broi^t  together,  to  the  end  you  n»y  have 
it  before  you  in  cme  view,  that  I  shidl  go  through  the 
disagreeaMe  task  of  rqteating  it. 

The  first  witness  in  point  of  fact,  as  well  as  of  im- 
portance, is  me^or  Snelling.  He  was  a  captain  when 
he  joinei^e  army  at  Urbana;  but  is  now  a  col(me]. 

fie  testifies  as  follows.  "  During  the  cannonade  I 
**  frequently  saw  the  General.  I  onoe  saw  him  stand- 
*'ing;  he  might  ha^uisen  twice ;  most  of  the  time  he 
"  was  sitting  on  a#nd  tent,  under  the  curtain  of  the 
^  fort  opposite  the  enemy's  batteries. 

^'  I  have  been  taught  to  believe,  that  there  are  eer- 
"  tain  human  passioiM  wluefa  are  indicated  by  appeal^ 


i< 


[ 


,'id 


n 


"'^  ^.iMt\ttf 


K: 

^^a        ' 

M 

f 

Wt' 

*m^'-'-. 

jJi^J""', 

iX 

•/"v-;| 

A^ 

W' 

^  :0 

jP^ 

'^i-^'- 

W^r 

^ 

'■m 


J , 


180 


DEFENCE  OF^ 


"  ances,  and  the  appearances  cS  general  Hull  accord- 
"  ing  to  my  mind  indicated  fear. 

"  The  reasons  that  induced  me  to  draw  that  con- 
"  elusion  weret  that  the  General  selected  the  safest 
"  plac^  in  the  fort  for  his  seat ;  his  voice  trembled 
"  when  he  spoke ;  he  apparently  unconsciously  filled 
"bis  mouth  with  tobacco,  so  that  his  cheeks  were 
*' extended  by  it;  the  saliva  ran'  from  his  mouth  on 
"his  neckcloth  and  cloaths;  he  often  rubbed  his 
"face  with  his  hands,  and  distributed  the  tobacco 
"juice  about  hb  face." 


.i(' 


,  He  further  testified  in  his  cross-examination,  that 
when  he  returned  from  Spring  Wells,  at  the  dawn  of 
day  on  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth,  he  .went  into 
the  fort  to  make  his  report  to  general  Hull,  but  could 
not  find  him,  nor  find  finy  one  who  knew  where  he 
was. 


W 


.•/■V  „; 


v. .. 


He  said,  he  did  not  know  if  general  Hull  was  in 
the  fort  at  the  time  the  o£Bcers  were  killeK.  He  saw 
him  immediately  afterwards.  After  the  men  were 
'Mlled  it  might  have  been  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes 
before  he  saw  captain  Hull  with  the  white  flag.  It 
might  have  been  an  hour,  but  l^did  not  think  it  was. 

The  witness  could  not  say  that  he  saw  general 

Hull  in  the  situation  he  has  described  between  the 

time  the  men  were  killed  and  the  sending  the  flag  by 

•  captain  Hull.    He  recollects  that  at  the  time  captain 


-tf.  ■ 


GE^NBBAL  HULL. 


181 


HoU  "Was  fixing  the  flag,  general  Hull  was  standings 
and  was  in  the  situation  he  has  described.  General- 
Hull  was  out  (^  the  fort  early  that  morning,  but  the 
witness  does  not  know  where  he  was.  At  the  time 
the  enemy  was  crossing*  the  General  was  striding  on 
the  parade.       < 


I  wish  the  Court  to  notice  the  great  attention, 
which  migor  Snelling  paid,  to  be  particular -in  very 
minute  cifcianstances  in  giving  his  testimony;  not 
-only  as  to  the  positions  in  which  he  saw  me,  but  when 
his  examination  was  read  over  to  him*  and  he  found 
that,  as  it  stood,  it  represented  him  as  saying  that  I 
had  distributed  the  tobacco  over  my  face,  he  desired 
it  might  be  corrected,  so  as  to  state  that  what  he  bad 
Biddi  was  confi^ffid  to  the  ^onrer  part  of  my  face. 


'>  'j 


>f  Captain  Mac  Commick  testifies  as  follows,  "  I  was 
^*  not  present  when  cokmel  Findlay  received  orders 
"to  much  into  the  fort  I  joined  him  as  he  was 
**  going  in|E>  the  fort  $  he  told  me  of  the  order*  and  said 
**  he  woidn  not  obey  it ;  but  would  go  into  the  fort 
**  himself,  and  directed  me  to  form  the  regiment 
"  The  colonel  then  came  back  so  near  to  me,  as  to 
"tell  me  to  let  the  companies  ma<<i|i  up,  and  I  did 
"  so.^  The  witnesscthen  relates  what  passed  between 
colonel  Findlay  andmyself,  and  proceeds  as  follows* 
"The  General  appeared  very  much  agitated.  He 
*'  Appeared  to  be  under  as  much  alarm  as  I  ever  saw 
"  a  person.    Hfe  had  been  chewing  tobacco,  and  the 

^-    n  ■-: 


■'M 


w 


'■■m 


«4|P     ^^^ 


J' 


182 


DEFENCE  OF 


'"  loMFer  part  of  his  face  and  his  vest  nvere  covered 
«  with  it." 


On  his  cross  examination  he  testified,  that  it  might 
have  been  tefa  minutes,  or  half  an  hour,  or  more,  after 
the  firing  ceased,  before  the  troops  were  ordered  to 
march  into  the  fort ; — that  it  was  at  least  half  an 
hour  after  the  firing  before  the  witness  went  into  the 
fort;— that  he  saw  me  once  that  morning  out  of  the 
fort,  and  thinks  I  was  near  where  colonel  Findlay's 
regiment  was  forming  the  line  of  battle  behind  the 
picket  fence.  Colonel  Van  Horn,  who  was  a  nuyor 
of  colonel  Findlay^s  corps,  testifies,  that  after  colo- 
nel FindlayHi  regiment  was  formed  on  the  morning  of 
the  sixteenth  of  August,  and  about  an  hour  or  half 
an  hour  before  the  flag  was  hoisted*  I  was  at  the 
line ;— that  this  was  during  the  cannonade ; — ihat  at 
about  the  time  the  firing  ceased,  captain  Snelling 
came,  with  orders  that  colonel  Findlay  should  return 
with  his  regiment  to  the  fort; — ^the  <cann(Miade  had 
then  ceased;— the  witness  turned  roimd,  ai)d  saw  the 
flag  hoisted  on  the  fort.  The  witness  further  staled, 
that  he  then  went  into  the  fort  with  lus  battalion,  and 
after  he  got  in  he  saw  me,  but  is  not  certain  whether 
I  was  there  wHin  he  entered.  The  witness  then 
proceeded  as  fodows,  "  when  Ifiirst  saw  general  Hull 
"  he  was  on  the  steps  going  into  one  of  *he  rooms. 
^'  Ub  face  was  discoloured  n'ith  tobacc  >  juice.  It  was 
"over  the  lower  part  of  his  face,  and  a  spot  was  over 
"  bis  eye.  1  thought  he  was  under  the  influence  of 
^fear.     I  had  no  doubt  of  it.'*    On  his  Gr«M«xaml» 


:../•:    ....V^ 


GENERAL  HULL. 


183 


nation  he  says,  that  he  saw  me  on  the  night  of  th<^ 
fifteenth,  and  as  he  thinks,  about  midnight,  and  before 
the  cannonading  had  ceased,  at  the  place  where  colo- 
nel Findlay's  regiment  was  formed  that  night.  He 
futTT  me  the  next  morning  out  of  the  fort  at  colonel 
Findlay's  quarters,  and  again  at  the  line  of  battle. 
When  the  witness  was  asked,  whether  care  and  anxiety 
might  not  have  produced  the  appearance  he  describ- 
ed, he  answered,  thai  care  and  anxiety  m^ht  have 
add^  to  those  appearances,  but  upois  comparing  faces 
he  thought  mine  bad  the  indication  of  fear. 

Captain  Bricer  testifies  as  follows,  '*  I  saw  general 
"  Hull  on  the  momii^  of  the  sixteenth.  He  appeared 
"  to  be  embarrassed,  and  at  a  loss  how  to  act  I  had 
"  but  one  opinion,  which  was  that  he  was  under  the 
**  influence  of  personal  few.  I  could  not  account  for 
"  the  surrender  in  any  other  way."  On  his  cross-ex- 
amination he  said,  "  on  the  morning  <^  the  sixteenth, 
^  during  the  cannonade,  I  saw  the  General  in  the 
"fort  sometimes  sitting,  sometimes  walking,  and 
**:sometinies  standing.*' 


Lieutenant  Stansbury  testifies,  that  on  the  night  of 
the  fifteenth  of  August,  he  found  n0Bt  about  eleven 
o'clock  at  night,  lying  on  the  piazsa  of  the  barracks 
in  the  fort,  with  my  boots  and  cloaths  on ;— >that  in 
the  morning  when  he  awok4  ai:  day  break  I  was  not 
there.  « I  saw  the  General,"  says  he, «  on  a  tolerably 
"  safe  place;  as  to  his  being  afraid,  I  cannot  say  whe- 
"iher  he  wa9  or  not"     "  I  saw  the  General  o..  the 


■fli'l 


\94' 


BEPENCE  OF 


"  parade  ground.    I  did  not  see  any  neetuity  for  bit 
^*  exposing  himself  more  than  he  did.'* 

Miyov  Jessnp  testifies/that  on  the  fifteenth,  alter 
the  cannonade  commenced,  he  in  company  with  Mr. 
Dugan  met  me  on  horseback  *a  the  street  near  the 
second  battery.  He  says,  <*  the  General  appeared  to 
^  be  agitated ;  either  Mr^  Dugan'  or  myself  observed, 
"the  General  was  frightened;  one  of  us  said,  we 
"  must  cheer  him  up.  We  approached  him,  spoke 'to 
"him,  he  appeared  pale  and  confused,  immediat^y 
**  dismounted  «nd  led  his  horse  towards  the  fort** 

**  T  did  not  see  general  Hull  till  about  break  of  day 
"on  the  morning  of  the. sixteenth,  when  the  General 
"^  came  to  my  tent,  and  directed  me  to  write  an  order 
''for  the  return  of  colonels  Cass  and  Mac  Arthur.** 

The  witness  further  testifies,  tha^  shortly  after  the 
enemy  commenced  their  fire,  at\flie  request  of 
colonel  Findlay,  he  went  to  me  \o  have  an  explana- 
tion of  an  order  which  had  been  delirered  by  my 
aid-de-camp; — ^that  he  found  me  and  received  direc- 
tions from  me,  for  forming  the  line  iff  battle;— that 
while  he  was  alSmpting  to  colle<:^  sonne  dragoons,  of 
which  I  had  directed  faifii  to  ti^^  the  command,  he 
saw  that  our  line  was  breaking  and  retreating  towards 
the  fort;-— he  thin  look^  towards  the  fort,  and  saw 
the  white  flag  lying  ftomit;— that  at  the  request  of 
colonel  Findlay ,  he  then  went  to  the  fort.  The  wit- 
ness then  proceeds  as  follows,  "I  found  the  General 


r*#' 


GENERAL  HULL 


185 


*'  in  the  fort.  I  thought  him  reiy  much  frightened.- 
**  When  I  met  him,  I  inquired  of  him,  if  it  were  pos- 
*^  sible  vre  a? ere  about  to  surrender.  Hb  said  some' 
*^  thing  about  ierms,  and  something  about  the  enemy's 
*^  force,  which  I  do  not  recollect.  His  vsice  at  that 
**  time  was  tremulous.  I  observed,  we  could  at  least 
**  hold  out  till  joined  b}*  colonels  Cass  and  Mac  Ar- 
"  thur.  He  replied,  my  God,  what  shall  I  do  with 
*' these  women  and  children!"  The  witness  then 
states,  that  he  left  the  fort,  went  to  colonel  Findlay,. 
and  did  not  see  me  till  terms  of  capitulation  had  been 
agreed  upon; — that  then  I'  was  perfectly  composed.- 
The  witness  also  testifies  as  follows : — *^  When  I  came 
"to  rqport  to  the  General,  after  reconnoitring  the 
**  enemy,  I  found  him  on  the  side  of  the  fort  next  the 
'*  enemy,  completely-  sheltered,  silting  on  a  tent  be- 
"  side  a  bed.  At  the  same  time  1  reported  that  ^oiflr  ' 
"  guard,  the  most  advanced  towards  the  enemy,  had- 
''surrendered.  The  General  said  that  colonel  Bnuh 
**  had  reported  to  him  ihat  his  men  were  leaving  him. 
«^'  After  this  when  I  met  the  General  in  the  fort,  and 
**  after  ihe  flag  was<  hoisted,  he  exclaimed  that  four 
^men  bad 'been  killed  by  one  shot;— ^he  appeareU  so 
*'  alarmed  as  not  to  know  what  he  was  doing."  The 
witness  then  describes  my  appearan<*.e  at  that  time 
nearly  in  Uic  words  which  had  been  used  by  other 
witnesses. 


The  witness  on  a  subsequent  part  of  his  examina- 
tion stated,  that  at  the  moment  when  he  was  in  conr 
venMtion.  with  me  on  the  evening  of  the  fifteeut|i, 
17* 


\. 


mh-— 


li 


hue 


180 


DEFENCE  OF 


near  the  second  battery,  a  shot  struck  a  stone  house 
near  me ; — that  I  appeared  much  agitated,  dismounted 
my  horse^  and  walked  off  without  making  him  a  reply. 
**  Whenever  I  saw  the  General,"  says  the  witness, 
"  before  the  .capitulation  was  signed,  he  appeared  agi- 
'*  tated;  afterward,  entirely  composed.  Whether  the 
"  agitation  proceeded  from  the  novelty  of  his  situa- 
"  tion  or  fear,  I  cannot  say,  but  I  believe  the  latter, 
^<  if  not  both.'* 


Captain  Eustinan  testifies  as  follows,  **  on  the  even^ 
^*  ing  of  the  fifteenth,  a  shell  appeared  to  be  coming 
"  into  the  fort.  General  Hull  ran  towards  the  north- 
'*  west  bastion,  apparently  to  avoid  it,  and  to  get  un- 
**  der  cover  of  the  platf<Nrm.    The  General  appeared 

alarmed  and  friglitened,  as  I  also  observed  to  my 
"  companions  at  the  time.'* 


i.( 


Lieutenant  Philips  testifies  as  follows,  "  I  saw  ge- 
^'  neral  Hull  <m  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth.  Most 
^*  part  of  the  time  during  the  cannonade  he  was  sittiiq; 
"  with  his  back  to  the  parapet  next  the  en^my.  He 
''  was  sitting  there  with  a  number  of  gentiemen.  I  re- 
'*  collect  one  gentleman  and  one  lady  near  to  him.  He 
« i^peared  to  me  under  the  influence  of  fear.  He  ap- 
**  peared  very  much  agitated.  J  think  doctor  Cun- 
'  -  ningham  was  the  gentleman  that  was  with  him. 
**  The^e  might  have  been  other  officers  with  him,  but 
^*  I  do  not  leoollect.'* 


'"''iSi>-^""'*'^  /ylit'Wf  l,».>.l,Jt.<iV«J' 


^n^Af—zr 


■-:|Sf*.')f 


GENERAL  HULL. 


187 


■iiU 


^Colonel  Miller^eitifies  as  followf ,  "  I  did  not  dis^ 
"  cover  any  agitation  in  the  General  on  the  fifteenth. 
"  On  the  sixteenth  lie  did  appear  much  agitated.  He 
*'  was  on  the  fort.  He  wcs  sometimes  sitting,  some- 
"  times  standing,  and  sometir><)s  walking.  Whether 
"  his  i^tation  proceeded  from  anxiety  on  account  of 
"  the  responsibility  he  was  taking,  or  from  perstmal 
*^  alarm,  I  cannot  say.  After  the  surrender  he  told 
"  me  ho  was  afraid,  if  he  had  fought  the  enemy,  they 
"  would  have  taken  advantage  of  that  part  of  his  pro- 
'  damation,  which  declared  that  no  white  man  takes 
**  fighting  with  an  Indian  should  be  spared.'* 


On  his  cross-examination,  colonel  filler  said,  "I 
^'  oaw  no  act  of  the  Generars  on  the  morning  of  the 
"  sixteenth  whicL  I  can  say  might  not  have  proceed- 
"  ed  from  the  fatigue  and  responsibility  he  was  under.** 

I  put  to  colonel  Miller  the  following  question  :—CaM 
yon  mention  any  act  of  mine  on  the  sixteentii,  which 
you  did  then  or  do  now  impute  to  personal  fear  ?» 
To  tills  the  witness  answered  :—*'Yes,  I  did  think 
**  such  an  immediate  surrender  n^t  have  proceeded 
"  firom  your  fears.** 

To  the  following  question :— Did  you  see  me,  while 
I  was  in  the  fort,  in  any  place  m  situiition  unfit  for  a 
commandiiqp  olBcer?— The  Colonel  answered >— "I 
**  can  describe  to  the  Court  where  the  Genwftl  WWS 
^  and  the  Court  cao  judge.** 


■v/^ 


i 


ti 


188 


DEFENCE  OF 


**  He  was  generally  near  the  easterly  parapet  of  the 
**  fort  I  VIM  there  part  of  the  time  myself.  The 
*'  General  leaned  do-^.n.  The  whole  easterly  side  of 
**  the  fort  was  as  safe  as  the  spot  where  the  Oenvril 
**  was  for  the  most  part  of  the  time.  The  General's 
*^  station  was  the  most  convenient  to  receive  commu^ 
**  Bications  Irom  without  tie  fort'* 


m-i 


Colonel  Miller,  upon  a  re-examination,  further  tes- 
tifies, that  he  had  frequently  obser^'ed  a  habit  which  I 
had  when  I  was  much  engaged,  of  chewing  tobacco  to 
excess,  and  taking  It  from  my  mouth  with  my  fingers, 
and  rolling  it  in  my  fingers,  and  putting  it  in  my  mouth 
again,  and  rolling  it  from  my  mouth  to  my  fingers 
alternately.  That  he  observed  more  of  this  habit  on 
the  sixteenth  than  usnmi  and  thought  the  addition 
might  be  owing  to  waui  of  rest  from  fatigue. 


1 


Kigor  Whistler  says,  my  appearance  indnced  him 
to  think  I  was  under  the  influence  of  personal  fear. 


.  Lieatenant  Peckham  testifies,  that  he  saw  me  on 
the  sixteenth  of  August  and  says,  "  I  had  no  doubt 
*'  but  that  the  General  was  under  the  influence  of  per- 
^'  sonal  fear,  from  his  embarrassment,  as  he  sat  still  and 
'''gave  no  orders.'* 

.  ll^or  Munson  testifies,  that  he  saw  me  on  the  fif« 
temnth  of  August  and  saw  me  again  on  the  sixteenth, 
alter  the  capitulation  was  settled.  He  adds,  "  The 
^  General's  situatioD  was  critical.  If.  be  bad  bad  any 


^^•tai* 


— ^'\1V 


,.32^:. 


GENERAL  HULL. 


18ft 


**  feelkigs,  he  must  have  had  great  care  and  anxiety.  I 
"  saw  nothing  which  might  not  have  been  accounted 
"  for,  without  resorting  to  the  imt>re8sion  of  personal 
**  fear.**  On  liis  cross^xamination  by  the  Court,  this 
witness  says,  **  It  was  ten  or  fifteen  minutes  after  the 
'*  officers  were  Icilled,  that  he  saw  me  sitting  in  one  oi 
**  the  officers'  quarters;  bat  does  lot  recollect  that  it 
<*  was  dur*'i)g  the  cannonade,  either  on  the  fifteenth  or 
'*  sixteen  th,  tliat  be  saw  me.** 

Captain  Maxwell  testifies,  that  he  served  in  the  re-^ 
volutionary  war;  was  engaged  in  the  affidr  at  Browns- 
town  under  colonel  Miller,  which  made  the  twenty* 
third  battle  in  widch  he  had  fbught;— that  after  the 
cannonading  commenced  on  the  fifteenth,  he  saw  me  on 
horseback  at  one  of  tho>  batteries  ;-^that  I  had  a  con- 
versation with  the  officer  commanding  at  the  time  the 
balls  were  passing  and  repassing ;— that  he  took  notice 
of  my  countenance,  and  that!  appeared  finn,  collect- 
ed, anii  cool ;— -that  I  sat  four  or  %Ve  minutes  on  my ' 
horse,  and  rode  off  again ;«— that  hil  did  not  see  me  on 
the  sixteenth ; — ^that  at  the  time  the  army  was  re- 
treating firom  Sandwich,  there  was  a«1amour,  that  I 
was  intimidated,  and  that  was  the  feasoA  why,  on  the 
evening  of  the  sixteenth,  he  particularly  observed  my 
countenance. 

General  Taylor  testifies,  that  he  saw  me  several 
times  on  the  evening  of  the  fifteenth,  daring  the  can^ 
nonade ; — that  there  was  no  impression  made  on  his 
mind  of  my  being  under  personal  fear  on  that  day  or 


i 


IM 


DEFENCE  O^ 


'X 


x:s.: 


evening;— that  I  appeared  to  be  thoughtful  and  veij 
low  tpiiited ; — that  he  heard  no  indication  of  inspirit- 
ing the  men ;— that  my  countenance  wai  dull;— that 
lie  saw  Die  near  the  gateway,  and  that  1  ordered  colo- 
nel Findlay  to  move  from  the  upper  to  the  lower  tide 
ef  the  fort,  without  any  speciftc  orders  how  to  form. 
Early  on  the  sixteenth,  Informstion  came  that  the 
•nemy  were  preparing  to  cross,  and  no  orders  were 
given  to  resist  them;— that  my  appearance  displayed 
more  of  the  marks  of  tobacco  than  he  had  generally 
Men  in  a  neat  man;— that  his  impression  was,  that  I 
waa  under  the  influence  of  personal  fear;— that  he  did 
not  see  me  again  till  the  fli^  was  hoisted ;— that  when 
be  saw  me  near  the  gate  on  the  sixteenth,  he  saw 
many  dBcers  ndth  me,  and  among  the  rest  captain 
Bnelling; — that  he  did  not  consider  being  there  as 
•hrinking  from  danger.. 

Captain  Bacon  testifies,  that  he  saw  me  in  the  fort 
very  frequently  on  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth ;— that 
on  the  sixteenth  he  saw  me,  with  doctor  Cunningham 
and  his  wife,  sitting  on  some  planks ;— that  he  also  saw 
other  persons  there,  some  of  whom  he  thinks  were  offi- 
cers ; — that  during  the  cannonade  he  saw  me  on  the 
parapet  of  the  fort,  once  on  the  evening  of  the  fifteenth, 
and  once  on  the  sixteenth ; — that  he  saw  me  in  differ- 
ent places  about  the  garrison,  during  the  cannonade ; 
—•that  I  seemed  engaged  as  udual,  but  agitated  on  the 
morning  of  the  sixteenth  more  than  common ; — that  he 
did  not  know  the  cause; — that  he  had  no  suspicion 
that  it  was  personal  fear,  neither  did  he  hear  such  a 


GENERAL  HUI<L. 


191 


iiMpicion exprested  by  any  of, the  officers;— 4hat  after 
the  shot  came  in  Mrhich  did  execution,  the  officen 
and  men  very  generally  were  in  the  eastern  side  oT 
the  Tort,  under  the  protection  of  the  parapet  next  the 
enemy. 

Judge  Witherell  testifies,  that  he  saw  me  on  the 
fifteenth,  during  the  cannonade,  near  one  of  our  bat- 
teries, when,  from  all  he  saw,  I  was  cool  and  collected. 

I  believe,  Gentlemen,  I  have  now  collected  and 
presented  to  you  in  connection,  every  syllable  of  the 
testimony  which  has  been  offered  in  suppwt  of  the 
specifications  under  this  charge  which  relate  to  my 
personal  appearance  and  deportment,  ^uch  parts  of 
the  testimony  as  have  the  most  bearing,  I  have  endea- 
voured to  repetft  in  the  witnesses'  own  words,  and 
have  done  it  with  as  much  accuracy  as  the  notes 
taken  by  my  counsel  would  permit. 

Before,  Gentlemen,  I  proceed  further  on  the  exami- 
nation of  this  testimony,  allow  me  to  lay  before  you  an 
extract  from  an  author  of  gre^t  respectability,  contain- 
ing rules  not  inappUcabte  to  the  present  occasion,  bj 
which  the  credibility  of  a  witness  ought  to  be  tested* 

"  A  witness,"  says  Mr.  Tytl^r,  in  his  essay  on  Mi- 
litary Law,  "  who  amplifies  his  testimony,  unneces- 
**  sarily  enlarging  upcm  circumstances  unfavourable  lo 
"  a  party ;  who  seems  to  be  gratified  by  the  opportii» 
''nity  <^fumislung  condemnatory  evidence,  or  manij^ 


V 


% 


I 


f'-X 


*-'  .•♦«. 


'  i:,'*! 


!*.,•%>..( 


n 


192 


DEFENCE  OF 


"  festly  betrays  ptussion  or  pr^udice  in  the  BUbstance  of 
"  his  testimony,  or  in  the  manner  of  delivering  it,  is 
"  to  be  listened  to  with-suspicion  of  his  veracity.  If 
^  a  witness,"  the  author  adds,  '*  takes  upon  him  to  re- 
'**  member  with  the  greatest  minuteness  all  the  cir- 
"  cumstances  €i  a  transaction  long  since  passed,  and 
**  which  are  of  a  frivolous  nature,  and  not  likely  to 
**  dwell  on  the  memory,  his  testimony  is  thereby  ren- 
"  dered  very  suspicious.** 


X   s. 


( -f 


5i,     • 


I  ask  the  members  to  test  the  testimony  which  has 
been  given  i^ainst  me  by  these  rules.  Were  thert 
not  many  of  the  witnes»es  who  amplified  their  testi- 
mony, and  unnecessarily  enlai^ed  upon  circumstances 
unfavourable  to  me;  who  seemed  to  be  gratified  by 
the  opportunity  of  furnishing  condemnatory  evidence? 
I  appeal  to  the  Court  to  judge  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  testimony  of  some  of  the  witnesses  was  delivered, 
and  whether  they  did  not  betray  a  warmth,  that  could 
not  leave  them  free  from  a  suspicion  of  strong  preju- 
dice or  bias  ? 


Major  Snelling  has  certainly  taken  upon  himself 
to  remember  with  the  greatest  minuteness  circum- 
stances of  a  frivolous  nature.  He  remembered  that 
my  cheeks  were  swelled  with  the  tobacco  I  put  in 
my  mouth.  He  remembered  that  my  neckcloth  and 
vest  were  soiled,  and  the  tobacco  was  distributed  about 
my  face.  And  when  his  examination  was  read  over 
to  him,  his  recollection  was  so  extremely  accurate 
as  to  the  most  minute  circumstance,  that  he  insisted 


rr": 


GENERAL  HULL. 


193 


that  vfhht  had'  M^  ^inltlea,'  lihould  be  so  corrected, 
ftS  to  read  that  it  was  the  lower  part  of  my  ftice  yirhicli 
was  soiled.  Though,  on  this  particular,  he  is  contra^-* 
dieted  by  colonel  Van  Horn,  who  it  appears  was  no 
less  observing  of  minute  circumstances,  and  whose 
memory  is  not  less  tenacious  of  hem.  Colonel  Van 
Horn  recollects,  and  has  been  very  particular  in 
stating,  Uiat  there  was  a  mark  made  by  the  tobacco 
over  one  of  my  eyes.  He  mm  so  very  minute  as  to 
observe,  that  it  was  over  my  left  eye,  though  I  be- 
lieve it  is  not  so  recorded  iu  1*9  testimony. 

Mfyor  3nelling's  correction,  with  respect  to  the 
situation  of  the  tobacco  on  my  face,  will  not  appear 
in  the  record  of  his  testimony.  But  it  will  be  broiight 
to  the  remembrance  of  the  Coiirt,  by  my  reminding 
them,  that  when  miyor  Snelling  proposed  the  alterr- 
tion  in  the  record,  so  as  ^o  state4hat  he  meant  to  have 
spoken  only  of  the  lower  part  of  my  face,  I  olgected 
to  it»  being  altered  in  the  minutes,  a-id  wished  that  it 
nilgbt  appear  from  the  record  of  the  evidence,  that 
this  was  a  correction  of  his. 

But,  dentlemen,  the  (pinion  of  mtyor  Snelling  that 
I  was  under  the  influence  of  personal  fear,  as  well  as 
the  same  opinion  of  other  witcesses,  wh  have  very 
nearly  followed  his  words  in  their  description,  is 
formed,  as  they  avow,  from  my  appearance,  and  from 
my  situation  and  conduct  in  the  fort. 
18 


•'  ■'^''^': 


m 


DEFENCE  OF 


A  correct  and  certain  judgment  of  the  emotions  of 
the  mind  from  indications  of  the  countenance,  or  from 
mere  personal  aprearances,  can  hardly  ever  be  formed. 
And  it  must  be  infinitely  difficult  to  do  so  when  fa- 
tigue,  anxiety,  and  a  great  responsibility  may,  all  at 
the  same  time,  be  producing  their  effect. 

Miyor  Scelling,  though  a  veiy  young  gentleman,  it 
is  to  be  presumed  has  great  acquirements,  and  it 
would  seem  from  his  testimony,  that  the  human  pas- 
sions have  been  the  olgects  of  his  study.  He  intro- 
duces his  testimony  on  this  point,  with  these  words : 
*'  I  have  been  taught  to  believe  that  there  are  certain 
"  human  passions  which  are  indicated  by  appearances, 
**  and  the  appearance  of  general  Hull,  in  my  mind, 
"  indicated  fear.*» 

I  hope  that  these  professions  of  major  Snelling  will 
not  give  his  opinion  an  undue  weight,  because  he  has 
not  told  us  in  what  school  he  acquired  his  science  in 
physiognomy.  Nor  has  he  givien  us  the  rules  by 
which,  when  the  mind  may  be  under  various  excite- 
ments, he  can  distinguish  the  appearances  'which  will 
indicate  the  prevalence  of  one  over  the  other. 


MtQor  Snelling,  I  have  no  doubt,  when  he  gains 
niore^age  and  experience,  will  find  that  the  indica- 
tions of  appearances  in  respect  to  the  human  nilnd 
are  fallacious.  Hifl  own  case  may  afford  an  evidence 
of  it. 


vfllh>i  ,  .  _'.N, 


GENERAL  HULL. 


105 


^  I  myself^  and  many  nvho  heard  his  testimony,  and 
that  of  many  other  of  the  nvitnesseSj  and  marked  the 
manner  of  it,  I'^^t^^  that  they  manifested  great  pa8< 
sion  and  prcgudipe  against  me;,  that  they  sesmed  gra- 
tified with  the  q[>portunity  of  furnishing  condemnato- 
ry evidence.  These  appearances  may  Iiave  been  fal- 
lacious, but  if  they  were  so,  it  is  strong  evidence  that 
tlie  most  erroneous  conclusions  may  fcte  drawn  from 
expressions  of  countenance,  tone  of  voice,  and  eager- 
ness of  manner. 


I  beg  it  may  be  observed,  that  most  of  the  witnes- 
ses, except  major  Snelling,  who  have  given  their  tes- 
timpny  9n  this, point,  did  not  see  me  in  the  "ort,  till 
after  the.;|iag|  w||i8  hoisted,  when  there  was  of  course  a 
cessation  of  hostilities,  nor  till  after  I  returned  from  the 
t?!  '  The  witnesses  have  oil  endeavoured  to  impress 
c  >  JEiinds.xtf  the,  Couri,  Uiat  I  intended  in  all  events 
U<  >uaKe  an  unconditional  surrender.  If  this  were  the 
ca(^,  where  was  the  occasion  for  personal  fear,  after  I 
had  invited,  by  the  flag,  a  negotiation,  and  hi'd  stop- 
ped the  enemy's  fire  ?  Miyor  Jessup  says,  t!iat  when 
he  saw  me  before  the  capitulation  was  signed,  I  ap- 
peared greatly  agitated,  but  that  afterwards  I  was  en- 
tirely composed.  And  yet,  as  major  Jessup  did  not 
see  me  in  the  fort  on  the  sixteenth,  till  after  the  nego- 
tiation was  commenced,  there  was  no  more  ground  for 
agitation  from  personal  fear,  when  he  saw  me  on  that 
day  previously  to  the  capitulation,  than  there  was 
after  that  event. 


106 


BSFENfEOP 


There  is  r  part  of  migor  Jessnp-s  tefltimoiqr,  wlii^ 
is  certalnl  J  worthy  of  remark.  His  power-of  j^id|^ 
of  the  liunian  passions  from  appearances  is  even^ivpe- 
riom*  to  nuyor  Spelling's)  beeause*  from  hk4eitinmqr* 
it  seems  he  can  perceive  the  appeuanees^  when  the 
object  is  at  some  disiiance.  He  states,  that  when  he 
and  Mr.  Dugan  saw  me  on  h<Mrseback,  on  the  fifteenth, 
I  appeared  to  be  frightened,  (me  of  them  said,  we  must 
«heer  him  ap;  we  then  approached  him,  says  the  wit- 
nesti,  and  spoke  to  him;  he  appeared  pale,  &e.  80 
that  they  had,  according  to  this  testimony,  pere^ved 
that  I  was  frig'titened,  while  t  was  <m  horseback,  ic 
the  face  of  the  enemy*^  fire,  and  before*  they-  had  i^ 
iiroached  me,  or  spoke  to  me.  a 


W!'. 


I  do  not  deny  that  on  the  nuMnii^  ef  thei^xteenth 
I  was  greatly  agitated.  My  body  was  wwn^th  fa- 
tigue, and  my  mind  was  filled  with  the  deepest  anxiety. 
On  the  one  hand,  I  well  knew  tibe  cimseqiKiBeM  of  a 
surrender.  I  knew  how  unfortuni^  it  was  for  my 
country,  that  I  should  be  obliged  to  yield.  X  saw  the 
consequences  to  myself,  I  knew  that  the  disappoint- 
ment  of  the  high  expectations  which  had  been  raised^ 
would  be  charged  to  me.  And  that  all  the  faults  of 
others,  to  which,  in  fact,  th»  failure  of  the  expedition 
was  owing,  would  be  laid  at  my  door.  I  saw  too, 
what  was  intended  to  be  the  effect  of  the  q>po8ition  of 
my  officers  to  a  measure,  they  knew  I  must,  or  would 
pursue.  In  proportion  as  they  fjund  me  decided  <m 
this  final  step,  they  became  insolent  in  their  opposi> 
tioo,  and  were  most  so  when  it  was  ascertained,  that 


'? 


c        •*w-' 


GENEll&Ii  HtJlji. 


1») 


Unopgr* 
lentiw 

henlie 
fteentb) 
fvemuft 
thewit- 
te.  80 
ircelved 
nek,  i& 
iMil  vp- 


witll-fc- 

icM  of  a 

►  for  my 
3L  saw  the 
sappoint- 
mraiscdy 

faults  of 
Kpedition 

•aw  too, 
osition  of 

or  would 
Bcided  <m 
ir  opposi- 

ned,  that 


thej  would  not  me«t  the  cneni]^,  and  could  not  be 
punished  by  me.  They  foresaw,  that  great  reputation 
was  to  be'purehased  at  so  cheap  a  rate,  al  appearing 
highly  averse  to  the  surrender,  and  afterward  pub- 
lishiQg  to  the  world  all  they  said  and  did,  as  evidence 
of  ^ny  criminality  and  tiieir  own  heroism. 

WLlle  all  these  considerations  enlisted  eVery  pri' 
vate  feeding  against  the  surrender;  my  mind  watf  agi- 
tated by  the  opposite  demands  of  duty.  The  dread- 
ful cop.&equence  of  unsuccessful  resistance,  or  indeed, 
of  any  thing  less  than  a  most  decisive  victory,  f  Hed 
my  thoughts.  Ic  ^he  midst  of  a  people,  among  whom 
I  had  lived  so  long,  as  to  be  known  to  almost  every 
inhabitant,  all  of  whom  looked  to  me  for  protection, 
and  many  of  whom  had  sought  safety  in  th^  fort;  I 
could  not  reflect  on  the  horroursof  a  general  massacre, 
which  would  have  been  the  consequence  of  a  defeat, 
without  emotion.  He,  who  in  such  a  situation,  could 
have  been  perfectly  tranquil,  whose  appearances 
should  have  discovered  no  agitation,  must  have  been 
either  less,  or  more  than  man.  He  must  have  been 
denied  the  sensibilities  common  to  our  nature,  or 
been  endowed  with  faculties  more  than  human. 

When  the  Court  considers  my  situation,  how  many 
c&j?«Hi  there  were  to  excite  strong  emotion,  will  they 
believe  ihat  the  witnesses,  who  have  testified  on  this 
point,  were  capable  of  such  diiscriminavion,  as  would 
enable  them  to  ascertain,  that  the  appearances  which 
they  have  described,  proceeded  from  personal  fear  ? 
18* 


^- 


fd8 


Bil^EN^  OP 


M i^or  S^elHiig  ^tofeHed  to  IhaVe  been  instructed  id 
this  branch  cf  scleii^e.  But  captain  Mac  Commick, 
who  wasiiotlntliefoiit  till  after  Findlay*s  regiment 
liid  inareli4d'in,' made  no  such  pretenBions.  He  ap^ 
peared  to  ftMnid  his  jtld^ment  on  his  5i»itural  instinct, 
and  indeed  he  did  right  not  to  make  a  claim,  vrhich 
was  beyond'  the  first  stage  of  civilization;  to  which 
iilik,  iiotwit!istanding  his  tawdry  regimentals,  it  was 
evii^nf  he  twlonged.  "^  0  r 

Several  or  the  witnesses  haVe  given  their  opinion 
6n  this  sul^ect,  with  less  confidence,  and  some  quali- 
ficati(Ais.  Colonel  Van  Horn  has  admitted  that  care 
teiiA  MJtia^  might  have  added  to  the  appearances 
which  he  descnttied.  His  belief,  however,  as  to  what 
related  to  personal  fdar,  ho  says,  he  formed  flrom  a 
cfnnpaHson  of  faces,  by  which  he  judged,  that  mine 
in^cat^  fear. 

■■">■-"''   .'y.      .,■      . 
%  •  • 

I  believe,  Bir,  that  in  the  comparison  of  counte- 
liances,  wheii  I  was  if.arrOunded  by  my  officers  at  the 
time  of  the  surrender,  a  vast  difference  might  have 
l^h  observed,  between  the  expression  of  [many  of 
tlieirs  and  mine.  If  my  countmiande  expressed  what 
I  felt,  it  must  have  shewn  traces  of  the  painfiul  anxiety 
by  which  I  had  been  oppressed,  >tnd  marks  of  tiie 
deepest  regret  for  the  measures  I  had  been  obliged  to 
pnreiie;  while  other  faces  might  perhaps  have  beamed 
with  the  exultation,  which  the  minds  of  some  can  feel, 
when  they  look  upon  what  they  may  think  a  fallen 
man*  '"^^  " 


GENERAL  HULL. 


199* 


Possibly,  there  mqic  have  been  aroand  me,  thoee 
ivho  felt,  and  whose  countenancei  expressed  a  joy, 
that  by  the  cap!  liil..iion,  th^  had  purchased  personal 
security,  and  avoided  a  bloody  contest,  at  the  expense, 
as  they  supposed,  of  my  character  and  honour. 

General  Taylor  also  concluded  from^«|  appear- 
ance that  I  was  under  the  influence  of  personal  fear. 
He  gived  you  the  grounds,  on  which  he  drew  hia 
conclusion.  They  are,  that  I  appeared  thoughtful, 
and  very  low  spirited; — ^that  my  countenance  was 
dull,  and  chat  he  saW  about  me  more  of  the  marks  of 
tobacco,  than  was  consistent  with  neatness.  Are 
these  grounds  which  will  warrant  a  conclusion,  that 
is  to  affect  the  ^ iTe  of  a  man  ?  As  to  what  has  been 
said  on  thiii  disgusting  sulgect  of  the  tobacco,  I  will 
dismiss  it  as  to  all  the  witnesses,  with  a  reference  to 
the  testimony  of  colonel  Miller,  who  proves,  that  I 
had  a  habit,  which  might  have  produced  all  the  ap- 
pearances, which  the  wt^-nesses  say  my  chewing  had 
produced.  It  is  known,  thi^  where  t^ere  is  a  habit 
of  using  tobacco,  it  is  commonly,  unconsciously,  taken 
,to  excess,  whenever  the  mind  is  much  occupied. 
Even  the  excitemait  that  some  of  the  witnesses,  who 
use  tobacco,  felt,  while  they  were  under  examination, 
deluged  this  floor  with  theik'  expectorations. 

I       - 

Major  Mimson  saw  me  in  the  fort,  fifteen  minutes 
after  the  officers  were  killed.  He  does  not  recollect, 
that  the  cannonade  tlien  continued ;  but  I  beg  the 
Court  to  remark,  t|)at  he  speaks  of  a  time,  to  which 


^t,i 


¥ 


»  1 


200 


DEFEKOE  OF 


the  testimony  of  many  of  the  oAoen  whobavA  spoken 
of  my  personal  appearance,  must  refer.  He  says,  he 
saw  nt^hing  which  might  not  have  been  accounted 
for,  without  resmting  to  the  supposition  of  personal 
fear. 

CapiyjIJAaxvell  did  not  see  me  <m  the  sixteenth, 
but  on  the  fifteenth  he  saw  me  in  a  situation,  where 
I  was  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy.  He  says  that 
I  was  collected  and  cool.  He  informs  you,  why  he 
was  induced  to  notice  my  appearance,  and  his  testi- 
mony is  of  some  importance,  because  it  shews,  that 
as  early  as  the  retreat  Ljm  Canada,  my  pfiicers  had 
begun  to  propagate  imputations  on  my  courage;  and 
because  his  testimony  must  relate  to  the  same  time, 
when  migor  Jessup  says,  he  saw  me  on  horseback, 
and  observed  such  strong  in^ations  of  fear.  If,  Sir, 
the  opinions  of  these  two  witnesses  are  in  opposition, 
the  Court  must  determine,  whether  they  will  rely  on 
the  veteran,  who  has  been  twenty-three  times  engaged 
with  the  enemies  of  his  country,  or  the  young  gentle- 
man who,  at  tilie  tiine  he  speaks  of,  was  about  twenty- 
five  years  of  age,  and  who  knew  no  more  of  battles, 
than  what  he  had  heard  or  learned  from  books.  The 
testimony  of  judge  Witherell,  wHo  was  a  revolutionary 
officer,  who  also  saw  me  on  the  evening  of  the  fifteenth, 
is  likewise  in  opposition  to  ihe  testimony  of  mi^or 
Jessup. 

Captain  Bac  an  says,  I  was  much  agitated  on  the 
morning  of  the  sixteenth,  but  that  he  had  no  suspicion 


.^rr; 


GENERAL  HULL. 


201 


it  was  perMoal  fear;  neither  did  he  hear  such  a  suspi- 
dOB  expressed  by  any  of  the  officers. 

Tiie  deposition  of  nuuor  Anderson,  I  have  not  been 
able  to  pvooure  in  time,  to  submit  to  my  counsel,  pre- 
vkmsly  to  my  defence  being  closed.  It  is  very  inn 
pcHrtant,  not  only  aa  it  respects  the  point  now  under 
consideration^  but  the  Court  vili  jind,  that  there  is 
a  great  variation  tbeiween  his  testimony,  and  that  of 
general  Mac  Arthur,  ixt  relation  to  the  fortification  at 
Sandwich,  but  aa  t  would  not  ask  another  postpone- 
ment of  the  Court,  for  the  sake  of  making  any  further 
QlNWB|rati(qi|s  on  thft  teirtimony  of  major  Anderson,  I 
must  reiyiqwiklhe  Court  to  examine  his  depoaition, 
apd^tOfSiva  hia  toatimony  ita^ua /freight. 

iiS^^  '.*■>',  ■  -      ■  ,,    ■     ■  .      ■  -  ■  - 

TlKve  are  acMiie  of  the  witnesses  who  have  given 
ftjuora  naked.  e|iinion^  that  I  was  under  the  influence 
of  p«nj»Qld  fiear^  without  assigning  any  reasons  for 
their  ofMnion,  whose  testimony  I  riiall  not  notice.  It 
is  impossible  it  can  have  any  influence  in  the  minds 
of  the  Court. 


^4 


'^ 


Mitfor  JesBup  said,  that  whether  the  sgitatitm  which 
he  described,  proceeded  from  the  novelty  of  my  situ* 
ation,  or  fear,  he  could  not  say,  but  he  believed  the 
latter,  if  not  both.  Captain  Baker  said,  he  was  of 
opinion,  that  I  was  under  the  influence  of  fear,  as  he 
could  not  account  for  the  surrender  in  any  other  way. 
This  explanation  of  captain  Baker  may  afford  a  key 
to  much  of  the  testimony  on  this  point.    He,  like 


202 


DEFENCE  OF 


manj  other  d*  the  ofiicen,  thought  the  surrender  un* 
nbcessaiy.  They  did  not  concern  themselves  with 
considerations  of  what  might  be  the  consequences  of 
resistance.  X^^y  therefore  saw  no  other  motive  for 
the  step  I  had  taken,  than  my  own  fears.  Tliey 
therefore,  when  questioned  on  tliis  point,  said,  they 
thought  I  was  under  the  influence  of  personal  fear, 
because  I  surrendered. 


(if 


I  beg  the  Court  to  note,  that  colonel  Miller^s  an- 
swer to  the  interrogatory  put  to  him  on  this  subject, 
is  to  the  same  effect,  although  he  was  stationed  in  the 
fort,  and  I  had  been  in  his  sight  wheoever  I  was  in 
tlMfcHres8,frem  the  commencementof  the  cannonade, 
till  the  surrender.  '  He  says,  he  saw  no  conduot  of 
mine,  which  might  ,not  have  proceeded  from  fatigue, 
and  the  responsibility  of.  my  situation,  and  that  he 
could  mention  no  act  of  mine,  which  he  did  then,  at 
does  now,  in^iute  to  personal  fear,  but  the  suiraider; 
and  "yet  colonel  Miller  had  better  opportunities  of  ob- 
serving me,  than  any  other  witness.  He  was  an  older, 
and  a  more  experienced  soldier,  than  aijy  who  have 
given  their  testimony ;  many  of  whom  heard  the  re- 
port of  an  enemy's  gun  for  the  first,  at  the  time  to 
which  their  testimony  rentes. 


■*:. 


■  If,  Gentlemen,  your  decision  upon  this  point  could 
rest  upon  the  weight  of  the  opinions  given  by  the 
witnesses  called  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  the  prepon- 
derance would  be  in  my  favour.  The  opinions  of 
colonel  Miller,  he  having  been  placed  in  a  situation 


^■,>--t-^,  ,|Mtij^»  HHIwwW—  «« 


GENERAL  HULL. 


203 


\^hic^  gave  him  such  superiour  advantages  for  con- 
tinual deliberate  observation,  must  deserve  more  re- 
spect, than  the  testimony  oT  all  the  inexperienced  aqd 
young  men,  who  only  saw  me  occasionally,  on  the 
morning  of  the  sixteenth,  and  who  have  attempted  to 
support  this  charge  by  their  opinions. 


80  far  as  any  of  the  witnesses  have  founded  their 
opinion,  that  I  was  under  the  influence  of  personal 
fear,  from  the  act  of  surrender,  as  is  the  case  with 
colonel  Miller,  and  captain  Baker,  and  others,  their 
testimony  can  have  no  weight.  The  Court  have  the 
same  opportunity  of  drawing  a  conclusion  from  that 
fact,  that  they  had.  I  have  endeavoured  to  satisfy 
the  Court,  that  that  act  was  justifiable,  or  at  least, 
that  I  had  strong  reasons  for  thinking  it'so,  and  if  this 
were  the  case,  it  cannot  be  made  the  ground  of  con- 
demnation, because  witnesses  may  have  made  it  the 
foundation  of  their  opinion  of  my  want  of  courage. 

-  But,  Gentlemen,  there  is  no  example  of  the  opinion 
of  witnesses  on  this  subject,  ever  having  been  re- 
ceived as  evidence  on  which  to  ground  a  conviction. 
Expressions  of  the  human*countenance,  and  the  man- 
ners of  men,  are  but  fallible  indications  of  the  work- 
ings of  the  human  mind.  The  difference  in  appear- 
ances, produced  by  the  excitements  of  different  pas- 
sions, are  too  subtle,  to  admit  of  observations,  from 
which  any  certain  conclusions  maybe  drawn— much 
depaids  upon  constitution,  and  often  much  upon  the 
temporary  physical  condition  of  the  body. 


ifj;j^<jjg:r;>V*E'rt>s-'r'" 


-^L_.^..  .  "^ 


i 


F 


* 


204 


DEFENCE  OP 


A  man,  worn  vrith  fatigue  df  body  or  mind,  and 
presied  with  a  thouMnd  dreadful  anxieties,  may, 
tliougii  on  the  point  of  Inevitable  destruction,  forget 
his  own  fate,  and  he  moved  only  by  the  condition  of 
those  around  him,  vrhile  the  superficial  observer 
would  impute  his  agitation  to  the  dread  of  death.  The 
uneducated  spectator,  who  has  not  been  taught,  as 
nii^or  Snelling  has  been,  the  indications  of  the  human 
passions,  would  most  probably  see,  in  the  countenance 
and  manner  of  the  Laocoon,  only  expressions  of  terror 
and  bodily  pain;  and  would  not  understand,  that  the 
artist  has  expressed,  in  the  countenance  and  convul* 
sive  agitation  of  a  dying  father,  agony  of  mind  ex- 
cited by  the  torture  of  his  expiring  children. 

There  never  has  been,  and  in  justice^  never  can 
be  a  conviction,  under  this  charge  of  cowardice,  but 
where  a  want  of  courage  is  indicated,  by  the  onUssicn, 
or  commission  of  some  act  in  violation  of  the  duty  of 
the  person,  against  whom  the  charge  is  made.   , 

I  shall  conclude  my  observations  upon  that  part  of 
the  evidence,  which  relates  to  my  personal  appear- 
ance, with  some  extracts  fVom  an  English  historian, 
who  gives  an  account  of  the  trial  of  Lord  George 
Sackville,  who  was  tried  for  misccmduct  at  the  battle 
of  Minden.  Dr.  Smollet  having  stated,  that  some 
testimony  was  given  to  prove,  that  when  certain  or- 
ders  were  delivered  to  Lord  George,  he  was  alarmed 
in  a  very  great  degree,  and  seemed  in  the  utmost 
confusion;  subjoins  remarksr  from  which  the  foUow- 


«, 


« / 


«i 


«^ 


\ 


tf 


i     f,l 


QIimili«  IVtX. 

kii  aie.titrMU*)  **  The  ««mM  raider  ivill  oTMrnielf 
**  dotormiae,  whetlMr  a  iiMii*t  htmi  it  to  be  JMtgeA 
*'  b7  aqy  ohuge  of  hk  wylwrfeii.  GnrnMag  laoh  m- 
"  change  to  have  happened,  whether  it  was  likely, 
**  that  an  oAcer,  who  Jiad  been  UMwe  than  once  in 
"  aetoal  lerriee,  and  behaved  without  leproaeh,  to  at 
*'  to  attain  an  eminent  rank  in  the  anny,  ilioald  ex- 
^  hibit  •ymptouM  of  fear  or  confuekMi,  when  in  reality 
^  there  was  no  appeaance  of  danger. 


(( 
<( 
(( 

u 
(( 
<( 
<( 
{« 

C( 

(i 


,*('  With  respect  to  the  impntation  of  eawitfdico  le- 
velled at  Lord  George,  by  the  unthinking  mnltif  ide^ 
and  circulated  with  such  industry  and  clanioar,  we 
ought  to  c<Mwider  it  as  a  mob  accusation,  which  the 
bravest  of  men,  even  the  great  Duke  of  Marlborough 
could  not  escape.  We  ought  io  view  it  as  a  dan- 
gerous, suspicion,  which  strikes. at  the  root  of  cha- 
racter, and  may  blast  that  honour  in  a  moment,^ 
which  the  soldier  has  acquired,  in  a  long  course  of 
painful  services,  and  at  the  continual  haxafd  of  his 
life.  We  ought  to  distrust  it  as  a  malignant  charge, 
altogether  inconsistent  with  the  former  conduct  of 
the  person  accused.** 


rif 


The  testimony  of  some  of  the  witneines  appears  io 
have  been  intended  to  prove,  that  I  manifested  a 
want  of  courage,  by  certain  acts  during  the  cannon- 
ade, as  well  on  the  fifteenth  as  on  the  sis  .c<'itb« 
These  are,  that  on  the  fifteenth,  I  dismounteik  and 
went  towards  the  fort,  when  a  shot  strack  a  house 
19 


2im 


0fir£NCB  em 


»i  Umik  »»oid«Aa  iheH  ^rlneb  ai^eajyd  to 
!»  »•■!  ag  iattt  th»  fert ;  and  tM  1  >Mii^M^  io  Ihe 
foit  ift  a  i^uB*  ef  leewBifyv  duriag  the  camanade. 


IfedoM  i^sear  Uy  nie»  Gmitieiiiea,  that  if  all  theie 
foctt  veie  ffinctfy  a»  tha  witnaMct  nvould  yaak  thtm 
to  appauv  th«]r  would  aot  si^ipart  angr  chaige. 


'•*'   i-a 


If  I  fiouod  myndf  aBDeQesawiijr  aspoaBd  to  tiba  shot 
ci  the  enemy  by  being  on  hwseback,  was  it  not  my 
da^to  disBWimt  ?.  Is  it  to  be  eoasidereda  deralwtion 
oi  dnlgr  kt  an  officer,  to  aaioid  the  ex{dosion  of  a  shell  ? 
Or  is  it  wyaBti^able  in  a  Gommanderf  wheB>  in  a  for- 
tress-that  is  bombarded^  to  pid  h&msetf  ia  a  place  of 
securitgr,  provided  he  be  in  such  sstoatiour  as  that  be 
may  give  his  orders,  and  perfimn  the  necessaiy  duty 
of  his  statk»  ?  Joining  from  what  I  have  seen,  of  ser- 
vice, withi  ite  bravest  mea  our  countiy  ever  pn> 
daced*  I  magr  venture  to  say,  that  tiia  Caiirt  would 
uiswer  ttiese  questions  iu  the  negate.  But  yet  I 
must  ask  the  patienoe  of  the  Court  while  I  give  the 
testimony  which  has  been  offered  oni  one  of  these 
p(dnt8,  (that  is  to  say,)  my  remaiidag  i»  flie  fMt,  and 
ray  situati(m  there,  a  slight  exandnatioa.  The  ethers 
I  do  not  tfahdcrHOTttiy  my  attanftiiBM. 

Mi||or  SaeHhigwenHiitotiia  fort  when  he  rotunied 
on  the  mondng  of  the  siacteenth  finm  Spriag  Wells. 
He  was  roused  from  a  repose,  alter  having  been  at  a 
post  all  night,  by  the  conuDMneemratiof  :Hie  umnon- 
ade.    He  remained  there  tlU  after  the  flag  went  out, 


•■,^,iV.>'-'' 


OffiSRJ^  mCL. 


20V 


^Inh  h6  vim  mai  t«4A  «iiIm«  M  cMmmI  ^•dtey's 
fvgiiiwiit.  ite  appMft  to  have  wttrwdi  toill»M 
i^nte)  vlMni  tto  ^ttttt'  ^Mnfl  'Ite  -ilfitiik  ^tiHotii9^vi9iit 
iiito<o«plafai  Dysett^  ^putenk  In  idiort,  ni(|or  SneH- 
iag-^fus  in  Uw  figirty^iMWMdiiig  'to  hb  aooMBt^^hlring 

■9»i  naliliiw  IMtMrlMnf^i  maMillnd  te,  wMi  Um  ex- 
ee|itloB,«f  a  Toy  idtoit  iirtwval  between  tl^  sending 
«r  tin  Iftg  wid  tfie  fml  sttrrender.  Kow,  daring  the 
time  of  the  cannonade,  mi^M  fitaicllingflairjme  stand- 
ing  bat  once.  His  memoijr  is  so  extremely  tenacioos 
«f  <^  minatost  «imMM>tences^  even  of  a  firlvirfiNis 
watoie,  liMt  lie  mVA  imiAf  tudxM  as.a  posiH^ity,  that  t 
tnay  tew  risen  twiee*    Tlie  words  of  mio^i'^iMUing 


M«4 


/ 


:v;.'  ■■"■'  "'^'  «^i^«s|^*  ■       ■   -  ■    .  :  ■    •     ■ 

4Mt «  During  tte  camnenade,  I  freqoently  sa:#  flie  Ck* 
**neral.  I  <mee  saw  liim  standing;  he  m%ht  have 
**  liien  twice  Jf  hmmk  of  tte  time  te  was  sitting  on  an 
«  old  t«nt,  onder  tte  MMlate^iif  tte  fMt,  opiposito  the 
^enemy^baiteries.'*  <*'  ' 


■W 


Wtetter  I  w«s  rtttittg  or  standing  in  (te  situation 
'whieli  oH^or  Sn^ing  detdibesyis  iaunateilal.  I 
Bhoold  teve  been  equaUy  safe  in  fitter  tMsition.  >  It 
Is,  tiierefore,  extraorffinaiy  tiutt  so  uninpiNrtant  a  cir- 
cnnutaHce  idioidd  teve  BMde  snoh  a  iavHng  impres- 
tion  on  Ids  Bdttd^ 


The  testunony,  lioweTer,  of  tte  other  witnesses 
called  by  ttie  lo^  Advocate  does  not  ai^ar  to  cor- 
respond with  tte  recollectiDn  of  mi^jor  Snelling. 


2M 


9BPfillCSO# 


:  \ 


■^ie 


'.0enfiS^  9riiy|or*i  testioioBy  it  certiioly  Wtfrtliy  fif 
immik-  H,anP«|in,  tiiijt  itiwuKli  miyor  SnelUag 
thmpglM»  HmtmgitaimBigtk  ^mMmm^r  coy^r  4]f.tlM 
pai&pet  of  tile  loKk  dudng  t\f9  paniMMiaiie  w^w  .«¥ideaee 
of  epDr|giHftBy  ^yet  ti^yir  Jiiyf^iiy,  Mi»<y»  it  feenw^ 
^ugh^'^  ^?«»M  JtiMSIp^to>«¥ji#ikiniiilffof^^t^  reiy 
iaiiM(r|ni(4«0Uiiii.  G«iieifd  TajiIok  #ar«»  be  ffkw  mar 
jor  Snelling,  asvWjeil  as  aamyjoih^t  of  the  ofllcon,  i9 
the  same  situation  that  I  generally  occupied)  during 

CaeMA  B«I(eri  si^ra,  <«  «|  4l|0  jo^faiBg  ofv  the  li^ 
"  teenth,  during  the  eann<Miade,  I  saw  ^  Ctonevalip 
"  the  f<Mt,  sometinMp  sittii^;,  sometimes  walking,  and 
"  sometimes  etmi^ogi'*  Colonel  AfiUer  also  states, 
that  I  ^was  sometimes  sitting,  semetiBMB  alaadiiii^,  a&d 
sf^mttinMs  walliliig* 


•H    *'t  .'«?!■/« 


m'Ar-  iiih-iHii% 


iemid«iiig»pi!tois4y  in  OM  sil)iatifmrdi|rii|g  t^^^^^ 
noDade»  if  I  bad  W Hv  MMltd  hy.  an  ,ipdue ..  regiwd 
to  personal  safi^il^  Fot  it  ^pipouoh  ^^  the  whole 
^^■ipteni  side  of  the  fort  was  as  secure  in  one  part  as 
;  another.'  .If  Uiere  w«fe  any  reas(Hia  for  giving  ptafior- 
M^e  to  tlie  spot ^iRhwe; the  witnesses  say  I  was. sit* 
.^g,  it  isj  that  it  was  new  the  gate,  a  situaticm  where 
I  could  easily  be  laund^  and.  where  it  was  most  conr 
renient,  as  cokmel  Miller  has  testified,  to  receive  re- 
ports, and  to  give  my  orders. 


.  From  tl4s  post,  I  had  the  whole  interiour  of  the 
fort  under  my  view,  and  could  communicate  my  or* 


OMEltAt  ttULL. 


209 


den  to  toy  part  Wu  I  not  then  in  &  pnpet  situa- 
tion for  a  commander?  Tlie  Court  will  recollect, 
that  colonel  Miller  states^  that  he  biliMelf  Krasftime^ 
times  with  me,  while  I  was  in  the  place  the  witnesses 
have  described.  And  the  fact  is,  that  eveij  ofBceir 
in  the  fort  placed  himself  under  tihe  protection  of  the 
eastern  parapet,  when  hb  duty  did  not  require  that  he 
should  be  in  a  more  exposed  situation. 


r 


But  it  has  been  attempted  to  prove,  that  I  remained 
in  the  fort,  and  took  no  measures,  and  issued  no  co- 
ders for  a  disposition  of  the  troops,  after  the  cannon- 
ade  commenced. 


Mi^or  Jessup  states,  that  shortly  after  the  answer 
had  been  returned  to  the  British  summons  on  the  fif- 
teenth, he  met  me  on  horseback,  and  that  I  then  gave 
him  directions  tor  the  disposition  which  was  to  be 
made  of  tiie  troops,  for  thd  defence  of  the  town.  It 
is  also  proved  by  the  testimony  of  nuyor  Jessup,  that 
itttibto  evening  of  the  fifteenth,  I  was  on  horseback, 
visiting  the  batteries  while  the  cannonade  continued. 

Mi^r  Monson  met  me  on  the  same  evening  on 
horseback,  when  I  was  visiting  the  posts.  Migor 
Jessup  said,  he  msi  me  on  the  night  of  the  fifteenth, 
at  about  midnight,  at  the  position  which  colonel  Find- 
lay's  corps  had  taken  up  for  that  night  I  was  also, 
as  he  testifies,  at  his  quarters  about  day  break  on  the 
morning  of  the  sixteenth,  while  he  was  writing  by- 
candle  light,  and  gave  him  directions  to  despatch  an 
10* 


210 


DEFENCE  OF 


order  for  colonels  Mac  Artlmr  and  Casiu.  And  cap* 
tain  Mac  Commick  testitteft,  that  he  saw  me  r  x  hone- 
i»ack  at  the  time  on  which  the  troops  were  formed,  a 
short  time  be^ire  the  firing  ceased.  Several  other 
witnesses  proved  tibat  they  saw  me  out  of  the  fort  at 
several  times,  as  mAl  on  the  fifteenth,  as  the  sixteenth. 
What  fonnda*?  nd  is  there,  therefore,  for  the  charge, 
that  during  ti^e  i"hole  .time  of  the  cannonade  I  took 
shelter  in  th    fo^ '  i 


M^jor  Snelling's  testimony  is  so  important,  as  to 
my  personal  appearance,  that  I  cannot  but  direct  the 
attention  fX  the  Court  to  any  circumstance  in  his  tes- 
timony on  any  other  point,  which  i  think  may  de- 
velop the  leqpirit  or  disposition  with  which  he  has 
testified.  With  this  view,  I  beg  the  Court  to  notice, 
that  nuyor  Snelling  has  testUled,  that  when  he  re- 
turned from  the  Spring  Wells,  on  the  morning  of  the 
sixteenth,  at  dawn  of  day,  he  went  into  the  fort  to 
make  his  repwt  to  me.  *'  But,''  says  the  mi^or,  **  I 
"could  not  find  the  General,. nor , find  any  one  wbp 
"  knew  where  he  was."  It  has  been,  proved  by  other 
witnesses,  that  I  was  out  of  the  fort  at  that  time. 
Now,  when  ms^or  Snelling  could  not  find  me  in  the 
fwt,  nor  find  any  body  that  knew  I  was  thore,.  it 
seems  to  me,  he  might  have  ventured  to  say,  I  was 
not  inthefiNTt  at  tiiai  time.  1  do  think,  he  ha^  at 
leaiit  as  good  groynds  to  draw  tl^at  .conclusion,  as  lie 
had  to. infer,  that  I  was  under  personal  fear,  from  the 
appearances  be  observed.  Miyor  Snelling  does,  in  a 
snbiequent  part  of  his  examination,  say,  that  I  was 


aSl^ERAL  RULt. 


211 


out  6f  the  fort  early  thai  moming.  But  whether  this 
refers  to  the  time  when- he  made  his  report  or  not,  I 
do  not  know. 

I  have  now,  Gentlemen,  done  with  this  charge,  so 
far  as  it  respects  my  personal  appearance  and  deport- 
ment You,  who  I  am  to  presume,  and  do  believ) 
are  brave  and  honourable  men,  will  judge  of  what  I 
must  have  suffered,  to  have  sat  here  day  after  day, 
listening  to  imputations,  of  all  others  the  most  wound- 
ing to  the  feelings  of  a  soldieir ;  to  have  these  impu- 
tations cast  upon  me,  by  representations  intenided  to 
nu^e  .me  appear  abjectly  and  disgustingly  base;  to 
be  obliged  to  hear  my  name  and  fame  polluted  by  the 
testimony  which  has  been  given ;  to  be  obliged  to 
repeat  the  language  of  the  witnesses  in  my  defence, 
arqin  themselves  punishments  hardly  inferiour  to  that, 
which  would  be  the  consequence  of  your  pronounc- 
ing me  guilty.  But,  Gentlemen,  <^  that,  upon  this 
charge-  of  cowardice,  I  am  bold  to  say  I  have  no 
dread. 

I  have  fought  more  battles,  than  many  of  the  young 
men  who  have  inqieacbed  me  of  this  crime,  have 
numbered  years.  .;* 

.  I  appeal  to  the  history  that  bears  record  of  those 
who  were  engaged  in  the  bloody  contests  for  our 
liberties.  There  you  shall  often  find  my  tumey  but 
not  Mil  coward! 


I 


sv 


212 


BEPENOB  OF 


I  have  IwcMBght  befiora  you  tlie  iettf  jnony  of  the  feir 
who  remain  of  tlioie,  who  were  my  eompankmB  in 
arnit,  in  timet  that  tried  men's  soub.  Do  they  say 
I  am  a  coward? 

« 

I  inyoke  the  epirits  of  the  departed  hemeti,  i^ho 
have  died  at  my  9ide  by  the  sword  of  the  enemy,  to 
say  if  I  aiiik  a  co\rard! 

I  would  call  the  sibades  of  Oates,  Wayne,  Svlouyler, 
and  of  Washington,  $:o  tell  you  how  often  they  have 
ted  me  to  battle,  and  to  say  if  they  found  me  a  cowitrd. 

Wi!!  yon  believe,  that  the  Bpiri'%  which  b^s  s<i 
■iSS.^\\  prompted  me  to  risk  my  life  for  m^  couaitry, 
8hi>utM  n'^^>\^ir  so  far  have  forsaiten  me,  as  that  I  sh(Ndd 
have:  i^e'^dme  a  trdUnr  voA.  a  coward  ? 

Will  you  believe,  tliat  the  years  in  ^liieh  I  have 
grown  gny  in  my  countiy's  service,  siumld  so  far 
iiave  changed'  my  nature,  as  that  I  could  have  been 
the  base  and  atgect  thing  my  enemies  have  repre* 
sented? 

No,  Gent*:men,  that  blood  which  animated  m^ 
youth,  age  has  not  chilled.  I  at  this  mraient  feel  its 
influence,  and  it  makes  me  dare  to  say,  that  no  man 
ever  did,  or  can  think  me  a  coward. 

Before  I  conclude,  permit  me  to  say  a  few  words. 
It  may  be  thought,  that  I  have  spoken  of  the  officers 


«*. 


mim9<^*'' 


/  / 


OSNfiRAL  HWLt/ 


213 


Who  bar*  been  wHneiaeB  againil  me*  with  too  nmch 
asperitjr.  They  have,  in  my  opinion,  forfeited  all 
elainu  to  my  respect;  but  I  do  not  mean  to  charge 
any  of  them  with  wilful  peijuiy.  I  beUe^e  they  liaTe 
imbibed  a  pr^udice  and  bias  against  me,  wliich  has 
influenced  the  pwceptt(»s  of  thek  own  minds. 


i;**-^- 


My  ol^ect,  by  the  examinati<m  I  have  ^ven  their 
testimony,  has  been  to  make  that  bias  and  pr^dice 
appear  to  you.  Many  of  them  ue  yoimg  men,  who 
give  their  country  great  promise.  Many  of  tliem,  I 
beiieTe,  have  good  hearts ;  and  Such  I  know  will  one 
day  regret,  that  they  should  have  yielded  to  an  in- 
fluence, which  has  induced  them  to  represent  me  in 
cohNVs  that  they  will  be  conscious  I  have  not  de- 
served. I  know  the  time  will  come^  when  they  will 
consider  how  they  courted  my  favour  when  I  was  in 
power,  and  how  they  treated  me  when  they  thought 
.  I  was  in  d  *giace,  and  saw  roe  in  adversity. 

W^n  that  fame  cmnes,  as  come  I  am  sure  it  will, 
let  it  be  a  consolation  to  them  to  know,  that  what- 
ever may  be  my  fate,  I  pity  and  from  my  heart  for- 
give them. 


I  have  now.  Gentlemen,  concluded  my  ditfeM 
I  have  noticed  every  accusation  which  the  Judge 
Advocate,  in  the  opening  of  the  cause,  mentioned  as 
those  which  he  should  rely  upon,  and  which  he  ex- 
pected to  maintain. 


'  ; 


m 


i2M 


DEFEKCfi  OF 


.    I  h«n  Mi  left,  u  I  beMifygi  wmf  fwrt  •€  the  sped- 
AealioM  to  whish  My  tetUoMNiy  wbatoTer  wm  oflb^ 


AlkMrnw,  itr.  PmMent,  mmI  OenUemen of  Mm 
Court,  ffith  Am  nKwt  JmcbMbIC  Miirifalllty  to  Ntom 
jrooriny  lineere  thankm  for  the  niMuier  in  whtoh  this 
trid  hM  beeii«oiidaetod.  For  tboagb,  m  I  tanibly 
coBcilve,  there  hM  beea  mum  departore  fipon  aocos- 
tomdl  finrnu,  id  refpoet  to  the  tamfawlkmof  nit* 
/WMw,  I  luMm  that  the  0«nt  haa  hem  fovemed  Iqr 
B0tUi^(  but  its  own  aeaae  of  peapito^. 

The  eondnct  of  the  memhen  of  thia  Court,  and  of 
the  Jndge  Adiroeetet,  has  been  aneh  aa  I  Fiad  antici- 
pated; end  eveiy  ibia^  that  I  eoadd  expect  flmn 
hoBoiiraUe,  imputial,  and  hwnane  nen. 

Wliaterer  may  be  the  sentence,  I  shaH  always 
*  with  gratitude  acknowledge  tliat  I  liaye  had  a  fair, 
candid,  and  patient  hearing.  I  do  feel  n^seif  bound 
to  nuke  partieolar  acknowifigBientB  to  the  qiecial 
Judge  Advocate,  for  tlM  delicfifty  ■*(!  propriety  of 
hk|fl|pportment  towards  me,  and  tisoogh  I  may  fee! 
tiilplorce  of  the  talents  with  which  he  has  ctMiduoted 
this  pposecutioii,  it  shall  not  make  me  forget  what  I 
owe  to  his  humanity'  and  liberality. 

Gentlemen,  my  life  is  in  your  hands.  But  yon  are 
guardians  of  what  is  more  dear  to  me;  you  are  the 
guardians  of  my  honour !  with  yon  in  sacred  deposite 


:)if. 


■A 


GBKISRAL  HCTLL. 


215 


is  that  iwoid,  which  lias  heen  my  eompanioii  in  timei 
tliat  might  Imyc  appalled  the  weali  hearted.  It 
has  be^n  ti^en  ftom  me,  till  you  shall  proiMNmae 
ttiat  I  am  iM<  miworthy  to  wear  it  I  feel,  that  in 
justice,  I  vofj  demand  it  of  you.  And  when  I  shall 
receive  it  at  yonr  hands,  believe  me,  that  here  is  yet 
enough  of  heart  and  life,  and  in  this  arm  is  yet  nerve 
enough,  to  draw  it  in  vindication  of  niy  country's 
rights.  If  1  should  receive  it,  imtarviuftfif  by  your 
judgment,  I  may  yet  live,  to  prov9  by  my  future,  as 
Well  as  by  my  nast  conduct,  how  I  have  been  cakmh 
,niakdy  and  the  justkit  eS  your  witmee.  '^7 


h 


■mr: 


'■•r, 


K7'^^'■■^.^t_.^ 


:s  --^-A^' 


>^r'-^''-'jii,i^f'' 


